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THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE IN THE SEVENTIES

Détente: Europe—USA—USSR

Karl Kaiser
Richard Pipes
Paul Seabury
Pierre Hassner

Soviet Foreign Policy

Vernon V. Aspaturian
Alexander Dallin
Arnold L. Horelick
Wolfgang Panofsky
Morton Schwartz
Richard F. Staar
William Zimmerman
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Jan F. Triska
Benjamin Zook

Czechoslovakia Today

Ota Sik
George Moldau

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Editorial Office

Ilford House, 133 Oxford Street, London W1R 1TD (Tel. 01–734–0592)

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The International Scene in the Seventies

Leopold Labedz

The present issue of SURVEY is devoted to analysis of the international balance of power and its prospects in the current decade. In an introduction to a similar issue of SURVEY (January 1966) on 'Foreign Policy in a Polycentric World', I wrote:

> 'For twenty years, or almost twenty, the realities of the Cold War looked very much the same in essence as when they dawned on a world expecting post-war cooperation between the Allies, a world which instead got Soviet expansion, bellicose pressures and peace offensives. Now that the new factors are emerging and are widely recognised as such (polycentrism, multilateral balance of power, etc.), there is no agreement about their significance, and not unexpectedly a plethora of interpretations.'

This is still true today, as can be seen from the contributions to this issue. In the earlier issue Raymond Aron wrote that:

> 'this world of growing complexity promises to be a paradise for the analysts and a hell for statesmen. In it the first can display their ingenuity and the second will discover the limits of their power.'

Today, Henry Kissinger himself illustrates both predictions. Seven years later (and twenty years after Stalin's death) we can see more clearly the limitations of the polycentric tendencies and discern more easily the basic characteristics of the contemporary scene behind all the changes in the international situation.

These changes have been recognized by all protagonists, large and small, explicitly by the United States in the Nixon Doctrine, implicitly in the policies of the Soviet Union and China towards each other, the USA and the rest of the world.

THE Nixon Doctrine is not just an intellectual construction postulating 'a lower profile' and the transition to a 'pentagonal world'; it is in the first place a result of the contraction of US power in the world. This diminished position has been indicated externally by the arrival of nuclear parity with the USSR, the withdrawal from Vietnam, the dollar troubles, and internally by the weakening of its political stand due to the rise of the New Left, 'new politics' and neo-isolationist tendencies. Georgy Arbatov presented his view of these developments in *Kommunist* (No. 3, 1973):

> 'In recent years . . . [the USA had to face many] economic problems, in particular, inflation and unemployment, balance of power deficits, the undermining of the dollar position and

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> difficulties in the world market. There were also complex social problems: poverty in the richest capitalist country, severe oppression of the US black population, the crisis and decline of big towns, an appalling rise in crime, decline of morals, rejections of bourgeois " values " by the young generation and, finally, ecological problems produced by a rapacious attitude towards nature. The aggravation of all these problems and the resulting intensification of the class struggle by workers and democratic movements have had a serious influence on opinions of a considerable part of the American public on foreign policy.'

Arbatov drew the conclusion:

> ' Recent international developments, including those which relate to Soviet-US relations demonstrate that the change in the correlation of forces is not some abstract formula, but a tangible reality which makes it possible to achieve great and positive changes in the international situation. . . . There can be no doubt that any changes in favour of imperialism would have brought about not a dètente, but an increase in tensions and would have stimulated agressive tendencies. The change in the balance of power in favour of socialism has on the contrary served to strengthen the cause of peace and international security.'

Arbatov quoted Kissinger as saying that ' it is getting more and more difficult to translate military power into political influence ', but this observation was applied only to the United States and not to the Soviet Union. In his analysis of Soviet-American relations he did not even mention China, although it is perfectly clear that it is the growth in the power of the USSR which is the real motive for the Sino-American *rapprochement*. The consequences of this development are far from welcome to the Soviet Union, for quite possibly they more than outweigh its previously accumulated advantages.

WHEN in 1958 the Russians refused to give full support to the Chinese during the Quemoy crisis, a major aggravation of the Sino-Soviet relations was precipitated. Eleven years later, the Sino-Soviet conflict had become such an important factor in shaping the attitudes of the protagonists that it led to a basic reorientation of Chinese foreign policy.

In China the Soviet Union is now regarded as enemy number one. In the editorial published on the National Day in *People's Daily, Red Flag* and *Army Liberation Daily* (1 October 1972), it was stated that the Soviet Union ' is even more deceitful than old-line imperialist countries and therefore more dangerous '. Commenting on the Kissinger visit to Peking, the Polish official *Trybuna Ludu* (24 February 1973) wrote that ' Chinese hostility is directed exclusively to the north '. The Soviet press is no less emphatic. *Problemy Dalnego Vostoka* (No. 3, 1973) stressed that ' Maoists manoeuvre and change their tactics, but their strategic goals remain unchanged '. An article in *Voprosy Filosofii*

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(No. 2, 1973) still referred to the American perception of these goals as consisting of an attempt 'first of all to liquidate the American military presence' in Asia and to prevent its replacement by a Japanese (or any other) military presence. But *Pravda* (5 March, 1973) was more up to date: it has now discovered that the Chinese leadership is interested in the preservation of the United States' military potential in Asia. No doubt Soviet leaders are aware of such facts as those reported first by the Japanese press and then by John Gittings in *The Guardian* (14 February 1973):

> 'In his talks with the Japanese politicians from the Liberal-Democratic Party, Chou En-lai gave a warning that the Vietnamese cease-fire would not bring peace to Asia as long as the Soviet Union was trying to "dominate the area". Chou also told the Japanese that he understood Tokyo's need to stay under the umbrella of the Security Treaty with the US, in the light of its relations with the Soviet Union.'

It is not surprising that ever since the Sino-Soviet split came into the open, there has never been more anger and fury in the Soviet press about China than at the present time. The number of articles and books dealing with that country already constitute a library. They are no longer devoted solely to ideological disputes, but also address themselves to an analysis of Chinese policies and objectives.

It is of course easier now than it was formerly for Soviet commentators to score points in their ideological polemics by pointing to the contrast between the past revolutionary fundamentalism of the Chinese and their policies since they started their ping-pong diplomacy. But that is a poor consolation. Soviet leaders have by now been forced to recognize the protracted character of the Sino-Soviet conflict and its historical importance. Nor can they fail to recognise that China has emerged successfully from its international isolation and, at least temporarily, from the internal instability of the Cultural Revolution period. They would not admit that it was their own military posture and their hints of nuclear action which must have contributed substantially to the shift in Chinese policies, but they certainly grasp its international consequences. Their relevance for the 'American imperialists' is clearly stated in another outspoken Polish comment on Kissinger's trip to Peking in February (*Polityka,* 3 March 1973):

> 'In the calculations of American politicians the tension and the degree of mutual suspicion should be greater between Peking and Moscow than between Peking and Washington and between Moscow and Washington. Such a situation would be almost ideal for the United States. On the one hand it should guarantee that there will be no military confrontation between the great powers; on the other, it should put the US into a tipping position as the power which has better relations with the other two partners than they can have with each other. American actions would of course have been pointless but for the attitude of the Chinese leaders who

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> provided the Washington policy planners with an opportunity to work out their doctrines. Their attitude is shaped by two basic elements: the anti-Soviet passion which undoubtedly nourishes all Washington's hopes and the new concept, elaborated in the last three or four years, of China's role and position in the contemporary world . . . Until 1969 Chinese foreign policy doctrine was based on the premise that Peking is the centre of world revolution and Maoist China the spokesman of all revolutionary and liberation movements throughout the world. This doctrine has now in fact been abandoned and replaced by a new one which asserts that China is a great power, equal in status to the other great powers, and that it should have a voice in all important contemporary issues. China wants to promote its own ideas on such international questions as disarmament, trade, state treaties etc. It is obvious that this doctrine serves the nationalist interests of China and not those of the world revolution, as Peking claimed only a few years ago.'

Disregarding the ideological framework in which what is a virtue for the Russians is a sin for the Chinese, this is quite a realistic perception of the present situation. The Chinese have indeed shifted their polemics to another plane since they re-oriented their policy. Now they are concerned with state relations rather than with party relations: they refer to the 'excellent international situation' rather than to the 'excellent revolutionary situation' in the world. But although most of the Chinese polemics are at present more concerned with foreign policy matters than with ideological disquisitions, their tone is no less hostile to and critical of Soviet actions, internal and external, from agricultural failures to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. No less indicative is the fact that the most damning charge against the victims of the Chinese purges was in every case based on their alleged contacts with the Soviet Union: these were invoked against Kao Kang, Peng Teh-huai, Liu Shao-chi and, most recently, against Lin Piao.

THE change in Chinese policy towards the USA was fundamentally a response to Peking's perception of the Soviet threat, but Soviet global policy is not just a function of the clash with China. The strategic and political relationship with the United States remains a central factor. 'To catch up with and overtake the United States' has been a predominant note in fifty years of Soviet history. It is ironical that the Soviet Union achieved nuclear parity with the USA at a time when 'it is more and more difficult to translate military power into political influence'. For a super-power the central strategic balance must remain nuclear, but nuclear weapons work to consolidate rather than to change it. They remain important as a deterrent in the background and a guarantee that in a local crisis a super-power will not have to back down, but they cannot be used in a political struggle. A nuclear confrontation in a crisis carries the risk of escalation. Aware-

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ness of this creates a common interest in reducing the risks. However, the US-Soviet nuclear agreements, from the Test Ban Treaty to Salt I, do not eliminate political antagonism between the two powers. Arbatov made it clear in his article:

> 'No matter how successfully the process of normalisation and of *détente* may develop, relations with the United States and other capitalist countries will remain essentially based on struggle. As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized, the CPSU has always maintained that in the fields of economics, politics and ideology the class struggle of the capitalist and socialist systems will continue. It cannot be otherwise because the ideology and class purposes of socialism and of capitalism are contrary and irreconcilable. But we will try to channel this historically inevitable struggle in such a way that it will not threaten wars, dangerous conflicts and an uncontrolled arms race. This would be a great gain for peace for all the people of the world, for all states. Therefore the question is not whether there will or will not be a struggle between the two systems. It is historically inevitable. The question is in what forms will this struggle be fought?'

In his book on *Ideological Struggle in Contemporary International Relations*, Arbatov explained in greater detail his concept of peaceful coexistence as 'a strategic principle of the revolutionary struggle'. The reviewer of this book in the Polish Party theoretical journal, *Nowe Drogi* (No. 2, 1973) complained, however, that he 'has not shown in his work what the connexion is between the Leninist theory of revolution and the concept of peaceful coexistence'. This is, of course, the crux of the matter. But if the strategy of peaceful coexistence is to be successful this connexion cannot be made too explicit.

IT has been obvious for a long time that in a nuclear age the Clausewitz dictum on war being the continuation of politics by other means, a dictum so admired by Lenin, has been made obsolete because direct military action between super-powers would be mutually suicidal. While this has not rendered the nuclear balance irrelevant for the conflict, it has restricted the field of direct action to other forms of struggle—political, economic, psychological. This truism has been better understood in the East than in the West where, ever since the emergence of the containment policy, there has been a tendency to think of East-West conflict only in military terms. Post-war developments have amply demonstrated that military power is not a sufficient condition for political success, although lack of military power may be a sufficient condition not only for military but also for political failure.

In the present world situation it is clear that the central military balance still remains bilateral, so long as China is not yet a fully-fledged nuclear power, while the political balance has become multilateral. In this situation it may be imperative, but not sufficient, for the United

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States and the Soviet Union to maintain the central military balance. It may not be sufficient because unless they are able to influence the political balance in their own favour, the overall balance may swing against either of them.

The means used to influence this balance differ. The Soviet Union has simultaneously increased its military might and engaged in a politics of *détente* in the West; it has continued its military build-up on the Chinese frontier (without decreasing its forces in Europe). According to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Soviet Union was spending in 1970 an estimated 65 billion dollars on defence (as against 78 billion by the USA). The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated that the USSR is spending 11 per cent of its GNP on defence, China 9·5 per cent and the USA 7·8 per cent. European expenditures on defence are lower (UK—4·9 per cent, France—4 per cent), but the European members of Nato are planning an increase of 1·5 billion dollars in this expenditure for 1973. China has made great progress in its long march towards nuclear status, moving from atomic to thermonuclear tests in a shorter time than any of the other four nuclear powers and two and a half years before the date predicted by most Western experts. But it has lagged behind in developing its operational missile system. Until it achieves full nuclear status, China needs to counter Soviet superiority by a *rapprochement* with America, to supplement its strategy of passive defence and ' people's war '. As the United States also needs a counter-balance to the Soviet Union, there is at present a coincidence of interests between the two countries. But this coincidence is predicated upon the continuation of the Sino-Soviet conflict and of relative Chinese weakness. At the moment the triangular balance is being worked out in Asia, where the Soviet Union, despite its spectacular military ascendancy, is politically blocked because of its conflict with China and its continuing adversary relationship with America, and because it can only expect Japanese neutrality and has little chance of bringing Japan to its side. Nor can it exploit its nuclear superiority to prevent China's emergence as a fully-fledged nuclear power: a pre-emptive strike against Chinese nuclear installations would embroil the Soviet Union in a never-ending ' people's war ' in Asia.

DOES this mean that with the stalemate in Asia and *détente* in the West, the international situation is indeed excellent, as the Chinese say, that the global balance has been stabilized, thus providing conditions for a evolution towards peace institutionalized on the basis of the gradually accepted rules of the nuclear game which would present the twentieth century version of the Metternichian concert of powers? Or that the three super-powers will coexist, not in the Orwellian world where ' war is peace ', but in the post-Clausewitzian world where for

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reasons of self-preservation struggles in the nuclear age are carried on ' by other means ' ?

History rarely fulfills schematic expectations. The pentagonal world is a political fiction, for neither Europe nor Japan can yet play the autonomous role ascribed to them. The Soviet Union, China and the USA are all separated by deep ideological chasms; there is no principle of legitimacy to unite them, as legitimism united the Holy Alliance, only fear of assured mutual destruction. Until such time when the new ' rules of the game ' will diminish the danger of mutual nuclear suicide, no power can contemplate with equanimity the political consequences of a nuclear threat. *Détente* in Europe is taking place at a time when the Soviet Union is simultaneously increasing its military might and tightening its internal controls. It has been aptly described by Malcolm Mackintosh as ' a newly arrived super-power, flexing its muscles, experimenting and probing and carrying out an active foreign policy '. What are the risks for Europe in a *détente* which coincides with American contraction and Soviet ascendancy? How lasting will it be? Has the Soviet Union actually become defensive, or at least status quo—oriented, as Richard Lowenthal believes? Perhaps the best way to unravel the foreign policy prospects of the three autonomous powers is not to engage in a necessarily inconclusive discussion about their evolution, but to look at their international and internal vulnerabilities and to visualise what they must try to avoid.

From this angle it is possible to see things better and to make more definite diagnoses. It is, in fact, quite clear what would at present be the worst foreign policy nightmares for these three powers:

For the Soviet Union—to face an ascending nuclear China and a unified Western Europe, both backed by the Americans and the Japanese.

For China—to face single-handed an ascending Soviet Union, no longer having a second front in a Europe which has failed to unite and fill the power vacuum created by an American withdrawal into ' fortress America ', while Japan has become politically neutral and economically supports the Soviet Union.

For the United States—to see the ending of the Sino-Soviet conflict and the falling of Western Europe under Soviet political influence, reduced to the role of a peninsula of the great Soviet Asian land mass, not only geographically, but also politically and culturally.

These are the situations which each of the three powers must try to avoid. But what is common to these foreign policy nightmares of the three respective powers is the crucial role which the fate of Europe plays in all of them.

The logic of this political situation implies that the Soviet Union, facing the Asian deadlock and unable to prevent the rise of China on its eastern flank, will try at least to prevent the growth of Europe on its western flank. The consolidation of its position in Eastern Europe, the

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creation of conditions which would frustrate the unification of Western Europe and facilitate American withdrawal from it are more likely to result from *détente* than from the kind of Soviet policy which once led to German re-armament and recently to Chinese rapprochement with the United States. The chances of the Soviet Union achieving all three objectives are not too bright, not only because they are inherently difficult, but also because the achievement of one objective may make more difficult the achievement of the others. In the long run the Soviet Union is more vulnerable than the other two powers. Its geopolitical position, with direct confrontation with China along the long frontier is worse than the American one 'beyond the blue water'. Internally, it is not homogenous like China, but it has the problem of the possible dissatisfaction of Soviet national minorities and the ever-present possibility of the reassertion of the tendencies towards national revolt in countries of Eastern Europe under Soviet domination. It is also the only one among the great powers facing territorial demands by other countries, Russian and Soviet acquisitions are still a political issue.

China in conflict with the Soviet Union is obviously interested in the preservation of the Soviet western flank, if only to avoid the transfer of Soviet divisions to its frontier, but also for other reasons. In the long run, when it acquires a more effective nuclear capability its need for the American connexion may disappear, but even when it can pursue a more equidistant policy in the triangle than it does now, it will still want to deal with the 'intermediate zone': Western Europe providing a useful counter to its great Soviet rival. For all these reasons China is interested in the West European connexion and it is understandable why it has denounced the Helsinki conference, encouraged the West European scepticism about it and supported the European Community and the increase in defence spending by the European members of Nato.

The USA is interested in some limitation of the development of strategic weapons, in the reduction of tensions and in a more regular relationship with the Soviet Union, but unless the neo-isolationist tendency becomes dominant in American foreign policy, it should be no less interested in preventing the balance of power shifting against itself. It can influence the Chinese only so long as the Chinese want it themselves. American policy contributed only indirectly to the development of the Sino-Soviet conflict and it cannot do much to help maintain it, except go on assuring that it wants to be on good terms with everybody. However, the roots of the Sino-Soviet conflict are so deep that it is not likely to cease regardless of what the United States may or may not do. If the internal cohesion of China survives Mao, the Soviet Union will not be able to do much about it either. It is in Europe, however, that American foreign policy will eventually face its greatest test, because it is only in Europe that a major shift in the international balance of power may occur. To promote a *détente* in Europe

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is desirable, even though in Western terms the Soviet Union tries to make it almost meaningless, provided that the fundamental issues are not befuddled and the illusions inevitably generated will not boomerang on the ability of the West to maintain its cultural identity and the balance of power in Europe.

IT is in Europe that the outcome of the conflict between the Soviet Union and the West will be decided. It may continue for a long time, but it can eventually either reach the point where Western Europe will start sliding under Soviet political influence or the point where it will begin reasserting its wider historical and cultural unity. Political evolution of Western Europe, however gradual, towards some form of unification is a necessary pre-condition of the recovery of the whole of Europe. Europe will be lost both culturally and politically if it finds no reserves of political will to seize the opportunities and to avoid the risks of *détente*. Otherwise 'Finlandization' of Western Europe will begin in Helsinki. Western Europe still remains the highest strategic and economic prize in the quarter century of post-war conflict. The preservation of liberty there will probably also decide in the long run whether it will be preserved in the United States.

This concern may seem superfluous at the time of *détente*, but in the longer perspective it may be a very important one. Historically, the outcome will depend on the cultural cohesion, persistence and the strength of political will generated in the West by the challenges of the polycentric era. Unfortunately, disturbing signs are increasingly appearing. Among them, the emergence of American-European economic tensions is particularly dangerous. What J. Robert Schaetzel called 'the dialogue of the deaf across the Atlantic' is becoming too frequent for the health of either Europe or the USA. Not only conflicts of interest but, frequently, their treatment on both sides of the Atlantic, aggravates the problem. The economic nationalism of American politicians like John Connally is matched by the political complacence of European politicians like Georges Pompidou. The neo-isolationist tendencies reborn in the United States can be matched by the neutralist tendencies reborn in Europe. Senator Mansfield is convinced that 'the Soviet Union will pull back from Eastern Europe as soon as the US withdraws from Western Europe' and that 'the ordinary people of Europe' want the Americans out (*Time*, 19 March, 1973). He is wrong on both counts. As Arrigo Levi said, there is in Europe a fundamental fear that for the second consecutive time, the US will draw wrong lessons from history. 'It applied lessons learned in Europe in the forties and fifties to Asia and found to its dismay Asia was not Europe. To extract itself from the Asian mistake, it had to play a balance-of-power manoeuvre. The fear is that Washington may apply the lessons learned in Asia in the sixties to Europe in the seventies. A balance-of-power game in Europe would be a disaster.'

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The fate of the Greek city-states after the Peloponnesian wars is still a useful reminder. Neither *détente* nor Western security would be enhanced by neutralist or isolationist tendencies in Europe or in America. Nor would they be enhanced by the residues of impotent gaullism in the former or by a new super-power gaullism in the latter. They can only be safeguarded by recognising the long term implications of the current political and cultural issues and by a patient effort to defend the fundamentals of Western civilisation which historically can only be a long haul (the battles of Tours, Kahlenberg, or Warsaw are not going to happen in the nuclear age). In such an endeavour new American and European initiatives are necessary to expand and maintain the momentum of European unification, to prevent Europe and America drifting apart and to avoid the shift against the West of the balance of power in the polycentric world.

The analysis of such problems and of their current background in the world scene cannot but be controversial. But, as usual, the clash of opinions may help to clarify the issues. We are grateful to the contributors to this special number of SURVEY for defining their positions sharply so that the inevitable differences of opinion provide for a better view of the problems involved in the discussion.

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U.S. and European Security in the 1970s

Karl Kaiser *

SINCE the outbreak of the Cold War, the probability of aggression in Europe has never been so low as it is today. The fear that the Warsaw Pact countries might contemplate an all-out attack, quite prevalent in the 1950s, has all but disappeared. West Europeans today judge the intentions and attitudes of the Soviet leadership to be sufficiently rational and pragmatic that the probability of aggression aimed at territorial gains or occupation is extremely low. The developments of recent years, particularly the agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany, the Four Powers Agreement, the agreements with the United States, and the initiative for a European Security Conference are seen as evidence of a substantial change in Soviet policy.

It is a moot question whether the change towards a policy of restraint in the Soviet Union can be explained by pragmatism and the peaceful intentions of Soviet leadership or whether the system of conventional and nuclear deterrence built up by the United States and Europe during the post-war period contributed to the prevention of war and the emergence of a more cooperative Soviet policy. Neither case can be scientifically proven, but we take it as a working assumption here that deterrence has played, and still plays, some role in preventing war and in inducing a policy of moderation.

MILITARY capabilities are not a reliable indicator of hostile intentions but they do give some indication of the perception of threat and of conceptions of possible military conflict. The ratio of military forces between East and West remains an essential factor in assessing possible threats to security if considered in the proper political context of the military balance. Given the immense complexity of any comparison of military capabilities, this assessment should be taken as an approximation, reduced to a few pertinent facts. Using the figures of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and of a recent Brookings Institution study,[1] which represent a middle ground between the somewhat optimistic

* This is an excerpt from the forthcoming book by Professor Kaiser, *Europe and the United States. The Future of the Relationship*, to be published by Columbia Books in Washington. It is based on a major report which Professor Kaiser presented to the European-United States Conference held in Columbia, Maryland on 7–10 December 1972 and sponsored jointly by the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies and the International Association for Cultural Freedom.

1 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *Strategic Survey 1971* (London, 1972); IISS, *The Military Balance 1971–1972* (London, 1971); *The Military Balance 1972–1973* (London, 1972); John Newhouse with Melvin Croan, Edward R. Fried and Timothy W. Stanley, *U.S. Troops in Europe, Issues, Costs and Choices* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1971).

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figures of the Pentagon and the pessimistic assessments of military experts in Europe, the situation is as follows.

At the level of alliances, in 1972 NATO's 5·4 million men in active armed forces (including France and forces stationed all over the world) face about 4·4 million men in the Warsaw Pact.[2] But the crucial area is Europe. If one compares all NATO forces assigned to Europe, including Britain, France, and Portugal, with the Warsaw Pact forces, including all the Soviet Union's allies and the USSR troops west of the Urals, NATO's 2,180,000 troops face Eastern troops totalling 2,250,000 men. (The tank ratio is 12,000 : 41,700.) As the following chart shows,[3]

Military Ratios between NATO and Warsaw Pact in the Central Region of Europe

	M-Day (without France)	M-Day+30 (with France)
Ground Force Manpower	1 : 1·6	1 : 2·1
Tanks	1 : 2·5	1 : 2·9
Tactical Aircraft	1 : 1·8	1 : 2·0

there is a net superiority of 1 : 1·6 in ground forces in favour of the Warsaw Pact in the central Region of Europe between the Baltic Sea and Austria, extending into Western Russian and excluding Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania in the East and France in the West. The advantage of the Warsaw Pact increases considerably as more time elapses after mobilization (M-Day), to 1 : 2·1 after 30 days. The shorter geographical distance involved and the structure of the Warsaw Pact forces make a fast build-up easier than in the West. It is only after a 30-day period, assuming that no attack occurs which hampers Western reinforcement, that the position of NATO improves in some areas, but overall conventional parity is never reached. Thus the Brookings study estimates that approximately 90 days after mobilization about 2·2 million Warsaw Pact troops would face 1 million or so NATO forces.

Although a host of clarifications should qualify this comparison (e.g. the limited reliability of some Warsaw Pact forces in case of war), it shows a clear conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact in the central region. In the northern area of NATO, the superiority of the Warsaw Pact in ground troops is approximately 5 : 1 if compared with the troops of North-West Russia[4] but, because of the uncertain impact of reinforcements by sea or air over long distances by both sides, it is very difficult to assess the exact balance.

The same difficulty exists on the Mediterranean flank of NATO, although for different reasons. IISS estimates show a ground force

[2] IISS, *The Military Balance 1972–1973*, op. cit. pp. 4–24.
[3] Taken from Newhouse, *U.S. Troops in Europe*, op. cit. p. 59.
[4] Newhouse, *U.S. Troops in Europe*, op. cit. p. 66.

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superiority of NATO of 525,000 : 385,000 men (but a tank inferiority of 2,000 : 5,000). However, the picture changes if instead of counting only six Soviet divisions, as the IISS did, one includes the 28 divisions available in adjacent Russia. Moreover, if one considers that the main Western ground forces are provided by Greece and Turkey, which are themselves at odds and each of which has considerable internal problems, the East-West ratio appears less favourable. If conflict occurs it is most likely to erupt in the eastern part of the Mediterranean, thus giving the advantage of short-distance or ground transportation for reinforcements to the Warsaw Pact.

Finally, the effectiveness of military intervention and of political control over a crisis situation varies considerably depending on the position of the respective superpower, whatever the nominal balance of forces may be between the two sides. The United States contributes 10 per cent of the manpower of all NATO forces in Europe whereas the Soviet Union's share of all Warsaw Pact forces west of the Urals is 66 per cent.[5]

IN order to assess the relevance of these military ratios within the wider political context of European security, three types of possible threat to security in Europe will be identified: first, open aggression with available conventional forces; second, a crisis of instability in which military action arises out of smaller incidents; third, political interference from outside with the purpose of restricting political choices. We shall consider these potential threats first under present conditions and later under the assumption that Europe must deal with them alone.

If we consider the first case—open aggression with available conventional forces, a contingency which caused considerable anxiety among military planners in the 1950s (e.g. the 'Hamburg grab')—the threat to security appears to be extremely low, if not zero. Three interconnected reasons for this may be cited. First, at this stage of East-West relations and Soviet policy, no motive or set of conditions is visible which would lead to such extreme action. Second, any such aggression would be extremely risky for the Soviet Union since it would meet at some—necessarily uncertain—point a tactical nuclear response, with the possibility of escalation to a use of America's strategic nuclear force. Third, such deterrence is made credible by the political and military involvement of the United States in European security, as expressed most significantly by the presence of American troops in Europe; but it is also credible because of the effective Western alliance system, based on a relationship of solidarity and mutual commitment.

For these reasons Western politicians and military planners have accepted Western conventional inferiority as something they can live with. Since the West will never attack, it does not need conventional

[5] *Bulletin*, Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, No. 97, 30 June 1972.

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superiority but only a minimum force to assure defence within the strategy of 'flexible response' that can activate nuclear deterrence. Indeed, it could be argued in so far as overt aggression is involved that the East-West ratio could even worsen a little without critically affecting Western security *provided* a credible link to the US nuclear deterrent is preserved.

The second type of threat, which might arise from constellations of instability and unrest in East-West relations, creates less predictable situations. It is typical that in such situations the borderline between military action and political threat cannot be drawn exactly. Possible origins of this type of threat could include, for example, incidents on the access routes to West Berlin, internal disputes among socialist countries which spill across to the West or a conflict in the Balkans. *Détente* itself[f] may well trigger a crisis of this kind by unleashing various social and political forces (as was the case, for example, in Czechoslovakia) or by creating extreme disparities in the balance of political and military power between East and West (e.g. as a result of excessive unilateral disarmament).

Such threats and possible responses are unpredictable. But, given the fact that opportunities and goals would be limited and that the initial risks involved for a Warsaw Pact country would be lower, the probability of a threat to West European security arising from this sort of situation, in light of Warsaw Pact conventional superiority, is greater than the chances of open aggression.

Nevertheless, under present circumstances, three factors keep the risk of this kind of threat within low and acceptable proportions. There is first of all the likelihood that any military action resulting from such a crisis would eventually meet the US nuclear deterrence mechanism as the crisis escalates. Secondly, Soviet policy in the recent past, particularly the American-Soviet accords in Moscow which included agreement on crisis management and the Declaration of Principles, suggest that, at this stage of East-West relations, the Soviet Union is aware of the potential dangers of smaller crises and willing to cooperate with the United States in containing them. Finally, under present conditions of American commitment to European security and a well-functioning Western alliance system, conflicts at the periphery affect the entire Western alliance system and this acts as a deterrent to the exploitation of small crises by military means.

A third type of threat, that of external interference in domestic affairs, takes us further into the political dimension of security. Such a threat could arise in a situation where Western Europe's economic strength, political cohesion, self-confidence, and relative military strength were so weak that the Soviet Union, exploiting her superiority by a mixture of pressures and threats, might interfere in West European politics, influence political choices and, without ever actually resorting to force, establish a strong and possibly even hegemonical position in West European affairs.

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This type of security threat has popularly been called ' Finlandization ', a term which appears inappropriate for two reasons. For one thing, Finland's particular exposure to Soviet pressure is enhanced both by her geographical proximity to the Soviet Union and by the fact that she stands alone. Western Europe—more distant from the Soviet Union and composed of countries with, even in the worst assumptions about the future, some continuing links—is in a less exposed position. Second, the resources and strengths of the West European countries are substantially larger than those of Finland.

Soviet and East German pressure on the internal affairs of West Berlin before the conclusion of the Berlin Agreement provides a vivid past example of this type of threat; an effort to slow the pace of West European integration could be an example in the future. Perfect equilibrium of military forces is not as important a factor in this sort of situation as political strength, confidence, and the certainty of effective deterrence in case *détente* breaks down.

Although the threat of interference by the Soviet Union remains at the back of Europeans' minds, it is of no real importance at the moment. Western Europe's strength, the momentum of unification, and trans-Atlantic cohesion (as expressed in America's commitments to European defence and her actual presence in Europe) are considerable enough to reduce such a threat to negligible proportions. Only significant changes in the political structure of Western Europe and in relations between the United States and Europe, to which we shall return below, could significantly alter this situation.

This brief assessment of the security equation in Europe has not covered its costs or the doubts it raises for the future. If one includes a quarter of the US defence budget and one third of the Soviet military budget, the United States, the European members of NATO, and the Warsaw Pact spend approximately $70 billion per year on the defence of this area. Given the demand and need for costly social reforms and public investments in both systems these costs are enormous and, understandably, the subject of growing criticism. Nor should the unquantifiable costs be underestimated: the psychological burden of fear (although decreasing), the costs of severed communications, and the lack of creative competition and cooperation—all typify a hostile relationship between two systems which could benefit each other (although here again things are changing). Finally, the system is not fool- or accident-proof. War can break out, and its vast potential cost, deliberately elevated as a deterrent to war, could become painfully real.

Though it will never be possible to determine exactly whether rationality in Soviet policy or deterrence has been responsible for preserving relative peace, there is no doubt that the post-war European security system has prevented war. Europeans appreciate all too well this characteristic of the European status quo. If anyone is to tamper with the

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present system, he must be very sure indeed that such change constitutes real improvement.

Can Western Europe Maintain its Security Alone?

The general relaxation of tension, reinforced by current balance of payment difficulties, has led to demands in the United States that Europe now handle its security alone without American participation. A few European conservatives and men of the Left feebly echo this demand (with the former favouring and the latter strictly opposing the formation of a European nuclear force). Changing American attitudes are well summed up in Senator Mansfield's remark, in rebuttal of the then Under-Secretary of State and now the Defense Secretary Elliot Richardson:

> It is all very well to talk about the 'strength, closeness, trust, realism and flexibility' of NATO, as Mr Richardson did. . . . But it seems to me that there is a contrast between these words and the fact that the 250 million people of Western Europe, with tremendous industrial resources and long military experience, are unable to organize an effective military coalition to defend themselves against 200 million Russians who are contending at the same time with 800 million Chinese, but must continue after 20 years to depend on 200 million Americans for their defense. The status quo has been safe and comfortable for our European allies. But . . . it has made the Europeans less interested in their own defense. . . .[6]

Usually demands such as this make the implicit assumption that Europeans are making an insufficient defence effort compared with that of the United States. We shall turn to this first.

Do Europeans Make a Sufficient Defence Effort Compared with the United States?

Like the earlier comparison of military capabilities between East and West, comparative assessment of defence effort within the West is inherently difficult and can never be exact for lack of universally accepted standards of comparison. In the many years of transatlantic debate on 'burden sharing', these problems have been discussed intensely among governments. Nevertheless, a few preliminary remarks may be in order before taking up the question of Europe's assuming sole responsibility for its own security.

In 1970, a year in which the Vietnam war took $16·7 billion of the American defence budget,[7] the United States spent about 7·8 per cent of its GNP on defence (to be reduced to 6·4 per cent in 1973),[8] whereas the Europeans spent about 3·7 per cent.[9] But this gap narrows if we consider

[6] *Congressional Record*, Daily Edition, 20 April 1970, pp. S 5957–58.
[7] Charles L. Schultze et al., *Setting National Priorities, The 1973 Budget* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1972), p. 73.
[8] Ibid. p. 40.
[9] IISS, *Strategic Survey, 1971*, op. cit. p. 26.

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three factors. First, as a result of different political traditions, the US defence budget contains a number of non-military expenditures whereas in Europe many military expenditures are included in the civilian budget. Second, defence simply costs less in Europe than it does in the United States. In the fiscal year 1972 the United States spent $40 billion of its defence budget on its personnel of 2·5 million men alone, i.e. almost twice the entire defence expenditures for general purpose forces of all European NATO members, a total of 2–9 million men. Finally, the United States, unlike Europe, plays a global role resulting in additional defence expenditures which, in many cases, are unrelated to European security.

In American discussions of defence, it is often assumed that Europeans can take a relative share of defence equal to that of the United States. This view not only overlooks the facts just mentioned but usually assumes that European recovery has resulted in a degree of wealth sufficient to make such a contribution possible. Although Europe has become wealthy, it is far less wealthy than the United States. A population of 208 million Americans enjoys a GNP which is 50 per cent higher than the GNP of over 300 million NATO Europeans. If the principle of differentiating burdens according to wealth which is applied to taxation within Western societies were extended to defence expenditure within the West, the difference between European and American spending would roughly correspond to the difference in their resources.

Any comparison of American and European defence efforts within Europe depends entirely on what share of US defence expenditure is assigned to Europe. According to official American sources, the total budgetary costs of the US commitment to NATO in 1969 (including troops in Europe, US-based forces assigned to NATO and the US Atlantic and Mediterranean Fleets, less the Polaris force), including all costs for annual investments and operations, as well as all indirect support costs in the US, amounted to $14 billion. The total cost of the 300,000 troops stationed in Europe (including the Mediterranean), plus their dependents and civilian employees, amounted to about $3 billion.[10]

The European members of NATO spend about $23 billion a year on general purpose forces in Europe (not including British and French Strategic Nuclear Forces and forces assigned to overseas areas); this is one-half *more* than what America's NATO commitment costs, according to official sources.

The West European countries, which have more men under arms in Europe than the United States has for her global policy, can therefore scarcely be accused of doing less in Europe than the United States, but

[10] IISS, *Strategic Survey, 1971*, op. cit. p. 21 ff. A Brookings study rated these costs much higher, i.e. at $25·4 billion for the US NATO commitment and 8·5 for forces in Europe. Charles F. Schultze et al., *Setting National Priorities, The 1972 Budget* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1971), p. 55. However, the IISS *Strategic Survey, 1971*, op. cit. p. 22, convincingly argues that this estimate must be too high.

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such assertions are increasingly entering into US public debate on these issues.

Behind such views, there is often the additional assumption that the US contribution to NATO defence in Europe does not really support a common defence system, also protecting the United States, but a system to defend Europe only. Since this American contribution is allegedly neither reciprocated by European support for the United States in other areas, particularly the trade and monetary fields, or needed, in view of relaxed tensions, some conclude that it can be dispensed with.

But this line of argument misses the crucial point by viewing European security in narrow terms of defence and of troop and weapons ratios instead of seeing security for what it is, today more than ever, that is a political and military structure which maintains stability and allows for peaceful change without unwanted outside interference or breakdowns. Europe's future security problem does not lie primarily in the conventional military balance but in the political context which stabilizes the military balance and makes mutual force reductions possible.

Can Europe Maintain its Security Alone?

A first glance at the defence capabilities of Western Europe suggests that Europe has a reasonable chance of defending itself alone since its resources are considerable, even by superpower standards. If one adds up economic and military capabilities in a number of fields (see chart on p. 19), Western Europe measures up quite respectably to Eastern Europe.[11]

In order to discuss security in all its dimensions and Western Europe's capability of maintaining security alone, we shall posit as a hypothetical case a course which is quite frequently advocated in the US public debate and more or less openly feared by a number of Europeans. We shall assume that the United States withdraws all her troops from northern and central Europe and the Mediterranean but that she leaves the military material required to arm reinforcements in time of need and that she maintains a nuclear guarantee for Western Europe with her strategic nuclear force.

Such a withdrawal of American troops would increase the superiority of the Warsaw Pact within the central and northern areas of Europe from 1 : 1·6 to 1 : 2·4. Moreover, the forces to be withdrawn would be among the best equipped and best trained in Europe.

The change in the conventional ratio would not in itself be crucial. What matters is something else. The substantial increase in conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact would render even more important those factors which have hitherto been meant to counterbalance such superiority; namely, America's political and security commitment to

[11] Compiled from IISS, *The Military Balance 1971–1972*, op. cit. pp. 8–11; IISS, *Strategic Survey, 1971*, op. cit. p. 26.

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*Comparative Defence Resources of an Enlarged EEC**

	Enlarged EEC	European Alliance members	USA	USSR	Warsaw Pact
Defence Expenditure 1970	$23·1 bill[a]	$24·6 bill[a]	$76·5 bill[a]	$53·9 bill[b]	$61·9 bill[b]
GNP 1970[c]	$636 bill[d]	$660 bill[d]	$977 bill[d]	$490 bill[b]	$641·5 bill[b]
Def. exp. as % of GNP 1970	3·6%	3·7%	7·8%	11·0%	9·5%
Defence expenditure 1971	$25·25 bill[d]	$23·9 bill[d]	$78·7[d]	$55·0 bill[b]	—
Defence Manpower (mid-1971)	2,090,000	2,939,000	2,699,000	3,375,000	2,682,000[j]
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE					
ICBM	—	—	1,054	1,540	
IRBM/MRBM	9	9	—	700	
SLBM/SLCM	80	80	656	830	
Strategic bombers	36	36	360	140	
MAIN COMBAT VESSELS					
Submarines					
Missile, nuclear[e]	5	5	41	70	
Missile, diesel[e]	—	—	—	56	
Attack, nuclear	7	7	53	25	
Attack, diesel	91	109	46	210	
Attack carriers	4	4	15	—	
Other carriers[f]	5	5	3	2	
Missile cruisers/destroyers	33	33	73	50	
Other escorts[g]	148	181	148	176	
MAIN BATTLE TANKS[h]	5,343	6,650	1,100	11,600	23,350[k]
TACTICAL AIRCRAFT[i]	2,800	3,600	8,500	8,700	10,336[k]

Notes: [a] NATO definition except Eire.
[b] See *The Military Balance 1970–71*, pp. 10–12 for calculation of these figures.
[c] OECD estimates.
[d] At 1970 official exchange rates.
[e] Ballistic and Cruise Missiles.
[f] ASW, Commando, and Helicopter Carriers.
[g] Cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and other non-coastal escorts.
[h] In the European theatre only.
[i] Combat aircraft of all Services.
[j] Includes 50 per cent of all Soviet forces.
[k] Includes Soviet forces in the European theatre.
* Includes Norway.

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Europe, as expressed through the US presence and its direct link to the US Strategic Nuclear Force. Complete removal of all troops would drastically undermine the credibility of the US nuclear guarantee. Such a withdrawal would, therefore, have an effect on security in Western Europe which far exceeds a mere change in troop ratio in favour of the Warsaw Pact.

IF we turn to the first type of possible threat identified above, that of all-out aggression, an assessment must depend on the assumptions one makes about Soviet policy. If one applies the prevalent notions of strategic thinking, American withdrawal from Europe would change the military balance in favour of the attacking side. The conventional superiority of the Soviet Union would be complemented by nuclear superiority in tactical and strategic weapons, which could encourage a pre-emptive strike on the nuclear forces of Britain and France followed by a conventional attack. British and French nuclear forces are not an effective substitute for the American nuclear deterrent, which is activated by involvement of US troops on the front line. Not only would these two nuclear forces be infinitely less effective in size and technology, as well as far more vulnerable, but their credibility and, hence, their deterrent effect would be lower since French and British troop involvement outside their own borders does not equal that of the United States which has spread half a million of its nationals—soldiers, dependents, and civilian employees—around the critical areas of NATO.

There is reason, however, to question such conventional strategic wisdom. Even if the Soviet Union could eliminate the British and French nuclear deterrents through pre-emptive strikes in order to mount a conventional attack, the present state of East-West relations and current Soviet policy relegate such a contingency to the realm of the barely possible. Reckless adventurism of this kind is not conceivable under present circumstances. Even if, technically, the US nuclear guarantee were not totally credible, it would at least remain uncertain. Only a victory of irrationality in Moscow and total estrangement between the United States and Europe could lead to a situation where the Soviet Union might be tempted to use the *threat* of such aggression as a means of exacting concessions from Western Europe. But such a future is extremely improbable. We can conclude then that in terms of all-out aggression, an American withdrawal of conventional troops would have relatively limited impact *provided the nuclear guarantee and a working relationship between Europe and America are maintained and Soviet policy continues to develop along present lines.* If the latter factors change, however, withdrawal would destabilize the situation.

WITHDRAWAL of all American troops would have its greatest effect (though so far the least considered) on the maintenance of security in a framework of crises of instability and external interference. In the

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case of crises of instability, military action would be limited, if not absent, at the beginning. If the United States were no longer present, the Soviet Union would not be required to take the same precautions for avoiding direct confrontation with the United States—undoubtedly a major consideration for the Soviets—since she would not encounter the physical presence of American troops. Moreover, Soviet moves and goals might be too ambivalent or simply too limited for the United States to risk activating the nuclear guarantee for Europe in a credible manner.

It is doubtful that the possibility of reinforcing the European NATO members by US-based troops in times of crisis would sufficiently improve the situation for the West Europeans. As has been suggested in the intensive debates among experts on this question, the dispatch of troops across the Atlantic could sharply increase the degree of tension in a crisis; consequently it becomes an instrument of rather dubious value. To bring American troops over only in time of need is of little use in crises where the adversary's objectives remain unclear or in a sudden crisis with quick, limited military action.

Various past crises in the Middle East and Berlin suggest that a withdrawal of American troops would undermine European security in what is the most probable type of conflict, namely, crisis of instability. How could Western Europe withstand an attack on, or a gradual strangulation of, Berlin—whose loss would have a profoundly disruptive effect on Western Europe—without America's political guarantee (reiterated in the recent Berlin Agreement) backed up by US involvement and US presence?

THE effects of total American withdrawal on possible threats to European security deriving from external interference would be even greater than in the case of crises of instability. But an important assumption is involved here which should be made explicit. It is hardly conceivable that a withdrawal of American troops could occur without bringing in its wake considerable strains and without undermining confidence and stability in Europe. To be sure, this would not be a sudden development but would probably evolve gradually, with European states reacting in various ways ranging from calls for unity, rearmament, and isolated accommodation with the Soviet Union. In any event, the political environment in Europe would be profoundly disturbed by such a withdrawal, which would leave open the possibility of gradual external interference by a Soviet Union no longer confronting a self-confident Europe, united in its defence policies with the United States.

One might rightly deplore a certain mentality of dependence on the part of Europeans which causes them to underrate their own capacity and to insufficiently develop and pool their own resources. But the dependence is a fact, whether one likes it or not, and so is the ensuing mentality. The substantial erosion of confidence and strength which would be caused by withdrawal of American support is likely to have disruptive and snow-

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balling effects if a limited military crisis were to break out or Soviet pressure be exerted.

WHAT we have said about different types of threats with regard to the northern and central region of Europe also applies to the Mediterranean area, although the situation there is even more complex than in the north. Numerically, an American withdrawal would only reduce Western superiority. For the time being, the Soviet Fleet in the Mediterranean is still smaller than the fleet of Italy alone. But, as suggested above, the levels of Western superiority are less certain under close inspection. Moreover, given possible repercussions from the Arab-Israeli conflict and the uncertain future of some Balkan states, conflict is more likely to erupt in the Mediterranean area than in Central and Northern Europe. In addition, as the functioning of the industrial societies in Western Europe and to an increasing extent of the United States depends on oil imports from this area, the Mediterranean is bound to assume growing importance to America and Europe. It is for these reasons that the impact of an American withdrawal becomes at once more unpredictable and more momentous.

GIVEN Western Europe's considerable resources, is there no possibility of her assuming sole responsibility for her own security?

Europe would probably be able to maintain her security alone if two conditions are fulfilled. First, there would have to be a genuine union of Western European states involving a common economic, foreign, and defence policy, based on solidarity and sufficient strength to act according to common goals. Second, Europe would need a nuclear force subject to a genuinely common defence policy and the decision-making of a united European government; this force could be much smaller than the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States but capable of surviving a first strike and of doing enough damage to deter Soviet military intervention in West Europe.

Both conditions are unfulfilled. Unification is still in its early stages and, deplorable as it is to Europeans, the engrained national traditions of different nation states make the process of unification very slow. Without unification and a common foreign and defence policy, the present numerical strength of European armed forces only amounts to the sum of separate national forces and is by no means as effective as it would be if it were the integrated instrument of a united Western Europe. The absence of adequate European cohesion, therefore, has a particularly crucial effect on the problem of future external interference and instability crises in Europe.

Any attempt to accelerate European unification by simply handing over to the Europeans responsibility for their own defence, confident that their will to survive will make them overcome their differences in a unanimous act of solidarity, is likely to be counterproductive. The

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transfer of certain security functions to Western Europe and a stronger and more deliberate European effort in this field could undoubtedly become elements of a new approach for the future, provided that they are undertaken jointly and after careful consideration, as we shall suggest later on. But a policy of transferring functions to a grouping which cannot assume them simply diminishes the security of all involved.

The second condition for an autonomous European defence, the establishment of a European nuclear force, is not fulfilled either. Unlike the goal of European unity, it is not even considered desirable by most Europeans. Apart from the fact that without American technological help—which is by no means guaranteed—the creation of a European nuclear force would take many years, its formation would probably raise more problems than it solved. Complete political unification and solidarity would be required before this most difficult of all political decisions could be delegated to a common institution. Since the military field is likely to be the last to be integrated in the process of unification, it will take a long time to create this precondition. More important, it will be impossible for many years to come to square the circle of West Germany's nuclear participation, which at present neither the Germans nor the other Europeans want, while, at the same time, avoiding discriminating against Germany. Finally, since the formation of such a force is likely to meet vigorous Soviet resistance and to sharpen East-West tensions, its creation would undermine rather than increase European security.

It is therefore doubtful that America would be wise to encourage a European nuclear force. As an American observer rightly put it:

> For the United States actually to support the nuclear development of Western Europe and Japan, in the hope of being ultimately relieved of its role as nuclear guarantor, and in the conviction that the present central balance makes any Soviet or Chinese retaliation impossible would sacrifice, if not nuclear peace, at least the chances of moderation and *détente* to a distant and dubious pentagonal nuclear ' balance '.[12]

Since the preconditions for an autonomous European defence role are unfulfilled in the case of European unity and undesirable in the case of a European nuclear force, European security cannot be maintained without active American involvement and presence. Even if many Americans, like most Europeans, conclude from the continuing *détente* that Soviet intentions have become less hostile, it would be premature to assume that military conflicts will no longer occur. Even if the probability has decreased to a 1 per cent chance, we need an insurance policy for that 1 per cent. Otherwise, as the experience of the 1930s in Europe showed, the 1 per cent probability may rise to a more dangerous level. Defending

[12] Stanley Hoffman, ' Weighing the Balance of Power ', *Foreign Affairs* (July 1972), vol. 50, No. 4, p. 622.

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American military involvement in Europe or European troop levels on the basis of the probability of all-out aggression or in terms of troop ratios, as some still do, begs the real issue of European security.

The most relevant security problems for Europe in the future are likely to arise from crises of instability and from attempts at external interference. Although the nature of these threats will make possible a number of adjustments, including a reduction of some military postures, a major American and European security effort will nevertheless still be required. Recent years have offered no grounds for belief that traditional power politics have sufficiently disappeared within the Soviet Union to make a common Western security effort unnecessary.

American and European Interests in Europe's Security

If we begin by examining *American interests* in European security, it must be said at the outset that a definition of such interests is, of course, up to the Americans themselves. Because America is today reassessing her role in the world, it is difficult to discern a clear consensus, let alone the eventual results of the present debate.

But we can take as a working hypothesis that the two basic interests which have guided American foreign policy in the past will continue to shape her future role in the world, namely, that the United States will not permit any area vital to the international constellation of power to fall under the influence of her main competitor, the Soviet Union, and second, that the preservation of stability in such areas is vital to her own interests. Even if America further reduces her involvement in the world, Europe will probably remain a region essential to American interests owing to its strategic position and resources.

Since Western Europe alone will not be able to maintain the security and since stability in this area is essential to the United States, it is in America's interest—even with reduced world involvement—to participate actively in the organization of European security, backing up her political commitment by maintaining some physical military presence and, in the economic field, the kind of cooperative relationship which she herself needs for her own prosperity in an interdependent international economy.

To date the American presence in Europe has been a major factor in preventing war. The burden of proof that security can be maintained without that presence should be borne by those who advocate reduction or withdrawal.

If these conclusions are correct, the current debate between America and Europe is being dominated by two false issues.

To begin with, total US withdrawal, given this reading of American interests, should not even be an issue. Those Americans who understandably and justifiably advocate reduction of America's overseas involvement in light of the Vietnam tragedy must ask themselves whether the redefinition of America's role in the world should be carried to the

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extreme of withdrawal from Europe and whether they are willing to face the prospect of instability in that critically important area of the world.

In internal American debates, advocates of US withdrawal from Europe often fail to see that withdrawal will probably *not* result in any significant reduction of American defence expenditures. Rather, it might lead to increases. A gradual reduction of the size of American forces in response to reduced threat, decided upon in careful consultation with her European allies and implemented in an orderly fashion, is one thing, but a unilateral withdrawal which leaves behind an unstable Europe is quite another. It is highly doubtful that America could in fact dissolve all the divisions she had assigned to Europe even if they were shifted to the United States. Withdrawal under such circumstances would not only represent no gain to American security but would undermine the cooperative basis of European-American relationships, necessary for reordering the international economy in coming years.

Withdrawal would also raise serious questions in regard to America's commitments as one of the Four Powers in Berlin and in relation to the German problem. Since Germany is located at the centre of Europe, where the Eastern and Western systems meet with the highest concentration of military power, and since West Berlin remains particularly vulnerable, this area will continue to be crucial to world peace. To argue—as some Americans and Europeans do—that these commitments, derived from the second world war and the Cold War, are now obsolete and should consequently be shelved as the remnants of a dark past is simply to overlook the continuing existence of many insecurities and threats, even though the Cold War, in its previous form, has disappeared.

As long as the East-West conflict persists, Central Europe will continue to require prudent attention and careful security measures. The new Berlin Agreement among the Four Powers was negotiated by the United States mainly with a view to the future, not the past, as a means of improving conditions for stability and peace in Europe. But the new commitments to West Berlin and stability in Central Europe cannot be fulfilled in times of crisis unless they are supported by a sizeable presence.

Most important, the notion of complete withdrawal overlooks the fact that maintaining the status quo in Europe would be in America's national interest even if relations with Western Europe were less friendly than they are today. The United States would suffer a severe setback if Europe, with all its resources and importance, suddenly or gradually slipped into the Soviet sphere of influence. That applies also to the southern flank and the Mediterranean. The Sixth Fleet stationed there participates in securing not only European interests but also America's national interests. This force is a major element of American influence in the Mediterranean, particularly in so far as the Arab-Israeli conflict is concerned; it also plays a major role in US competition with the Soviet Union. To a growing degree, the Sixth Fleet will secure shipment from the Middle East of oil supplies on which the United States will become increasingly dependent.

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Even without NATO commitments, these US forces would almost certainly be in that area. For these reasons, advocates of withdrawal from Europe ignore the fact that the security of Europe is in the common interest of both America and Western Europe.

If this interpretation of American interests is correct, discussion of financial savings resulting from complete withdrawal is based on false issues. Since a complete withdrawal of all 300,000 troops from the Mediterranean and Western Europe would decrease stability in those areas, little or no money would be saved, because it would almost certainly be necessary to maintain these units fully or partially in the United States owing to the weakened European situation.

Moreover, the effect of American troop presence in Europe on the American balance of payments has been exaggerated. In 1971 Senator Symington observed during the debate on the Mansfield Amendment providing for withdrawal of American troops:

> U.S. defense expenditures in Western Europe which entered the international balance of payments in the fiscal year 1970 totalled $1·731 billion, the highest figure ever for such expenditures. In order to place this figure in perspective, let us note that our balance-of-payments deficit in 1970 on a liquidity basis was $3·85 billion; therefore, our military expenditures in Western Europe accounted for 46·1 per cent of all that deficit. If military sales to Western Europe, which I am informed totalled $599 million in 1970, are deducted from the $1·77 billion of military expenditures in Western Europe, net military expenditures still constitute 30·5 per cent of the total balance-of-payments deficit in 1970.[13]

Apart from the fact that the balance-of-payments deficit rose from $3·85 billion to $29·8 billion in 1971, this view misinterprets the order of magnitude of the various factors influencing the US balance of payments. Many are more decisive than military expenditures. In 1970, American exports amounted to $42 billion while imports totalled $40 billion, income from US investment abroad added up to $8 billion ($9·3 in 1971), and the net outflow of private capital was $6 billion.

It is somewhat difficult to understand why the United States has spent up to $20 billion a year and many thousands of American lives on defence in Vietnam—an area which a growing consensus regarded as not essential to American interests—while objecting to annual expenditures of $3 billion in support of an area which is vital to American interests. Nevertheless, Europeans must recognize that the maintenance of an American presence in Europe constitutes a genuine problem in so far as the US balance of payments is concerned. But a solution of this problem should be reached primarily through international economic reform which will hopefully terminate America's chronic payments deficits of recent years. An agreement on burden-sharing in a new multinational form to offset

[13] *Congressional Record*, Daily Edition, 19 May 1971, p. S 7395.

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America's military expenses in Europe would then play only a secondary role. We shall return to these questions later.

If we turn now to *European interests*, it is obvious that the maintenance of a viable security link with the United States remains essential, although there is need and leeway for the establishment of a different organization and better conditions for maintaining this link. In this connexion three aspects of European interest are particularly relevant.

First of all, any reorganization of US-European security should more adequately reflect the increased weight, identity, and growing unity of Western Europe and should provide for a European contribution to an alliance which supplants the former concept of an Atlantic community in which a single United States was associated with a number of smaller European allies and one Canadian ally. The new concept of alliance should involve a bilateral partnership, with Europe on the one hand and the United States and Canada on the other.

Secondly, it is essential for Europe to create preconditions which will enable France to participate fully in any European defence contribution to an Atlantic security partnership.

Finally, it is in Europe's interest that whenever American-Soviet dealings have relevance for security in Europe and for European-American relations, they be accompanied by genuine consultation or be made multilateral when problems are of mutual concern.

America's and Europe's common interests relating to a reassessment of their security relations are currently threefold. First, both Europe and America want to buy security at lower cost by decreasing their defence posture without upsetting stability and by reducing risk through *détente*, cooperative ventures with Eastern Europe, and arms control. Second, it is in the interest of both the United States and Europe to close the endless debate on troop stationing and withdrawals and discontinue the accusations which have been erosive and divisive in their relationship. They should instead examine the present situation together in order to find an adequate and relatively permanent solution for the security dilemmas of both sides.

Third, the United States and Europe have a mutual interest in pursuing solutions in the security and economic fields simultaneously; not only has each field had a somewhat neglected but highly negative impact on the other but a solution in one requires a solution in the other.

Finally, America and Europe should stop looking at their security efforts in the traditional terms of East-West confrontation. Instead, they should undertake a common effort to build a lasting international structure in Europe which will maintain peace while allowing for change.

Elements of a New Approach

In examining a new approach to the European-American security relationship, let us now consider possible machinery for initiating and sustaining a reassessment of new measures; the prerequisites for, and

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participants in, any discussion of the issues involved; and, finally, the specific measures to be considered.

Machinery: If governments on both sides of the Atlantic concur in some of the conclusions outlined above, they will obviously require political machinery to deal with the issues raised by security in coming years and to examine future steps. Some of the steps worth considering, including organizational measures, are identified below; needless to say, other measures are conceivable.

It would be very useful to create an informal and effective European-American commission of eminent and knowledgeable private citizens to examine the factors governing security in the Atlantic area and to recommend security policies for the future; the commission should focus attention and mobilize opinion, invigorate the transatlantic dialogue, and provide a working basis for action by legislatures and governments.

In order to make sure that security aspects are seen in relation to the problems of international economic reform and policy coordination within the Atlantic area, this commission should be, as far as possible, identical with a similar commission to review current problems in international economic reform and to recommend solutions for the future.

Participating governments should put all expert advice and information at the disposition of this commission, which should work outside established institutions, such as NATO, in order to make a fresh beginning and to facilitate French participation. The commission should be free to establish subsidiary bodies to deal with specific issues and to tap the expertise of existing institutions.

In view of the importance of discussion among members of the informed public on both sides of the Atlantic, the commission should consider at an early point in its work when and in what form representatives of legislatures should become involved so that favourable conditions will be created for democratic consensus on all measures to be recommended.

At an appropriate moment, an Atlantic summit conference of heads of governments should be convened in order to define the outlines of future security policy in the Atlantic area and to provide political impetus for new steps.

Prerequisites—Debate and Consensus: In both America and Europe, there is great need for political leaders to stimulate debate of these issues. While it may be easier to settle many problems through high-level private talks and quiet diplomacy, it is crucial that such actions be complemented by public discussion aimed at remedying the present state of public ignorance by presentations of the facts and of possible choices for the future.

Americans and Europeans will have to face some uncomfortable facts in this regard. In the United States, the relationship of trust which once existed between foreign policy leaders, on the one hand, and Congress and public opinion, on the other, has been disturbed considerably by the

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Vietnam war and other factors. As a result there is greater need—not less—for public support of any new policies so that these may be assured of the degree of certainty and continuity which is required for the future.

Moreover, the few voices raised in public debate in America, outside government, too often represent specific interests and are unable or unwilling to take a long-term view or to see their interests in a wider perspective. There is little careful analysis of the middle ground which lies between the alternative extremes of defending the status quo, on the one hand, and of radical change through total American withdrawal from outside commitments, on the other.

A similar phenomenon can be found in Europe. There is insufficient informed discussion between those—particularly the young—who think the time has come for dumping all military security policy and those who, partly in reaction, cling all the more rigidly to the status quo. There is far too little attention to the middle ground and to gradualism as a way of approaching present problems.

There is no point in hammering out solutions among governments and a small elite which would not then be supported by legislatures and the public. The democratic traditions of both America and Europe require that reorganization of their mutual relationship and of their respective roles in the world be endorsed by democratic consensus among their legislatures and the public. Moreover, in the security field, continuity and a modicum of certainty are indispensable. Not only would the Europeans like to see an end to uncertainty about America's commitment to their mutual security, but the Americans, in turn, want a clearer and more certain perspective of Europe's contribution. The establishment of such an atmosphere of reasonable predictability and trust in the future will be essential in order to resolve the difficult economic and financial problems which Europe and America share.

Specific Measures—MBFR I: A Troop Reduction of 50,000 in the Central European Region: A first and relatively speedy phase of Mutual Balanced Forced Reductions between East and West could seek a decrease of about 50,000 troops on each side in the area of the Benelux Countries, West and East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. Of that amount 80 per cent could be allotted to a withdrawal and dissolution of American and Soviet troops and 20 per cent to a dissolution of other NATO and Warsaw Pact troops located in these countries.

Such a procedure would solve the following dilemma: on the one hand, it would meet strong pressures on the US Administration to reduce the volume of American troops in Europe and would do so in an orderly and mutually agreed fashion, on the basis of reciprocity by the Warsaw Pact. On the other hand, it would accommodate the desire of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact to lower the cost of security without upsetting the balance of forces or becoming bogged down in the various

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aspects of MBFR which are so complex and difficult that they will take years to be resolved through East-West negotiations.

In order to explain this dilemma, let us look briefly at the main problems which are involved in MBFR.[14] This subject has been under intensive discussion within the West ever since NATO proposed negotiations on balanced troop reductions to the Warsaw Pact at its 1968 Council meeting. While there are differences of opinion among NATO members on various aspects of MBFR, it can be said that three goals may be common to the West as a whole: first, MBFR could help to limit the Soviet Union's capacity for intervention and control in Eastern Europe; second, MBFR could help to reduce military confrontation and create a balance at a lower level of military posture; finally, MBFR could be a complementary area of negotiation, as well as a testing ground, in the political process of *détente* between East and West.

There are four different problems involved in MBFR, of which reduction of troop levels is only one:

(1) Constraints on military movements (such as general military movements, manoeuvres, reinforcements in time of crisis, etc.);
(2) A force limitation agreement (e.g. a limitation on specific types of military forces);
(3) The reduction of forces; and
(4) Establishment of a system of verification.

Each of these problems raises very different and highly complex issues, which cannot all be dealt with here. For example, how can balanced reduction be achieved when the Warsaw Pact has a natural geographic advantage because of the shorter distances required to obtain reinforcements? How can the thorny problem of verification be solved, given traditional Soviet opposition to any on-site inspection? How can different weapons systems and different types of forces be compared? Behind each of these problems lie delicate political questions, such as the influence of the respective superpowers, the internal cohesion of the respective alliances, the kinds of military strategy to be employed, etc.

If the West pursues too adamantly through MBFR the objective of inducing political change within Eastern Europe, its progress could be very slow for such intentions would meet with deep distrust in the Soviet Union. Moreover, agreements to limit military deployment and to restrict capability of intervention would also pose serious problems for the Western states since they are more dependent on reinforcements in time of crisis than is the Warsaw Pact.

In fact, the proposition that MBFR can be a major instrument for inducing political change must be seriously questioned. In most of its subject areas, e.g. the non-use of force or genuine restraints on military

[14] We follow here in part the comprehensive analysis by Christoph Bertram, 'Mutual Force Reductions in Europe: The Political Aspects', *Adelphi Papers*, No. 84 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972).

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movements, progress will be possible only when political conditions are ripe. In practice MBFR can be little more than a series of measures which accompany and accelerate the political process of improving East-West relations.

This view is based on the assumption that MBFR can take place in two phases. In the first phase, one particular aspect—the reduction of troops in the countries of Central Europe—would be the subject of negotiation and agreement. If the more complex problems of geographical asymmetry, verification, general principles, constraints, etc. are removed from the centre of negotiations—although they cannot be entirely neglected—negotiations should have a reasonable chance of success within a limited time span. In order to facilitate negotiations and to avoid any detrimental precedent, it should be made explicit that any solution agreed on in the first phase should not prejudice any step or approach to be taken in the second.

Only during the second phase of MBFR, when, hopefully, the political situation in Europe will have improved as a result of the first agreement, can the more complex and political aspects of MBFR become the subject of negotiations. A considerable amount of time will undoubtedly be required before such negotiations produce results.

While the exact number and location of troops to be withdrawn will have to be determined through study within the West and negotiations with the East, the general order of magnitude we recommend would imply a substantial reduction of American troops. If each side is reduced by 50,000 troops, the resulting withdrawal of 40,000 American troops would amount to a 13 per cent reduction of all American troops stationed in Europe and the Mediterranean and to an 18 per cent reduction of troops stationed in the central and northern regions of NATO. The reduction suggested here would in fact be implemented in the central and northern areas and would decrease the number of American troops, mainly those stationed in Germany, to about 180,000.

Although the proposed reduction of 50,000 would further increase the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe, the increment is small enough not to undermine Western security substantially in respect to the different types of future threats possible within Europe. The effectiveness of America's commitment would not appear to be substantially weakened although it might approach its lowest tolerable threshold. The effectiveness and credibility of this commitment would be more assured if simultaneously a long-term concept of the European-American security relationship (as it will be discussed below) can be agreed on in the near future.

Selection of the Benelux countries and the Federal Republic of Germany in the West and East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland in the East would confine the reduction to an area where the high concentration of ground troops makes reduction somewhat less of a problem than on the northern and southern flanks, where naval and air forces

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are of higher relative importance. Although the eastern reduction area would be larger than that of NATO, selection of these countries would simplify matters considerably by avoiding the complex issue of achieving balance through asymmetry in reductions. At this stage NATO can tolerate an identical numerical reduction by East and West in the proposed area. But at a later stage and a lower level of military posture, the question of balance must be approached in a more thorough fashion by creating packages of various measures on each side to achieve an equilibrium that is acceptable to both.

The preceding proposal of a first-phase reduction of troops includes about 20 per cent European troops (10,000). Their participation appears necessary not only in order to give them a share in the savings involved but also in order to ensure adequate European participation from the very first step of MBFR. If the need arises, savings resulting from troop reductions can be used by Europeans, in part, to finance European contributions to European-American undertakings covered in a general financial agreement (to be discussed below).

The negotiations in order to be effective, must be conducted by the governments of countries with troops in the reduction area. This would involve the participation not only of countries in the reduction area and the superpowers mut also, on the Western side, of Britain, Canada, and France. Participation by Britain and France appears important both as a means of accommodating French concerns that MBFR might erode Four Power responsibility for Germany and because they are the two major military powers in Western Europe outside the countries of the reduction area.

A Reassessment and Restatement of the European-American Security Relationship

An examination of the security situation in Europe and the nature of American security commitments resulting from it seems imperative. Given the relaxation of tension in international politics and the neo-isolationist criticism of American security policy in Europe—partly a spill-over from criticism of involvements elsewhere—only a rational assessment of the situation, combined with the presentation of a security policy that is persuasive to Congress and relevant sectors of the American public, can put an end to that criticism and provide the kind of consensus necessary for certainty and continuity in US policy.

President Nixon's administration has been trying to build the consensus for a foreign policy which implies a changed and more moderate role in world affairs and provides a credible alternative to a war-weary public—wide sectors of which have been seized by a mood of withdrawal from international politics. Although his Administration has not failed to prove its commitment to European security in words or deeds, Europeans consider that this commitment would have the desired degree of long-term certainty only when it is not challenged domestically but is,

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instead, based on a dependable consensus. This consensus becomes all the more important if it should be decided—as we have suggested here—to reduce the physical presence of the United States in Europe and reorganize certain aspects of the alliance.

The final assessment and restatement of any security commitment to Europe is, of course, an exclusively American matter but discussions with Europeans, e.g. within the proposed European-American Commission, would be desirable prior to decisions on this question. Any restatement of the American security commitment to Europe cannot be taken in isolation; it must depend not only on a common assessment of the security situation but also on possible future measures, particularly on the long-term contribution which Europe is willing to make. In view of the desirability of legislative action, participation by legislators in this consultative process would be desirable.

One possible form for the restatement of the security commitment between America and Europe would be a joint declaration by the participating governments, preferably on the occasion of the proposed summit meeting of heads of Atlantic governments. Such a declaration could be accompanied by appropriate declarations from the various legislatures, e.g. in the United States by a ' Sense of the Senate '. Though declarations by the legislatures might differ from each other, each could be related to the basic issues covered in the governmental declaration.

A second possible approach would be to treat this declaration as a formal amendment to the NATO Treaty and to seek legislative action through the usual procedure of ratification.

Such a statement or amendment to the NATO Treaty should include a brief assessment of the common security situation prevailing after the 20-year period for which the original North Atlantic Treaty was concluded. Further developing the theme of the Harmel Report of 1968, the statement should outline the desirability of both security and *détente* and the prerequisites for each, in both American and European policy. These prerequisites should include on the American side a mutual contribution to security, the nuclear guarantee, and a continued US military presence in Western Europe. The statement could outline the common goals of policy on *détente*, arms control, and disarmament in Europe.

As with the NATO Treaty, the commitments undertaken in the common declaration should be valid for 15 to 20 years, and each side should agree to make important changes in its security policy only in coordination with its transatlantic partners (or partner, once Europe can act as a single unit in this field).

A European-American Financial Agreement

If the Europeans conclude that their security will continue to depend on an American commitment to Europe and some physical military presence, they should make an effort to ease the financial burden of that

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commitment. Conversely, if the Americans conclude that the defence of Western Europe is in their national interest, they should likewise agree to bear a large part of the financial burden.

Americans who argue that the US presence in Europe is maintained as a favour to the Europeans and should consequently be paid by them misread the realities of common security in the same way as Europeans who argue that the cost of American troops in Europe is none of Europe's business, since it is incurred in pursuit of US national interests. This sort of argument and continuous debate over sharing the financial burden have caused considerable strain in European-American relations and should be terminated by an agreement which settles such issues for a long period of time.

A relatively effective way of easing the financial problems in European-American security relations would be to carry out successful force reductions in East and West through MBFR. If one accepts the figure of $3 billion per year (operational, investment, and indirect costs), as the total cost of all US forces stationed in Western Europe, including the Mediterranean, a reduction of 40,000 troops in the first phase of MBFR as proposed above would amount to a saving for the United States of approximately $390 million annually. This calculation assumes that the troops would be dissolved after their withdrawal.

Nor are the foreign exchange savings negligible. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to give precise assessments since expenditures vary according to the type of troops to be reduced and according to possible arrangements concerning reinforcements. (Should the *matériel* of the troops being reduced stay in Europe? At whose expense? Who pays for the transport capacity needed to assure reinforcement?) But if we take the 1971 foreign exchange costs for US forces in Belgium, the Netherlands, and West Germany—amounting to $765 million ($1·24 billion minus $475 million of military purchases)—the proposed troop reduction would cut foreign exchange costs to approximately $350–400 million annually. (These figures do not include the approximately $90 million which West Germany pays annually to the US budget for troop facilities in the Federal Republic as a result of the 1971–73 US-German Offset Agreement.) Further budgetary and foreign exchange savings would be made if in the second—but more difficult—phase of MBFR, a reduction of American troops or weapons can be negotiated.

Despite these potential improvements some difficult problems remain. Since the largest part of American expenditure for troops in Europe is made in Germany, the United States has negotiated agreements with the German government whereby its foreign exchange expenditures have usually been offset to about 80 per cent through action by the German government. In the beginning, this was done primarily by purchasing military equipment in the United States; later, after the dollar weakened, it was achieved by German commitments not to change dollars into gold and to grant low-interest loans to the United States.

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But both procedures became increasingly difficult as Germany's needs for military equipment from the United States declined with the completion of rearmament and with growing pressure for standardization and production of arms within a European context. Moreover, the granting of loans to the United States by the German Central Bank only postpones without solving the problem. As a result, in the 1971–73 Offset Agreement the Federal Republic agreed to pay $200 million in budgetary support to the United States to build and improve local facilities for US troops.

In order to meet American criticisms of lagging European contributions, NATO also decided in December 1970 to spend an additional $1 billion over five years on a European Defence Improvement Programme for NATO infrastructure.

An attempt to reconcile American interests with European policies and financial capabilities in the light of the changing security situation could be made at two levels.

At one level, the financial implications of the US security commitment to Europe must be seen in the overall context of the economic and, in particular, monetary situation of the non-communist world. The reform of the international monetary system and—to a lesser extent—of the international trade system must create preconditions for ending the chronic US balance of payments deficit. If the non-communist countries succeed in this venture—and Europe's contribution will be vital—part of the problem of easing the financial burden of American security policy in Europe will have been solved.

To be sure, Europeans are divided on the question of whether, and how, to make a connexion between reform of the international economic system and American military involvement in Europe. Whereas some French sources argue that the United States may exploit the security issue in order to extract economic concessions from Europe, other Europeans tend to accept a link between the two areas and see the need to help the American government find a solution acceptable to a highly sensitive American public, which vastly overrates the economic burden of American military presence in Europe. In any event, reform of the international economic system, let alone its beneficial effects on the American balance of payments, will not occur for some time. For this reason, intermediate measures should be considered.

At a second level, measures should be considered which could take effect very soon and be relatively permanent. Here we must distinguish between two measures: first, an agreement on steps which the European side would take as long as the US balance of payments is in deficit for specific reasons and to an extent agreed upon beforehand. This agreement could be stated as a quasi-automatic obligation on the part of Europe to help, through available monetary and other means, in solving what are, hopefully, only transitional difficulties.

A second agreement, on the distribution of costs, is more important

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since possible troop reductions and savings can reduce the foreign exchange problem to more manageable proportions. Western Europe and America should together examine which parts of certain expenditures in Europe can be taken over multilaterally by the Europeans as a group. If it is in the interest of all West Europeans to secure American involvement in Europe, then all should participate in such a scheme. Costs to be considered might include expenditures for infrastructure located in Europe and could be financed, as well as administered, by an emerging West European defence structure.

In fact, measures aimed at a redistribution of costs would represent an important step towards the creation of a West European defence structure within the Alliance. The infrastructure such a group might take over includes, for example, supply and logistics, alert systems, radar installations, and stationing facilities for non-national troops. The last item is particularly important since a solution of this kind would transfer the politically disadvantageous budgetary subsidy now paid by the Federal Republic for troop stationing from the bilateral level to a European pool. The financing of this agreement, while making multilateral a number of bilateral and former NATO agreements, should not radically depart from the present state of affairs in terms of cost distribution.

The Creation of a West European Defence Structure

Strengthening a West European defence structure would be desirable for many reasons.[15] First of all, the time has come to create a somewhat stronger European identity within the Atlantic security relationship and to make Europe's contribution not as the sum of efforts by various states but as a joint group. Such a group would attempt to establish common positions whenever a specifically European interest is at stake or a European point of view is appropriate. It would work toward standardization and integration of arms production and establish a European command structure where this appears feasible. The creation of such a group should facilitate, and make a contribution to, the emergence of a common European foreign policy.

Secondly, the establishment of a West European defence structure should help to maintain firm ties between the United States and Europe by reorganizing the relationship and by supplanting the Atlantic Community in its previous form—an alliance in which a powerful United States was associated with many smaller countries—with a bilateral partnership aimed at maintaining security and at creating the conditions required for peaceful change in Europe over the next decade.

Thirdly, such a structure would help to compensate for a possible military weakening of Western Europe as a result of troop reductions. It would also be the group to assume certain functions which the United States, in redefining her own role, might pass on to Western Europe.

[15] The following proposals incorporate some suggestions made in François Duchêne, ' A New European Defence Community ', op. cit.

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Finally, such a structure would create better conditions for associating France more completely with the security efforts in Western Europe.

A West European defence structure could take the Euro-Group within NATO as a point of departure and develop it further where possible. In a number of cases such measures might require formal agreements which, step by step, could give a more formal structure to the Group. The West European defence structure would be the appropriate forum to pool a number of activities that were mentioned earlier in connexion with a European-American financial agreement, notably a variety of activities in the field of supply and logistics, communications, alert systems, and stationing of non-national troops. This group could negotiate as one partner with the United States and Canada and administer and finance such activities.

Although the West European defence group is not identical with the enlarged European Community and although the Community, already ridden with problems, should not be burdened with over-ambitious defence plans, a pragmatic and gradually increasing association between the defence structure and European economic and political unification would be desirable. A first step in this direction could be made if the members of the group were to merge their permanent representations to the European Community and NATO.

After a phase of consolidation and the development of arrangements with the United States and Canada, a West European defence structure could also be the appropriate, if not indispensable, forum for keeping any movement towards British-French cooperation in the nuclear field from having a divisive impact on Western Europe; rather it could induce further integration in this field. A number of technical, economic, and political reasons speak for cooperation between, and a merger of, these two deterrents. But the time is not yet ripe for such a development.[16] Cooperation or merger of the two forces, involving British transfer of nuclear know-how originating in the United States, would require American approval, and that approval is yet uncertain. Moreover, spokesmen for France, having long stressed that the nuclear risk is indivisible and that only a nation alone can decide on nuclear matters, argue that a merger of nuclear forces would require complete political unity, far beyond what exists today.

Indeed, Europe would be well-advised to avoid the potentially divisive and very controversial question of a common nuclear deterrent for many years. But the time may come where a small but effective British-French deterrent would be useful, assuming a European role agreed on with their partners in the European Community and complementary to the nuclear guarantee of the United States, which would, in turn, give it support. A West European defence structure could help to prepare the

[16] For a comprehensive analysis, see Ian Smart, ' Future Conditional: The Prospect for Anglo-French Nuclear Cooperation ', *Adelphi Papers*, No. 78 (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971).

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ground for such a development and to prevent tensions between Britain and France, on the one hand, and the rest of the European Community, particularly West Germany, on the other.

More than in the past there will be differences in perspectives and interests between the United States and Western Europe in the nuclear as well as the conventional field. This will be true, for example, in the field of arms control in Europe, such as MBFR. Nevertheless, in view of European aspirations and the basic tenets of the Nixon Doctrine, Americans and Europeans should in the future regard an internal West European process of examining and formulating European interests and positions as something natural.

Progress toward a European identity in defence will depend first on the willingness of Europeans to coordinate and pool their resources and to give that coordination an increasingly political character as the substance transcends technical matters. Second, as revealed by the unfortunate episode of the MLF in the 1960s, a unified European defence will require American backing as long as Europe's dependence on military support from the United States (more clearly felt in West Germany than elsewhere) gives the American government leverage to impose its will on a European ally. (This remains true even though the long-term damage caused to European-American relations by such American postures would be considerable, even more today than in the 1960s.)

It is imperative therefore that Americans and Europeans see the development of a European identity in defence matters against the background of basic common interests and make sure that such efforts do not erode the relationship of cooperation, particularly in the field of security.

A final word shoud be said about possible Soviet reaction to the establishment of a West European defence structure. It will almost certainly not be positive. Since a development of this kind will not contain any overt provocation for the Soviet Union, her reaction may be relatively mild. Soviet interest in preventing sudden and potentially destabilizing changes in Europe was demonstrated earlier when Brezhnev's Tiflis speech favouring MBFR helped to defeat the Mansfield Amendment stipulating unilateral US troop withdrawals. The creation of a West European defence structure can also be seen as an attempt to induce gradual change without upsetting fundamentally the existing security structure between East and West. Since the establishment of a structure along the lines proposed could help to prevent the creation of a European nuclear force—the development feared most by the Soviet Union—she might well desist from strongly opposing a Western European defence structure.

The United States and the European Community

American attitudes toward the emerging European Community have changed considerably, from unconditional support in the early post-war period to a mixture of qualified support at the official level and indiffer-

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ence, misgivings, and opposition at the unofficial level. Moreover, the nature of the issues dividing the United States and Europe and the dynamics of the forces in play suggest that this US-European alienation may become worse unless both sides make energetic efforts to reorganize their relationship.

Such reorganization should aim at restructuring relations along the lines of a bilateral partnership, with special machinery for consultation and policy coordination.

The present inability of the European Community to overcome its national divisions and to move toward genuine economic and political union is one of the major reasons for rising American reservations about the European Community. The revival of genuine efforts toward unification will make an important difference to both the United States and other outsiders in evaluating the Community's economic impact on themselves.

Greater unity is necessary not only to influence attitudes but also for greater effectiveness in solving common problems. The United States and Europe must undertake thorough reform in many fields. The chances of success will be infinitely greater if, instead of going through the frustrating experience of dealing with nine different parties, the United States can deal with one single partner—a Europe which can express itself with one voice, regardless of whether it is the Commission of the Community or a particular member of the Community speaking for the whole.

If the European Community fails to make substantial progress toward unification within the near future, American resistance to certain economic measures adopted by the Community is likely to grow, along with American disillusionment with this undertaking which they had supported for many years with great hope. A tougher American policy in its dealings with nine divided countries could, of course, aggravate Europeans' resentment of their inferior situation and make them turn against the United States, leaving American policy torn between withdrawal and continuing involvement to protect their own interests.

The Difficult Path Towards Partnership

At present, the degree of mutual misunderstandings, lack of information, and ignorance of the fundamental problems at stake have reached a dangerous level in European-American relations. As a European observer put it, ' American opinion tends to perceive simultaneously the spectacular " reconciliation " with China, the partial arrangements with the Soviet Union, and the monetary commercial quarrels with the Europeans; it appears as if the United States had as adversaries, if not as enemies, allies only '.[17]

Peaceful transformation in Europe is the declared goal of all European governments and the superpowers. But as can be seen the

[17] Raymond Aron, *Vingt-cinq ans après le Plan Marshall*, paper given at an American-European Conference at Royaumont, 4–7 May 1972, mimeographed, p. 27.

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process of detente, of arms control measures and of creating new structures of cooperation is not without problems. It unleashes new forces which render the process unpredictable and potentially unmanageable to the point of leading to the opposite of what one set out to do.

Policies for the coming years have to transcend Cold War fixations in a double sense both by ceasing to regard the East-West conflict as permanent and immovable as well as by avoiding the opposite conclusion that any security policies involving military means can be abolished as the remnant of a reactionary past. Peaceful change must enhance security and in the short run at least maintain it.

Security in Europe is the result of three inter-connected dimensions: first, the balance of military power; second, the structure of relations between the states involved in this area; third, the domestic freedom to pursue policies of one's choice and adequate conditions for peaceful change without outside interference. A military balance alone is no guarantee for or indicator of security. Its political context gives it real meaning: the political solidarity and identity of interests among allies, the firmness of commitments, the structure of alliances etc. Moreover, the nature of the political relationship between the adversaries and their allies, the degree of tension, the conflicts or identities of interest, etc. provide the setting of security. By the same token an interpretation which would view security exclusively from the standpoint of the probability of military action would be equally misleading for it would leave out the large area of non-military pressures and interference which are of particular importance to Europeans.

In the U.S., despite Administration efforts to the contrary, the public discussion appears to presume that the entire security relationship with Europe can be reduced to the question of whether or not U.S. troops should stay there, be financed by the Europeans or withdraw. This fixation is mirrored in the West European public which watches every development in this field across the Atlantic with the typical nervousness of the dependent. Unable to overcome deeply rooted national myopia, the Europeans also have great difficulties seeing the security problen in a larger perspective.

A rational debate is needed on the issues at stake in which problems are examined, illusions and prejudices exposed, and alternatives presented. Unless, for example, the informed American public can be convinced through a rational presentation of the facts that US isolationism and protectionism are basically irreconcilable with American interests, any attempt to reform trade or monetary policy, let alone security policy, will be difficult if not futile. Therefore a public discussion to accompany measures at the diplomatic level between America and Europe is urgently necessary.

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Operational Principles of Soviet Foreign Policy

Richard Pipes*

PERHAPS the best way to define the scope of this essay is negatively, by stating what it is not. Our purpose is not to lay bare the motives of Soviet foreign policy or its ultimate aspirations. These topics lie at the heart of the matter, of course, and cannot be entirely ignored; but, belonging as they do to the realm of national and elite psychology they are best set aside for separate treatment.[1]

Nor will our concern be with the narrower subject of Soviet techniques of negotiation. Although diplomats trained in the traditional school have good reason to look upon Russian (or, more precisely, communist) methods of negotiating as in a class of their own, it is doubtful whether such methods actually exist.[2] Frustrations experienced in negotiating with communists derive from the fact that the latter often engage in talks in order not to reach an agreement but to attain some other, incidental objective, such as ascertaining how strong is their opponents' determination on a given issue, splitting hostile alliances, or influencing world opinion. When they intend to use negotiations in this manner, communist diplomats indeed display an intransigence which can be mollified only by full acceptance of their terms, that is, by surrender of the principle of compromise which is the quintessence of negotiation.

However, whenever they happen to be interested in a settlement, communist diplomats act in a traditional manner, efficiently and undeterred by difficulties. One need only recall the speed with which in 1939 the Soviet Union concluded its non-aggression treaty with Germany, or the relative ease with which the communist bloc settled its outstanding difficulties with the West immediately after Stalin's death, once the new party leadership in Russia had concluded that a *détente* was in order. Responding to Eisenhower's 'deeds not words' speech of 16 April 1953, in which the President called for a resolution of several major problems, among them Korea, Vietnam, and Austria, communist diplomats negotiated in reasonable time mutually agreeable terms on issues which only a short time earlier had seemed to defy all

* This article is based on a paper presented by the author at the Conference on the Soviet Union and the Middle East at Tel-Aviv University and subsequently submitted to the US Senate Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations.

1 I have attempted to deal with this matter briefly in 'Russia's Mission, America's Destiny: The Premises of US and Soviet Foreign Policy', *Encounter*, October 1970.

2 This subject is treated by a group of experienced negotiators in Raymond Dennett and Joseph E. Johnson, eds., *Negotiating with the Russians* (Boston, 1951), and in an amusing chapter in Heinz Pächter's *Weltmacht Russland* (Oldenburg-Hamburg, 1968), pp. 372–77.

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solution. As a result, in July 1953 there was an armistice in Korea, in June 1954 an armistice in Indochina, and in May 1955 a long overdue treaty with Austria. It is certainly no coincidence that shortly after President Nixon had announced he intended to pay a state visit to China, hoary disagreements affecting the status of West Berlin melted away and a workable draft of a four-power agreement could be hammered out. All of which suggests that if the West often faces excruciating difficulties negotiating with the communists the fault lies not in different negotiating techniques. The communists employ distinct methods of diplomatic intercourse only when they have in mind objectives other than negotiation and agreement.

One way to describe what we will be talking about is to borrow terms from the vocabulary of military science. The language of Soviet politics is permeated with militarisms: even the most pacific spheres of government activity become 'fronts' which have to be 'stormed', all-out 'offensives' are launched to conquer internal difficulties, and even peace itself becomes the object of a 'struggle'. The martial language is appropriate, for, as will be noted shortly, Soviet theory does not distinguish sharply between military and political forms of activity, regarding both as variant ways of waging conflict which it regards as the essence of history. 'Strategy' and 'tactics' are useful in this connexion, and have been employed. But even more accurate is a third term from the vocabulary of Soviet military theory, 'the art of operations' (*operativnoe isskustvo*). Its origin apparently goes back to the 1890s, but it acquired special relevance in the 1920s, when Soviet experts, analysing the record of World War I and of the Russian Civil War, concluded that neither 'strategy' nor 'tactics' adequately described warfare waged with mass armies under industrial conditions. They then created the concept 'art of operations' to bridge the two. Since that time this concept has occupied an honoured place in Soviet military thinking, and, indeed, some Soviet authorities credit Russian victories in World War II to its systematic application. If tactics describes the employment of troops on the battlefield, and strategy the overall disposition of all of one's forces, the 'art of operations' denotes the fluid and dynamic element in military planning by virtue of which individual tactical moves are coordinated over a period of time to promote the ultimate strategic objective, defeat of the enemy.

According to Soviet theorists, under conditions of prolonged modern warfare victory requires a succession of interdependent operations, based on solid logistic support and synchronized to produce on the enemy mounting pressure which, attaining unbearable levels, eventually causes him to collapse. In the literature on the subject, there are just enough hints to indicate that the 'art of operations' is derived mainly from analysis of the campaigns waged in World War I by General Ludendorff, whose masterful conduct of 'total' war seems to have exercised a greater influence on communist political practices than the writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels combined: 'The purpose

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of operations is the destruction, the complete annihilation of the vital forces of the enemy', states a recent Soviet handbook on the subject, paraphrasing an authority of the 1920s, 'its method is the uninterrupted attack; its means, prolonged operational pursuit, which avoids pauses and stops, and is attained by a succession of consecutive operations, each of which serves as the transitional link towards the ultimate goal, accomplished in the final, closing operation'.[3] The whole concept, with its stress on coordinated, uninterrupted assault intended to bring mounting pressure on the enemy, admirably describes what is probably the most characteristic feature of Soviet foreign policy.

The subject is of great importance and deserves the kind of careful study given to Soviet military practices. Soviet foreign policy involves a great deal more than diplomacy: diplomacy is one of its minor instrumentalities and Soviet diplomats resemble more the bearers of white flags sent to cross combat lines than the staff officers or the combatants. But it is also more than mere military bluster. One cannot isolate from the total arsenal of Soviet foreign policy any one weapon and by neutralizing its sting hope to still its thrust. To understand this policy one must understand its mode of operations. The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on this remarkably ignored subject.

The Art of Operations

In an essay on creativity, Arthur Koestler observed that seminal ideas are born from bringing two premises belonging to two different mental fields to bear upon each other.[4] Using this approach, Marxism may be said to owe its influence to a successful fusion of sociology with economics, and Freudianism to the grafting of medicine onto psychology. With this definition in mind, we may ascribe the significance of Leninism as an ideological force in the twentieth century to an innovative linking of politics with warfare—in other words, to the militarization of politics which Lenin was the first statesman to accomplish.

For psychological reasons which need not be gone into here, what most attracted Lenin in the writings of Marx and Engels was not the liberal and democratic spirit strongly in evidence there, but the idea of class war. Peter Struve, who knew him well in his early political career, says that Lenin took to Marx's theory mainly because he found in it 'the doctrine of class war, relentless and thoroughgoing, aiming at the final destruction and extermination of the enemy'.[5] Class war, of course, was and remains the common property of all socialist and anarchist movements of modern times. But to Lenin, more than to any other prominent radical of his period, it was a real, tangible thing: a

[3] *Voprosy strategii i operativnogo isskustva v sovetskikh voennykh trudakh, 1917–1940 gg.* (Moscow, 1965), p. 13.

[4] *Insight and Outlook* (New York, 1949), especially Chapter xviii, 'The Eureka Process'.

[5] Cited in my book, *Struve, Liberal on the Left, 1870–1905* (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), p. 134.

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daily, hourly struggle pitting the exploited against the exploiters and (after November 1917) what he defined as the 'camp of socialism' against that of 'capitalism' or 'imperialism'. What to Marx and Engels was a means, became for him an end. His preoccupation as theorist was always with the methods of waging political warfare: anything that did not in some way bear on that subject, he regarded as harmful, or at best, as useless. All his thinking was militant. He was the first public figure to view politics entirely in terms of warfare, and to pursue this conception to its inexorable conclusion. Lenin read Clausewitz rather late in life (1915), but he immediately found him a most congenial writer. He referred to him often, praising him as a thinker whose ideas, as he once put it, have become 'the indispensable acquisition of every thinking man'.[6] As one might expect, he especially admired Clausewitz's insistence that war and politics were not antithetical means of conducting relations among states but alternatives, chosen according to what the situation required. On one occasion, Lenin told a friend that 'political tactics and military tactics represent that which the Germans call *Grenzgebiet* [border areas]', and urged communist party workers to study Clausewitz to learn the applications of this principle.[7]

These historical and biographical facts require mention because the Soviet leadership in power since November 1917 has been thoroughly imbued with the spirit of Leninist politics. The reason lies not in the innate force of Lenin's ideas or the ability of any idea to be bequeathed intact from one generation to another. It lies in the fact that the Soviet leadership of today finds itself in a situation in all essential respects identical with the one Lenin had left on his death, that is, devoid of a popular mandate or any other kind of legitimacy to justify its monopoly of political power except the alleged exigencies of class war. The regime is locked in; and even if it wanted to extricate itself from its predicament by democratizing it could not do so because of the staunch opposition of the bureaucratic establishment to genuine political reform. The closed character of Russia's ruling elite, its insulation from the inflow of fresh human types and ideas by means of the principle of cooptation assures a high degree of ideological and psychological continuity. In this respect, the Soviet elite resembles a self-perpetuating religious order rather than what one ordinarily thinks of as a governing class. The growth of productivity, the rise in living standards, the spread of education, and the sundry other factors which some Western observers count on in time to liberalize the Soviet system have no bearing either on the internal position of the ruling elite or on its

[6] V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, 3rd ed. (Moscow, 1926–37), xxx, p. 333. Admiration for Clausewitz is something the Bolsheviks and the Nazis have in common.

[7] V. Sorin, 'Marksizm, taktika, Lenin'. (*Pravda*, No. 1, 3 January 1923, p. 5.) On another occasion, Lenin wrote: 'To have an overwhelming superiority of forces at a decisive moment in a decisive place—this "law" of military success is also the law of political success. . . .' Lenin, *Sochineniya*, xxiv, p. 635. Lenin's copious notes on Clausewitz are reprinted in *Leninskii sbornik*, xii (1931), pp. 387–452.

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political outlook. Only a major upheaval—such as a prolonged and unsuccessful war, or a prolonged and unresolved feud among the leaders —could alter the situation.

The Soviet government conducts a ' total ' foreign policy which draws no essential distinction between diplomatic, economic, psychological, or military means of operation. It also does not differentiate in any fundamental respect between domestic and foreign relations. This accounts for the virtual absence in the Soviet Union of a literature devoted to the theory of foreign relations. Every policy decision, after all, is made in the Politburo of the party. As a rule, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs (the incumbent, Andrei Gromyko, included) is not a member of the Politburo—a fact which suggests the importance that attaches to his office. The Soviet Union maintains a Ministry of Foreign Affairs with its diplomatic corps because other countries with which it deals happen to do so. It does not, however, entrust the Ministry with the formulation of foreign policy. All important foreign policy decisions are made in the Politburo and frequently are even carried out by its own departments. The role of the Ministry is further whittled down by the practice increasingly to entrust foreign policy matters to organs of the police and intelligence. The KGB, through its ' Foreign Directorate ' (First Main Administration), and with the assistance of organs of military intelligence (GRU), may well have a greater voice in Soviet foreign policy, especially as it concerns the so-called Third World, than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Alexander Kaznacheev, a one-time Soviet diplomat stationed in Rangoon, states that among his hundred or more colleagues in the embassy, fewer than one-fifth actually worked for the Ministry and were responsible to the Ambassador; the remainder were employed by other agencies, mostly engaged in intelligence activities and reporting directly to Moscow.[8] In contending with a foreign policy of such an unorthodox kind, the United States has had to charge its own Central Intelligence Agency with a variety of responsibilities exceeding its formal mandate. These activities have recently been restrained, to the visible relief of the KGB and other operational intelligence agencies of the Soviet Union which prefer to have this particular field all to themselves. The steady shift of the epicentre of US foreign policy management from the Department of State to the White House is probably part of the same process which earlier had led to the broadening of the CIA's functions, namely, the need somehow to counter ' total ' Soviet policy with a ' total ' policy of one's own.

The Correlation of Forces

When we say that Soviet policy is inherently militant we do not mean to imply it is necessarily belligerent. In the context of an ideology

[8] Cited in Sir William Hayter, *Russia and the World* (London, 1970), pp. 18–19.

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which regards armed conflict as only one of several instruments at the politician's disposal, militancy can be expressed in a great variety of ways. If those who take a 'soft' line in regard to Soviet Russia tend to err in their estimate of Soviet motives and aims by making them appear more reasonable than they in fact are, the 'hard' liners err only a little less seriously in their judgment of Soviet procedures, overestimating the role of warfare and neglecting other means of waging battle which Russia employs. In the decade that followed the end of World War II, American policy towards the Soviet Union, anchored as it was in the 'hard' position, concentrated so exclusively on the Soviet military threat that when in 1954–55 Russian strategy changed and 'peaceful coexistence' replaced the head-on assault attempted under Stalin, American policy was thrown into a confusion from which it has still to recover.

Militancy rather means maintaining one's citizenry in the state of constant war-like mobilization, and exerting relentless pressure outside Russia's borders. The means used differ, depending on the circumstances.

One of the basic ingredients in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy is what Russian theoreticians call the 'correlation of forces' (*sootnoshenie sil*). By this term is meant the actual capability of the contending parties to inflict harm on each other, knowledge of which allows one to decide in any given situation whether to act more aggressively or less, and which of the various means available to employ. The concept is used in the analysis of the internal conditions of a foreign country in which Russia has an interest, (in which case it refers to the power relationship of social classes) as well as to international affairs where the parties are sovereign states or multinational blocs. Analyses of the 'correlation of forces' are by no means an academic exercise. Under Khrushchev, when rivalry with the United States assumed new and dangerous forms, Soviet publications were filled with learned inquiries into the power balance between the Western and Eastern blocs, and there is every reason to believe that then, as now, such studies seriously influenced policy. 'Force', of course, is a vague and relative concept, and Russian analysts almost always overestimate quantity (e.g. land, population, and productivity figures) at the expense of quality (e.g. fighting spirit, cultural factors, or the calibre of leadership). Still, mindful of the Russian proverb: 'If you don't know the ford don't step into the river', they do not plunge into contests blindly; they rarely gamble, unless they feel the odds are overwhelmingly in their favour.

Russian leaders regard military force as a weapon to be used only in extreme contingencies when there is no alternative and the risks involved appear minimal. There are many reasons to account for this caution, the main one probably being lack of confidence in their own troops, especially when engaged outside Soviet borders. They much prefer to use military force as a means of blackmail. The reluctance to commit

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their military forces abroad distinguishes Soviet expansionism from the German, and it would be a mistake to hope tc contain it by excessive reliance on methods which might indeed have stopped Hitler in the 1930s.

The militancy of Soviet foreign policy rests on the unspoken assumption that the Soviet Union can assail the enemy at a time, and a place, and in a manner of its own choosing. It is so strongly permeated with the offensive spirit that contingency plans in the event of failure and enemy counter-attack seem rarely to be drawn up, if only because even to contemplate retreat opens one to accusation of defeatism. The Russians are quite prepared to pull back when resistance on any one sector of the enemy front turns out to be stronger than anticipated: there are always other sectors which are less staunchly defended and where one's force can be applied to better advantage. But when the opponent chooses to strike back, they are surprisingly vulnerable. The inability of the Russians, in the summer of 1941, to stop Hitler from penetrating deep into their country was in no small measure due to a failure to prepare for defensive war. In the Cuban missile imbroglio of 1962, the response in Moscow to decisive American counter-measures was panic. (How embarrassing this was to the Soviet government may be judged from the fact that Khrushchev's famous cable of 26 October to President Kennedy still has not been released. Considering that much more embarrassing revelations concerning the US government have been made public in recent years, such solicitude for Russian feelings seems out of place.) Nor did the Soviet leadership seem to have anticipated the outbreak of the Israeli-Arab war of 1967 which its own actions had done a great deal to provoke. If, so far, the government of Soviet Russia has not been required to pay a heavier price for the failure to anticipate blows, it is only because their opponents usually have been content with a reversion to the *status quo ante* and did not press their advantage.

Militancy is so deeply entrenched in the mentality of the Soviet elite, it follows so naturally from the character of its personnel and its relationship to the population at large, that it is doubtful whether the best way to ease East-West tensions is by attempting a piecemeal resolution of specific disagreements. Those who urge so in the name of pragmatism are in fact motivated by impatience. In the case of East-West tension, specific disagreements are not the cause but the consequence. The second world war, too, was not, after all, fought over Danzig.

The uses of threat

On 23 February 1942, on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Red Army, Stalin issued an Order of the Day in which he listed five 'constant principles' that win wars. They were, in order of importance, first and foremost 'stability of the home front,' followed by second, morale of the armed forces. third, the quantity and

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quality of the divisions, fourth, military equipment, and fifth ability of the commanders.[9] That Stalin should have attached such significance to morale, and in particular to the morale of the civilian population, is not surprising considering that the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia because the 'home front', unable to withstand the strains of war, had collapsed. Given his admiration for Hitler, Stalin might even have come to believe that German defeat in World War I, too, had been caused by failure of the civilian population to support the front-line troops. In this pronouncement, we have a valuable clue to that element in military and political operations which the maker of Soviet Russia and his heirs regard as crucial.

It has long been an axiom of military theory that the ideal battle is won before a single shot has been fired, by the victor depriving the enemy of the will to resist. Demoralization has been practised with particular success by Napoleon, and German military theorists, following the example he has set, have striven with great perseverance to duplicate his feats. For all their admiration for the German military and willingness to learn from them, the Russians, however, have been slow to apply this particular principle to politics. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union in the first quarter century of its existence was ponderous and unimaginative. Soviet leaders seem first to have learned how to unnerve the opponent without actually fighting (or as a prelude to fighting) from observing the brazen manner in which Hitler, alternating threats with inducements, had managed to paralyze England and France. The effect on colonial peoples of Axis victories has often been noted; but it was probably no smaller on Soviet Russia which shared with the colonial nations a sense of awe towards the great powers of the West. Stalin has expressed on a number of occasions respect for Nazi methods, but always with one reservation: Hitler was overconfident, he underestimated the enemy, he did not know when to stop. The Cold War which he himself launched represented, in effect, a replay of Hitler's game but with careful attention to the 'correlation of forces'.

The quality common to Nazi and post-1946 Soviet methods of waging political warfare is the practice of making limited, piecemeal encroachments on Western positions to the accompaniment of threats entirely out of proportion to the losses the West is asked to bear. The threats are coupled with all kinds of inducements which make non-acquiescence even more absurd. The Soviet Juridical Dictionary, in its definition of threat as a criminal offence, inadvertently provides a useful description of its uses as a political weapon: Threat (*ugroza*), it says, is a 'distinct type of psychic influence on the victim for the purpose of compelling him to commit one action or another, or to refrain from committing them, in the interest of the threatener. . . . Such threats . . . can serve to paralyze the victim's will . . .'.[10] In the case of

[9] Cited in J. M. Mackintosh, *The Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy* (London, 1962), pp. 90–91.

[10] P. I. Kudryavtsev, ed., *Yuridicheskii slovar*, 2nd ed., II (Moscow, 1956), p. 550.

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international politics, the primary target of threats is public opinion. Their function is to disorient it to the point where it refuses to follow the national leadership and by passive or active resistance compels the government to make one concession after another.

Threats can be direct or indirect. Khrushchev specialized in the former, cultivating the public stance of a violent and unpredictable man whom it would be unwise to provoke—a ploy of which Hitler was the first to make masterful use. Sometimes Khrushchev liked to drop hints as to what Russia would do if thwarted—hints so vaguely worded as to be open to differing interpretations. At other times he spelled out his threats with brutal frankness, as for example, when he spoke of 'country-busting'. The present Soviet administration, though not bashful about its capacity to punish adversaries, prefers to appear as a mature world power, aware of the awesome responsibility possession of nuclear weapons imposes on it. But it is not averse to taking advantage of the 'irresponsibility' ploy by shifting blame onto its friends and allies, which it occasionally depicts as wildly emotional, hoping, by this device, to enlist Western support for its policies. This gambit has been used repeatedly in recent years in the Middle East. A recent dispatch from London by United Press International, for example (and it is one of many), credits anonymous East European diplomatic sources with the intelligence that the Soviet Union fears Egypt could involve it in a Middle Eastern war against its wishes. Russia—the dispatch continues—is, of course, doing all it can to restrain President Sadat, but since its own prestige is at stake 'precipitate Egyptian war action could drag Moscow into hostilities despite Russian intentions'.[11] The implied conclusion is that the United States, in order to avoid general war in which it might have to confront the Soviet Union, should compel Israel to comply with Egyptian terms. Such 'leaks', reported by the Western press as if they were news, have for Soviet Russia the same value as direct threats but they cost it even less, allowing it to blackmail in the name of third parties.

Until it had the bomb and the means of delivering it across continents, the Soviet Union was unable credibly to threaten military action as Hitler had done in 1933–39 and therefore could not wage global Cold War in an effective manner. Stalin had ordered the manufacture of atomic and hydrogen bombs, without having a clear understanding of their uses: he probably thought he had to have them to be able to face the United States as an equal. His attempts at paralyzing the West into submission were ultimately a failure because his threats carried no conviction. The benefits to be derived from nuclear blackmail were first grasped by Khrushchev and the military who had helped him unseat the more cautious Malenkov. Almost immediately upon coming to power, Khrushchev instigated a major deception intended to convince the United States that he had at his disposal more nuclear weapons and

[11] *The Boston Evening Globe*, 10 November 1971, p. 15.

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better means of delivering them than in fact was the case. First came Aviation Day of July 1955 when small units of Bisons, apparently flying in circles over Moscow, suggested to Western observers that Russia already had a respectable fleet of strategic bombers. Two years later came the Sputnik, and an even more incredible deception concerning the number of Soviet ICBMs.[12] These stratagems helped to undermine the traditional sense of invulnerability to external attack of the United States and persuade it that the only viable alternative to mutual nuclear destruction was accommodation with the Soviet Union. This proposition was not explicitly stated but hinted at. It was President Eisenhower and his advisors who first spelled out the principles that there was 'no alternative to peace', that 'war had become unthinkable' and that negotiation was therefore the only feasible way of settling all disagreements with the Soviet Union. The Geneva Conference of 1955 and the Camp David meeting of 1959 formalized this understanding. Since, as will be pointed out, the Soviet Union enjoys great advantages in negotiations with Western powers, the acceptance by the West of these principles represented a considerable Russian victory. It set the rules for the conduct of operations against the West in a fashion favourable to the Soviet side.

In one sense, the policy of threats initiated by Khrushchev has not worked: even nuclear blackmail has not made the United States and its allies give up their principal positions, such as NATO and West Germany's membership in it. But the policy has had considerable effect on Western public opinion. Ever since the Soviet Union acquired the ability to inflict heavy punishment on Western countries a paralysis of the will has set in. The leadership stands firm but it can no longer wholly depend on the citizenry, and this condition sooner or later must reflect itself in national policies. While encouraging these tendencies toward isolationism and *embourgeoisement* in the West, the Soviet leadership in its internal policies seeks to steel the Soviet population and, by depriving it of the good things of life, to keep it lean, hungry, and alert.[13]

Appeals to foreign groups

In seeking to influence foreign opinion, Soviet leaders rely on sociological methods of analysis to differentiate the various social and ethnic groupings and determine where each is most vulnerable. We are dealing here with a practical application of political sociology learned from Marx with which the founders of the Soviet state had gained experience while still in the underground. The method is certainly not infallible:

[12] This fascinating story is described by Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chicago, 1966). I owe these two authors the reference cited above in note 10.

[13] It is interesting to observe that whereas in the era of 'peaceful coexistence' with the West, the Soviet government goes out of its way to maintain in Russia the spirit of ideological militancy toward the West, during the period of amity with Nazi Germany (1939–41) it was equally anxious in its internal propaganda to give no offence to the government of Hitler.

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it serves better to spot weaknesses than strengths. Even so, it is vastly superior to the rather amateurish manner in which some Western powers approach foreign affairs. When, many years ago, the United States committed half a million men to fight a ground war in Vietnam, not a single American university had a chair devoted to Vietnamese history. (There still is none at the time of writing, for that matter.) It is simply unthinkable that the Soviet Union would ever plunge into a major foreign intervention without acquiring beforehand a solid store of historical, economic, political, social, and cultural information on the country in question, and from it obtain at least some idea who its potential friends and enemies there are, and how to deal with them. A large part of the research in Soviet institutes devoted to the social sciences and of academic and cultural exchanges is intended to provide the government with such information. Although Russians enjoy a reputation for abstract theorizing and Americans for pragmatism, in the formulation of foreign policy the reverse holds true. The Russians are not likely to undertake any action on the basis of highly generalized assumptions; they usually arrive at decisions on the basis of concrete, factual data in which everything bearing on the 'correlation of forces' is given the most careful scrutiny.

Before World War II, Soviet propaganda was aimed primarily at those underprivileged groups which had traditionally been the object of socialist propaganda: the working class and colonial peoples, above all, followed by other discriminated or deprived groups. Since World War II, the appeal to the underprivileged has been gradually muted and the Soviet leadership has been increasingly courting the established and the aspiring. Why this change occurred it is difficult to say. Perhaps the lower classes had not justified the high hopes placed in them, revealing an unsuspected penchant for nationalism. Perhaps the Russians were impressed by the success which Hitler had had in manipulating the upper and middle classes in England and France. Finally, as the ruling class of Russia has itself turned into a privileged order it has perhaps come to feel greater affinity for its counterparts abroad. Whichever explanation is the correct one, there can be no doubt that in recent years Russian communists have courted with greater vigour and success the upper third of the social strata than the bottom.

In Western countries, the appeal is to the monied and managerial elite. In recent years, Soviet theorists have become increasingly sophisticated in their analyses of 'capitalist' societies, recognizing the existence of various interest groups within what under Stalin had been considered a homogeneous 'ruling class'.[14] This information enables the Soviet government to direct appeals calculated to sway influential groups in favour of its policies and through them to apply political pressure on foreign governments. In addition, individual persons, valuable because

[14] H. William Zimmerman, *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations, 1956–1967* (Princeton, N.J., 1969), pp. 214–218.

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of their connexions or their influence on public opinion, are won over by appeals to their greed or vanity. A considerable effort is mounted to this end, an effort of whose dimensions the general public—and often its very victims—have little inkling. In the underdeveloped countries, much of the effort is aimed at the aspiring lower middle class, lured by the prospect of secure office jobs in the enlarged bureaucracy which would come into being under a one-party system and a centralized economy.

In this connexion a few words must be said about the function of foreign communist parties which is often misunderstood. Communist parties are not used for purposes of subversion except in the most backward areas of the world because, being vulnerable to penetration by police agents, they cannot provide the necessary security. KGB agents who have been uncovered in the West not only had no connexion with local communists but made every effort to appear conventional. Nor are these parties thought of as alternate governments to take over after the existing governments have been overthrown. When, after World War II, the Soviet Union occupied Eastern Europe it did not put in positions of power local communists but communists trained in Moscow. Once the East European client states had been solidified, the local communists were purged as thoroughly and with even greater vindictiveness than adherents of the so-called 'bourgeois' political parties.

The principal role assigned to communist parties abroad seems to lie in the realm of legitimate political activities and the moulding of opinion. Where they enjoy enough voter support to form significant parliamentary blocs—as in France or Italy—they can be used to tip the legislative scales in a manner favourable to the USSR: for example, by opposing NATO or the Common Market. Where they are not strong enough to do so, they can still provide vigorous opposition to the groups in power and to some extent intimidate them. Public demonstrations are particularly useful. These are never spontaneous but they appear to be so and always receive public notice. A well-organized demonstration can create a completely false impression of the actual state of opinion in a given country and sway fence-sitters. In October 1968, while a crowd of six thousand protested on Grosvenor Square against American intervention in Vietnam, only seven demonstrators showed up in front of the Soviet Embassy to protest against the invasion of Czechoslovakia on the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Czech republic. In Tokyo, the masses roam the streets to protest against the terms on which Okinawa is to be transferred to Japan; there is no news of demonstrations against Soviet refusal even to discuss the transfer to Japan of the Kurile Islands. In countries with a low level of literacy, it often happens that the communist press is also used to spread the most outrageous lies aimed at discrediting individuals, parties, and states unfriendly to Soviet interests and prepared by the 'disinformation' branch of the KGB. Last but not least, foreign communist organizations

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are valuable to the Soviet Union for internal purposes. On any issue, the Soviet press can always cite resolutions of foreign communist parties to convey to the Soviet public an impression of solid support abroad for Russian policies. Useful as they are, one must not overestimate the importance which the Soviet leadership attaches to foreign communist parties. It much prefers to establish working relations with the foreign elites; and there is enough evidence on hand to indicate that when the interests of the Soviet Union require it, foreign communist parties are readily sacrificed. They are only one element in the calculation of forces, and not the most weighty one at that.

Some diplomatic propaganda techniques

In addition to appealing to specific opinion and interest groups abroad, the Soviet Union also engages in major propaganda moves on issues which it considers of major international importance, the purpose of which is to attain concrete political advantages. These are never launched haphazardly: they are deliberate, projected over the long term, and pressed with great vigour.

The most important of those has been the cause of peace. There is no need to go into the history of the various peace campaigns initiated by Stalin and carried on by his successors. What merits attention is the adroit use made of the peace slogan for the benefit of Soviet foreign policy. Inside Russia, the communist regime succeeded long ago in establishing the principle that any opposition to it is, *ipso facto* and, as it were, by definition, counter-revolutionary. Once that principle has been accepted, the Soviet government need not examine any claims made against itself. It may admit, in retrospect, that errors have been committed; but while the policies which might lead to these errors are in force, no questioning is allowed since to do so is tantamount to giving aid and comfort to the class enemy. Since it acquired nuclear weapons the Soviet Union has succeeded to a surprising extent in persuading foreign opinion that insofar as any conflict between the major powers creates the danger of world destruction, all hostility to the Soviet government and its ideology or any thwarting of its will is *ipso facto* and by definition tantamount to war-mongering. By this logic, 'anti-communism' is equated with 'anti-humanism'. Like so many weapons of political warfare, this device is double-edged; but it so happens that the other edge is never bared.

To maintain its reputation as *defensor pacis*, the Soviet Union frequently concocts imaginary threats to world peace which it then takes credit for dissipating. Soviet histories of foreign policy are filled with such incidents: for example, an alleged Turkish threat to Syria in 1957, alleged United States plots against Iraq in 1958 and 1962, and alleged Western designs against the Congo in 1960 and Cyprus in 1964. By foiling such nefarious designs of its own invention, the Soviet Union gains much credit at small expense and minimum risk. In Spring 1967

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this time-tested device backfired when an alleged Israeli plot against Syria, put forward by Soviet intelligence, for once was not quietly resolved but led to war.

An interesting and often successful technique employed by Moscow is to turn the tables on the opponent by confusing the real issues at stake. A classic example is Soviet propaganda in the present Israeli-Egyptian dispute. To understand how this technique works it is best to abstract from the specific issues of the Israeli-Egyptian conflict and approach it in a generalized manner. Two powers—let us call them A and B—are at odds. War breaks out, country B defeats A, occupying in the process some of A's territory. At this juncture, in normal international practice, sooner or later negotiations begin. In the resulting peace settlement, the defeated party usually has to make some concessions to the victor, among them, possibly, territorial ones. If for the defeated party A we substitute, say, France in 1870–71 or Finland in 1939–40, and for the victorious party B, respectively, Prussia and the Soviet Union, the pattern becomes clear. In both instances, the victor secured from the vanquished some territory and returned the remainder. Such too, according to the dictates of logic, precedent, and interest of the countries involved, ought to be the outcome of the 1967 War. That it is not, is due, in the first place to the unwillingness of Egypt to recognize the existence of Israel as a sovereign state. In this refusal Egypt is supported by the Soviet Union. The peculiar feature of this conflict is that whereas the real issue at stake is negotiation between the belligerents, Soviet propaganda has managed to make the main issue appear Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the course of the war. Thus, a matter which should be part of the final settlement of the conflict becomes a precondition of negotiations leading to a settlement. Whatever one's feelings about the substance of the Israeli-Egyptian dispute, one cannot but admire the adroit use of an intellectual confidence trick to turn the tables on an opponent and shift the onus of recalcitrance from oneself to the other party.

Soviet estimate of the American psyche

In dealing with the United States in particular, the Russians have worked out over the past 30 years an interesting set of approaches based on certain assumptions about American ways of thinking and feeling.

In discussing the relations between America and Russia, one cannot emphasize strongly enough the effect which their disparate economic traditions have had on their political conduct. A country like the United States whose preoccupation is commercial is inherently predisposed toward compromise: each trading transaction, after all, must hold some profit for both parties; negotiation is over the division of profits, not over the principle of mutual benefit. On the other hand, a country which makes its living primarily from the production of goods —never mind whether agricultural, extractive, or industrial—is equally

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predisposed toward monopolistic control and the denial of the principle of compromise.

This factor has had an immense influence on the conduct of international relations of the two countries. When the United States makes a proposal to the Soviet Union, it invariably includes in it provisions designed to make it palatable to the other party; in other words, it makes concessions in advance of actual negotiations, assuming the other party will do likewise. (There have been instances of the United States making major concessions to the Soviet Union to get it to do things it wanted anyway, such as join in the last stages of the war against Japan.) But where the other party is a country like the Soviet Union, without a great commercial tradition and furthermore impelled by ideology toward intransigence, this assumption does not hold. The Russian position always represents the actual expectations of the Soviet government, weighted down with additional unrealistic demands to be given up in exchange for the other side's concessions. In this sense, the Russians always enjoy an immense advantage in negotiating with a country like the United States. Any compromise works in their favour insofar as the American preliminary position already includes some concessions which need not be fought for at all. Occasionally, in preliminary talks, Russian diplomats work out with their opposite numbers from the West a compromise formula which is then sent to Moscow as representing the Western position. Clearly, when Moscow sends back its counterproposals, the Russians come out the winners. This technique theoretically gives the Russians three-quarters of the gain in any compromise solution.

Equally important though more difficult to define is the Russian play on certain elements in the American psyche. A strong residue of the Protestant ethic causes Americans to regard all hostility to them as at least in some measure brought about by their own faults. That one can be hated for what one is rather than for what one does (to use Mr George Kennan's formula) is difficult to reconcile with the liberal Protestant ethic which still pervades American culture. It is quite possible to exploit this tendency to self-accusation by putting in motion a steady barrage of hostile actions accompanied by expressions of hatred. The natural reaction of the victims, if they are Americans, can be and often is bewilderment accompanied by guilt. An atmosphere conducive to concessions is thus created, the purpose of which is to propitiate the allegedly injured party. The roots of English appeasement in the 1930s probably lay in these psychological factors; and the Russians, imitating the Nazis, have had much success in exploiting such methods. One need only recall the uses Stalin made of so-called American 'intervention' in the Russian Civil War, as a counterpart of Hitler's use of the Versailles *Diktat*, to see the parallel.

Adherence to priorities

The militant spirit of the Soviet leadership, its refusal to separate sharply either peace from war or internal politics from external ones,

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and the participation in the making of foreign policy of several organizations, among which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs occupies a position of subordinate importance—all this creates a foreign policy which tends to be undisciplined and overactive to the point of frenzy. Soviet foreign policy consists, in the first instance, of an interminable succession of probings, which like military reconnaissance, are meant to draw enemy fire and reveal his capabilities, dispositions, and intentions. Much attention is paid in Moscow to these responses. The Soviet government undoubtedly likes the arrangement with the White House established in the 1960s by virtue of which the two parties signal to one another some of their intentions: it saves Moscow a great deal of guesswork and permits it to make appropriate dispositions of its own forces. In the past it has not always correctly interpreted American responses: overly sophisticated signals bewilder Russian leaders and can mislead them. There can be little doubt that Stalin interpreted Dean Acheson's statement that Korea was not within the American 'defence perimeter' to mean just what it said. Acheson's attempt to deflect from himself some responsibility for the communist attack on South Korea is not convincing. For although it may be true, as he says, that other statesmen and military figures had made the same point before him, his voice, as that of the Secretary of State and President Truman's confidant, was in Russian eyes the authoritative one.[15] Brilliant and successful as he generally was in dealing with them, in this one instance Acheson inadvertently gave the Russians the wrong signal. President Kennedy's careful distinction between 'defensive' and 'offensive' weapons in response to Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, could well have suggested to Moscow lack of resolution, and encouraged it to send missiles there. In general, it does not pay to be too clever with Russian politicians: they are inclined to interpret ambiguity as equivocation, equivocation as weakness, and weakness as a signal to act.

Although uncommonly activist, Soviet foreign policy is not haphazard and without direction. The record indicates that it tends at any one time to concentrate on only one major task.

The very first objective of Soviet foreign policy is to make certain that all the territory which at any time has come under Russian or communist rule remains so: in other words, that whatever changes occur in the world map affect the holdings of the other camp. The reason why this should matter so much is complicated and only partly explicable in terms of the need always to appear to be advancing and never in retreat imposed on its adherents by historical materialism. Another and perhaps the major part of the explanation lies in the historical experience of Russia, namely in the manner in which the centralized Russian state originally came into being. The typical national state of Western Europe emerged from the suppression by the monarchy of the feudal nobility and church, and the concentration in its

[15] Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York, 1969), pp. 357–58.

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own hands of all public authority. While this process also occurred in Russia, there another factor came into play as well. The rulers of Moscow, aspiring to become masters of the whole country, had first to subjugate the numerous rival principalities born from the collapse of the Kievan state in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. To do so, they had to conquer territory and incorporate it into the Muscovite domain. From the earliest, seizing land, uprooting from it all vestiges of self-government, and holding on to it, assumed for the rulers of Russia an extraordinary importance, becoming in their mind the essential attribute of sovereignty. Stalin carried this preoccupation to the lengths of an obsession: he not only made certain he recovered territories (Eastern Poland, the Baltic states, and Bessarabia), first obtained by virtue of his nefarious deal with Hitler, but he also insisted on recovering all the lands lost by the tsars. Sometimes the cost of holding on to conquered land is unreasonably high, as in the case of the Kurile Islands, whose retention mars Russia's relations with Japan.

Russian communists consider the status of lands and peoples at present under their control entirely beyond discussion. In this respect, Soviet foreign policy adheres consistently to the principle 'what is mine is mine, what is yours is negotiable'. For evidence we need look only at Berlin. The status of Berlin after World War II was regulated by agreements made among the four Allies. Hence, any unilateral change in its status by one of the four occupying powers was illegitimate, and at the very least should have been accompanied by similar changes in the status of the other parts. But in 1958 the Soviet Union decided to recognize East Germany as a sovereign state and gradually transferred East Berlin to its control. The Western powers both refused to recognize this act as legitimate and to follow suit by transferring sovereignty over West Berlin to the Federal Republic. The Russians for their part have not allowed the status of East Berlin to be placed on the agenda of any of the summit meetings or conferences concerning the fate of the two Germanys since 1958. At the same time, however, by applying intermittent pressure on West Berlin, and in particular by hindering its communications with West Germany, they have transformed what in fact is a problem of Berlin as a whole into a 'West Berlin problem' which threatens peace and as such requires a negotiated settlement. In the recently concluded Four-Power Agreement, the Federal Republic apparently secured better terms on Berlin than it had expected. Still, the cold fact remains that neither the Federal Republic nor the Western powers secured in it any concessions whatever on East Berlin because East Berlin was not even on the agenda. Under these conditions, the Russians have nothing to lose and always something to gain from negotiations, which helps explain their penchant for summit meetings, security conferences, and other big power encounters.

Closely connected with the insistence on holding on to land is the quest for foreign diplomatic recognition. The importance attached to securing international legitimacy became evident from the instant com-

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munists had seized power in Russia. Lenin's policy, which led to the signing of the Brest Litovsk Treaty in March 1918, rested on the premise that every price was worth paying as long as in return the Central Powers would recognize his regime as the legitimate government of Russia. Lenin's conduct on this occasion is regarded by communist theoreticians as a textbook model. The implicit recognition of East Germany contained in the recently concluded four-power agreement probably outweighs in the eyes of both Russian and East German communists the value of all the concessions which they had to make to secure it: the more so that they had no right to the things they traded in the first place. It may also be noted that the Russians find genuine satisfaction in the fact, that from what otherwise was a thoroughly humiliating experience—the Cuban missile episode of 1962—they had managed to retrieve implicit American recognition of the Castro government.

The defensive element in the Soviet foreign policy is unmistakably clear: the sanctity of communist authority, once established, is inviolate; violation means war. The West has accepted this equation, allowing the Soviet government to concentrate on offensive operations.

Since the end of World War II the Soviet offensive effort has concentrated on three consecutive targets. Between 1946 and 1953 it was Europe, where the aim was to eliminate American influence and to transform the entire area into a Soviet dependency. This attempt having failed, due to resolute American opposition, the priorities changed. In 1954–55, Stalin's successors launched a flanking movement against the United States and Western Europe aimed at detaching the so-called Third World. The policy of what became known as 'peaceful coexistence' put into effect concurrently and coupled with nuclear blackmail, was designed to keep the United States at bay while it was being contained and isolated. A brilliant success, this gambit might well have yielded even more spectacular results had the Chinese communists not refused to go along with it. In the 1960s, the conflict with China increasingly attracted Russia's principal attention. In the past few years, the previous strategy of containing and isolating the United States has been replaced by one stressing the containment and isolation of Communist China.

While pursuing the primary objective of the moment, the Soviet Union does not neglect other opportunities; but by and large, mindful of the principle of 'correlation of forces', its leaders maintain a clear distinction between the primary thrust and diversionary actions. The quiet manner in which in the 1960s they liquidated their political interests in such areas of tertiary bearing on their conflict with China as West Africa and Latin America, and in which they are presently pursuing a *détente* in Europe, illustrates this fact. Anyone who deals with Soviet foreign policy must also know how to distinguish the central from the incidental, and not allow himself to be misled by noisy but non-essential diversions.

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Role of intelligence services

Not even the most cursory survey of the subject can avoid some mention of the influence which intelligence organs exercise on the formulation and execution of Soviet foreign policy. Russians are very proud of their intelligence services, being confident of their ability to penetrate the highest echelons of political and military establishments abroad. Their pride and confidence are justified. Sir William Hayter, one-time British Ambassador to Moscow, concedes that probably no important secrets are hidden from Soviet intelligence. But the uses to which information obtained by these services is put is another matter. Sir William goes on to say:

> [Soviet diplomatic agents] seem only able to gather information by underhand intelligence means and to be incapable of picking up the kind of information that any normal foreigner can acquire by using his eyes and ears. Partly this is due to the distrust with which they are trained to regard all non-communist phenomena. Partly it is due to their distrust of each other, which makes normal contact with foreigners, and normal reactions to such contacts, suspect in the eyes of the numerous agents who are watching each other in the embassies. For whatever reasons, one has the impression that Soviet embassies have much information about, but little real knowledge of, the countries in which they are working.[16]

These generalizations can be broadened to include not only the Soviet embassies but that whole vast realm of foreign policy where the intelligence services play a major part. Intelligence organs are constitutionally unsuited to judge broader issues of public policy and in particular to understand public opinion. The Soviet intelligence apparatus is even less suited for work of this kind than the others, because, accustomed as it is to operating with virtual impunity at home, it instinctively treats all politics as a subject of manipulation pure and simple. There is some indication to suggest that some of the outstanding fiascoes of Soviet foreign policy in the Third World have been caused by overconfident and ill-informed Soviet intelligence operatives.

Even more risky have been Soviet experiences with the device of 'disinformation' so dear to the heart of the KGB because so successful in the hermetically sealed environment of Soviet Russia. On the face of it, the grand deception perpetrated on the United States in the 1950s concerning the number of Soviet bombers and ICBM's was a brilliant success. It succeeded in that it caused the United States to give up the idea of 'massive deterrence' and freed the Russians to engage in all kinds of adventures in the Third World. But in the end the deception brought the Soviet Union more harm than good because the authors ignored its political implications. For one, it spurred the United States to enlarge its rocket arsenal. Secondly, it confused and angered the Chinese government which, apparently uninitiated into the secret, took

[16] Hayter, *Russia and the World*, p. 24.

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Soviet boasts at face value and interpreted Russia's failure to press its alleged advantage over the United States as cowardice, collusion, or both.

The effects of the Sino-Soviet conflict

Soviet foreign policy since the end of World War II has been predicated on the assumption that the United States, Russia's principal rival, does not covet anything that belongs to the Soviet Union and therefore will not pursue offensive operations. This conviction must first have been planted in the mind of Soviet leaders by America's refusal in the late 1940s to take advantage of its nuclear monopoly in face of rising Soviet challenges and provocations. If there were any doubts about its validity, they should have been dispelled by the hollowness of John Foster Dulles' 'rollback' threat. With this assurance, the Soviet Union could launch with relative impunity the offensive operations whose outlines we have sketched. In such a contest, time was clearly on Soviet Russia's side. Its offensive operations carried out on many levels assured that it could lose nothing and gain much, while in the West public opinion could be expected to exert increasing pressure on the governments to seek accommodation as an alternative to nuclear holocaust.

Today much of this policy is a shambles. The conflict with China is a calamity of the first order for the Soviet Union, with the profoundest consequences for the conduct of its external relations. That Russian leaders and theorists do not talk much about these implications only serves to underline the gravity with which they view the matter, because, as a rule, the Soviet hierarchy is least inclined to discuss in public issues which concern it most. The calamity derives not only in incurring the enmity of a country regarded as a trusted ally responsible for guarding Russia's eastern flank. Rather, it derives from the nature of the Chinese communist regime and the kind of political warfare it is likely to wage against the Soviet Union. Henceforth, the comfortable premises which had permitted the Soviet Union to carry out long-term offensive operations will no longer apply. China does not recognize the inviolability of Russian possessions: indeed, it makes active territorial claims on the USSR. It cannot be intimidated by nuclear blackmail, because its population is held as firmly in the regime's grip as is the Soviet. On all issues, it does not seek the middle ground, but full satisfaction of its interests. In the Third World, it appeals to much the same constituencies. In short, it enjoys the same advantages vis-à-vis the Soviet Union that the Soviet Union for the past quarter of a century has enjoyed vis-à-vis the West.

As the tricks which have worked so well with the prudent commercial nations of the West prove unavailing against another communist regime, Soviet Russia may well throw caution to the wind and rely increasingly on brute force. Under these conditions, militancy can indeed come to mean belligerency. The immense and uninterrupted

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growth of the Soviet military establishment in all its branches suggests that such a shift may already have taken place. The *détente* achieved on the occasion of President Nixon's journey to Moscow does not appear to me a major turning point in modern diplomatic history and does not alter my basic conclusions. The Soviet Union requires good relations with the United States to face China; it also needs United States credits and economic assistance. To attain these ends, minor concessions may be in order—the more so that it is far from clear that the USSR in fact made any concessions at all in the major achievement of the Moscow conference, the SALT accord.

Psychologically speaking, the Soviet Union may be at that point in its history which Germany had reached around 1890: a point at which it feels predisposed to throw aside cautious probing based on the weighing of the 'correlation of forces', in order to engage in 'world politics' in which power is pursued for its own sake. If that happens, other operative principles in the conduct of foreign relations will have to be worked out.

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On *Détente*

Paul Seabury

HOW should we now understand this fashionable word? Quite differently from the *Oxford English Dictionary* at the turn of the century, whose principal definition commenced as follows:

> DETENT [a.F. *détente* derived from *détendre* ' to slacken, unstretch, undo '.] The earliest application of the word in French was to the *destente* of the arbalest or cross-bow, whereby the strained string was released and the bolt discharged; hence it was transferred to the analogous part in firearms. (OED, 1897 ed.)

Today, however, its primary meaning is benign. It signifies some condition of relaxation, some lessening of tension. Muscles and nerves become less taut; a previous alertness to hostile threats gives way to casual indifference. Not all signs of change are seen as signs of trouble. In current jargon, one is not uptight.

Yet however we understand *détente* in Europe today, it should not be regarded merely as some overt act of relaxation. *Détente* applies to relationships—those between and among states, nations, communities and blocs. It is the relationship which is, or is to be made, less tense and more relaxed, and this relaxation should involve not only tolerance but also a candid recognition of realities. But what realities? What are the actual results of *détente* going to be? How much relaxation, and what kind, is compatible with security? If the peace of Europe for a quarter of a century has depended upon some considerable amount of reciprocated vigilance, is such vigilance compatible with the search for new relationships?

THE idea of *détente* as generally employed today in Europe is not very specific: it seems, rather, a mood or spirit, within which policy is to acquire its shape and substance. The idea of *détente*, once accepted as spirit or guiding principle, and as intrinsically desirable, could well become an instrument to silence or muffle those who raise troublesome questions of substance, thereby disturbing the mood which, it is to be hoped, will bring about a new and more relaxed situation.

But, as we can see, the spirit of *détente* may be employed as a device to obtain new strategic arrangements in Europe. In what ways might these arrangements be made? And to whose benefit or disadvantage?

On all sides, during the Cold War, much will and force, energy and spirit, have been expended on what could be called the deterrence of unwanted futures. For deterrence must be seen not only as the deterrence of war, of acts of aggression, but of *all* acts, tendencies and events of a political character which might be regarded as dangerous and highly undesirable. In other words, it is not accidental, not the

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simple result of 'historical processes' and other abstract forces, that the world we are now in is—to a Rip van Winkle of 1952—surprise-free and in its general contours relatively familiar. It is so also because of persistence of the will, resolve and strategy of those who engage in what the dispirited social scientist would call 'system-maintenance'.

Roughly speaking, in Europe the USSR has successfully managed to sustain the substance of Yalta, namely, its effective dominion in Eastern Europe. Roughly speaking, in Europe America and its European NATO partners have sustained their conditions of freedom for their societies. Roughly speaking also, in all but marginal areas of Western Europe, open and democratic régimes dominated by moderate forces hold away. In the West, extremism of Left and Right has been checked.

In the inventory we make of the various stakes of international competition, one commanding item has been that of the political-strategic balance between the two super-powers, America and Russia: a balance not all of whose characteristics are adversary, but whose strategic characteristics remain fundamental to the political calculations of other states and of other political forces. This commanding element, the hegemonial relationship, in its wide-ranging influences, directly and subtly affects many other relationships, most notably those among Europeans and between West Europeans and the Eastern bloc which is dominated by the Soviet Union. A particular reason for this is that, were the American element subtracted from European equations of influence and force, Western Europe *ceteris paribus* would be a congerie of nation-states which, taken in their entirety, would be decidedly inferior, in their national capabilities, to their ancient continental neighbour, the Soviet Union.

From an historical point of view, such a hypothetical European-Russian relationship is quite unprecedented, as are other aspects of that East-West relationship. We should remember that we are speaking in the context of relative peace-time normality, when the economies of nations are functioning well, when vast disruptions of past wars have subsided, and people's attentions are by and large directed to the internal qualities of their nations' existence. In the 1970s, the power disparity between East and West Europe, between the EEC countries and those of the Warsaw Pact, remains permanently lop-sided; one cannot imagine anything—short of a miracle or an unwanted apocalypse—which might change it.

LIKE *détente*, the concept of security has various meanings. Since the word first became fashionable in international politics in the 1920s, it has come to mean the certitude of safety which nations and states seek with regard to their environment. The quest for security has entailed vigilance, the acquisition and retention of allies, and the possession of credible means of self-defence, alone or in concert with others. In a sociological sense it has entailed a wish for internal cohesiveness, and a public consensus about the nature of the 'self' worthy of defence.

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In the 1920s, for instance, the quest for security led the French government to maintain large armed forces and to devise complex sets of alliances and *ententes*. To many at that time, it seemed that this French passion for security vis-à-vis Germany was sterile, rigid and punitive. Be that as it may, it was certainly extremely vigilant; so also were the conceptions of collective security which much later informed the UN Charter, and the many blocs and pacts which flourished after the second world war.

But the idea of security, as it has been employed in the English language, has not always had such subjective connotations. The question is: does security pertain to some objective condition, or to one's feelings about it? The feeling may poorly correspond to the facts of the case, while the sustaining of a secure condition may, paradoxically, depend upon, and even be a consequence of, a feeling of 'insecurity'. *Angst* may give rise to warranted confidence; overconfidence, to well-deserved anxiety.

The concept of European security involves ambiguity even when considered as pertaining to some objective condition rather than to a feeling about that condition. In Europe, in its most comprehensive sense, it pertains of course to the avoidance of general war. Memories of this are still powerfully impressed upon all Europeans. Of course, this basic notion of general-war-avoidance is taken to be compelling due to the generally recognized probability that nuclear weapons would be used in it. In this common recognition of a common situation, Europeans (and Americans) possess a much more heightened sensitivity than most others. General war, as historically experienced, has also been, geographically, Europe-based war; both the tinderbox and the stakes of such conflict have been seen to be in Europe. The only other major and comprehensive conflict of modern times, in which modern weapons were employed to their fullest, was the Japanese war of 1941–45. Yet, as we know, that conflict was risked by Japan only because of the European one. In that respect it was a derivative of the European war. The many conflicts which have recently raged in other parts of the world have perhaps owed their fanatic intensity and comprehensiveness to the fact that belligerents did not labour under the *obvious* fear of mutual annihilation. The point is that it was the Europeans who first absorbed the full awareness of the horrors of 'unlimited' war; at the same time they are aware of the presence of means by which it might be waged. So long as this is the case, fantasies of complacency, such as those widespread in Europe on the eve of 1914, are as improbable as fantasies of arrogant aggressiveness, such as those which gripped the rulers of Nazi Germany in the 1930s.

European security as a general concept pertains in a negative sense to avoidance of general war; it has no other general meanings, but there are several crucial, if less comprehensive, ones. These involve the security of Western states and peoples; the security of the Soviet Union; the security of individual East European states; and the security of the

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neutrals. And then there is the security of the United States, woven into the fabric of the Atlantic Community. Pacts and blocs have their special criteria of security; so do individual states which happen to compose them.

When we turn our attention to these specific conceptions of security, we cannot fail to note the fact that here we are speaking, not simply of war-avoidance, but also of system-maintenance or (as is still true of Soviet ideological claims) system-extension. For here, security pertains not only to equations of military capabilities, but also to the fibre of social institutions, the cohesiveness of known communal affiliations, etc. Existing security organizations serve different functions. They are embedded in quite differing political cultures, each of which contrives its own political necessities. Finally, a specific historical equilibrium, based in part upon equations of military power and in part upon social cohesiveness, binds the system together. Such a strange field of forces greatly differs from the kind of public order of nineteenth-century Europe, which was managed by diplomats and statesmen sharing common values. The political orders of the East are those of managed closed societies; those of the West are open, pluralist ones. Those of the East are dominated by doctrinaires who still speak of the need to intensify ideological combat, while in the West people are growing increasingly tired of ideological encounters. In the West, national liberation wars are foresworn; but the Soviet Union continues to fuel them, in regions where they might weaken certain Western states without risk of general war. However much the Soviet Union talks to Europeans of the need to renounce force and legitimate the status quo in Europe, it continues elsewhere to lend political and moral support to movements and forces which are at war with dominant Western values.

Whatever else may be said, in recent times the security of Europe, in its most comprehensive sense, must be seen as grounded upon complex equations and balances of force and of conceptions of these. Several firmly anchored relationships have constituted the groundwork of the post-war European system. At a time when some would say the era of confrontation in Europe is coming to an end, or has actually ended, there would seem something paradoxical in the fact that the principal agencies of European confrontation are also the linchpins of Europe's stability. For Europe's security has rested upon forces confronting each other—as in the case of the forward positioning of alliance forces in Central Europe; and it has also rested upon political systems in both East and West which owe their respective characters to quite antithetical philosophies. In the West, quite important institutions, like those of the European Community, have flourished within the context of this confrontation even though, as institutions, they are inspired by an ethos quite antipathetic to *Realpolitik*.[1]

[1] It is important to note that the institutions of Brussels and Strasbourg, the nuclei of a 'united Europe', are devoid of defence responsibilities, and do not collectively

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DÉTENTE, a time for many diplomatic negotiations and possibilities. thus occurs within a particular field of European forces and influences. Since 1948, and the commencement of the so-called Cold War, the central facts of Europe's existence have been its profound division and also its growing cohesiveness. Today's Europe is deeply divided between East and West, but it has attained by means other than war a state of *de facto* integration which would have seemed inconceivable to those who knew only the pre-1939 Europe. The dissipation of traditional national hostilities in both East and West Europe has dwindled, and Europe is the more stable for this. This new condition, in the West, has been brought about by the voluntary concert of states, while in the East it has been imposed by Soviet *Diktat*. The two cohesions of Europe rest upon different bases and are sustained by different means. One must object to the brutal modes by which Soviet hegemony is sustained; but in so doing, one ought not to forget the conditions of chronic chaos in Eastern Europe which preceded both the first and second world wars. The fact of Soviet and American strategic pre-eminence in Europe since 1945 has been a controlling element in the diminution of all authentic continental rivalries. If in their respective ways different Europeans long for circumstances in which such superpower presence may wane or disappear, yet that presence has been of crucial importance in establishing the outer limits, the perimeters, of what is politically feasible in Europe. In the contentions and disputes of Europe, it has been the known possibility of great-power thermonuclear engagement which more than once has saved the peace. (We should recall, in this connexion, that in the 1930s quite fanatical political propositions were widely regarded by many Europeans as quite plausible. It was possible for Hitler, for instance, to advance incredible propositions since in power terms his strategic calculus was, from a military standpoint, not wholly absurd. A Hitler today would generally be regarded as mad.)

For these reasons alone, *détente* would thus appear contingent upon some features of the existing power system remaining in equilibrium, as grave reminders of necessary political limitations.

Yet many would now see things differently: the occasion of *détente* might be seen as the occasion also of de-confrontation; the outlines of a new, better Europe may appear as the snow of the Cold War melts.

SOME years ago Paul Valéry, in a short essay on Montesquieu's *Persian Letters*, addressed the question of the relation of *mind* to political *order*:

make 'European' foreign policy. These institutions in fact were based upon a common philosophy which renounced the greatness of *Machtpolitik*; their ethos is absolutely civilian. They have until quite recently been exclusively devoted to activities and transactions internal to the member states. Security and defence are the prerogatives of individual West European states, NATO, and North America. When some now speak of this Europe as one of five great world power centres, this is true only with respect to its economic influence.

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> The reign of order which is that of symbols and signs, always results in fairly general disarmament, beginning with visible arms and gradually spreading to the will. Swords get thinner and vanish, characters get rounder. The age when fact was dominant fades imperceptibly away. Under the names of foresight and *tradition*, the future and the past, which are imaginary perspectives, dominate and restrain the present. . . .
>
> When order is finally established—that is, when reality is sufficiently disguised and the beast sufficiently tamed—freedom of the mind becomes possible. When order reigns, mind grows gradually bolder. Under the protection of established security, and thanks to the forgotten reasons for the state of things, minds rise up and disport themselves, and now perceive only the trammels and peculiar ways of society. The conditions and premises of the social order are completely forgotten; and it is nearly always those who have been best served or most favoured by it who forget most quickly.
>
> The mind, being all the more unhampered by the deeper demands of order as these have the more effectively relieved it of thinking about them, becomes intoxicated with its relative ease, enjoying the play of its own lights and pure combinations. . . . The criticism of ideals is everywhere brilliant and effective—those very ideals that gave intelligence the leisure and occasion to criticize them.
>
> Meanwhile, the instincts of preservation and perpetuation become exhausted or perverted.[2]

It is in Valéry's sense that one might enquire into the current possibilities in European *détente*. The relationships within Europe, and among the Europeans, the North Americans and the Russians, were fashioned by the interplay of vast forces in chaotic circumstances of military destruction and political impotence. The time when the structures of Europe were, so to speak, 'handed down' was one of necessity, when swift decisions of absolutely far-reaching significance could be, and were, made by contemporary statesmen not in fits of absent-mindedness, but out of compulsion and necessity.

Every relationship has its natural history: so do those of the so-called Cold War. There are commencements, refinements, proliferations, setbacks, even terminations. What was originally so critical, in the East-West relationship, was its obviously provisional nature: the apparently arbitrary character of so many of its components, which were not grounded upon consent either of states or of peoples, but upon chance concatenations of power-on-the-spot. The German problem, lying at the heart of it all, seemed to epitomize the larger problem. But the larger context within which this German problem was lodged was geographical Europe, divided into two parts. And this in turn gave rise to the fundamental contrast between the two parts of the European system: a dual contrast. From a Western point of view, the contrast is one between open societies and closed ones; from an official Soviet viewpoint, it is an

[2] Paul Valéry, *History and Politics*, pp. 217–18.

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historically provisional one between the progressive camp of socialism, and the reactionary camp of capitalism. Without here troubling to refine these distinctions (conforming to a reality which could include a Spain and a Yugoslavia, deviants from purer norms), one must see that the more deepseated features of the European confrontation were not really susceptible to diplomatic alteration, although by treaty or other contract the arrangement could be made consensual, a kind of public law of Europe. To see the confrontation as 'merely' that of national interests, including those of the superpowers, was to ignore the fact that what sometimes was downgraded as 'mere' ideology actually went to the central matter of how societies are run, and the purposes informing them. In this sense, in the East especially, ideological considerations are for all practical purposes so intertwined with state interests as to make any serious distinction between them impossible if not absurd.

For this reason, attempts to breach the barriers imposed by power-cum-ideology, could only be made on the grounds that profitable *ad hoc* adjustments were in the interests of the existing systems—notably, for instance, in the control of crises, the curtailment of nuclear-weapons proliferation and now, for example, in fashionable joint environment-control activities. Essentially, the distinctions between the two 'camps' continue, as these pertain to their essential characteristics. In the eighteenth century, Gibbon pointed out the chief reason why the conflicts within Europe among its legitimate states had been conducted with relative constraint: that those responsible for statecraft 'knew Europe' as one 'great republic', one with common standards of politeness and cultivation, and a 'common system of arts, laws and manners'. Such standards restrained their ambitions by 'the mutual influence of fear and shame'. Power struggles on the international scene were 'in the nature of temperate and indecisive contests'. Needless to say, constraints on international conflict are now of quite a different character; for there have been two Europes, and the tension between them arises from their genuinely different characters. In the case of the Soviet Union, moreover, a striking feature of its presence in Europe lies in the fact that its chiliastic doctrines, embedded in the structure of state and society, compel it to continue its assertion that the object of state policy and the laws of history ordain the transformation of the European system, and the world of politics in general. Another is that the nature of its particular influence in Europe arises from its constantly growing military power, seemingly unchecked by genial sentiments of *détente*.

When one turns to the common conception of European security, i.e. the aversion to becoming again a central theatre of war, one notes that this arises not simply from a commonly-shared awareness of what such a war would be like. One might hope that it also sprang from a common awareness that in general terms there should be an equilibrium of military forces and social institutions in Europe, and this has in fact been the case. The components of this equilibrium at any given time have been quite

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asymmetrical—strength of one sort on one side has been countered by strength of another sort on the other. In the West, the fact of this rough overall correspondence of strength has sustained the logic of deterrence as the basic policy of defence. Western governments have tended to perceive their own security problems as aiming at neutralizing the latent threat of Soviet and Warsaw Pact capabilities. This aim of course has been institutionalized in the NATO bloc; for without the integrity of a joint defence system including the United States, the West would simply be a loose *congerie* of states confronting what *Pravda* continues to call a 'Soviet Fatherland' fostering the principles of 'proletarian internationalism'. Western concepts of security thus depend upon institutions capable of sustaining an equilibrium. But this has not been an object of Soviet long-term policy in Europe.

IT is easier to comprehend Soviet concepts of European security, which, under duress, are shared by their Warsaw Pact allies, than to discern any agreed Western equivalent, shared by the North Americans and their European alliance partners. In the most general sense, of course, the security of Europe has meant the security of the West; and as far as capabilities are concerned, the main component of security has been contributed by the Americans. Since 1956, 'forward strategies' of security, entailing moral or other support for 'liberation' movements in the East, have in the interest of peace been forsworn, and since that time, if not even earlier, an ethic of deterrence, comprehensive in its implications, has been embodied in the Western consensus about strategy; the principal means to security has been seen as the discouragement of such Soviet adventures and miscalculations as might occur were the West to prove both weak and disunited. But beyond this purely deterrent conception of security, there has been no other more comprehensive, Europe-wide, Western view of what security might be.

On the other hand, Soviet conceptions of European security since the mid-1950s have been couched in very comprehensive terms. They focus upon all-European security, defining it in terms of a system of security, indigenous to Europe, ultimately freed from military blocs and, notably, freed from NATO and from the United States. In substance, security for them entails a recognition of the 'realities' of the status quo in Central Europe and the East: namely, of the boundaries, the social systems and the regimes which owe their origins and nature to the fact of Soviet hegemony and control since 1945. In the official Soviet view, security is not to be seen either as equilibrium between blocs, nor even as derived from the actions of the blocs jointly to advance greater stability and reciprocal trust. Rather, security has been seen as transcending or replacing the blocs. 'Europe', a recent official spokesman has asserted, 'can be represented only by Europe itself, that is, by the totality of all the European states'. 'The goal of the European peoples is a Europe which actively, but on an equal level with other continents, participates

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in the general development of mankind, does not impose its will on anyone, but also does not submit to dictation from anyone else.'[3] For a long time, also, Soviet initiatives have pressed for the disestablishment of the blocs, security 'guarantees' entailing renunciation of force by all European states, and the development of all-European institutions for such all-European activities as an era of good feeling might inspire. For them, the inviolability of frontiers, coupled with contractual renunciation of force, appears to mean a freezing of the European territorial status quo. But such a renunciation of force (*Gewaltverzicht*) would presumably not apply to relations among the socialist states of Eastern Europe; but only to the relations between them and the countries of the West. The principle *cuius regios, eius religio* does not mean, in the East, that the individual *regens* may change religion without risking the application of force by the Soviet Union in the manner of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

These Soviet initiatives and proposals are not some fresh line of action and thought inspired by new circumstances. They go so far back in time—to 1954 in fact—and have been for so long a recurrent feature of Soviet declared policy, that it seems likely that they are based upon a firm conception of the *preferred* future state of Europe consonant with Soviet long-term interests. The future Europe of which such Soviet policy 'speaks' is to be a Europe of Europeans, a region inspired by common interests and distinct from other world regions; one in which the legitimacy of Soviet- and Eastern-bloc states would be internationally recognized; one in which, by a multilateral contract not unlike the Kellogg-Briand Pact, war and force would be renounced; and one in which the Cold War blocs and pacts would be dissolved. A crytographer deciphering this picture would find that such a Europe lacked an American presence and possessed a Russian one; it would comprise a multitude of small- and medium-sized states plus one giant one (the USSR); and it would be represented by institutions of Helsinki, in which the objects of European public policy would be multilaterally negotiated. It would be a Europe dominated by the Soviet Union.

It is important that we formulate clearly what is involved in a prospect of Soviet dominion which gives rise to legitimate Western concern. The West need not fear the ancient bogey-man of direct and unprovoked Soviet military aggression. The Russians have long been aware of the vast risks which such action would entail, if indeed they ever contemplated it seriously. Nor need Westerners think that a prime Soviet object is to welcome and to fuel any or all occasions of Leftish rebellions in the West. The Soviet response to the abortive French uprisings of 1969 suffices to indicate that major civil unrest or even war in the West does not necessarily accord with Russian state interests.

But a grave Western concern must continue to be that of Soviet ability to blackmail individual Western states, or the West collectively,

[3] I. Aseyev, 'Europe 1972: Time of Hopes', *International Affairs* (October 1972), p. 19.

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in a time of crisis, and so to affect the predispositions of Western leaders and publics that their responses in major contests of will are neutralized or conflicting. For on such occasions, it is the known configurations of strategic capacities and will which most deeply affect the calculations of governments. The USSR would like to see a Europe composed of states with regimes content to accept or share the fundamental security principles of the Soviet Union, content with such inner autonomy as it might permit them to enjoy.

There is in this connexion one paradoxical, disconcerting possibility: among some East Europeans, long resigned to enduring the fact of Soviet hegemony in their own lands, an enlarged Soviet sphere, peacefully extended Westward, might add new and welcome Western elements to an otherwise bleak environment of Russian dominion. After all, such a result would be one way to end the classic Cold War division of Europe!

Furthermore, while the military blocs might dissolve or otherwise be disbanded, the organization of proletarian socialism in Eastern Europe would continue to exist as the authentic, integrated example of socialist internationalism. Cold War 'confrontation' would be supplanted by a new and genial atmosphere. The 'aggressive NATO bloc' would be no more, and no longer could act in support of 'the reactionary, antipopular regimes in Western Europe'. The 'stocks of US nuclear weapons' and the 'large contingents of land forces of the USA' would no longer serve to plague the security of Europe. 'It is impossible to count upon the establishment of a lasting peace on earth until a radical turn towards an international *détente* in Europe is achieved.'[4]

The fundamental barrier to an authentic reconciliation in Europe arises from Soviet hostility to the West, which is no mere posture of *Realpolitik*; it lies at the very heart of Soviet secular theology. It is in fact difficult to see how this could be otherwise, unless the Soviet Union were to undergo a massive and quite fundamental transformation. Pragmatic Westerners may sometimes lose sight of the fact that the theoretical nature of Soviet Marxism is of essential importance and must be taken seriously. The West, and America especially, remain the enemy until such time as they may have experienced the necessary historical transformation. We can no more quarrel with the obstinacy of such a view than with any religious or quasi-religious belief system; the trouble with it is that the belief system, unaltered since Stalin's time, posits the existence of specified enemies as being historically necessary and as determined by forces outside their control. This feature, positing the permanent division of the world into two camps, remains unaltered regardless of how others may come to perceive the character of world politics. The intensity with which this world view is held by Soviet officials is in no way diminished in this era of *détente*.

[4] Alexei Shitikov, in *Materials*, Soviet Committee for European Security (Moscow, 1971), p. 9.

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IF we speak of a European system, namely that which habitually took Russia into account while ignoring a remote, isolationist U.S.A., we observe that at no previous (pre-1939) period in European history, even in Napoleonic times was the strategic equation of pan-European forces so overwhelmingly dominated by one power. Even at the height of Napoleon's dominion in Europe, there remained two great European States, England and Russia, in command of great resources of military, economic, and geographic land-mass strength, which countervailed French power. The distribution of influence and power in 'classical' pre-1937 Europe, in times more normal than the Napoleonic period, was far more diffuse; in the post-Napoleonic era, for example, it was divided among five major powers. Such is no longer the case and, for a variety of reasons, it is now unlikely that such a European distribution of influence and power could ever again resemble that which came to an end between 1939 and 1945. The contemporary stability of Europe and the independence of West European nations both depend upon a broader field of forces, which includes the United States.

There never was, in the so-called Cold War, enthusiasm in any sector of articulate American public life for a concerted course of U.S. hegemonial action, which was unabashedly imperial, annexationist, nor which wished to persevere in a course of indefinite political expansion. And indeed it is dubious whether the extensive range of widened U.S. overseas commitments could long have been sustained, without the plausible objects of taming, controlling, and hemming in the seeming constant expansion of the Communist world, its two principal components, Russia and China, and its various lesser ideological auxiliaries.

'If fear be dupes, hopes may be liars'—the non-imperial aspirations which long informed American policies were to some extent nourished by quite real though often misperceived views of Soviet threats. In this respect, American public perceptions of Soviet and communist world behaviour during the Cold War were often far out of line with real dangers. Yet the hopes—of a post-Cold War world of widely-diffused power and responsibility—could also be deceptive. For there could never be assurance that such new circumstances of power-diffusion would, for such a reason, be safer than the tighter cohesions of power and alliance which distinguishes the Cold War blocs in the long phase of protracted crisis.

In all respects, the current Washington official world view nurtures, welcomes and encourages the disaggregation and diffusion of power; it seeks to inspire new linkages of interdependence with old adversaries, it introduces new economic and trade criteria into calculations of alliance relationships; and it welcomes circumstances in which the American presence will generally be deemed less conspicuous and less forward-based. We may currently distinguish the policies of the Nixon Administration, in their broadest sense, as combining a lower posture of active engagement-as-commitment, with a higher posture of initiatives towards adversaries. With respect to both of these, the environment

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in which action occurs is seen as increasingly diffuse, and in many important respects (aside from nuclear, strategic matters) diffusion is welcomed and actively encouraged. In relationships to allies, a new philosophy of burden-sharing, originating in and applied to Asian affairs in 1969, has been steadily globalised. Both in Asia and in Europe, 'partnership' places greater stress upon what the partner should do for himself.

By way of contrast, we may perceive, in the Soviet Union, quite a different appreciation of opportunities and priorities. For here *détente* is first of all to be seen as the occasion of consolidation, not the retrenchment and diffusion, of power and responsibility. The policies of *détente* aim to consolidate what already exists as reality in the Soviet sphere of influence and to have Soviet preponderance recognised by the West as an international fact of life. *Détente* is an occasion for the intensification of ideological solidarity and orthodoxy. In most Western countries, *détente* domestically has resulted in various degrees of ideological relaxation—in the social rehabilitation for the Marxist Left—a new dispensation which, in France, for example, has meant the recrudescence of the Popular Front and prospects of authentic, rather than sham Gaullist, neutralism. In the Soviet Union, however, in so far as *détente* is considered a new posture in international politics, it applies to the careful official nurturing of state-to-state relations; but the possibilities of *détente*'s internal application to Soviet life are vigilantly checked. The ideological struggle is officially strengthened, and deviation more vigilantly sought out, as Soviet diplomatic engagements with the West multiply. Both with respect to the Warsaw Pact, and to the Comecon, *détente* coincides with and corresponds to methodical strategies of strengthening these institutions as new initiatives, new linkages, and new agreements are sought with the West.

Consolidation is also essential in *détente*, to the Soviets, in ways which vividly contrast with the essentials of the Nixon Doctrine of disaggregation, decentralisation of America's alliances. For in the latter instance, and perhaps mistakenly, an essential aspect (if not gamble) of the Doctrine is that disaggregation and the diffusion and devolution of responsibilities likewise may quicken and enliven collective capacities; many of America's allies today, and for good reason, fear that this might prove not so. An essential asymmetry, in Europe at least, which currently is inspired by prospects of American and Soviet troop withdrawals, in the West consists in the fear of American abandonment; in the East, in the hope of new freedom, or (to Communist leadership) the fear of popular rebellion. The two military alliances thus rest upon profoundly different bases. For Warsaw Pact power serves the function of shoring up régimes and systems against popular pressures, while NATO power serves to help fortify Western nations against Soviet power. In the West, the calculations which go into determining levels of military strength are provided by considerations of deterrence and of hypo-

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thetical battle requirements; in the East, by similar calculations plus the consideration of policing unwilling populations.

IN both East and West there have been real fears as well as real hopes regarding *détente*. In the West, the most justifiable fear of it has been the obvious difficulty of being able publicly to justify great defence expenditures, vital though these may be, when popular expectations of normalcy continue to rise. It is impossible to sustain public support for large armed forces by sustaining artificial tension.

Détente also particularly underscores fear of American abandonment: for there would be small likelihood that, with European publics increasingly disenchanted with defence expenditures, their American cousins would act any differently with respect to expenditures for US troops stationed overseas.

But whatever gains have been reaped from East-West *détente* diplomacy in the past three years, these are not reflected in Soviet military outlays. Soviet capabilities in Europe grow, while those of the West diminish. To many Westerners the institutions of NATO, furthermore, seem to be an obsolescent survival, yet Western strategic doctrines, essential to deterrence, have stressed both parity and sufficiency in forces. Could a *détente* safely ratify and permit an obvious Soviet strategic superiority?

The institutions of Western security have been Atlantic and not European; there are no European defence institutions *per se*, other than the military establishments of individual states; a de-Atlanticized Europe might to some seem appropriate to new, friendlier relations with the East. A re-legitimation of Popular Front governments in Latin parts of Europe might well encourage views of this kind. Western governments, more directly responsive to shifts in public mood, seem more likely than their Eastern counterparts to reduce force levels in response to short-range trends. These are the Western risks.

For the East, *détente* entails risks of a quite different character. The ensuing relaxation might spill over into ideological matters. The demand for increased ideological vigilance, now powerfully reaffirmed by Soviet leaders, is accompanied by their own attempt to confine the agenda of *détente* diplomacy to matters which state agencies can carefully regulate. They seek in this way to minimize the domestic risks which extensive, informal and private encounters among citizens would entail for their control. Nor are such apprehensions ill-founded: the Czech experience of 1968—and similar tremors of 1953 and 1956 elsewhere—attest to the rapidity with which such a system of rule might disintegrate were the momentum of ideological relaxation to intensify.

The risks of *détente* in the West pertain chiefly to security as defined in military terms; in the East, as defined in political terms affecting the very survival of communist regimes. The chief risk of *détente* is seen

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in the West as that of Finlandization; in the East, as that of revolution, rebellion and subsequent repression.

Western *détente* strategies ought, it would seem, to give high priority to goals consonant with Western democratic values, to aspirations towards a Europe in which basic human rights were generally respected, in which freedom of travel, movement, exchange of ideas, and freedom of political participation were ensured. The widespread Western antipathy to tyranny entails a careful intolerance of Soviet-style regimes. Yet the obvious difficulty of pursuing such a purpose in *détente* lies precisely in the fears which it engenders in communist states: for a strong wind of freedom from the West may again cause the Soviet Union to intensify its ruthless imposition of orthodoxy on its Eastern neighbours. The pursuit of East-West liberalization might well lead to repression.

Hence the asymmetry of concern with security in a time of *détente*. Nevertheless, if there are to be clear confidence-building measures in *détente* (in a game in which there are to be winners, not losers), these must aim to stabilize rather than destabilize, to enhance rather than diminish the sense of taken-for-grantedness in the existing structural features of Europe. From a Western point of view, such features of *détente* must include, at the very least, a guaranteed strategic equilibrium; means of inspection and certification to diminish the risk of faulty intelligence and miscalculation; the re-opening and further enlargement of East-West commercial channels choked by Cold War restraints; and the encouragement of closer *de facto* relations with moderate, if not liberal, elements in the East. The Soviet contribution to such *détente* must clearly involve the abandonment of its search for strategic supremacy in Europe, just as the Western contribution already implicitly renounces the object of directly or indirectly undermining or overthrowing Eastern regimes. It would seem clear that while more might be hoped for, not much more can be aimed at; no synthesis of a new Europe can be an explicit object of statecraft. If such synthesis comes at all, it may come as a by-product or side-effects of more modest ambitions, and of a much higher one: the avoidance of general war through the maintenance of political equilibrium.

OBSERVERS of the present *détente* typically watch the motions of states, and listen for new sounds from them. But in a time of great expectations, political leadership may share in a general uncertainty as to purposes and as to the direction in which events move. If previous patterns of regularity in the relations of states and social systems are brought into question, what would really be gained were fundamental understandings lost? Ideally, the movement towards new forms of European security should be incremental, not radical; innovations ought to be firmly rooted in basic principles. The question remains: how aware are Western publics of the basic principles? Or, as Paul Valéry warned, are such conditions and premises of the social order forgotten, when ' reality is sufficiently disguised and the beast sufficiently tamed '?

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Détente: The Other Side

Pierre Hassner *

AFTER the tanks in Prague, the talks in Helsinki. The city of the Wall is also the city of the four-power agreement and of the treaty between the two German states. Presidents and businessmen travel back and forth between Moscow and Western capitals; Czech intellectuals and Soviet dissidents travel only to mental wards or to exile. Occasionally, the testimony of an expelled critic or a message from Prague tell a not too interested Western public of the other side of *détente*.

Has Eastern Europe grown closer or more distant? Indeed, did it or will it ever really attract the attention of the West, whether in terms of moral or ideological solidarity or in terms of security and power?

The invasion of Czechoslovakia did not create a serious risk of war, nor did it compromise the atmosphere of *détente*, though it did modify the nature of the latter profoundly. The Prague Spring and its suppression raised many serious problems in a deeply moving way; the reciprocal discovery and subsequent dialogue between people and leaders, the problem of resistance and violence in a highly developed society; the question of the compatibility of socialism and freedom or, indeed, of socialism and imperial domination. Nonetheless, how many West Europeans saw these vital problems in a new light because of Czechoslovakia? And how many people are there who think that Eastern Europe is uninteresting because to their minds revolution can only be romantic and violent, whilst imperialism can only be capitalist or socialism tyrannical! Too far away to concern us, too near to fascinate, Eastern Europe has no luck with its Western neighbours, even on the moral and ideological level.

This is even truer of power relations. Left-wing intellectuals are tempted to neglect it because it disturbs their moral comfort, whereas right-wing governments neglect it (except for election time) because it disturbs their diplomatic comfort. Till very recently anyone who talked of Soviet imperialism in Eastern Europe was automatically suspected of stirring up the Cold War on behalf of American imperialism. Nowadays one could only be accused of being an agent of Peking, since China is the only power which explicitly and actively questions the legitimacy of the Soviet empire. Meanwhile the United States, acting within the framework of summit agreements symbolized by the meeting in Moscow at the time of the Haiphong blockade, and Western

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Europe, acting within the framework of different bilateral dialogues and of the multilateral one on European security, are both in the process of granting the Soviet Union the formal recognition of its sphere of domination which it has sought for 25 years. At the very moment when it is losing ideological authority, Soviet power still dominates by military might.

In the short term, the dangerous or interesting regions of the world are those which are contested or ambiguous, those regions where the great powers are present, though the extent of their commitment or their powers of control are unclear: Asia, the Near East. The massive and determined nature of the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe harms the universal attraction of communism. But it intimidates those in the West who are impressed by force and reassures those who are frightened by instability. The declining solidarity of the revolutionary international is offset by the growing solidarity of the conservative Holy Alliance.

The question at the moment, which has a significance transcending Eastern Europe, is whether the alliance of an imperial ideology and a military balance, both equally rigid, is sufficient to guarantee the sealing-off of a region, when it is opposed not only by the local people's aspirations to national independence and their desire to communicate with the outside world, but also by the tendencies of modern societies, economies and techniques towards interpenetration. Should one place more confidence in impersonal forces than in the will of men? Will Eastern Europe, cast yet again in role of object rather than subject, be swept along, like all other ' preserves ', by the dynamics of a more general evolution?

The Consecration of Yalta

For Western Europe, this tendency to stake everything on historical evolution of a global nature rather than on specific political endeavour appears doubly tempting, because it is based on a great number of precedents as well as the hierarchy of Western interests. Eastern Europe has had its own national revolutions and social upheavals; throughout history, however, its fate has been decided at least as much by the outcome of some more general situation or evolution, whose main determining factor was the respective situations and inter-relations of the great powers surrounding it. In retrospect, the period between the two wars, the era of balkanization and of relative freedom of action between several influences, now appears as an interregnum brought about by specific circumstances (the eclipse of Russia and Turkey) which was then suppressed by Russia's reappearance on the scene.

As far as Russia is concerned, Eastern Europe constitutes an immediate, intrinsically valuable interest, essential to what remains of its imperial authority, both from the point of view of ideology and of actual power. But what is it for the others? For the United States, and

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nowadays for China, it is part of the global tug-of-war which either thrusts them into opposition or binds them to the Soviet Union. To China it is an essential factor, for two reasons. Apart from the conflict of powers there is the ideological rivalry of two forms of communism, and the fact, rooted in geography, that the more secure Russia feels about its empire in the West, the more threatening it will look in the East. But for the United States, Eastern Europe is of marginal importance, never either formally conceded to the Soviet Union nor energetically disputed. The Cold War was not the result of any division of the world into spheres of influence, nor of an active struggle to gain power over such spheres, but rather of a stalemate, of a kind of static or trench warfare, with each of the great powers knowing that it had no direct access to one half of Europe, yet doing everything possible to make digestion of the new sphere difficult for the opponent. It has always been the Soviet Union and Western Europe, in particular Germany, which counted for the United States; showing an interest in Eastern Europe meant primarily creating difficulties for the Soviet Union and keeping the possibility of German reunification open. In both cases the attitude was kept up without much energy or conviction and now that *détente* with the Soviet Union and the division of Germany are accepted, it is being abandoned almost with relief.

This division, which was regarded as the provisional acceptance of a lesser evil, is now gradually coming to be seen as a rightful division, one of the elements of the new American-Soviet cooperation, which is considered essential to the new world order. With this shift of the great powers from conflict to cooperation, the Yalta agreement on spheres of influence is gradually losing its mythical character and becoming reality. Once again, then, the East Europeans can only calculate the consequences of a development which is beyond their control.

Apart from the Germans, the attitude of West Europeans to Eastern Europe is largely determined by the way Western Europe itself is organized and by its relations with the United States and the Soviet Union. When people talk of the building of Europe they are thinking above all of Western Europe. When people stress *détente* it is primarily the Soviet Union they are thinking of. In Western discussions on the nature of transatlantic or East-West relations, Eastern Europe is raised only as a minor issue, to prove that the Soviet danger still exists or, on the contrary, to demonstrate the transformation of communism. For West Europeans, the Europe of prosperity and, to a great extent, of freedom, is atlantic Europe or at least that of the American challenge; for a declining, but still substantial number, the Europe of ideology is represented by the Soviet Union; so is, for an increasing number, the Europe of power. In view of this, what picture of Europe could Westerners form that might emphasize their links with their eastern neighbours, lacking as they do both prosperity and power? There seem

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to be two possibilities in terms of international structure: a Europe of small and medium powers, a Europe of independent nations, standing up to the great powers, or Europe as a Third Power. The latter—in terms of ideology, Europe as a Third Way—could be a synthesis of capitalism or of socialism, or on the other hand, it could decline both and aim at an original model, thus constituting a European model of both civilization and social organization.

Considering these two points of view, a European belonging to both East and West will perhaps be forgiven if he is occasionally tempted to say: If only Eastern Europe could! If Western Europe only would! It is true that, confronted as they are by obstacles and risks to a far greater extent than those of the West, the experience of one East European country can provide a remarkable example of perseverance in quest of independence, whilst the experience of another, like the Prague Spring, may reveal a serious and precise awareness of the ills both of communism and capitalism, thereby suggesting, if not the means, at least the direction by which one might transcend them. Indeed all these countries, when given a chance, show an awareness of a specifically European identity in relation to the superpowers, which the West Europeans do not always possess. But what echo can this longing for a common ground with Western Europe in the search for independence and progress find and how much weight does it have, gripped in the straitjacket of determining military and economic factors?

It was only during one period, recently, that the straitjacket seemed to loosen slightly and the echo seemed to be there. Between the death of Stalin and the invasion of Prague, or more specifically between 1963 and 1968, there was an increase in the East European countries' freedom of manoeuvre and the interest they roused in the West. For the first time it seemed that the continent's fate would be influenced as much, if not more, by the dialogue between the two Europes than by that of the two superpowers. It is interesting to recall both the reasons for this phenomenon and the characteristics of the period to understand the hopes it gave rise to and the disillusionment of that present period.

From détente based on change . . .

The first sign came from the East, in the form of differentiation in the communist world and a trend towards *détente* with the West. Both tendencies, though partial, limited and subject to halts and regressions when they went too far, have survived these difficulties, especially the first. Malenkov's new course and Khrushchev's attempt to give both the Party's leading role and that of the Soviet Union a more dynamic and flexible character, led to the uprisings in Berlin and Budapest. Nevertheless Poland retained something of its October for a long time, and Hungary began to develop again a few years after its own October, while the spirit of Camp David held sway less than three years after Budapest, and *détente* between the two Ks was flourishing less than two

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years after the Berlin wall and six months after the Cuban crisis. More than anything else, the conflict with China and Albania as well as the Rumanian heresy seemed to herald what some commentators were already referring to as the breakup of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe.

After the finally happy conclusion of the Cuban crisis and the end of the Berlin crisis, the feeling of a Soviet threat ceased to provide fuel for the Cold War in the West. The only remaining obstacle to *détente*, and at the same time to the division of Europe, seemed to be the German problem. The division of Germany, both a cause and a consequence of the Cold War, has been the only real link between the two Europes since the war, embodied in concrete form by the status of Berlin, by inter-German trade (considered by the Common Market as internal trade), etc. From the moment that these two Europes began to differentiate themselves more clearly, by limited polycentrism in the East and by the adoption of more nationalist policies in the West, particularly by France, the problem of the destiny of the two Germanies became vital. Germany could not be reunited by military pressure. The West's standpoint—no *détente* without reunification—became increasingly untenable, because all the West Europeans, apart from Germany, were more interested in *détente* for themselves than reunification for their neighbour, and because German public opinion no longer believed that all it had to do was wait for a peace treaty to produce reunification. Hence the idea that the problem could only be approached by way of a detour, provided by European *détente*. Instead of making reunification a precondition for *détente*, or making the solution of the German problem a precondition for solving the European problem, the idea of a parallel approach and then of an actual reversal of priorities was gaining ground.

From then on, the door was open for all sorts of contacts, indirect manoeuvres and combinations. The question was no longer whether one should engage in negotiations, but rather of knowing who would conduct or control them, who would talk to whom: West Germany, France, West Europe, NATO, the United States? With the German Democratic Republic, the other states of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union? The different plans combined or stood in opposition to each other: 'little steps,' '*Wandel durch Annäherung*' in Germany, 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals' in France, 'peaceful engagement' or 'bridge building' in the United States.

In Germany, emphasis was placed on maintaining at least some minimal links between the two halves in order to keep open the chances for a future reunification, as well as on efforts to humanize relations within the nation. As attempts at negotiating with Moscow and at making contact with Pankow seemed to offer no prospects, Bonn turned to the countries of Eastern Europe, in particular those, like Rumania, who were prepared to engage upon a dialogue, not only of an economic

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nature, like the others, but also diplomatic. The hope was that good relations with all the communist countries would in the end soften the inflexible attitude of those countries whose cooperation was vital—namely, the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic.

The second attempt was made by de Gaulle, in whose vision the rebirth of national politics in Eastern Europe, which he had been predicting since 1945, played the most decisive role. His premise was that, henceforth, national considerations would be more important than ideological ones, and that this would apply equally to the Soviet Union as to the satellites. He estimated that because of the latter's resistance and, primarily, because of the Chinese threat, the Soviet Union would feel prepared to withdraw from Eastern Europe, or to adopt a style of domination more tolerant to national independence and outside influences such as that of France, in exchange for greater influence and security in the West, to be brought about by an American withdrawal and a new status for Germany. In its turn, Germany would accept its frontiers and limitations on armaments in exchange for some softening of its division. Soviet interests would then coincide with those of France, which wanted above all to free itself—and Western Europe at the same time—from American hegemony, while continuing to contain Germany to a certain extent. It would be a matter of substituting a broader and more flexible form of containment, based on an agreement of states, for the former rigid manner of containment, based on the respective integrations of the two Europes. For this, France would have to take up the position of intermediary between Germany and the Soviet Union, and, with this end in view, use its influence with the states of Eastern Europe, to attenuate their distrust of their two powerful neighbours, encouraging them to work their way, at the same time, into the new dialogue.

Indeed, for American authors like Brzezinski, adviser to President Johnson in 1966–67, and H. Kissinger, it was important to take German and European aspirations towards reunification into account, yet at the same time integrating them into a more global perspective, which would give a more positive significance to Atlantic ties and to the dialogue between the two great powers. A direct dialogue between Bonn and Moscow or Pankow would be dangerous; on the other hand, de Gaulle and Europe generally did not have the means to match their vision. The general direction taken by Europe was right, but it could not meet with success in Moscow without American support. For Kissinger, the emphasis was on negotiations relating to the political-military future of Germany. To Brzezinski, it seemed the emphasis should be placed on a convergence of economic interests, a new Marshall Plan designed for Eastern Europe should be put forward, the specialized institutions of the West, such as OECD, should be opened to Eastern Europe, which would then be attracted, finally bringing the Soviet Union with it, into a network of interdependence and of functional and multilateral ties which

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would make ideological opposition and even the very existence of the East German satellite appear an anachronism, marked for progressive disappearance.

. . . to détente within the status quo

The nature of these different plans and the rivalries they gave rise to, give us an idea of the varying dilemmas which confront all policies towards Eastern Europe, and which, ever since 1967, have seemed doomed to paralyse any such initiatives.

THE first dilemma: should one treat East Germany like other states? From the West German minister Schröder, through de Gaulle, to Brzezinski and Kissinger, all have drawn a distinction between the other communist states, which corresponded more or less to some national reality, and the German Democratic Republic, an artificial creation which would become isolated in the process of *détente* and which a European settlement, accompanied by a withdrawal of occupying forces, would condemn to extinction. However, though the states of Eastern Europe, particularly those who had no immediate fear of a reunited Germany, were willing enough to engage in a dialogue with the F.R.G. over the objections of the G.D.R. the latter country and the Soviet Union were keeping a careful watch-out and in 1967 managed to impose a policy of solidarity on the whole bloc, for Rumania. On the other hand, German public opinion, in particular the inhabitants of Berlin, did not take kindly to initiatives intended to isolate and exclude from the benefits of *détente* its 17 million compatriots, i.e. the very people with whom they wanted to maintain or re-establish links. From 1967 the policy of isolating East Germany was finished; this however meant that the frontier of the two Germanies became as intangible as the German-Polish frontier and that, for the foreseeable future, *détente* in Germany would assume the form desired by the Soviet Union, namely, the maintenance of the status quo. This meant that the state of division would certainly be confirmed and possibly consolidated, albeit—in the most favourable case—somewhat humanized.

THE second dilemma, and the most essential one: should one approach first the states of Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union? It is evident that any response of an exclusive nature would be disastrous. To go straight to the Kremlin would mean helping it to consolidate its empire, with the effect of making it yet more rigid and exclusive; on the other hand, to try to encourage division in this empire and detach the weakest links, would not only amount to alienating the Soviet Union, but would also produce counter-reactions on its part making even heavier the very yoke one had intended to lighten. Even if one approached the different communist countries in all innocence, letting them decide for themselves

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what Big Brother would tolerate and what risks they themselves might take, this too might end in the same result. In order to circumnavigate these reefs one has first to suppose either, like de Gaulle, that the Soviet Union is prepared to withdraw because of its preoccupation with China if given guarantees, or, like Brzezinski, that the Soviet Union is so attracted by the promise of Western technology that it would be prepared to let itself be drawn into some common system which would dilute its authority. Secondly this presupposes that the dynamic influence of an opening to the West and of internal liberalization would not escape the control of the communist leaders of the different countries, and that it would not involve them in an abrupt rupture with the Soviet system. There is too great a chasm between the conservative, police-minded Soviet Union and the exasperated population of Eastern Europe, the margin of action both of the local leaders and external powers is too narrow, not to make brutal ups and downs much more likely than harmonious synthesis.

Thus Western Germany has moved from a perhaps imprudent preference for the states of Eastern Europe, in spite of Moscow's opposition, as was the case under Schröder, to what might be considered a somewhat inelegant preference for Moscow ever since the invasion of Prague. Under de Gaulle, France seemed to possess a clearer grasp of the situation and engaged in a more methodical attempt at achieving a balance between the Soviet Union and its allies. But even then its policy was not lacking in ambiguity and contradictions. 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals' seemed on some occasions to signify a Franco-Soviet agreement which would replace Soviet-American hegemony, on others it signified a revolt of European nations, both East and West, against 'both hegemonies'. De Gaulle visited the Soviet Union before Eastern Europe, and then Poland, the Soviet Union's orthodox ally, before Rumania, 'the Gaullist of the East'. However, in 1967 and 1968, during these journeys, he made speeches which went far beyond the accepted formulas, calling for national independence or the emergence of an autonomous central Europe. Yet he seems to have done nothing on a diplomatic level to lend support to Rumania and Yugoslavia, either in their day-to-day concerns, or after Prague when they feared a Soviet invasion, nor did he make the slightest gesture of a public nature to try and stop the invasion or to limit repression in Czechoslovakia. On the contrary, France was the first Western country to help the Soviet Union recreate a legitimate image for itself, the first after the Prague invasion to pretend that nothing essential had changed, whilst its own policy in relation to the East was moving more and more towards an acceptance of the concept of division and *détente* based on the status quo.

Finally, on the American side, the evolution and fluctuations were even more pronounced. Peaceful engagement in Eastern Europe had, in the beginning, been seen by such theoreticians as Brzezinski in terms of an attempt to detach the satellites; then this concept assumed a more

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multilateral nature, including the Soviet Union, but keeping the German Democratic Republic in isolation; the final version included everybody and is based, in fact, on accepting the status quo while hoping that, by giving it a multilateral and cooperative character, their most recalcitrant opposite numbers, the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, would emerge from it transformed. In reality, increasing emphasis was placed on bilateral *détente* with the Soviet Union; the American indifference towards the Soviet invasion in 1968 and the Moscow Agreement, followed by a visit to Poland in 1972, are the two clearest indications of this development. Yet the same Johnson, in the autumn of 1968, was uttering energetic, if ambiguous, warnings against any attempt to invade Rumania and Yugoslavia, and the same Nixon visited Rumania and Yugoslavia in 1969 and 1970 before going to Moscow and Warsaw, to the great displeasure of the Soviet Union. Thus one cannot predict with certainty the behaviour of the United States in a violent crisis, particularly if it were to be in Yugoslavia, nor can one underestimate the Nixon Administration's predilection for showing the Soviet Union that it can cause troubles for the latter with its allies, a tendency also apparent in its China policy. All in all one can say that the present trend is distinctly one of agreement with the Soviet Union, founded on an acceptance of the latter's authority in its own sphere, and that any concern to encourage an evolution in the nature of this authority does not, to put it mildly, seem to hold a very prominent place in the preoccupations of American global diplomacy.

THE third and fourth dilemmas are implicit in the first two. Basically, they have to do with the question of whether pre-eminence should be given to societies or to states, in both East and West. The third dilemma has its source in the distinction, often made with respect to the evolution of Eastern Europe, between de-Stalinization or internal liberalization, and de-satellization or external liberation. It seems that in the long run these tendencies may well converge; Yugoslavia is a case in point. Having broken with the Soviet Union purely to save its national independence, the conflict with the Soviet Union forced it to seek a new legitimacy of its own and to open up to the West. When the Soviet threat had declined, these two tendencies then led it to grant increasing freedom both to intellectuals and to the different national groupings. Moreover, at the moment, there can be discerned in Yugoslavia a hardening in internal matter and a *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union in external affairs—a negative indication that the two tendencies are related. Nevertheless, everyone knows the case of Albania (not to mention China) where total de-satellization has not led to any liberalization, quite the contrary,—or the case of Hungary which buys its internal reforms at the price of total orthodoxy in external affairs—or Rumania where the primary concern for external independence has considerably reduced arbitrariness from above when compared with the

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period before 1964, but has not led to any initiative from below—or the case of Poland, where Gierek, who is more responsive to the needs of the population than Gomulka, has so far sought far less than the latter to play any real role in external affairs.

NOW one is confronted by the three-fold problem: what do the countries of Eastern Europe want most? What is the Soviet Union most likely to tolerate? What do the Western countries have the most right, duty or interest to encourage?

The Prague Spring aimed at internal change, not opposition to the Soviet Union. However, inasmuch as the Soviet Union felt its own concept of its authority threatened by this internal transformation, the question of external independence as a condition of internal reform, and the question of resisting pressure or indeed the invasion were inevitably raised, no matter what the intentions of the Czechoslovaks themselves might have been. If one is then led to conclude in favour of the Rumanian way—to seek political independence first and the rest later—one (and in particular the Rumanian population) is tempted to think that without any internal reform, especially in the economic sphere, one runs the risk of not possessing the means for any external independence other than verbal, and that if the leaders, whether to reassure the Soviet Union, or to protect the country from the latter's possible actions, continue to reinforce centralization, this is a heavy price to pay for a spectacular and acrobatic foreign policy. The example of Czechoslovakia shows the value of the Rumanian model; a certain stagnation of the latter lends value to the Hungarian way.

Faced with the extremely limited freedom for manoeuvre of these countries, with the impossibility of foreseeing the criteria and limits of Soviet tolerance—each intervention having invalidated the rules seemingly implied by previous experience—faced by the fact that it is impossible for these peoples to express their preferences, those of the Western nations are hardly likely to be decisive. Yet to a certain extent they must, either indirectly or explicitly, make a choice.

Thus West Germany, primarily concerned with the fate of the German Democratic Republic, perceives that the latter depends above all on its ties with Moscow; yet, while in the final analysis only independence from Moscow would make it possible to change the East German regime, in reality, since this radical change will most likely never take place, it is, paradoxically, on greater influence from Moscow that West Germany must rely to soften the position of the GDR. In any case, once the aim is no longer the actual reunion of the two states, it will become the improvement of the fate of the population in the German Democratic Republic rather than an increase in the freedom of action of its government. Similarly, the American position, inasmuch as it no longer seeks to detach the satellite countries from the Soviet Union, can only point to the benefits of general *détente* for the internal development of

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these societies. In contrast to this, French policies under de Gaulle were favourable, in principle, to the independence of these states, but disdainful of their ideology and internal regimes; hence the lack of interest and support for the Czechoslovak experience, judged to be the work of intellectuals who were incompetent on the diplomatic level.

From this example one can see clearly that the preferences shown for Eastern Europe derive in the first place from those one has for oneself. This brings us to the fourth dilemma, which includes all the others, in that it brings into question our concept of international life and of politics itself: on what grounds should we struggle, what development do we hope for and what should we encourage? Should we think in terms of states, political regimes, or social structures? Apart from the choices which we cannot make for others and the direct influence we are unable to exercise over them, what choices are we making for ourselves and what indirect influence will they have on these other nations' development? To the extent that what happens to Western Europe may have a value as an example or as a magnet for Eastern Europe, one can see a basic opposition between two different concepts, one giving priority to the independence of states and the other emphasizing the interdependence of societies. According to the first, the more we retain our sovereignty, the more we detach ourselves from the United States, the more we shall encourage the countries of Eastern Europe to live up to their national personalities and detach themselves from the Soviet Union. According to the other concept, the more successful we are in creating a zone of cooperation and prosperity, forgetting old quarrels, the more the countries of Eastern Europe will tend to feel reassured by this stability, attracted by this prosperity, and thus be drawn into this cooperation. On one side priority is placed on the break-up of the present blocs, without any clear idea of what would succeed them; on the other, priority is placed on sub- and supra-national links, stretching increasingly between West and East, depriving conflict and sovereignty of any real meaning. In both cases, there would be a decline in the role of ideology, to the benefit either of a differentiation of national interests, or of a convergence of modern societies.

Gone with the tanks! They were the messengers of the counter-revolutionary Holy Alliance, just as the barricades of Paris had heralded the contagious nature of revolts. The two had this much in common: they shattered the illusion of 'the death of ideology', an illusion shared by those nostalgic for the European concert and the prophets of the technetronic age. For a Europe based on the irresistible pull, either of national will or of technological convergence, to have a chance at all, the Soviet Union, which possesses the military power, would have had to subscribe to a concept of its interests which resembled that of its Western partners more than does its present medieval concept based on the identification of temporal and spiritual power. Calling to mind that it has the last word, that is the big batallions, the Soviet Union

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made it clear that, contrary to de Gaulle's hopes, conflict with China would serve to encourage it in strengthening its authority in its empire rather than withdrawing from it, and that, contrary to the hopes of Brzezinski, it was in fact the Soviet Union that held its satellites back and not they which carried it towards the west.

The trend towards *rapprochement* does exist in these societies, but is always blocked because the country which is least close to the West happens to be the most powerful. Thus when the process of European convergence really gets going, the countries of Central Europe like Czechoslovakia immediately find themselves so far ahead on the way to a common civilization and language with Western Europe that the Soviet leaders become anxious and put the brakes on. To the Soviets, developments are only acceptable if they can be controlled. So they never go far enough, for fear of going too far: the Soviet Union has no desire to sacrifice the two birds in the hand for one bird in the bush, i.e. Eastern Europe for European reconciliation, economic and technical cooperation and an extension of its influence in the West, all of which seem to the USSR, however desirable, more uncertain and fraught with risks, and less vital than its rule in Eastern Europe.

This reaction, which could have been foreseen a long time ago, became increasingly evident after 1967. What is most astonishing is that, having chosen the priority of consolidation in Eastern Europe with the most brutal clarity, the Soviet Union nowadays seems to be making —as a bonus, so to speak—gains in the other sphere too. It seems on the way to obtaining the European reconciliation, the economic and technical cooperation, the growing influence in the West promised by Western strategy before 1968, without having to make the concessions and furnish the guarantees which the latter demanded. It can eat its East European cake and have its Western *détente* too.

Historically, the Soviet Union has had to face a double dilemma. On the one hand, rigidity in the East or *détente* in the West; on the other hand, cooperation with the United States to maintain the status quo or with the West Europeans to diminish American influence. Today, with the confirmation of Soviet power in Eastern Europe, with Western acceptance of this *fait accompli*, with the American trend towards withdrawal and the uncertainties of Europe, all these factors seem to combine, giving all these trends simultaneous sway: a conservative hardening inside and active *détente* outside, while cooperation with the United States is combined with a certain progress at the latter's expense, shaping the situation in a way beneficial to the Soviet Union. Traditionally, periods of *détente*, favourable as they are to pluralism, have presented more problems to the Soviet Union than to the West. This time, however, the combination of Western crises and the Soviet success in applying a miraculous cure to the ills of polycentrism, one that could hardly be used in Western Europe, in other words armed intervention,

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seems to have led to a *détente*, which, at least in the short term, is more favourable to the Soviet Union than to its allies and rivals.

Normalization and the Normal

Here again the most surprising thing is not that *détente* survived the intervention in Czechoslovakia, but that so soon afterwards, on both sides, things went so much farther than before 1968. The Soviet Union put forward the idea of a conference on European Security in 1954 and then again in 1965; however it was only after its third launching in spring 1959 that the idea was first accorded a favourable reception, and it will now almost certainly take place. Germany put out feelers under Adenauer, then engaged in a more or less full-scale Eastern policy under Schröder and the Kiesinger-Brandt Great Coalition; yet it was after 1968 (even before Willy Brandt came to power—in fact in the spring of 1969) that the Soviet Union played the card it had always held in reserve till then: to include Germany in the process of *détente* and, in so doing, to give up its role as unifying scarecrow of the bloc. It is evident that the main reason for this is to be found in the success of the intervention in Czechoslovakia, similar to that other avowal of failure in the East, which also proved a source of success in relations with the West: the Berlin Wall.

In both cases, the move reassured the Soviet and East German leaders that they could control the process of *détente* by stopping it abruptly if it was getting out of hand. Since then they have felt less need of an external threat as a unifying factor; force is enough, especially as it crushes any hopes for reunification which the peoples of Eastern Europe and of the Western powers, in particular Germany, might have pinned on an evolution of Soviet ideas and priorities. Now that there is no longer any hope of changing the status quo, the hour of normalization has struck.

Another evolution of Soviet attitudes seems to be moving in the direction of a greater acceptance of the status quo: Moscow has considerably diminished the anti-American aspect of its policy on European security; it hardly disguises any longer its acceptance of existing alliances. On the other hand it hopes that *détente*, in the form of the treaties with Federal Germany and the Security Conference, will square the circle by consolidating its sphere of domination in Eastern Europe and confirming its legitimacy, showing both recalcitrant peoples and governments that there is no point in harbouring any more illusions about Western support.

In this respect, the recognition, particularly by Germany, that it is necessary to come to terms with the Soviet Union before Poland and Czechoslovakia and to count on its influencing the German Democratic Republic in the right way, is particularly important. In the same way, the European Security Conference is a perfect symbol, both of *détente* and of the acceptance of the status quo, understood as meaning the

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consequences not only of the second world war but also of the second Prague *coup*.

For all that, what uncertainties attend this calculation, how riddled with worms the fruit of this status quo, what ambiguity and contradiction surrounds the horrible term 'normalization'! Procrustes could well be counted, if not as its inventor, at least as its hero, expert as he was in normalizing his friends and guests. The word 'normalization' is used every day, both for relations between the West, in particular Germany, and the communist world, and for getting Czechoslovakia back into line. That the pacified and reconciled Europe of *détente*, *entente* and cooperation should at the same time be the one where, four years after the invasion, Soviet troops are still in Czechoslovakia, where men are sentenced by the courts for having advocated that people boycott the elections, whilst in the Soviet Union itself, dissenters are 'normalized' in psychiatric clinics, all this may be understood in terms of realism; yet it cannot but bring to mind the cry of a Czechoslovak writer: 'We live in a world where madmen put straitjackets on normal people'. What relation is there between these two forms of normalization, that of East-West relations and that of the Soviet empire? One is probably the essential precondition of the other: only the normalization of Czechoslovakia, that is absolute control over the empire, gives the Soviet Union enough confidence to begin normalizing this empire's relations with the outside world. But what reaction does the second produce in the first?

This, for us, is the heart of the matter, and it is at this point that we enter into the realm of supposition and contradictory guesses. Does external normalization have any effect on internal normalization, does it render the latter all the more irrevocable by legitimizing it, or, on the other hand, does it point up the abnormality of it by removing the alibi of security? Indeed, in the long run, will external normalization transform the internal situation in its own image, into a normality that is peaceful, tolerant and flexible?

Obviously the West, and particularly the Brandt government, places its best on the last hypothesis; the Soviet Union, on the other hand, can only make the opposite gamble, whether in fact it believes in the opposite effect, or whether it is prepared to accept risks (which it believes will be limited and controllable) in Eastern Europe for the sake of an active policy towards the West. Hence the question: what, in the present phase, is considered 'normal' in Western Europe? Would it consist of return to its actual geographical situation as the Western point of a Eurasian mass where the Soviet Union would command the dominant position dictated by its size? Or does it mean a Europe of *détente*, where the Common Market and even the American presence would be considered normal, but where the creation of a political and military Europe would constitute a dangerous development, whose abnormal nature would, precisely, be shown up by the normalization of East-West

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relations? From now on all speculations on the second thoughts and strategies of both sides are permitted, for the simple reason that, with the official recognition of the status quo, with the official acceptance of *détente* and the increase in contacts between the two halves of Europe, we have entered, no doubt for a long time, into an era of ambiguity, uncertainty and guesswork.

This is exactly what, in our minds, appears to be the major distinction between the present international situation and its historical precedents; this is, for example, what distinguishes the military intervention in Czechoslovakia from other occupations, the German-Soviet treaty from other negotiations, the European Security Conference from other conferences. Rarely have force and diplomacy rested on such implicit gambles about the effects on long-term historical, political and economic, but above all, psychological or social, processes. Yet nobody knows to what extent they can be manipulated, reversed, influenced, controlled or limited by troops and treaties.

In the long run, who can possibly pretend to know whether the invasion will secure or compromise Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, whether the meaning of *Ostpolitik* lies in the acceptance of German division or in the adoption of the only possible way to surmount it, if the European Security Conference will favour the unity of the blocs or their dissolution? In other ages, force and diplomacy permitted conquests and the reversal of alliances. During the Cold War, such modifications of the status quo were impossible, the situation was frozen in confrontation, the two blocs welded by the threat, real or supposed, of the enemy, with the status quo upheld by the fact that nobody recognized it. The two-fold paradox of this era of negotiation is that, on the one hand, all this spectacular activity amounts basically to recognizing the status quo, yet, on the other hand, this recognition of the status quo could activate psychological and social forces which would undermine it far more powerfully, because more unpredictably, than all diplomatic or military undertakings.

The uncertainties of détente

The primary characteristic of the situation in Europe is the contrast between the rigidity of the system, on a state and international level, and the fragility of its societies, the continuation of structures which have lost their legitimacy yet have retained enough power to show up the weakness of those who challenge them. Between blocs, alliances, or regional organizations, rivalry no longer leads to conquest or even to active subversion. It becomes a matter of 'competitive decadence', of comparative resistance to the forces of disintegration which eat away at all of them, and which will be encouraged by their mutual acceptance and by interpenetration. The Cold War was in fact characterized by the triumph of the defensive, hidden and protected by a verbal offensive. Policies of *détente* do not necessarily disturb the balance between

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alliances or societies, but they do tend to make them much more vulnerable to each other. From the moment of the existence or legitimacy of social structures is recognized, real competition, whether intentional or not, begins: it relates to their content, their comparative degree of dynamism and unity.

Within any particular institutional framework there is room for considerable variation in the balance of wills, of hopes and influences. A sort of 'hot peace' is increasingly replacing the Cold War; in relation to the latter this new peace has the same relation as the Cold War had to war: it is a step further away from the use of force and aggression against the opposite system. However, the threats against the solidity of the systems themselves have not necessarily diminished.

In this new phase of ambiguity and contradiction, isolation can be broken, but only in favour of an asymmetric and unbalanced penetration rather than of reconciliation. There may always be enough social ferment to prevent stabilization by freezing, enough communication and convergence to prevent stabilization by isolation, enough rigidity to prevent stabilization by adaptation, enough separation and divergence to prevent stabilization by integration. The main characteristic of the 'hot peace' is neither force nor cooperation, but the constant reciprocal influence of societies within the framework of a competition whose goals are less and less tangible, whose means are less and less direct, whose consequences are less and less calculable, precisely because they involve activities rather than strategies and indeed because these activities are important as they affect what societies are as much as what they do.

Power considerations retain their importance, even if only within this complex process, in which the Soviet Union is increasingly superior on the military level, while the Western countries are superior on that of economics and technology, but in which the most decisive element is in fact the crisis, both social and spiritual, of modern society. Though this is more visible and diffuse in the West, it is more controlled but more explosive in the East. The brutality of communist regimes makes them better at repressing their dissidents while the elasticity of Western societies makes them better at coopting them. At present, Soviet imperial authority, both inside and outside the bloc, is expanding, yet always exposed to explosions; in the West, the main threat is rather erosion.

If this is so, the same process of *détente* can promote the external success of the Soviet Union whilst aggravating its internal difficulties by setting in motion the cycle of liberalization, explosion, repression. In the West, it can help the economy by reducing military expenses but also contribute to ideological disintegration and a waning of authority in external affairs, passing from moralistic pacifism to resigned or unavowed dependence. At this point Europe would adopt the most reassuring interpretation possible of Soviet policy, precisely because it needed reassurance. The term 'Finlandization' has often been used in this context; if it means the difference between the internal regime and the

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external situation, the ambiguity of an influence usually exercised over external policies and only exceptionally over internal ones, one could then say that both Western and Eastern Europe can at the same time either fear or hope for such a process of Finlandization. One would have less freedom of external action and the other have more freedom for internal development.

The problem of the present period is: who will Finlandize whom? Will the process of *détente* have the effect of making things difficult for a Western Europe which would be coherent and capable of action, by drowning it in a pan-European group dominated by the Soviet Union, or will it rather transform the latter's empire into a classical sphere of influence. Will it give rise to a slow erosion of ideological barriers or to abrupt explosions with unforeseeable consequences? The anxiety of the Soviet leaders in face of the revolt in Gdansk in December 1970 clearly indicates that this hypothesis cannot be excluded, that in fact this development is inherent in the very nature of a system which allows no peaceful expression of opposition. However, if Eastern Europe is in a state of permanent instability, it is still the situation of the Soviet Union which is decisive, and this seems to be far less fragile.

In the West, Northern Europe, which is relatively stable politically, is increasingly exposed to the psychological effects of Soviet military might. In the South, the instability of societies and regimes, from the Balkans to the Spanish peninsula, raises the spectre of internal conflict and external intervention.

The vital spots are Yugoslavia and the two Germanies. Yugoslavia is threatened both by erosion and explosion, by social and national conflicts, subject to the influence of capitalist society and to the watchful and not always reassuring concern of the Soviet Union, always ready to profit from the divisions in Yugoslav society to reaffirm its socialist solidarity.

As for Central Europe, it is a zone of balance unlike the North, and of stability unlike the South; it is also the region where the two countries most representative of the two systems are in closest contact, and in the most decisive manner. If Western Germany were too weak or too strong, if it were either 'Finlandized' or aggressive, if East Germany were attracted by it or were the victim of any violent agitation, it would in one way or another call into question the whole balance of the continent. Indeed the swiftness of mental transformation in Germany leads us to think that after having been the most predictable country of Europe, Germany is now again beginning to display the famous and disquieting '*incertitudes allemandes*'.

The policies of the Soviet Union seem to display a very lucid awareness of this new state of fluidity, with its dangers and possibilities. Not a day passes in the Soviet Union and all the countries of Eastern Europe, but there is a call for ideological vigilance, which runs the risk of being lulled by the process of *détente*, or an exhortation to continue

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the anti-imperialist struggle, at the same time taking a stand against the Cold War and for the dissolution of the blocs. Not a day without protests against 'psychological warfare' or ideological contraband from the West, whilst ideological struggle is set against the convergence of societies. The communist countries' restrictive attitude to the theme of the 'free movement of people and ideas' shows how much they feel on the defensive in this respect. They are trying to acquire the economic and technical benefits of *détente* while avoiding intellectual and social contagion by keeping up ideological hostility and by a certain physical isolation. However, on the other hand their attitude to the comparative evolution of the two systems is optimistic.

In a report on Western Europe in the 1970s prepared by top Soviet specialists for the Central Committee, the points emphasized were the American trend towards withdrawal, the aggravation of conflict between capitalist countries, the cultural and moral crisis of Western society, which it is supposed will assume particularly serious dimensions in Germany, and, by contrast, the necessity to reinforce the integration, unity and dynamism of the socialist camp.[1]

The expectation and exploitation of 'social disintegration' takes precedence over the more classic expectation of economic crisis. The outlook is neither one of war nor one of revolution, but that of a patiently expected and discreetly encouraged evolution.

That is how we must interpret the Soviet Union's recognition of Western realities. It does not seek to blockade Berlin, nor to engineer the neutralization of Germany, the dissolution of the Common Market of the departure of American troops from Europe. Nevertheless, within the existing legal and social structures, it desires a Berlin as detached as possible from the Federal Republic, a Federal Republic as detached as possible from Western Europe, Western societies as divided as possible, as long as this does not lead to upheavals which might call its authority in its own zone into question. It recognizes Western realities, but only in order to change them.

In an even more prudent, though perhaps less lucid and systematic way, this is also the approach of the German *Ostpolitik*. In this sense one can contrast the policies of Brezhnev and Brandt with those of Khrushchev and de Gaulle. The latter attacked the European order frontally, whether it concerned Berlin or the existence of alliances or blocs; Brezhnev and Brandt have both understood that the only chance of modifying the status quo was to start by accepting it. This was already true of the German *Ostpolitik* sketched out before 1968. But at that time it was a question of accepting part of the status quo (basically the territorial one) in order to modify another (basically the political one); the emphasis was more on changing than accepting. Now the emphasis is reversed: the Federal Republic recognizes not only its

[1] Cf. Michel Tatu, *Le triangle Washington-Moscou-Pekin et les deux Europe*, p. 79.

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frontiers but, in fact, the German Democratic regime and Soviet supremacy in Eastern Europe.

Like the Soviet Union, however, it hopes that the process of *détente* and communication will work in a way favourable to the former aims, now redefined in a more realistic, that is more modest and, especially, less immediate way. The slight difference between the policies of the Soviets and those of the Germans is that the former do not content themselves with hoping; whilst all the time trying to avoid provoking anxiety, they exert a discreet but firm and constant pressure in favour of their objectives.

The efforts of Willy Brandt's Germany are, for the time being, directed more at proving its good will than at negotiation proper; its main aim seems at present to be the creation of an atmosphere of confidence and cooperation, to which it attaches an intrinsic value and which, on the other hand, it hopes will encourage a favourable evolution. It is not unaware that this evolution is not certain; but it believes that all attempts to exercise direct pressure in favour of the independence of states or the freedom of individuals in Eastern Europe would only arouse suspicion and irritation among the Soviet and East German leaders and drive them to put a stop to the process, whereas the whole point of West German policy consists of showing them that nobody wants to sabotage their authority, or even of helping them to stabilize it, in the hope that once assured of its solidity they will be able and willing to make it more flexible.

What should the West do?

Although the result is vague as regards both prospects and words, at least Germany has a coherent attitude (if not a policy) and a coherent perspective (if not a strategy). Can any other approach be adopted in this day and age?

Michel Tatu's excellent book on the subject calls on the West to assume a posture that is closer in spirit to that of the Soviet Union, i.e. tougher or more combative in short-term negotiations and laying less stress on vague concepts like climate or *détente* or on risky gambles:

> The one certain fact is that the Soviet leaders do not allow themselves to be impressed by a ' climate ', an eminently changeable thing and one that they can, moreover, modify at will. What counts for them is what can be got straight away, on the spot; two ' birds in the bush ' are a small price for them to pay in return for one ' bird in the hand ' from the opposite camp.

Negotiations with the Soviet Union are excellent where give-and-take bargaining is involved; but it is dangerous for us to go about it with our hands tied, by making an irreversible commitment to *détente* and refraining from maximizing our gains or criticizing the Soviet Union so as not to allow the climate to worsen for fear of ' reverting to the

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Cold War'. An approach of this kind would pave the way for Finlandization.

Tatu also accuses Western foreign policymakers of being too interested in the Soviet Union and insufficiently interested in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union is bound to be dominant in any dialogue, at least until a European federation can form a power capable of redressing the balance. In the absence of such a federation, the only acceptable European equilibrium would be based on a balance between the countries of Western Europe and the small and medium-sized states of Eastern Europe. The East European states should be the preferred negotiating partners for Western Europe, closer as they are in terms of culture and feeling and less dangerous because of their smaller size.

Tatu is obviously aware of the eternal dilemma (in relation to Western Europe, Eastern Europe is too strong if the Soviet Union is included, and too weak if it is excluded), and of the crushing argument that the Soviet Union has the means of preventing this kind of dialogue between Eastern and Western Europe. He too takes refuge in long-term hopes:

> This is no reason for agreeing, in the name of a somewhat short-sighted 'realism', to adhere to the views of the Kremlin and agree to schemes which run the risk of being proved embarrassingly wrong ten years later. The success of a policy cannot be judged by the length of time which it takes to reach solutions, but by the quality of the solutions and the length of time they will endure. In the meantime, it would be better to do nothing rather than move in the opposite direction from the 'optimum' solution.[2]

This must certainly be the only really worthwhile and serious debate involved in an approach to Eastern Europe. Like all valid points of debate it has no obviously right answer. It involves a post-Prague version of the second and third dilemmas outlined earlier. It corresponds, seen from Eastern Europe, to the distinction between the Rumanian and Hungarian paths (which have been dubbed respectively the 'intra-bloc nationalist' and the 'consumer' deviations). These can be broken down into the argument as to whether the Soviet Union should be stood up to for the sake of independence on the part of small and medium states or whether society should be reformed and the lot of the population improved while avoiding at all costs conflict with the Soviet Union in foreign policy. Tatu is obviously an admirer of the Rumanian method, whereas Willy Brandt bases his policies on the same hypotheses as the Hungarian approach. In both cases, moreover, it is how the communist world itself evolves which appears to be the decisive factor rather than Western policies whose real importance is normally only marginal, although they can doubtless be important in Soviet decision-making at times of crisis.

[2] Op. cit. p. 48.

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Perhaps Tatu underestimates the importance of the relative opening up of the East, of the gradual strengthening networks of communications and interdependence, while Brandt underestimates their potentially explosive effects. Perhaps Tatu gives too much weight to the Soviet leaders' capacity for avoiding the social, political and ideological side-effects while Brandt is too optimistic about Soviet willingness to put up with them. Perhaps Tatu—especially writing after the Prague invasion—also overestimates the room for manoeuvre possessed by small and medium-sized European states, while Brandt has surely underestimated the resentment aroused in Eastern Europe by the fact that he chose first to talk to Moscow.

When all is said, it certainly seems that the only hope is a long-term process within the existing framework. But with regard to the way the countries of the West are playing their respective parts in this process, Tatu is certainly right to deplore their lack of dynamism, lack of confidence in their case and lack of solidarity with the East Europeans. This criticism is valid when applied to three issues: reciprocity in short-term talks, a long-term all-European project and an abandonment of double-talk.

VIEWED in the light of these three considerations the German *Ostpolitik* is obviously somewhat flabby, but the policies of other Western countries are still more so. In his Nobel Prize speech, Brandt gave quite a penetrating analysis of the aims of his policies. He said that they were designed to strengthen German freedom of manoeuvre, but went hand in hand with a renunciation of great power ambitions; to maintain existing alliances and institutions, but expanded in scope, and eventually to be modified in meaning by all-European cooperation; to safeguard the balance of national interests but within the framework of and on behalf of a 'European world and internal policy (*Weltinnenpolitik*)' that would look after the interests of men and societies as much as of nations and states. In France, on the other hand, it would not be too unjust to say that government policies towards the East are a mixture of Atlantic orthodoxy and pro-Soviet leanings in the name of the dissolution of power blocs, while that of the left is a brew made up of League of Nations-type utopianism and acceptance of the Brezhnev doctrine in the name of socialism and democracy.

The French have begun to take seriously the prospect of an eventual American withdrawal and consequent Soviet military superiority. This has led them to become, in certain respects, the staunchest supporters of NATO orthodoxy. They not only oppose the idea of American troop withdrawals but were, until recently, hostile to any form of mutual and balanced force reductions, despite the fact that certain states, either non-aligned or heretical communist in character, seek in these measures some protection against great power intervention. At the same time the French want to maintain relations with the Soviet Union which are at least as

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cordial as those maintained by other countries. To do this France has chosen to be converted with belated enthusiasm to the idea of the European Security Conference. The reason for this conversion is that the Conference is considered unlikely to have any significant outcome. But at the same time, so as to profit from the gesture, France is embarrassed by an agenda likely to raise matters that will displease the Soviets. This is true even where the matters raised touch on principles that France tries to advocate, like freedom of movement for men and ideas.

As for the non-communist left, at least in France, it protests against talk of the dangers of a Prague-style intervention or of the application of the Brezhnev doctrine to a socialist Western country. This optimism is based on its trust in the permanence of blocs. When accused, then, of basing its hope for democratic socialism coming out on top of its communist allies in a coalition government upon the permanence of the Yalta partition and of American military presence, its leaders declare that they do want to replace this bipolar order by an independent Europe. But they give no indication of the way to get there. Their only positive policies are reminiscent of the old three-point formula (arbitration—collective security—disarmament) which was already quite unrealistic at the time of the League of Nations, let alone in the nuclear age! Added to this is a tendency to accept Soviet-inspired proposals on European security without any effort to adapt them to specifically European interests or to the cause of human rights. Rather than this combination of verbal condemnation and acceptance in practice of the blocs, it may be more desirable, here as elsewhere, not to hide realities. These are the facts, inescapable for the time being, of the Soviet presence, the equally inescapable need for a military balance in Europe, whether Atlantic or continental, and the unacceptable character—now and forever—of the political and human consequences of this presence and of this balance: oppression and division, the closing of borders to individuals and their opening to tanks.

INSTEAD of seeking to reassure everyone by resorting to universal untruths on blocs and security, it would be more honest and more effective to give it to the Soviet Union straight. The Russians should be told that nobody is trying to eliminate the role of the great powers, but that the Western objective is to limit their tendency to exploit this role for oppressive ends. Existing blocs should be changed into alliances. This would mean that freely chosen alliances, balanced and limited in scope to foreign policies and defence, should take the place of ideological police-state groupings. It should also be stated that the West aims to create within the alliances and between them and non-aligned states, the same security which already exists between the two alliances and which has turned Europe, unlike Asia or the Middle East, into the continent of 'the War which has not taken place'.

It might be useful to employ the fourfold slogan of the Prague spring:

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Socialism, Liberty, Alliance and Sovereignty. Western countries would make a solemn declaration that they have no intention of acting against either the socialist structure of the countries of Eastern Europe or their membership of the Warsaw Pact. They would, however, make a no less solemn declaration that the degree of warmth in their relations with East European countries depends on the extent to which the latter enjoy internal liberties and external sovereignty.

It would not mean aiming at imposing on these countries a Western definition of these concepts; peaceful coexistence, as the Soviets justly desire, must be applied to all regimes. On the other hand, mutual understanding, cooperation, participation in joint bodies and common undertakings, the spirit of community and dialogue any solid peace would be based upon, presuppose a minimum of reciprocity and common attitudes, definitions and rules of conduct.

This position could be applied both to the immediate level of day-to-day negotiations, in forming new pan-European institutions, perhaps stemming from the Conference itself, and to the more utopian and long-term concept of a Europe reconciled.

In the first stage, the search for common definitions of such notions as cultural cooperation, subversion and non-intervention, should lead to real reciprocity in commercial exchanges and communications networks, in the understanding of the limits with which they must be hedged about for security reasons and of the guarantees needed to prevent their abuse, etc. In areas where the asymmetrical nature of political regimes or alliances or where differences inherent in the temporary ordering of priorities would prevent reciprocity eventually growing to symmetry, they should be replaced by compensation and compromise. States should be able to agree, for example, on the optimum number of cultural and technological exchanges. If one group cares more about the first and the other cares more about the second, they ought to be able to weigh the advantages of military security or political control against losses of potential economic advantage, etc. Such weighing up of activities that are different in nature is certainly artificial and exceptional, but numerous precedents do exist. In the late fifties and early sixties, protracted negotiations between the United States and Hungary led to Hungary's being fully reinstated in the United Nations in return for an amnesty for political prisoners. Other amnesties in other Eastern countries have accompanied East-West commercial deals. Similar measures were taken by the GDR to ease Willy Brandt's electoral position and the treaty between the two Germanies does contain an implicit bargain of '*Menschliche Erleichterungen*' against '*staatliche Anerkennung*'.

In the second stage, this kind of dialogue is the chief justification for accepting the idea of creating pan-European institutions. A commission on crises and conflicts could discuss differences arising from political, economic and military matters. An arms control committee could

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monitor the introduction of measures designed to limit the freedom of action of the superpowers (oddly named, in the current jargon, ' confidence-building measures ', whereas their essence is rather to be a substitute for confidence). A political assembly which would be consultative and would function on the consensus principle rather than on majority vote, could give each state a chance of expressing its views in an arena broader than the framework of their respective alliances, yet narrower than the forum of the United Nations. A European commission for human rights would be set up, based on a pan-Europeanization of the European Declaration of Human Rights and of the institutions built within the framework of the Council of Europe, like the European Human Rights Commission and Court which are functioning today to protect them. This commission would hear the grievances of individuals and associations as well as of states.

It should not be forgotten that such institutions would serve as an instrument through which the Soviet Union could try to put a brake on the growth of a West European political or military entity. But West Europeans capable of uniting for a common project should be in a position to accept the risks likely to stem from accepting the logic of mutual free access and interpenetration, which is the only possible alternative to monolithic blocs and spheres of oppression.

A Third Voice

But has such a common plan any chance of seeing the light of day? Here we come to the third aspect—the most distant and uncertain one, and yet probably the key to the other two. All the practical compromises and the temporary recognition of all the unpleasant realities can have real meaning if a real European project underlies them. What could this project be? Perhaps the gradual emergence within their respective present alliances and systems of a Western Europe and Eastern Europe whose dialogue would engender a third voice rather than a third force or a third way. Perhaps the combination of preferential ties between these two Europes between countries having common traditions transcending military and ideological barriers all suggests that it would be possible. Perhaps the dialogue between a European way to liberalism and a European way to communism might end by defining at last the premises of a real democratic socialism. Today, one can only speculate.

At any rate, it is not for governments to propose today the political, let alone the ideological shape most desirable for a future Europe. But what about the intellectuals? What about the parties of the left? Can the left really be taken seriously if it ignores or forgets the international lessons to be drawn from the division of Europe, or if its critique of the existing structures and its search for a new model neglect the critiques and the explorations of the Polish October and the Prague Spring? Can one break out of the ' silence of Europe ' without breaking out of the double-talk and ignorance about Eastern Europe, without abandoning

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the cowardice which consists of not supporting efforts towards independence on the part of Soviet satellites because of the desire for peace with the Soviet Union, or, conversely, in order not to embarrass the same East European states, the cowardice of ignoring the appeals of oppressed individuals?

Two voices from the East put us in our place. The first is that of a Czechoslovak historian writing to one of his friends who left the country in 1968. He asks his correspondent what concepts are being worked out in this Europe, which the Prague Spring wished to become part of, that could stimulate the rebirth of the reform and reconcilation movement the day the balance of power permits it. One can imagine the embarrassment of the recipient of this letter.[3]

The other voice is that of Solzhenitsyn in his Nobel Prize speech. He takes the Western world to task for being able to say, when faced with a muddy swamp, 'Oh, what a pretty little pool!' or, on seeing someone in heavy chains, 'Oh, what a charming necklace!' The spirit of Munich is, as far as Solzhenitsyn is concerned, not so much non-resistance as the acceptance of the supreme sin—the absence of communication, a refusal by artists, intellectuals, and scientists to take up the miraculous gift which they are the only ones to possess, that of being able to cross frontiers and barbed-wire fences 'at a time when there are no longer internal affairs on our overpopulated earth, and when the salvation of mankind depends on each of us making his neighbour's affairs his own and on the peoples of the East having a vital interest in what is being thought in the West, on the peoples of the West having overriding concern about what happens in the East?'

NEITHER the balance of power, nor the preoccupations of the peoples of the West, nor the priorities of governments, nor the demands of technology hold out much hope for Eastern Europe to escape from the empire of force. As Solzhenitsyn says, only one weapon against violence remains, and that is the refusal to lie. If we need a utopia, let those who, in both East and West, have no power whatsoever, remain at least faithful to that which is suggested to them in the proverb which the Russian writer uses to end his speech: 'A word of truth weighs more than the whole world.'

[3] Cf. V. Kusin, *The Intellectual Origins of the Prague Spring*, p. 48.

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Soviet Foreign Policy in the Seventies

Jan F. Triska

IN December 1972, a two-day conference on Soviet foreign policy in the seventies took place at Stanford University under the auspices of the Center for Russian and East European Studies. The conference participants addressed themselves to five specific themes, as follows: The Soviet Union, United States and China *(Wayne S. Vucinich, Stanford University, chairman; Vernon V. Aspaturian, Pennsylvania State University, speaker; and Robert A. Scalapino, University of California, Berkeley, Benjamin Zook, US Department of State, and Jan F. Triska, Stanford University, commentators);* American-Soviet Relations *(Jan F. Triska, Stanford University, chairman; Jack F. Matlock, US Department of State, speaker);* The Soviet Union and the Communist World *(Milorad Drachkovitch, Hoover Institution, chairman; Herbert S. Dinerstein, Johns Hopkins University, speaker; and Paul M. Cocks, Hoover Institution, Kenneth T. Jowitt, University of California, Berkeley, and Leopold Labedz,* Survey *and Stanford University, commentators);* Constraints on Soviet Foreign Policy: Disarmament and Arms Control *(Henry S. Rowen, Stanford University, chairman; Wolfgang Panofsky, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, speaker; and Marshall D. Shulman, Columbia University, Richard F. Staar, Hoover Institution, and John W. Lewis, Stanford University, commentators);* Major Soviet Foreign Policy Targets *(Roman Kolkowicz, University of California, Los Angeles, chairman; William Zimmerman, University of Michigan, speaker; and Arnold L. Horelick, Rand Corporation, Firuz Kazemzadeh, Yale University, and Alexander Dallin, Hoover Institution and Stanford University, commentators).*

The symposium which follows contains the papers and the formal comments delivered at the conference. But it does not contain informal comments made from the floor and the discussions which followed. Although we had taped the whole conference, hoping that the full proceedings would appear in print, time constraints and space limitations prevented us from doing so. We can only name here those conference participants not mentioned above who took part in the discussion: Yuri Borys, University of Calgary; Fred Breit, Whitman College; Peter K. Christoff, San Francisco State University; Ralph Fisher, University of Illinois; Harry Gelman, Visiting Research Scholar, Hoover Institution; Gregory Grossman, University of California, Berkeley; Peter Grothe, San Jose State University; Ronald Hilton, Stanford University; Gordon S. Hodgson, National War College; Andrew Janos, University of California, Berkeley; Herbert Kaplan, Indiana University; Mrs Sarra Kliachko, Stanford University; John Knowles, US Department of State;

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Mrs Suzanne Knoirsch, College of Notre Dame; Ladis K. D. Kristof, Portland State University; Gail Lapidus, University of California, Berkeley; Ivo J. Lederer, Ford Foundation; Stephen Ledogar, US Department of State; George Lenczowski, University of California, Berkeley; C. Bickford O'Brien, University of California, Davis; Dragisa Ristic, Defense Language School, Monterey, California; Lynn Roberts, Whitman College; Samuel Sharp, American University; Richard L. Siegel, University of Nevada; John Thomas, San Jose State University; Jozo Tomasevich, San Francisco State University; Ivan Volgyes, University of Nebraska; William Welch, University of Colorado; Eric Willenz, US Department of State.

The conference on Soviet foreign policy in the seventies—the tenth annual conference sponsored by the Center for Russian and East European Studies at Stanford—is our second conference to appear in Survey *as a symposium. We are grateful to Leopold Labedz for his cooperation. We are indebted to Harold H. Fisher, the distinguished dean of American scholars studying Soviet foreign policy, for kindly serving as a wise Honorary Chairman of the conference. But our greatest appreciation goes to Elise Johnson, without whom there would have been no conference.*

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The USSR, the USA and China in the Seventies

Vernon D. Aspaturian

IN the course of the 1970s, it will become increasingly apparent that the basic foundations of a post-Cold War international system are being laid. After more than 30 years of inconclusive general conflict, marked by civil and local wars, domestic social convulsions and revolutions, eye-ball to eye-ball confrontations, an ever-spiralling arms race, and prolonged attempts unilaterally to impose conflicting, ideologically inspired visions of world order and justice upon the globe, the major actors in the international system have apparently decided independently that a new post-Cold War world order must be founded upon a fresh consensus which transcends competing and conflicting—not merely different—ideological and social systems. The emerging world order will not, therefore, follow a war in which one group of powers emerges victorious and imposes its will upon another group, but will rather result from a nuclear stalemate and a stable balance of terror.

For more than a decade, the Cold War has not only produced no positive gains for either side, but has been enormously expensive, psychologically enervating, and physically exhausting. Furthermore, national development and priorities have been distorted, domestic social convulsions and turbulence have been generated, alliances and coalitions have been disrupted, and ideological commitments have been challenged, eroded, and diffused. Neither the American nor the communist vision of an international order is likely to prevail; the first failed because even the richest and most developed country in the world could sustain neither the will nor the cost—material, human, and moral—to realize its vision, and the second failed because the fracturing of the communist monolith has made impossible the very concept of a unified communist outlook and will to prevail.

The 1970s will see the emergence of a new world order with existing national ideological and social systems more or less intact, although considerably modified in extent and character. It seems likely that there will be a prolonged period of 'peaceful coexistence', during which the international order will be re-examined and redefined, as the major actors in the system redefine their own identities, roles, missions and relationships to the system as a whole and to one another. This self-redefinition, rather than a straightforward realignment of actors, will be the principal preoccupation of the 1970s. All the major actors will adjust themselves to the new international order while at the same time concentrating on the preservation or establishment of their own internal evolution and development, as the nexus between domestic policy and foreign policy

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becomes even more crucial than in the past. Existing notions of defence and security, coexistence and cooperation will undergo serious examination and alteration as new balances are struck between domestic needs and priorities on the one hand, and purposes and objectives in foreign policy on the other.

An essential characteristic of the Cold War was that defence and security, not simply foreign policy, were defined in terms of ideology, and thus increasingly assumed an absolutist if often amorphous character. The Cold War was characterized not only by a conflict of state or national interests, but by a conflict between competing ideological and social systems, in which the latter rather than the former became the reference point for defining 'defence'. Not the defence of this or that state, but the defence or expansion of a system or ideology became the focal point, although this was inextricably linked with a parallel, if subordinate, promotion of state interests. Under these conditions, 'defence' policies transcended the sphere of state security and became increasingly irrational and indecipherable in conventional terms, responding to the imperatives of affirmative messianic rather than defensive objectives.

The 'overdevelopment of foreign policy' or 'over-commitment' characterized primarily those of the United States and the Soviet Union, while the foreign policies of other states either atrophied or suffered from underdevelopment. Atrophy was the prime characteristic of France, Britain and China, while underdevelopment afflicted the foreign policies of Japan and West Germany. The difference is probably explained by the fact that the former were part of the victorious Allied coalition and the latter, the major axis powers. The new balances struck between domestic and foreign policies will result in less foreign policy activity on the part of Moscow and Washington and more on the part of the other five states, especially China and, to a lesser degree, Japan and West Germany.

AMONG the first casualties of the 1970s will be messianic foreign policies and 'global strategies', as the US and the USSR reduce their commitments and China and the other states expand their foreign policy horizons. The very concept 'global power' may become obsolete, particularly if China aspires to this status, as it makes little sense to speak of three 'global strategies' and it is absurd if even more are involved. Although universalist and messianic rhetoric is unlikely to disappear entirely, it is improbable that any combination of actors can successfully mobilize the social energies, sustain the will, expand the resources and amass the power necessary for the active pursuit of a global strategy animated by messianic purpose in the coming decade.

While the redefinition of identities will be the most important issue of the 1970s, other related critical problems will also demand simultaneous resolution. Some, like the re-examination and redefinition of foreign policy goals and objectives, the reconceptualization of defence and

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security, the rearrangement of priorities, and the redirection of growth and development, will logically flow from the redefinition of identities. Other issues, like the problem of succession (concerning elites as well as generations), national integration and system maintenance, constitutional and institutional development, may also emerge during the 1970s. All the major powers will experience social and political turbulence as they make readjustments, debate priorities and options, redistribute social and political power and wealth, and try to resolve these conflicts.

The Crisis of Identity

What is an identity crisis as it relates to major powers? Basically, it is a matter of the image the leadership of the state and its supporters hold of its nature, role and purpose in the international community. Does it conceive of itself as dedicated simply to defending and promoting the interests of its citizens and inhabitants, or does it imagine itself to be the vehicle of a higher mission, transcending such interests? Does it view itself as a terminal entity, the nucleus of an expanding organism, or a model to be universally emulated? Are its purposes absolute or relative; its goals limited or universalist? To what extent is its self-image, moral and physical integrity, and sense of self-fulfilment dependent upon the achievement of transcendental purposes as opposed to more modest criteria? To what degree is its conception of 'security' and 'defence' integrated with the achievement of higher purposes? And finally, to what degree is the legitimacy of the state, the system or the social structure interrelated with transcendental objectives?

THE crisis of identity is particularly critical for the Soviet Union and the United States, for unlike most other states, neither is a conventional nation-state. The Soviet Union can to some degree justify itself as a Russian state, but there is no American 'nation' as such for the United States to rely upon for self-justification and legitimization.

However, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States conceives of itself as an ordinary nation-state among others, and both have invested themselves with a mission and purpose beyond the simple satisfaction of the needs and interests of their citizens. Both are supranational states without being conventional imperial states, and until recently neither was aware of any identity problem. Each felt confident of its identity, as defined by itself and by others; each was a global power, the leader and centre of a coaliton of states in which its paramountcy—military and ideological—appeared assured, indisputable, indispensable and permanent.

The United States envisaged itself as the proud leader of the 'free' and 'democratic' world, which had only recently saved the globe from the scourge of fascist totalitarianism, and was now similarly dedicated to shielding it from the aggressive and predatory ambitions of the Soviet Union and communist totalitarianism. While there is no exact parallel,

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the Soviet Union likewise saw itself as the advance guard of a new, liberating communist order, ordained by history to liberate the world from capitalist imperialism, just as it had recently rescued the world from the savagery of fascist imperialism. Whatever the merits of these self-appointed roles, the Soviet Union and the United States were convinced of both the legitimacy and definition of their respective identities; the identity of each was to some degree a function of the other. 'Totalitarianism' and 'imperialism' became, in effect, ideological code-words establishing what each was against, while at the same time obscuring the fact that each had the affirmative purpose of imposing upon the world its own vision of a just and stable order, a *pax Americana* or *Sovietica.*

After three decades of bipolarized rivalry, the United States has implicitly recognized its failure to impose its version of justice and order upon the international system. The Soviet leaders are probably aware that there is very little likelihood of imposing theirs either, in view of the Chinese challenge to Soviet leadership in the world communist movement and the polycentric evolution of the movement itself, although some Soviet leaders, particularly ideologues, have not completely abandoned the notion that abdication by the United States from the position of 'world policeman' gives Moscow the opportunity to assume such a mantle. In this connexion, however, the dominant group within the Soviet leadership probably subscribes to the wise caveat issued by Georgi Arbatov that the failure of the United States to sustain its role as 'world gendarme' demonstrates that 'no single country can govern worldwide processes', thus implying that for Moscow to take on such a role would be costly, risky and ultimately futile.

The crisis of identity for both Moscow and Washington thus resolves itself into a re-examination of their mission and purpose in the world community, with a tendency to reduce their scope and intensity. Both countries retain powerful residual universalist and messianic impulses derived from tradition and ideology, reinforced in recent decades by enormous military and economic capabilities, and although these have been blunted, they have been neither exhausted nor explicitly repudiated. During the 1970s, we are likely to see at least a temporary retrenchment to regional hegemonies and continued erosion of ideological impulses in foreign policy. Whether this remains a temporary condition will depend not only upon the domestic forces and trends in each country, but also on the growing power of other states and the resolution of their own identity crises, particularly China.

The apparent admission by the United States and the Soviet Union of failure to achieve their global missions and retrench from the forward messianic positions in the international community is bound to produce political traumas and social turbulence in both countries, since to a great extent the structure of priorities, the internal distribution of power, the direction of development, the mobilization of social effort, the discharge

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of psychic and moral energies and the contours of legitimacy were conditioned and shaped by these identities, roles and missions in world affairs. While the circumstances of failure are different and the character, duration, and intensity of the internal political bickering and social turbulence provoked will also vary, reflecting in each case the nature of the system, it appears very likely that social turbulence, political conflicts and perhaps even challenges to the legitimacy of the system will occur in both countries the 1970s.

Indeed, the United States has already explicitly admitted failure, signalled first by the decision of Lyndon Johnson not to stand for re-election and then by the lower profile and evident retrenchment of US foreign policy during the Nixon Administration. The Arab debacle in 1967 and the sudden expulsion of the Soviet presence from Egypt in 1972, while not as traumatic as the US failure in Vietnam, nevertheless are strong indications that the global reach of Soviet foreign policy is also being diminished. One might even suggest that a common awareness in Washington and Moscow that the failure of their respective global policies would generate strong domestic reactions produced a common interest in finding a settlement that would not only serve to stabilize the international system but their respective internal orders as well. This may also explain the evident favouritism which the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime displayed for President Nixon in the 1972 presidential election.

The American admission of failure was first provoked by domestic disorders at home. This culminated in President Johnson's refusal to stand for re-election, which gave further impetus to internal turbulence, symbolized by the nomination of George McGovern by the Democratic Party; his basic position challenged not only America's globalism in foreign policy but the very legitimacy of the socio-politcal system. The process of social turbulence has not yet started in the Soviet Union, since it has yet to find its detonator, but all the basic ingredients for a social explosion, whether slow or rapid, controlled or uncontrolled, are to be found in Soviet Society.

THE Chinese crisis of identity is somewhat different from that of the United States and Russia. Whereas the latter are abandoning, temporarily or permanently, universalist and messianic policies that have become too costly, dangerous, and unrealistic, the Chinese are searching for an identity in the world community, from which they had effectively isolated themselves for two decades, not without, it must be said, substantial assistance from the United States. It was the search for an identity rather than its abandonment which triggered internal convulsions in China. Certainly, one of the basic issues faced by the Chinese leadership was whether it should establish a separate and independent identity in the international system as opposed to its identity as a member of a communist bloc of states subordinate to the Soviet Union. Related to this paramount issue were the following:

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(1) The development of a separate and independent nuclear and missile capability in defiance of Moscow and 'world public opinion', as expressed in the Partial Test-Ban Treaty of 1963 and the impending threat of nuclear non-proliferation;

(2) The establishment of complete autonomy in the domestic construction of socialism and communism, creating its own socio-political institutions and developing its own priorities;

(3) The redefinition of its own independent relationship to the international order and its major actors, including the United States and the Soviet Union, without reference to Moscow or the communist movement; and

(4) The active reassertion of its claim to a seat on the UN Security Council as one of the five permanent members, which would legally and formally institutionalize her identity as one of the major actors in the international community.

Mao's determination to establish the independent status of China, with, without, or against the Soviet Union, divided the Chinese leadership, led to the prolonged convulsion known as the Cultural Revolution, and resulted in the transformation of China from its number two status in the communist world into a growing number three in the international system, and created the foundation for the further development of China's identity during the decade of the 1970s and beyond. The first major fruit of this transformation was the *rapprochement* with the United States, which recognized China as one of the three major powers in the world. A major risk was a direct military confrontation with the Soviet Union, and this too was successfully withstood by China, but not without a bloody border skirmish in early 1969, when a perturbed Soviet leadership contemplated a direct assault on China's growing nuclear capability.

During the 1970s, China will determine whether she should endeavour to become an authentic global power on the scale of the US and Russia, or whether she should aim for the more limited goal of establishing herself as the dominant power in East Asia, with or without a sphere of influence. Despite Peking's periodic disavowals of any ambition to become a global or superpower and her denunciation of the concept and its implications, the Chinese, for the moment, appear to be keeping their options open. What does seem clear, however, is that China does not intend, in the near future, to develop a missile capability that could reach the continental US, largely because of the cost and risk, and will instead concentrate on strengthening both her conventional capabilities and building up her stockpile of thermonuclear warheads, short-range and intermediate-range missiles, sufficient to deal with the Soviet Union, Japan and India. It would therefore appear that Peking expects the US to disengage from the Asian mainland, allowing the indigenous powers to establish a local equilibrium, which Peking apparently believes would, with adroit diplomacy and militant exertion of influence, leave her as the paramount power in the region in the coming decades.

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AS the United States, the Soviet Union, and China redefine their identities and prospects, it goes without saying that the other major actors—Japan, Germany, Britain, and France, and possibly India—will re-examine their own too. The French had already made their bid for a redefined identity under de Gaulle and the limits of French redefinition have, in a sense, already been demarcated, while the British apparently are content with their progressive slide into relative inaction.

As the United States carries out a worldwide retrenchment and makes independent and unilateral arrangements with Moscow and Peking, those major powers which relied upon the American nuclear umbrella to shield them from their stronger neighbours will inevitably be forced to redefine their own identities in world affairs and seek either new protectors or make independent arrangements with other major powers as a transitional move, pending a final determination as to whether to assert an independent role alongside the United States, the Soviet Union and China. India, the weakest of the large powers and a state with fewest options, has at present chosen to seek the protection of Soviet power, since both countries have a common interest in blocking, containing or making more risky any Chinese attempt to expand their influence at the expense of Moscow and New Delhi.

Japan and West Germany remain potentially the most exposed to diplomatic extortion as US power recedes, and both are potential candidates for the superpower (though not global power) and nuclear power club, because of their impressive economic and technological capacity, their large, skilled and disciplined populations, and their military and hegemonic traditions. One must not forget that the 90 million Germans are the largest *nation* in Europe, after the Russians, and although divided into four entities (West Germany, East Germany, Austria and West Berlin), the profound desire of the Germans for reunification into a single, powerful state is still a latent force of volcanic dimensions. One cannot expect the Germans, alone of all large nations, to remain permanently content with their dispersal into four states. West Germany, alone, has the fourth largest GNP in the world, and Japan with her 100-million-plus population generates the third largest GNP. Leaving aside the various manoeuvres and stratagems each may use as they struggle to find their identity, one must assume that both will remain alert to possible vacuums and openings that may develop in a fluid situation so that they might reassert themselves and develop military capabilities and political aspirations more in keeping with their immense economic power and historical traditions. It was relatively easy to keep the lid on both countries during the bipolar era, since each had very little room to manoeuvre, but in a period of changing power configurations and alignments, both countries will have a greater latitude for asserting themselves.

Japan's latitude for manoeuvre is greater than that of Germany, because she is united as a nation, has the advantage of being an island,

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is in a good position to play off Peking against Moscow, and is more assured of US protection during a period of transition. Germany, on the other hand, is deep in the heart of Europe, is divided, surrounded on all sides by neighbours who feel threatened by the revival of German power, and thus is less able to play her neighbours off against one another. Furthermore, Germany will not be able to employ a residual US protective umbrella in the same way as Japan. Yet, in a sense, the future of both countries is symbiotic; the reassertion of Japanese power, for example, could alter the situation sufficiently to enable the Germans to reassert themselves.

Farewell to Globalism?

Bipolarity and the Cold War largely shaped and imposed identities upon the Soviet Union and the United States and to a lesser degree upon other states, and most importantly it defined the relationship between the two global powers. In the 1970s, the Soviet Union and the United States will not only be forced to redefine their relationships with their allies, client states and Third World countries, but also with one another. The emerging character of this relationship is by no means clear, but residual features of bipolarity and global rivalry will continue into the 1970s, and may gradually be transformed into something more than mere peaceful coexistence.

The most difficult task of the two global powers will not be so much to divest themselves of their messianic and global foreign policies, but to dismantle and restructure the psychological attitudes and socio-political structures that these policies produced. Shorn of their messianic impulses and global ambitions, both powers must undergo a psychological metamorphosis as they devolve to the status of one great power among other great powers. The Soviet Union already has several roles to which it can retreat, but the withdrawal from communist universalism will nevertheless inevitably call into question the legitimacy of the Communist Party and its right to rule once its ' historic mission ' evaporates. Undoubtedly, the Communist Party will seek to renew its legitimacy by stressing the building of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and will probably succeed, but not without considerable redistribution of power to other institutions and structures.

Although the United States is not entirely unfamiliar with withdrawal symptoms, having experienced them after the first world war, the withdrawal is likely to be of vaster dimensions and hence more traumatic; it will be retreating from the very apex of the international system to being just one of several large powers. And, as in the case of the Soviet Union, the internalization of messianic energies will be the result, as American society copes with the agonizing problem of whether it will become an integrated nation (assimilation) or whether it is destined to be a polyethnic, polyracial pluralistic state. If it is the latter, serious constitutional and structural questions will inevitably emerge. In any event, both the Soviet

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Union and the United States will be confronted with the prospect of social turbulence as they deal with these explosive racial and national questions. How these questions are resolved will have a significant influence on the redefinition of foreign policy goals.

The relative decline of US and Soviet power during the coming decade will undoubtedly be seen by Peking as confirmation of its prognosis that both global powers have entered into a period of decay in contrast to China, whose role in foreign affairs will be increasing. As Chinese power and influence grow, Peking's role options increase and its problems will be just the opposite of those of the US and the USSR. Will Peking strive for global power status and develop messianic policies or will it be content to reach a level of parity with the Soviet Union and the United States? In terms of *decades*, should China attempt to become the paramount power in the international system, it would run the risk of initial confrontation, not with the United States but with Russia, the latter being more immediately threatened than the former. Similarly, Peking's desire for a *rapprochement* with the US may have been stimulated in part by its expectation that Moscow would seek to displace the US as 'world policeman', and thus threaten the Chinese. As long as the Sino-Soviet conflict is unresolved and each of the two communist giants has outstanding claims against the other, the slow abdication of the US from the apex of the system will probably proceed smoothly in that Moscow and Peking will attempt to check each other's possible ambition to move to the top.

The crux of the Chinese identity problem thus will be whether Peking desires to transform China into a more than Chinese state. Historically, the Chinese, of course, have experienced their own approximation of what might be called a messianic, global policy. As the Middle Kingdom and the Celestial Empire, however, the Chinese did not so much impose or extend their civilization to others, i.e. did not engage in affirmative action, as rent out their civilization in return for tribute and deference. The Chinese 'international' system was neither 'imperialistic' nor 'messianic' in the Western sense, but was nevertheless based upon the idea that China was not simply an ordinary state among states and that the benefits of Chinese civilization and culture was not reserved for Chinese alone. Some aspects of Chinese policy today, particularly in the Third World, exhibits traces of this tradition rather than the messianic tradition embedded in the Soviet conception of 'world communism'. The Chinese seek to inspire emulation and require mainly deference in return for providing a model rather than conformity.

NEVERTHELESS, one cannot completely assume that, simply because other powers, namely, the US and the USSR, have become disenchanted with the role and disillusioned with the results of messianic and global policies, other states (China) may not aspire to replace them, firm in the conviction that they will succeed where others have failed.

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Similarly, one cannot confidently assume that because the United States has decided to abdicate its number one position in the international hierarchy such a position automatically disappears rather than being temporarily vacated, and that other states may not eventually lust for it. The Soviet Union might conceivably do so if its leaders have the will and nerve to risk the manifold costs—including possible failure—as well as its undoubted seductive opportunities. Of course, it is possible for a single state to aspire to number one status without pursuing global policies or messianic impulses, just as it is possible for a state to pursue messianic and global policies without aspiring to be number one state. In either case, both the costs and risks would be considerably reduced; it is only when states aspire simultaneously to achieve both that the effort becomes too burdensome to sustain for a long period of time without unambiguous success.

What is difficult to conceive, however, given the history of the past half century, is a world system in which no power aspires to number one status, pursues a global policy, or is animated by a higher mission, a situation which existed for about 100 years after the Congress of Vienna. This may perhaps be the case for a short transitional period—the 1970s and part of the 1980s, perhaps—as old contenders retire and new ones contemplate entry, but the likelihood of a neo-Metternichian era of five power centres complacently secure and content with their respective spheres of influence is hardly likely today.

It is even possible that the United States, either on its own initiative or in response to a bid from elsewhere, may resurrect its moralistic legacy and embark once again upon messianic adventures, armed with new conceptions of order, justice and salvation more in keeping with what may be perceived as the inevitable trends of history. Much of the Leftist criticism of American 'imperialism' and globalism, for example, is not so much an attack upon globalism, interventionism, and messianism as it is an attack upon the content and direction of American policy. Instead of being neo-isolationists, as sometimes alleged, these critics would infuse American policy with an interventionism and messianism directed against racists, fascists, reactionaries and oppressors all over the world. We know, however, from past history that while the political and ideological substance of a messianic policy may change, these policies nevertheless seem to follow a uniform pattern: self-righteous moralism, accumulation and concentration of power, militarism, interventionism, expansionism, ideological conformity, political repression and killing.

The Redefinition of Defence and Vital Interests

One of the most immediate problems for the Soviet Union and the United States as they retrench from global positions is the redefinition of their *defence* and *security* interests and their conception of *vital* interests. The two can be coterminous, but need not be; defence and security interests are always a part of vital interests, but vital interests can also

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be defined outside the requirements of defence alone. The danger for a country like the United States is its tendency to swerve from an ideological definition of vital interests to a purely physical definition and vice versa, as reflected in contrasting policies of either unlimited interventionism or hemispheric isolationism. Hence, the redefintion of defence interests will be easier than that of vital interests.

Since both the United States and the Soviet Union are regional powers as well as global powers, each already possesses its own regional sphere of influence, including an inner territorial glacis made up of client or satellite states subject to varying degrees of control by the hegemonic power. Each sphere is differently managed, reflecting the nature of the political and social system of the regional power. The American territorial sphere of influence has been the Western Hemisphere, with Canada, Central America and the Caribbean constituting the inner territorial glacis.

The current Soviet territorial defence zone is a much more recent development, since what Moscow has traditionally considered as part of its defence zone and sphere of influence has been historically claimed by other great powers. Thus, Eastern Europe, the current Soviet territorial glacis in the West, has been traditionally claimed by Germany as its own in the past, and historically has been viewed by both Moscow and Germany as simultaneously a defence zone and a forward position for further penetration eastward or westward as the case may be. Since Germany is currently in no position to contest the Soviet zone in Eastern Europe, the latter constitutes the Soviet territorial glacis in the West and this has been formalized in the Brezhnev Doctrine.

The Soviet defence zone in Central and East Asia, except for Mongolia, remains ill-defined and is actively contested by China. The entire 'socialist community' was at one time the Soviet defence zone, but apparently this is no longer true in the Caribbean or East Asia. As the Soviet Union and the United States retreat from their global positions to their regional spheres, the Chinese will be advancing towards global positions and in the process will attempt to demarcate a sphere of influence, including perhaps an inner territorial glacis whose precise demarcation remains to be established. As the US disengages from the Asian mainland, an already unsteady local equilibrium will probably collapse as the Chinese seek to establish their predominance in the region. A three-cornered contest among Moscow, Peking and Tokyo will most likely ensue, with the Japanese seeking mainly to preserve and extend their commercial interests and securing their defence, while Russia and China contest more directly over political and territorial issues. As China's power and capability grow, the threat to the Soviet Union's eastern marches will be correspondingly increased. It appears clear that Peking is determined to arrest, diminish, and perhaps even reverse the Soviet presence in East Asia, although a full-fledged confrontation may not develop in the 1970s.

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THE redefinition of vital interests beyond the requirements of defence will be much more difficult for the big powers to delineate. Without ideological imperatives, the components of vital interests beyond defence tend to become banal, selfish and uninspiring, reduced almost entirely to international commerce and investments, interests hardly worth risking nuclear war. To what extent, for example, in an era of deglobalization and *détente* between Moscow and Washington, will the security of Western Europe constitute a vital interest area for the US if it is no longer essential to US defence and security? Since the US has become involved in two world wars to prevent a single power from dominating Europe, is it realistic to believe that America can dismiss Western Europe as a non-vital interest region? These will not be easy questions to answer in the 1970s, particularly if 'threats' to Western Europe originate in internal ideological and political conflicts. Aside from the widespread fears of the so-called 'Finlandization' of Western Europe, what about the greater likelihood of 'Chileanization', i.e. the revival of political coalitions between local communist parties and other left-wing parties (in France or Italy) on the Chilean model? Would the absence of a US military presence in Western Europe encourage such developments and to what extent could they be construed as detrimental to US interests? The broader question is, of course, will the elimination of Western Europe as a zone of US vital interest lead to its transformation into a Soviet sphere?

It was the anticipation of the possibility that the US might no longer consider Western Europe as vital to its security that impelled General de Gaulle to create the French *force de frappe*, and with all the talk of unilateral US reductions or withdrawal, MBFR, SALT II, and the European Security Conference, the *force de frappe* syndrome may become a live issue in Europe. To a larger degree than usually recognized, the US military presence in Western Europe constituted a shield not only against a possible Soviet military onslaught, but also against internal political and social convulsions, and in particular a guarantee against communist participation in Western European governments.

If US forces are withdrawn from Western Europe and Europeans come to believe that the American nuclear force is no longer a credible deterrent to Soviet political and diplomatic pressures, Western Europe can become an area of Soviet opportunity. Utilizing a combination of seductive blandishments and subtle forms of diplomatic and political pressures, Moscow could inspire the creation of Leftist coalition governments in which the communists would play an initially muted role, which would become more forceful as developments permit. In Germany, Moscow might even skilfully encourage some form of federation or confederation of the two Germanies in return for a communist role in West Germany. In this way, new avenues and opportunities for Soviet political penetration and influence in selected Western European countries would open up without the risk of counter-penetration in Eastern Europe.

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The possibility of direct or indirect extension of Soviet influence to Western Europe can provoke political turmoil and anxiety in all European countries, but particularly in West Germany, the most exposed because of its close proximity to Soviet power, its powerful Social Democratic Party, its vulnerability to Soviet blandishments, and its lack of an independent nuclear deterrent. Since the policy of nuclear non-proliferation, to which West Germany has adhered, presupposes that nuclear powers will defend non-nuclear powers, a US unwillingness to risk war with Moscow if it applies pressure against West Germany (or Japan) would be incompatible with the nuclear non-proliferation agreements. In some German political quarters, such a withdrawal of US nuclear protection might be interpreted as a *rebus sic stantibus* clause in relation to Bonn's adherence to the non-proliferation agreement and thus renewed demands for a German *force de frappe* might be generated, provoking great commotion in all Europe and in America as demands for a clarification of the US position both at home and abroad are raised. The broader question of whether nuclear non-proliferation in a world no longer bipolar actually serves the interests of peace or merely preserves an unfair advantage of the nuclear powers over the non-nuclear powers will also arise, thus perhaps contributing to the erosion of the legitimacy of the non-proliferation treaty. Whether it will be possible to deny an independent nuclear capability to West Germany and Japan alone among the great powers under these conditions will be one of the great issues to be resolved in the 1970s.

Although the 1970s will create new opportunities for Soviet foreign policy, Moscow will also be faced with the greatest hazards and vulnerabilities among the great powers. The Cold War and bipolarity in many respects provided the Soviet leaders with a measure of security and relatively simple options, since the United States functioned not only as a rival of the Soviet Union but in some respects as a legitimizer of Soviet control over its own sphere and provided the justification for pursuing a global policy. With the US willingness to abandon its role as world policeman and reduce its worldwide commitments, the Soviet leaders have been deprived of a powerful justification for their own globalism. Furthermore, the discipline which the Cold War imposed on the two global powers served to confront the Soviet Union with only one main rival. And as long as US-Chinese enmity persisted, even Moscow's rebellious partner was conveniently chained by the United States and was thus crippled in its confrontation with the Soviet Union. The abdication of globalism by the US thus frees the Western European powers and Japan from the constraints imposed by America, while the *rapprochement* with China leaves Peking free to concentrate its fire on Moscow. While these changes in US policy do not pose an immediate threat to Soviet interests, it will become apparent during the 1970s that the voluntary diminution of American power automatically provides all the other powers with greater freedom to develop their own and to

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define their interrelationships without direction from the United States. Most importantly, the de-bipolarization of the international system creates the opportunity for great powers on both sides of the ideological divide to cooperate and collaborate against the Soviet Union. Thus, the Chinese have already thrown out many hints of possible cooperation with both Japan and Western Europe in their respective dealings with the USSR, none of which have gone unnoticed by the Soviet press.

In this connexion, the peculiar geographical location and configuration of the Soviet state once again assumes geopolitical significance. The Soviet Union has the longest continuous state border of any state in the world; the border with China alone is the longest, most remote, and most hazardous international frontier of any between two hostile states. Of all the major powers, the Soviet Union is the most vulnerable to concerted action on widely separated fronts. It is encircled by no less than three major powers geographically (China, Japan, and Germany), all of which have latent or active territorial demands against the Soviet state, and it constitutes the main target of all the non-Soviet nuclear powers (Britain, France, China and the US). Should West Germany and Japan also acquire a nuclear capability, the Soviet Union would display even more anxieties.

The Soviet leaders cannot view the emergence of a polycentric international system with placid equanimity, and whatever Soviet advantages may accrue in the first years of the 1970s may rapidly erode soon thereafter. Paradoxically, the United States may emerge as the chief 'protector' of the Soviet state in the 1970s, and only with its active cooperation and support can Moscow hope to manoeuvre among its many potential enemies and the various hostile combinations which may develop on both her Eastern and Western frontiers.

The United States, on the other hand, because of its unique geographical position would remain vulnerable to direct attack only from the Soviet Union, since the other nuclear powers (including potential ones) have neither the desire or reach to directly threaten the United States. Of all the nuclear powers, only the US and the USSR possess an authentic intercontinental capability; the nuclear capability of the other nuclear powers (including potential ones) is only of local relevance and the most relevant locality for all is likely to be Russia.

A Eurasian continent with six or more nuclear powers would create the foundations for a new and qualitatively different type of nuclear stalemate and thus serve to render the Soviet capability useless for diplomatic purposes, since it would be vulnerable to multiple retaliation from different directions. Moscow could become the subject of multiple pressures around her periphery on the part of powerful neighbours seeking to rectify local grievances against the Soviet Union. Curiously enough, nuclear proliferation would serve to debase the Soviet strategic capability as it applies to the United States and result in a Eurasian containment of Soviet power more effective than that ever forged by the

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United States. Correspondingly, the relative strategic position of the United States would be enhanced.

Problems of Succession and Development

The United States, Russia and China will all confront a succession problem in the 1970s. The American succession is preordained by the US Constitution since President Nixon cannot succeed himself, whereas the succession problem for both China and Russia is predetermined by the age structure of their leadership. It is certain that the Nixon Administration and possible that the Brezhnev-Kosygin and the Mao-Chou regimes will not be in power in the latter half of the 1970s. Who will be directing the affairs of state in the three countries remains one of the critical questions of the coming decade. In all three countries, the succession problem may be transformed into a crisis, as the problem of elite succession merges with the problem of generational succession, particularly for Russia and China. In these two cases, not only the principal political personalities but the elites themselves are advanced in age and as of this moment no serious attempt (except in the military sphere) has been made to phase the new generation into positions of authority at the apex of the political structure.

The nature of the coming generational succession crisis for the Soviet Union can be illustrated graphically with statistical precision. The average age of full members of the Central Committee in 1971 was 58 years, up from 49 in 1952 and 43 in 1939, whereas the average age of the Soviet population was 29 in 1971, up from 22 in 1939. Thus, the average age of the Central Committee increased at twice the rate for the entire population over a 32-year period. The contrast is further reinforced when we learn that in 1966, 78·5 per cent of the Central Committee members were *over* 50 years of age, while 78·7 per cent of Communist Party members were *under* 50 years of age in the same year. By 1976, the average age of the Central Committee will be 63 years. (See Table 1.)

The ageing leadership situation is even more critical for the Politburo and Secretariat. The average age of these two central organs in 1971 was around 62 years old, and will be 67 in 1976. Although I do not have data for the Chinese leadership, it would appear that its problem is even more critical, with many prominent Chinese leaders being in their late sixties and seventies, including both Mao and Chou.

What this suggests is that the actuarial tables will dictate the death of relatively large numbers of key people within a brief span of years, and create a vast vacuum at the top which can in turn provoke a scramble among those of the next generation for power and authority. The nature and direction of this generational succession crisis can in its turn trigger widespread social turbulence as intermediate positions are vacated, creating opportunities for even larger numbers of aspirants for upward mobility from below. In the Soviet Union, this generational succession problem will probably aggravate the national problem since men in a

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TABLE 1

Age Structure of the Soviet Leadership
(Politburo and Secretariat)

		Age	
Name	*Date of Birth*	*1972*	*1976*
FULL MEMBERS—POLITBURO			
Pelshe	1899	73	77
Suslov	1902	70	74
Podgorny	1903	69	73
Kosygin	1904	68	72
Brezhnev	1906	66	70
Kirilenko	1906	66	70
Shelest	1908	64	68
Voronov	1910	62	66
Kunayev	1912	60	64
Mazurov	1914	58	62
Grishin	1914	58	62
Polyansky	1917	55	59
Kulakov	1918	55	59
Shcherbitsky	1918	54	58
Shelepin	1918	54	58
Average		62·1	66·1
CANDIDATE MEMBERS			
Mzhavanadze	1902	70	74
Ustinov	1908	64	68
Solomentsev	1913	59	63
Andropov	1914	58	62
Rashidov	1917	55	59
Masherov	1918	54	58
Demichev	1918	54	58
Average		59·1	63·1
SECRETARIAT			
Suslov	1902	70	74
Ponomarev	1905	67	71
Brezhnev	1906	66	70
Kirilenko	1906	66	70
Ustinov	1908	64	68
Solomentsev	1913	59	63
Kapitonov	1915	57	61
Kulakov	1918	55	59
Demichev	1918	55	59
*Katushev	1927	45	49
Average		60·4	64·4

* The appointment of Katushev as a member of the Secretariat dropped its average age of membership by nearly two years.

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chaotic scramble for power will be hardly concerned with the maintenance of the carefully designed national quota system introduced by Khrushchev and continued by his successors. It is quite likely, if the Russians tend to dominate the ranks of the future political elite, a nationality crisis may develop.

Succession crises in major states, whether generational or not, constitutional or not, will always leave their imprint on the direction and definition of foreign policy goals. Even in the United States, where the succession problem is relatively uncomplicated, the struggle of the Democratic Party, first to unify itself and second to oust the Republicans, will revive widespread national debate and controversy over foreign policy. All three countries are confronted with a generational problem, but at least in the United States, this has been explicit and overt and to some extent is in the process of adjustment, whereas in both Russia and China, generational cleavages are latent and suppressed and hence likely to be more explosive and violent in their effects.

Succession crises involving elites and generations and their manifold attendant disturbances will tend to create anxieties, uncertainties and possibly even paranoidal tendencies in the countries that experience them, as well as in neighbouring states. Indecisiveness and political paralysis can be the result in some cases and thus provide opportunities for others to take advantage of momentary lapses of decisiveness and absence of policy.

AMONG other important domestic problems facing the big three powers is the question of social and economic priorities and how this will affect the social structure and political system. In the 1970s, economic growth will continue in all three countries, but the direction in each will be significantly different. In the United States, increasing attention will be paid to the domestication of economic growth, arresting overdevelopment and improving the quality of life. Closely related to this will be the problem of integrating the racial minorities, particularly the black population, into the economic and social structure in an equitable manner.

In Russia, the main direction of economic growth will be that of a mass consumer society, modelled somewhat but not entirely upon that of the United States, whereas in China, industrialization and modernization will be the prime focus of attention. It is likely that Chinese social and economic development will diverge widely from that of both Russia and America, since a mass consumer society in a country whose population will soon reach the one billion mark appears both not feasible and undesirable. Chinese economic development will endeavour to create an alternative model to that of the US and USSR and emphasize an egalitarian rather than a hierarchical-bureaucratic social system while at the same time creating a sufficient industrial and scientific-technological base to shore up its claim as the third dominant power in the international

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system. Whether an incentive structure based upon egalitarian rewards and ideological inspiration can produce the necessary economic results will once again be tested in the 1970s.

Beyond Détente and Peaceful Coexistence

The 1970s may also provide an answer to the basic question of whether it is possible to construct a more durable and positive international order than one based upon mutual deterrence, *détente* and 'peaceful coexistence', i.e. an order founded on a new trans-ideological consensus in which different social and ideological systems could interact and cooperate, rather than function as competitors and adversaries. To a large degree, ideological and system rivalry generate the appearance, if not always the reality, of threat and affect definitions of security and defence. As long as differing social systems remain anxious about their ability to compete successfully, the prospect of failure contributes to insecurity. The Soviet leaders, in particular, conceive of defence and security not only in state terms but in system terms as well, and perceived threats to their system are apt to stimulate stringent and severe ideological controls over their citizenry. If this kind of ideological threat could be successfully dispelled, it might create the basis for an international order based upon trans-ideological consensus in which different social systems could exist and develop without any critical need to prove themselves in an international forum. 'Competitive coexistence' could thus be supplanted with mutually supportive coexistence, and *détente* would assume the contours of an *entente*.

The philosophical basis for such an attitude in the Soviet Union already exists in the fragile 'democratic movement' under the sponsorship of individuals like Andrei Sakharov, but the movement is not likely to grow and may even be further repressed if the competitive element between social systems continues to characterize the international system. Admittedly, it would be very difficult for the Soviet leaders to move towards such a relationship, in view of their paranoia concerning 'ideological coexistence' and the 'interpenetration of ideas'. The first step in providing an incentive for the Soviet leaders to move in this direction would be for the United States to unilaterally abandon its competitive stance in dealing with Moscow and to exercise self-restraint in its sermonizing and moralizing about the evils of communism and gloating over Soviet political ineptness and economic failures.

Above all, the United States should, for the moment, avoid a frontal clash with the Soviet insistence on blocking the extension of 'peaceful coexistence' into the ideological realm and refrain from demanding that the Soviet leaders 'open up' their country to foreign ideas in return for US assistance. Demands of this character will serve to reinforce the suspicions of the Soviet leaders who interpret the coexistence of ideologies and the interpenetration of ideas as devices for undermining and weakening the communist system. While the rhetoric of 'no peaceful

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coexistence in the realm of ideology' may sound unnecessarily harsh and even aggressive to American ears, it will be essentially defensive rather than aggressive in its function. A prolonged relaxation of internal tensions and *détente* will create manifold international problems for Soviet society and will serve to weaken the legitimacy of the Communist Party and hence the Soviet system itself; hence, ideological conformity and controls are apt to be increased during the initial years of the 1970s as a defensive mechanism.

The Soviet leaders are determined to preserve the essential character of the Soviet social order and will adopt all the necessary measures to maximize its maintenance. There are too many glaring weaknesses and obvious malfunctions in Soviet society for the Soviet leaders to risk the importation of competing ideas or to allow the expression of dissident and critical views on the part of its own citizens.

What is more likely to 'open up' the Soviet system is a policy not of challenging the system but of assisting in its efficient operation. This would require a policy on the part of the United States to help the Soviet system to work within the parameters of its own internal goals and objectives. It would result to some degree in subsidizing the Soviet social order (and by implication the Chinese system as well) by providing help in such a way as to minimize the defects and malfunctioning of communism. Only when the Soviet leaders are convinced that the United States is not interested in undermining or weakening its domestic structures and institutions will they give serious attention to the relaxation of ideological controls. The recent grain deal with Moscow is an illustration of this process; a 'Cold War' response would have been to give wide publicity to Soviet agricultural difficulties and refusal to sell grain in order to aggravate the situation.

Curiously enough, China may pose less of a problem in the realm of 'ideological coexistence' than the Soviet Union and thus may more easily enter into a mutually supportive coexistence relationship with the United States. Its culture and civilization is so profoundly different from that of the West and its age and durability so demonstrable that it provides a natural immunity against crippling ideological infections. But Russian culture is a part of Western civilization and Leninism is a Russian variant of Western Marxism. And given the historical tradition of Russian feelings of cultural inferiority vis-à-vis Western Europe (as opposed to the Chinese tradition of cultural superiority), the Soviet leaders are painfully aware that the Soviet system can be perceived by many Soviet citizens as a defective and retarded version of Western democracy and socialism, thus rendering it susceptible to invidious comparisons.

Under conditions of mutually supportive coexistence, different social and political systems would flourish and support one another in achieving internal goals and objectives rather than engage in exercises designed to demonstrate the superiority of one system over another. In other words,

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the United States should strive to help the Soviet system work, assisting it with its technological and economic difficulties rather than hoping and waiting for the system to collapse, and the Soviet Union might eventually wish to reciprocate, thus providing a more profound sense of security than that provided by a nuclear stalemate and mutual exhaustion. The Soviet leaders would have less to fear from foreign ideas or the dissident views of their own citizens and the system could adapt and adjust to accord more faithfully with its own values and goals as expressed in the Soviet Constitution. In this manner, the Soviet Union might achieve 'system parity' just as it has achieved nuclear parity, and thus provide a more durable basis for peace and cooperation.

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School of International Affairs, Columbia University
Offices: 420 West 118th Street, New York, N.Y. 10027

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Comment

Robert A. Scalapino

PROFESSOR Aspaturian's imaginative and challenging paper raises several basic issues. First, there is the question of the all-too-ready acceptance of convenient terms like bipolarity and multipolarity, globalism and regionalism—terms useful, possibly indispensable, but which should also be constantly qualified, even challenged, lest we write the history of this era in unambiguous terms when our times, in fact, abound in paradoxes and uncertainties.

Have we in fact left the bipolar era? Certainly we have not left it in purely military terms. There are still only two 'superpowers' in the military sphere, and that is likely to remain the case for the foreseeable future. Indeed, it can be asserted that throughout the period which has been labelled 'bipolar', the United States maintained a decided military superiority, and only with the advent of the so-called multipolar period did the Soviet Union achieve military parity. One of the questions for the future is whether both sides, the Soviet Union in particular, will accept military parity, and how each major nation will define its security interests and needs, in the light of constantly changing commitments and demands.

It is appropriate here to indicate that I do not think it likely that the People's Republic of China will be regarded as a major global power in the foreseeable future. China's problems of development—both economic and political—are bound to be formidable. The modernization of a society of between 700–800 million people is a prodigious task, and if it is to be achieved with any substantial degree of success, it will require the great bulk of that nation's human and material resources. Even then, the process is certain to be slow and painful. Throughout history, leaders have of course embarked on foreign adventures to distract attention from internal problems. However, China's capacity for adventurism on a global scale seems to me to be limited. China will certainly be a major Asian power, and of particular significance to the small states on her borders. To them, she has always been a superpower—except during periods of Chinese decay. It is also likely that she will continue to be a serious thorn in the side of the Soviet Union. To put China on a level with either the US or the USSR in global terms, however, seems inappropriate.

There are, of course, many factors involved in power of which military force is only one; economic capacities, political cohesion, and such psychological considerations as the will of a leadership and its people are all of major importance. Even in the military sphere, the absolute supremacy of the two 'superpowers' has undoubtedly been affected by the wide dispersal of weaponry in recent years, and the advent of other nuclear powers. Nevertheless, the very fact that the SALT discussions

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concerning weapon control between the United States and the USSR are of such crucial importance is only the most visible indication of the fact that this is still, to a great extent, a bipolar era.

On the other hand, I most emphatically do not agree with the thesis that bipolarity—even at its height—represented an era of global policing by the two big states. This is one of those convenient phrases of current political in-fighting that is rapidly being turned into 'conventional wisdom'. In fact, it is not the case that either the Americans or the Russians were ever global policemen. Both sides may have made unwise commitments; both sides may have overextended themselves on behalf of a certain region or cause. These are issues that will be debated for the indefinite future. The US and the USSR had a clear sense of priorities, however, and neither their military power nor economic resources were dispersed in random fashion. The United States, for example, always placed its primary emphasis upon two areas; Western Europe and Eastern Asia—the areas where the two world wars originated, and the regions considered—quite logically—as of primary importance to American national interests. American policy towards Africa has consistently been at a low level of involvement. It has treated the Middle East as important but within certain limits.

IN the very recent past, moreover, the two major powers have both been reassessing their commitments, although with different results. Unquestionably, the United States has been reducing its international commitments, and seeking to contain them within a more reciprocal, multilateral framework. Professor Aspaturian would ascribe this to the failures of the past whereas I would ascribe it rather to the successes. It is true that two limited wars—Korea and Vietnam—have left in their wake disillusionment, even bitterness. At best, one does not win limited wars in the traditional American fashion; and at worst, one may ultimately lose them—although history's final verdict on these two wars remains to be written. Be that as it may, in terms of the major goals of the past 25 years, American foreign policy has been successful enough for the unilateralism that followed the second world war now to give way to a greater degree of reciprocity, mutuality, and responsibility. These are indeed the themes of current American policy towards such regions as West Europe and Japan.

Let us not forget what has been achieved in less than three decades. First, nuclear war has been prevented, and a set of safeguards against such a war, complex and uneven as they are, is slowly being constructed. 'The advanced world', to which the United States has contributed so much of its human and material resources since 1916, has reached new levels of growth. It is rightly pointed out that not all trends in the advanced countries are favourable, particularly in the political realm. Democracy is facing new challenges, not least in the United States. But in view of the horrendous predictions of 1945–46

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concerning such societies as France and Italy, not to mention Japan and Germany, one is justified in a certain degree of scepticism regarding modern-day Spenglerians. Meanwhile, the first stages of independence have been less traumatic than might have been expected for the 'Third World' nations, among many of which the age of charismatic leaders has given way to a more sober, pragmatic generation, with a corresponding reduction in foreign adventurism and futile exercises in Afro-Asian-Latin American Solidarity.

In Russian eyes, the Soviet Union can claim a considerable degree of success for its foreign policies too. It is, of course, easy to emphasize Soviet 'problems', be these Czechoslovakia or Egypt, but in point of fact the USSR has had a great many more 'successes', among which even Czechoslovakia—from its standpoint—is probably to be classed. Success breeds new responsibilities, and it is surprising that Professor Aspaturian does not put more emphasis upon the recent substantial expansion of Soviet commitments, particularly in Asia.

This Soviet policy of increased commitment can be regarded as partially defensive, notably with respect to the containment of China, and it is quite possible that before this decade has concluded, Russia too will face a crisis of priorities—with at least the Russian political elite debating seriously some of the same issues now being discussed in the United States. For the present, however, we are faced with a different situation: one 'superpower' is reducing, the other expanding its commitments. This situation has serious implications in the area of military parity, credibility with allies, security and even domestic politics.

I raise these points to indicate that *the timing* of superpower decisions with respect to commitments may be as important to their mutual relations—and the stability of the world order—as the overall trends of policy themselves. Once again, international politics cannot be treated in unilinear terms without grave distortion of the facts—and damage to the validity of any predictions.

Let us assume, however, that the United States at least continues to reduce its commitments, or to put them on a more reciprocal basis. Will this lead from 'globalism' to 'regionalism'? Professor Aspaturian's answer seems to be yes. Mine would be no. America's primary problems and hence her primary concerns will continue to be world-wide. For the foreseeable future, the US will stand at the apex of two crucial triangles: the US-USSR-China triangle, so vital to issues of peace-war, peaceful coexistence, disarmament and weapons control; and the US-Japan-West Europe triangle, so critical for issues of economic interactions within the advanced world, and thus to the prosperity of most nations. These relationships and these issues will far transcend in importance purely regional concerns, and they will occupy the primary energies of American policy-makers in the decade ahead. A similar analysis of the interests—hence the policies—of other major states could be made.

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MY final point concerns the issue of messianism, which Professor Aspaturian—perhaps correctly—believes has been an important element in American foreign policy, being typically expressed in the desire to save the world for democracy. I am not myself convinced that this has been the guiding principle of American foreign policy in recent years; Woodrow Wilson died a long time ago, and American idealism—while rekindled during the second world war and its immediate aftermath—has not been the sole, perhaps not even the predominant, factor in the foreign policies of the 1950s and 1960s. Rightly or wrongly, the US moved towards balance of power policies rather quickly after the second world war when no other peace-keeping principle seemed promising. Unquestionably, however, a residual idealism in American culture finds its way into evaluations of policy, positive or negative. Thus, the same people who insist that we should not interfere in the internal affairs of another nation, or impose our system upon them are also prone to denounce aid to non-democratic states—without always making it clear whether this refers merely to dictatorships like that of Greece or also those like Rumania and Yugoslavia. And Professor Aspaturian, having pushed aside messianism, reintroduces it via the back-door, by suggesting that we might want to turn our attention to saving communist societies, if the task of saving societies in the developing countries has proved too great a burden!

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Comment

Benjamin M. Zook

IN commenting on Professor Aspaturian's thought-provoking paper I would like to deal with one or two of the major points.

The first concerns his discussion of the decline of ideology or the 'messianic' impulse as a factor in the foreign policy motivation of the USSR, the US and China. For one thing, a comparison between the US and the two major communist powers in this field does not seem appropriate. The US has traditionally been noted for its pragmatism and lack of ideological orientation, whereas ideological considerations have always been a hallmark of communist regimes in both domestic and foreign policies. While it is true that ideology will decline as a motivation in communist foreign policy formulation—indeed, this trend is already observable—it is worth noting that ideology will nevertheless remain a significant factor. This is true above all because ideology is the *raison d'être* for the monopoly of political power exercised by the ruling oligarchies in the communist systems. To the extent ideology is eroded or cast overboard, the legitimacy of the ruling clique is called into question.

Professor Aspaturian also seems to have formulated an overly optimistic prognosis for communist-US cooperation and harmony in the 1970s, particularly with regard to the USSR. Even given the absence of any ideological considerations, the very circumstances in which the USSR and the US find themselves will inevitably make for keen competition between them. Both are in a special class as superpowers, with far-flung interests around the globe. Rivalry between them for expansion of influence at the expense of the other, and the pursuit of conflicting national interests, will certainly remain a feature of their relations in many parts of the world. It is to be hoped that this competition will be characterized by restraint, as pledged by the document on Basic Principles governing bilateral relations, signed by President Nixon and Party leader Brezhnev at the Moscow Summit last May. It certainly does not seem at all likely that either the US or the USSR will withdraw into regionalism, or become merely regional powers, as Professor Aspaturian suggests. To be sure, both countries may increasingly exercise caution about becoming too involved in certain situations; they may curtail some commitments and reorder priorities. But the withdrawal of either from a global role seems out of the question. It is certainly unthinkable that the US would cease to regard Western Europe as a priority area of US foreign policy and one in which vital US interests are involved.

In the case of communist China, Peking will remain a regional power in the coming decade, and problems in Sino-US relations will be confined largely to areas peripheral to China. Even within these confines there will be ample occasion for rivalry, especially as regards Japan. However,

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China's potential for the 1970s appears to have been grossly exaggerated. China does not have the option during this period, as suggested by Professor Aspaturian, of becoming a super or global power on a par with the USSR and the US. Indeed, at the end of the decade China will in all probability trail behind several other countries in economic and political status in the international arena—most notably Japan, and also certain European powers such as West Germany and France. US problems with China will therefore not attain the magnitude or pervasiveness of those with the USSR.

To end on a more positive note, Professor Aspaturian's paper makes an especially useful contribution where it describes the difficult prospects that the emergence of a polycentric international system raises for Moscow. Encircled by a number of major powers (China, Japan, and West Germany) which have territorial or other demands on the Soviet Union, and being especially vulnerable to concerted action on widely separated fronts, the USSR is confronted with the prospect of manoeuvring between many potential adversaries who may form various hostile combinations on both its eastern and western frontiers. Professor Aspaturian even envisages the possibility that the Soviet Union may come to look upon the US as its chief ' protector ' in this difficult geopolitical position. Here he raises important considerations of *realpolitik* which the Washington policy-maker would do well to keep in mind.

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Comment

Jan F. Triska

WHILE I agree with a great deal of what Professor Aspaturian had to say, I would like to take issue with him on three particular points: (1) the decline of United States and Soviet influence in the world; (2) the possible Soviet manipulation of communist parties in Western Europe; and (3) the Chinese role in international relations in the 1970s.

WITH respect to the first point, Professor Aspaturian postulates 'deglobalization' of the United States' and Soviet Union's influence in world affairs in the 1970s. Envisaging 'less foreign policy', a foreign policy 'reduced in scope and intensity' on the part of both states, he ignores the increased proliferation of transnational relations which are being brought into the political sphere.

It is clear from current statistics that the flow of transactions across national boundaries in terms of goods, services, messages, and people is growing exponentially in both scope and intensity. The reason for this increase is not only that distances are smaller and the flow of communications is greater and faster, but also that it is increasingly difficult to cope on a national level with problems such as scarcity and utilization of natural resources, the growth of technology, the destruction and pollution of environment, the energy crisis, overpopulation, and so on. Transnational perspective and planning is more and more necessary. Multinational corporations offer no answer to these problems, although they are part of this growing transnational process. International relations theorists tell us that these across-the-boundary transactions are increasingly being dealt with on a political level as part of the popular trade-off pattern, on the part of states, a bargaining mechanism which is making transnational negotiations and relations more important. These trade-offs may take place either within or among particular types of transnational issues, but they do reach the state level. The result is that the policies of different countries are becoming more interdependent, and the US and the Soviet Union are leading in this process. Hence, to speak of the deglobalization of the two powers is not enough. Deglobalization in security issues, yes. But there is increased globalization in international transactions at the same time. The result will not therefore be less foreign policy for America and Russia, but more, much more; it will simply be different in nature, and very complex.

THE second point involves possible Soviet manipulation of communist parties in Western Europe. I do not agree with Professor Aspaturian's contention that there exists a threat of either 'Finlandization' or 'Chileanization' in Western Europe. There may be coalitions between

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local communist parties and other left wing parties; this is in fact possible in several countries, France perhaps being the first. But I cannot see Western Europe becoming an area of great Soviet opportunity via the local communist parties even if United States forces are withdrawn. The West European communist parties, especially the important ones, ceased to be pawns on the Soviet chessboard long ago. In fact they became important in national policies precisely because they could no longer be manipulated by Moscow. Having abandoned their roles of subservience vis-à-vis the USSR, they gained membership, votes and influence. For all practical purposes, their participation in their respective national political processes became responsible and even respectable. They are not bunches of Soviet-paid revolutionaries. In fact, they could not revert to their former roles even if they wanted to, as this would destroy them. They could negotiate and bargain with the Soviet leaders, but such negotiation and bargaining would not be substantially different from that of other national parties or groups in Western Europe in similar situations.

AS to the third point, the future role of China in international relations, I do indeed think that China is actively seeking the status of the third power in the world. It has successfully challenged the Soviet Union in the world communist system; it has been developing nuclear and missile capability in spite of the Test Ban treaty; it has successfully claimed UN Security Council status as a permanent member; and it has achieved *rapprochement* with the US. But China is seeking that position not in terms of today's global power status, but of tomorrow's 'deglobalized' security relations, and, in my opinion, it has arrived at an accurate assessment of future world conditions and trends.

As a potential third power, China is concerned about the possibility of collusion between the Soviet Union and the United States against it. In November 1972, Li Teh-sheng, the top Chinese military political officer, again expressed this deep-seated fear. The Chinese leadership is trying its utmost to reach and maintain a minimum capability sufficient to deter the other two powers from forming a coalition. The future diffusion of security influence capability on the part of both the United States and the Soviet Union means that this minimum will require less investment for China than it did for the other two. In this context, however, a little will mean a lot. I think, therefore, that China will try to become the third power as rapidly as possible, as the possibility of collusion between the Soviet Union and the United States cannot be ignored (though I anticipate considerable lessening of the Soviet-Chinese tensions over the next several years). It seems likely that an inferior—China—will be able to become equal while equals—the United States and the Soviet Union—can reduce their nuclear arsenals without fear of a belligerent China; in this way, China will not be limited in acquiring a greater nuclear and missile arsenal.

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THIS threefold change—decreased emphasis on security, a proliferation of policy interdependence, and the Chinese aspiration to third power status—will produce, in my opinion, change in relations among the powers. The abrasive, confrontation-prone hostility of the past, obsessed with ideology, will give way to pragmatism, a willingness to make compromises, to negotiate and bargain. The great powers will be subject to pressures for greater restraint in their interrelations, and for adaptability in the face of changes among themselves as well as in the formerly rigid alliance structures. Interests will be too diversified for the allies of one side to be lined up against the allies of the other. For example, Japan has interests in Asia which affect her relations with China, but not her relations with the United States or the Soviet Union, and West European states have similar interests in East Europe and the USSR.

Restraint will thus be built into the new system of international relations because any serious disruption would be dangerous, especially to the initiator. Political skill—based on humility rather than superiority—will be at a premium. And the main theme will be the proposition 'no permanent friends, no permanent enemies', where patterns of conflict and harmony between the powers will depend upon varying combinations of issues—i.e. strongly felt needs—at any given time.

CONTREPOINT

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US-Soviet Relations in the 1970s*

Jack F. Matlock

FOR those of us directly involved in the changes taking place in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, it is useful to pause from time to time and reflect on the broader import of our actions. We must ask ourselves whether these are more than surface changes; whether they reflect merely a tactical phase or are harbingers of basic, lasting changes in our relationship; and—most important—precisely what is changing and what is not.

Although these questions cannot be answered with certainty, it is obvious that 1972 brought a striking change in US-Soviet relations. Few would have dared to predict two years ago—let alone ten years ago—that by the end of 1972 the United States and the Soviet Union would have achieved an important step in the limitation of strategic weapons, would have concluded a series of agreements involving scores of joint efforts, and would have drawn up the framework for a vastly expanded economic relationship. A realization of this fact should temper our confidence as we try to look at the future from today's perspective.

When the late Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson said that he wished Americans would stop talking about the 'Cold War' and begin thinking of Soviet-American relations as the 'Hundred Years' War', he was accurately mirroring the gloom of a period of successive crises, any one of which could have been the prelude to a new and terrible world war: Korea, the offshore islands, the Lebanon landings, the Suez and Hungarian crises, the confrontation over Cuba, Premier Khrushchev's demand that the US leave Berlin or risk nuclear war.

Yet it is clear that, at the May summit, both sides, after decades of a treasury-draining, bone-wearying Cold War, formalized their mutual intent to embark on a new, more stable set of relationships. In President Nixon's words, the movement towards 'better understanding, mutual respect, and point-by-point settlement of differences' has 'begun to free us from perpetual confrontation'. General Secretary Brezhnev, as recently as his speech of 13 November 1972, referred to the Cold War as a thing of the past and pointed to 'important changes for the better that have taken place recently in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America . . .', declaring that '. . . for our part we are prepared to continue the improvement that has begun in Soviet-American relations, to further develop reciprocally advantageous cooperation in different fields, based on the principles of peaceful coexistence'. Furthermore, public opinion seems to have accepted the judgment of our political

* This is a summary of a speech delivered on December 1, 1972, at the Conference on Soviet Foreign Policy in the Seventies, at Stanford University, California.

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leaders. It is hard to find any serious observer today who does not agree that at no time since the end of the second world war has a direct US-Soviet conflict seemed less likely.

BEFORE considering future prospects, however, we should first examine the present situation more closely. Though international relations cannot of course be measured statistically, some figures may be of interest. In 1972, more agreements were concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union than in any other year in the history of their relationship. Between the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1933 and the end of 1972, 101 agreements were signed between the two countries. Twenty-two of these were signed in 1972 and 42 during the Nixon administration.

By far the most significant event of the year in this respect was, of course, President Nixon's trip to Moscow in May 1972. The most notable results of the President's meetings with the Soviet leaders at that time were the conclusion of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The overwhelming importance of these agreements is widely appreciated. Even so, many other agreements reached in 1972 might not have been possible, or would not have had the same significance, without their prior conclusion.

The SALT agreements have tended to overshadow the others, although any one of the latter would have been considered a major development under other circumstances. Four of the agreements set out a broad framework for cooperation in fields of medical and health research, the protection of the environment, space exploration and science and technology. These agreements marked a significant step in US-Soviet relations in these areas, a movement from exchanges, important as these are, to joint cooperative projects, which embody a more intensive mutual involvement than the exchange of information and views.

The Summit also brought the first agreement since the second world war between military services in the two countries, when Secretary of the Navy Warner and Admiral Gorshkov signed an agreement on the prevention of incidents at sea between the American and Soviet navies. Intensive negotiations were conducted in the economic sphere, and it was decided to establish a joint US-USSR Commercial Commission to complete negotiations on a comprehensive trade agreement.

Finally, in chronology but not in importance, the 'Basic Principles of Relations' were signed by President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev on the day the President left Moscow. The 'Basic Principles' form a statement of intent, and were it not associated with a series of concrete achievements, this statement might well be dismissed as yet another addition to that great heap of pious statements by world leaders which are ignored or disputed in practice. The 'Basic Principles',

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however, do not stand in isolation. In conjunction with the agreements on specific issues of which they are part, they deserve the most serious attention.

Of particular significance is the pledge to avoid military confrontations, to exercise restraint in mutual relations and to avoid efforts to obtain a unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, by direct or indirect means; scrupulous observance of these principles alone could put relations between America and the Soviet Union on a new basis. Since the statement of principles was signed, the evidence has been overwhelming that both sides are taking them seriously, although only time will tell how faithfully they will be observed in the long run.

PRESIDENT Nixon and the Soviet leaders alike said as the Summit meetings ended that, even though much had been achieved, all that had really been done was to lay the foundation of a new edifice. The edifice itself, the ' new relationship ', still had to be constructed. Although the incredible pace of those eight days in Moscow has not been maintained, there has developed what President Nixon called a ' momentum of achievement ', in which progress in one area bolsters progress in others.

In July, 1972 an agreement was signed for the sale of grain to the Soviet Union and the first meeting of the joint commercial commission was held. In October, after arduous negotiation, a series of agreements were reached in the economic field: a settlement of the second world war lend-lease debt, a comprehensive trade agreement, and an agreement regulating maritime relations. Numerous joint commissions and working groups in the field of cooperation met during this period. Then the second phase of SALT talks began in Geneva on 21 November 1972.

In the multilateral sphere, talks began in Helsinki on 22 November 1972 to prepare for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and both sides agreed to begin the exploratory phase of Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks on 31 January 1973. Multilateral talks on other topics of course continued in regular forums such as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and the United Nations General Assembly.

A brief review of the way the agreements signed at the Summit are being implemented may convey an idea of their impact. Under the environmental agreement some 30 different projects involving nine working groups are underway. As provided in the medical science and public health agreement, dozens of scientists have already held numerous sessions working towards cooperation in the conquest of cancer, heart disease, and illness caused by environmental pollution. Plans have been laid for several joint research projects, and others are under discussion. In the field of space exploration, US-Soviet joint working groups have set 15 July 1975 as the date for the joint orbital docking mission of Apollo and Soyuz spacecrafts. In the science and technology field, six working groups have been examining proposals for joint projects. The

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Soviet Academy of Sciences has agreed to increase bilateral scientific exchanges 50 per cent, and next year the US Atomic Energy Commission will discuss with its Soviet counterpart the details of cooperation in demonstrating the engineering feasibility of thermonuclear fusion power. Provocative actions at sea have already diminished as a result of the agreement on preventing incidents at sea, and further consultations will be held next year.

Even before the trade agreement of 18 October 1972 was reached, a spectacular upswing in US-Soviet trade became evident. While in 1970 US exports to the USSR totalled $118·7 million and in 1971 $161·7 million, in the first nine months of 1972 alone they had reached $328·8 million. Sales include not only grain and motor vehicle manufacturing equipment but equipment for oil and gas pipelines, ore mining, and electronics.

MUCH has obviously been accomplished, but a great deal still remains to be done. The US hopes to be able to forge a network of bilateral ties with the Soviet Union which will achieve the goal stated by the President in his report to Congress on 1 June 1972 when he looked forward to 'forming habits of cooperation and strengthening institutional ties in areas of peaceful enterprise', so as to 'create on both sides a steadily growing vested interest in the maintenance of good relations between our two countries'. Areas of contact and institutional interlocking already involve hundreds of scientists and officials, and mutual interests are being engaged on many levels.

Such a US-USSR network of ties will, it is hoped, reinforce the wider goal: a world in which pragmatic development of interdependence supplants ideological fanaticism, where the equitable adjustment of international issues comes to prevail over unilateral threats or resort to force. Increasing interdependence can perhaps ultimately inhibit the sort of behaviour which produces confrontations.

But these aims cannot be fulfilled automatically or easily. The agreements achieved so far are still to be implemented and tested, and much further negotiation lies ahead.

In negotiating these agreements several basic rules have been followed. First, each was negotiated on its own merits, avoiding agreement purely for the sake of effect; second, true reciprocity was sought; and third, the negotiators paid great attention to detail. Viable agreements cannot be based upon glossing over real difficulties, even if they are secondary and tertiary. Today's agreements must not themselves become the source of discord and friction in the future.

AFTER looking at US hopes for the future, let us ask what problems loom on the horizon of US-Soviet relations. First of all, both practical and conceptual difficulties are bound to arise out of the inter-

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action of two societies and political systems as radically different as the American and the Soviet. These problems will run the gamut from the difficulty experienced by American businesses in finding adequate office space in Moscow, to the impediments that engrained Soviet habits of secrecy present for cooperative endeavours, to the imbalance inherent in the dealings of private American institutions and businesses with the centralized organs of the Soviet government.

A second set of problems, which overlaps with the first, will flow out of the incongruity between *détente* and what Moscow calls 'the ideological struggle'. Continued emphasis on the alleged impossibility of coexistence in the field of ideology and on an intensification of what is called the 'ideological struggle' run counter to the real world's actual tendency towards closer cooperation and mutual interdependence. It would be most unfortunate if *détente* in the 1970s continues to be marred by unreasonable controls on the free flow of information and persons and by attempts to isolate Soviet citizens from the main trends of our age.

However, it should be noted in this connexion that the USSR's policy of *détente* abroad has been accompanied by an intensification of the so-called 'ideological struggle' at home, which will, if continued, have a very direct effect on the attempt to implement exchanges and cooperative programmes. The elaborate system of closed zones and travel controls imposed by the Soviet government on US officials and private citizens, and by the American government on Soviet officials in retaliation, is bound to hamper the rational implementation of cooperative endeavours. Although this is an anachronism no longer having any clear relevance to national security, the Soviet government has not yet indicated its willingness to abandon this mutual irritant, despite the fact that the US has already dropped restrictions on Soviet exchange visitors and tourists.

The 'ideological struggle' can also create difficulties in more indirect ways. The American public cannot be expected to remain indifferent to the way the Soviet government deals with the fundamental issues of human rights and free movement. Actions which appear to violate these basic human rights can only diminish American public support for a closer relationship; on the other hand positive action in this sphere would have the opposite effect.

A third set of problems, possibly the most serious of all, could arise if the USSR failed to implement the May 1972 Declaration of Principles and pursued an aggressive risk-taking policy of confrontation by, for example, escalating the naval arms race through a major build-up of naval deployments abroad. In seeking influence through naval deployments on distant oceans and conducting a variety of military programmes with assorted clients, the Soviet Union would perhaps only be doing what comes naturally to a great power; but this would be entirely out of keeping with the Moscow declaration's emphasis on restraint. However, Soviet attempts at expansion or destabilization are by no means inevitable.

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AT this point it may be useful to examine a broader question: why has the movement towards *rapprochement* taken place? What motivates the Soviet leadership?

The 'geopolitical situation' has clearly encouraged a shift from policies of confrontation. Two decades of crises in Europe failed to obtain for the Kremlin what it sought there. Meanwhile, the emergence of a hostile China as an ideological and military rival created the nightmare of adversaries on two fronts, something Russian rulers have traditionally attempted to avoid.

Economic factors also make it undesirable for the Soviet Union to maintain policies of hostility and tension towards the West. The Soviet leadership faces a growing technological gap between Russia and the other developed countries. Problems of resource allocation become increasingly acute as the cost of modern armaments spirals. These problems become even more difficult in years when a bad harvest requires large expenditures of foreign currency simply to meet current requirements for food. Unless ways can be found to keep abreast of technological developments, improve productivity, and speed up development of the civilian economy, the Soviet leaders must face the dismal prospect of dropping to number three in economic output before the end of the century. Better access to Western technology, trade and capital can obviously alleviate these problems.

With these factors in mind we can ask what other course could be calculated to meet Soviet needs without unacceptable risk, and whether in fact there is any attractive alternative to the relaxation of tension for either side. The answer seems clear that both have set their course on the basis of soberly calculated national interest.

Yet another question must be considered. Changes in the Soviet leadership may produce changes in policy, which is perhaps founded on personal attitudes. New Soviet leaders might repudiate the *détente* policies of the incumbents, coming once again to favour greater aggressiveness and militancy.

It seems to me, however, that any likely ruling group in the Soviet Union would very probably continue current foreign policy in its broad outlines, supporting at least a controlled and limited *détente*, since current policies are based firmly on what a Marxist would call objective reality. The world has changed over the last two decades, and although it is by no means news that we no longer live in a rigidly 'bipolar' world, it is noteworthy that some Soviet quarters seem to be acting on the basis of this new reality. This is a hopeful sign. The US and the USSR will no doubt continue to be the two strongest world powers, and the nuclear weapons balance is still bipolar. But there are now many centres of political power in the world, and the number of major power competitors has increased. Regional powers are arising, with Western Europe and Japan as well as the US, Soviet Union and China as principal actors on the international scene.

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In such a world, being a superpower does not mean what it once did. The trappings and accoutrements are no longer such an asset; military hardware does not necessarily bring desired political influence. If, for example, the Soviets did seek to use their increased naval power in 'gunboat diplomacy', the result in many cases would be limited and sometimes even self-defeating.

The experiences of 1972 may perhaps also justify a re-examination of some established Western 'rules' for negotiating with the Soviets canonized during the immediate post-war years. Interrelations between the US and the USSR no longer resemble a zero-sum game; loss by one in some part of the world is no longer—if it ever was—the other's automatic gain. There is evidence that the Soviet leaders are beginning to perceive this and to act accordingly.

Similarly, it has been a Cold War maxim that the Soviets do not understand or permit compromise, and that they envisage negotiations only as a means to wear down strong adversaries or intimidate weaker countries. It has been pointed out that the word 'compromise' is not native to the Russian language. While this proposition was undoubtedly true at one time, the achievements of 1972 demonstrate that painstaking preparation and insistence on reciprocity and mutual advantage can create the conditions for genuine negotiation and compromise.

Another Cold War truism was that the Soviets used 'summitry' to create an atmosphere of *détente* without substantial achievement. Again, the Summit of 1972 shows that this is not necessarily the case. Indeed, better communication between leaders can lead to concrete achievements as well as a clearer understanding of each other's motivations and basic attitudes.

LET us look again at the three questions posed at the beginning of this article. First is the question of whether the change which has occurred in US-Soviet relations is more than merely superficial. I believe that it has in fact affected US-Soviet relations in a fundamental way and that both sides are making a genuine attempt to deal with each other in businesslike negotiations rather than shouting matches, or—worse—by brandishing arms and making threats.

Secondly, is this merely a tactical phase soon to be followed by another round of tension, or will there be a lasting improvement in relations? Only time will tell, but for the various reasons we have discussed, it appears that the two countries have a real opportunity to build a more satisfactory relationship.

The third question is that of what exactly is changing. The observable changes, so far as the USSR is concerned, involve policies and means of conducting foreign relations. As yet, little significant change is discernible in the Soviet leadership's handling of internal affairs, and this may well produce problems for US-USSR relations.

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IN dealing with the problems of forging what it is hoped will be a new, more stable, more cooperative relationship with the USSR, it is imperative for the United States to work within a framework embodying the following elements. First, existing ties with US allies must be strengthened. In the steps already taken in the move from a pattern of confrontation to one of negotiation, the US has based its policy on full consultation and solidarity with its allies, and this must continue. Second, the US must maintain a sufficiency of strategic and conventional military power both to meet possible contingencies and to provide a basis for negotiating further agreements to slow the momentum of the arms race and, hopefully, to begin to reverse its direction. Third, the US must continue to approach issues of US-USSR relations with an open mind, willing to comprehend and accommodate legitimate Soviet concerns for security and other national interests, but with a firm insistence on arrangements which embody genuine reciprocity.

George Kennan provided a concise statement of what a realist can strive for in US-Soviet relations in the 1970s when he said: 'Somewhere between the intimacy we cannot have . . . and the war there is no reason for us to fight, there is a middle ground of peaceful, if somewhat distant, coexistence on which our relationship . . . could be considerably safer and more pleasant than it now is'. It is this 'middle ground' that can now be glimpsed at the end of the process which has been set in motion.

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The Soviet Union and the Communist World

Herbert S. Dinerstein

THIS article on Soviet policy towards socialist states and communist parties in the 1970s is largely centred on the history of the creation of new socialist [1] states. Prediction is a hazardous and generally unsatisfactory exercise and this writer, at least, feels that he can contribute best to an understanding of the future by reviewing the past. If we can review the experience of successful socialist revolutions and unsuccessful attempts *as perceived by Soviet leaders*, we will have some notion of the preconceptions with which they approach the problems of the maintenance and the extension of the system of socialist states. Soviet perceptions of past revolutions have changed over time; different Soviet leaders have assimilated their experience differently. Therefore we can only arrive at an approximation of what the Soviet leaders believe are the lessons that the history of past revolutions holds for the future. We shall see how the Soviet leaders have eventually found each model of socialist revolution to be bound to specific circumstances at a particular historical juncture and relevant neither to the present nor the future.

My general theme is that the Soviet leadership has been bemused by a myth of its own creation, the myth of the October Revolution as the paradigm for all future revolutions. As states became socialist in different ways, the Soviet leaders clung to the myth, forcing the different revolutions into their old conceptual framework. By now the Soviet leaders are at the point, or almost at the point, of realizing that there is no paradigm of revolution—or rather that there will be no universal system of states modelled on the Soviet Union. All states with universalist pretensions have given them up sooner or later and the Soviet leadership seems to be abandoning them sooner than most. In the reasons for and the quality of that disappointment we shall seek to isolate the political expectations of the Soviet leadership.

THE main fallacy in the Soviet myth of the October Revolution was the confusion of its two phases: the seizure of power and its consolidation. Like so many revolutionaries before and after them the Bolshevik leaders did not fully realize that they had made a revolution when they assumed power on 7 November 1917. They knew that they had overthrown the Provisional Government but they feared that they might only

[1] The title follows the non-communist practice of talking about communist states or the communist system. In the body of the article, however, to avoid shifting between two usages, ' socialist ' is employed to designate states ruled by communist parties.

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be as ephemeral historically as the Paris Communards. Since then Soviet historical writing has tended to regard the seizure of power as the all-determining event. Soviet historiography has focused on the (brief) preparation of the *coup d'état* of 7 November and the events of that day, while the Civil War that followed is treated as a distinct and new phase. This division has distorted Soviet appreciation of the nature of revolution. In thinking about repeating the experience of the October Revolution, the Soviet emphasis has been on the *coup d'état* rather than the struggle to keep what had been grabbed, but it is hard to imagine how the revolution could have survived without the Civil War. The course of that struggle provided the Bolsheviks with a victorious army with which to enforce their claim to power. Moreover, the Civil War saw the establishment of the security police, the Cheka, a body that induced those feelings of awe, fear and submission that the Russians call *strakh*.

But the new state also had positive appeals. It was the leader of the Russian population in the struggle against the interventionary armies of more than a dozen foreign countries. This circumstance made it possible for many non-communist soldiers and officers in the Red Army (whether they had volunteered or been compelled to fight) to feel that they were true patriots ejecting the foreigners from Russian soil. Thus the very Bolsheviks who had so recently been preaching revolutionary defeatism were able to tap the deep and ferocious patriotism of the Russians.

They were also able to tap the nationalism and national resentments of the non-Russian peoples of the country. Since the White armies were situated largely in the western and southern parts of the country, they had to deal with demands for national autonomy or independence of the non-Russian peoples residing in these areas. They promised these peoples only to consider their claims in a Constituent Assembly at the end of the Civil War, failing thereby to win their support. But the Bolsheviks blithely promised self-determination. The Soviets also accepted and legitimized the spontaneous land seizures of the peasants, thus ensuring the neutrality of the majority of the population.

The Bolsheviks knew of course that the Russian proletariat was very small, and that to describe the October Revolution as a proletarian revolution was something of an exaggeration. Some of their more orthodox Marxist opponents, the Mensheviks in particular, argued that a dictatorship of the proletariat could not survive without the employment of terror if it had not been preceded by a successful bourgeois revolution. The theory was that during the bourgeois phase the proletariat would have grown to a size and power which would make its rule possible without the extensive employment of force.

By treating the seizure of power as a subject in itself and refusing to treat the Civil War (during the course of which instruments of compulsion were created and employed) as a phase of the consolidation of the seizure of power, the Bolsheviks were insisting on the proletarian character of the October Revolution. Some Bolsheviks were victims of their own

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propaganda; others perhaps kept their reservations to themselves and hoped that in the next revolution, the proletariat would indeed play the role ascribed to the Russian proletariat in the official accounts of the Russian revolution. But like other objects of apotheosis that survive the act of creation, the proletariat has proved a disappointment. The proletariat failed the test at its big chances—the first and the second world wars.

Although communist doctrine did not require that communist revolutions be born directly of war, there was a strong tendency to think of the revolutions of the future in terms of the only socialist revolution that had ever occurred. By 1923, after the disappointments of the Polish campaign that failed to produce a revolution and the failure of several other uprisings, Europe settled down to a decade of relative quiet followed by threats from the right. Stalin completely misjudged Hitler's political potential, believing like many of his non-communist contemporaries that Hitler's term of office would be short. Stalin hoped that in the next phase, the German communists would be able to best the group he considered to be his main enemy—the German Social-Democrats. But Hitler was able to consolidate and expand his power, gaining the acquiescence and even the support of large numbers of the rank and file German communists. After the Munich settlement collapsed in March 1939 and the British guarantee to Poland, an intra-' imperialist war ' with the Soviet Union playing the role of *tertius gaudens* became possible and the Soviet Union and Germany quickly agreed to partition Poland. The Soviet Union, it seemed, could avoid the destruction of war and Germany could now pursue it with better prospects of success, her eastern front having been neutralized. The Munich agreement which had presaged a new period of foreign intervention to be borne alone was relegated to the past. Now the future seemed to offer an even better prospect for socialist revolutions than the first world war had. The second round of internecine world war, the communists believed, would lead to the destruction of the structure of other capitalist states, giving the proletariat and its vanguard party another chance to make a socialist revolution. But the events of the second world war again showed that the proletariat was not revolutionary. What the Soviet leaders failed to realize, and perhaps do not yet realize, is that the proletariat in industrialized countries, and even more so in unindustrialized countries, is a privileged class inclined to support the state, which maintains it in a better situation than unskilled labour or the peasantry. When economic growth increases the absolute and relative rewards of the workers they support the system that made this possible. If organized unions are permitted, the proletariat often strikes a bargain with the capitalists in which organized, highly skilled labour (the labour aristocracy of Lenin) is guaranteed its privileges in return for social peace.

Stalin's often quoted remark to Charles Bohlen lamenting the loyalty during the war of the German workers to the German state reflected his

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belief that the proletariat was not a revolutionary force. When the proletariat is directly attacked as in Russia in 1904 or when the state persists in fighting a lost war as in the autumn of 1917, they may take up arms. But when the proletariat has a stake in society the difference between what they have and what they might get has to be very considerable for them to risk their lives and possessions.

Between 1907 and 1914 the Bolshevik leaders resignedly accepted the view that men who had newly acquired a measure of economic security cherish it and ignore or attack those who want them to risk it for greater benefits. When they seized the opportunity offered by the collapse of the Imperial regime and the haplessness of the Provisional Government, they substituted the communist party and its instruments of compulsion for the proletariat, believing however that in an industrialized country a stronger proletariat would play the role originally assigned to it.

The second world war administered a rude shock to these hopes. The German proletariat served the state no worse than the other classes; the proletariat in the countries occupied by the Germans collaborated no less and sometimes more than other classes. The vanguard parties of the East European countries, Yugoslavia and Albania excepted, were completely ineffective, confirming Stalin in his contempt for them. As the war drew to a close Stalin did not expect that revolutions on the model of the October Revolution would occur.

BUT two different avenues to revolution then opened up. One derived from the function of the Red Army as a surrogate for the proletariat and its communist party, and the other from the creation or enlargement of a communist party capable of seizing and holding power during the course of a national liberation war. Thirty years later, however, neither seems to hold much promise for socialist revolutions.

The communist parties in Eastern Europe, with the exception of the Czechoslovak party, were small, based on ethnic minorities, and marginal to the political life of the country. At the end of the war many of their leaders had just returned from exile, sometimes long extended, in the Soviet Union. Communists and non-communists would agree that these parties could not have taken power in the immediate post-war period had not Soviet troops been in occupation of those countries, but communists tend to regard this assumption of power as historically foreordained and only accelerated by the presence of the Red Army. Non-communists, however, regard the shift in power as imposed from outside. The role of the Soviet Union or its army as a surrogate for the proletariat should have undermined the official myth of the revolution. No longer is the proletariat the effective agent of the destruction of the old order; it is sufficient that its self-designated vanguard grasp or be handed the instruments of power. The myth of the proletarian revolution should have received its death-blow but myths die hard.

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In the Soviet Union itself the proletariat has become a bastion of the established order as it has in many other industrialized countries. After a period of meeting the demands of the Russian peasant the Communist Party declared war upon him. The main burden of the collectivization of agriculture and industrialization was borne by the peasants. The workers were relatively better off. By now the Soviet workers, especially the better paid ones, are the mainstay of the system. They are patriotic, conservative in life-style and resentful of intellectuals who challenge the system. They have arrived. Perhaps they have not travelled as far as their counterparts in some non-communist countries but they hardly want to return to where they came from.

The loyalty of the proletariat to socialist systems has been incorrectly interpreted to mean that the proletariat is disloyal to non-socialist systems that provide the same or better services. The proletariat supports the system that rewards it be it socialist or non-socialist. Unless a capitalist system is in collapse and cannot continue to meet the expectations it has aroused, it can count on the support of the classes who have recently benefited from the system or expect to do so shortly.

THE national wars of liberation fought as part of the second world war seemed to open another path to revolution. In Yugoslavia the old regime was destroyed by foreign armies and the resistance against the German and Italian occupiers enabled the Communist Party to grow from a handful to a force capable of taking and holding power as foreign forces withdrew. In China the Kuomintang was deflected from its intention of destroying the Chinese communists by the successive stages of Japanese invasion and occupation. For a variety of reasons well described in the literature, the course of these wars and the circumstances of their conclusion strengthened the communists and weakened their opponents. The accession to power of the Chinese and Yugoslav communists seemed at last to prove the thesis propounded by Lenin at the 10th Party Congress in 1920: the Communist Party, by taking part in a national war against a foreign invader in alliance with the bourgeoisie, gains a position of strength from which to dislodge its erstwhile allies from power in the second stage of the revolution. But it was not the Yugoslav communists who had dealt the decisive blow to the Germans and Italians; it was the Anglo-American-Soviet coalition. It was not Mao's soldiers who destroyed the Japanese armies; it was the United States, and, in the last week of the war, the Soviet armies. And Stalin reminded Tito of this fact when he said that communism had come to Yugoslavia on the bayonets of the Red Army.

(In later years the Russians and the Chinese were to argue about the relative importance of national liberation wars in the defeat of capitalist states and the creation of new socialist states. The Russian insistence that national liberation wars were an ancillary phenomenon meant that the Chinese were not the architects of their own revolution. But the

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Chinese cherish their myth—namely that their revolution was made completely on their own and is the model of future revolutions.)

In Stalin's view communism had come to China, Yugoslavia (and Albania), as it had come to Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, as the consequence of a world war in which the ruling classes of some states had been so weakened that feeble communist parties could seize and then consolidate power. Such an analysis did not contradict the view that capitalism was basically flawed, that it was historically doomed, but it emphasized world wars as an accelerator of the process, world wars moreover in which the existence of the Soviet Union magnified the self-destructive aspects of the imperialist system.

In the first decade after the second world war official Soviet writings, and presumably Stalin too, saw the future of the struggle between capitalism and socialism as an extension of the past. As long as imperialism existed it would produce internecine wars into which, as in the past, the Soviet Union might be drawn despite its efforts to avoid participation. Hence the Soviet Union embarked on a new phase of industrialization, hoping to deter attacks until its military establishment could wage war on a basis of equality or even superiority. But by the end of the 1950s the possession of nuclear weapons by the USSR seemed to promise security to the Soviet Union from imperialist attack unexpectedly soon, since without the existence of such weapons the Soviet Union would not have reached this position until the economic power of the socialist state system could provide traditional military forces imposing enough to deter 'imperialist attack'. But now that the possibility of war between the major powers seemed to have been eliminated, the necessary precondition for the socialist revolutions that had followed in the wake of the second world war had also been eliminated. History had taken an unexpected turn but was this really a blow to the future of communism? Were there not less painful and costly ways of making a revolution than on the ruins of war?

BEFORE examining the Soviet claim that Czechoslovakia came to socialism through parliamentary means, I shall briefly present my own view of the course of events. The Czech political leadership had been demoralized first by French betrayal in 1938 and then by the extensive collaboration of the population with the occupying forces. The Slovaks had accepted statehood at the hands of the Germans. At the conclusion of the war when these two peoples were reunited, they had little reason to believe that their Western allies would be any more helpful in the maintenance of their independence than they had been earlier. In the immediate post-war period the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia thought that any opportunity to take power lay far in the future, but in 1948 they changed their strategy. Public opinion polls had revealed that the communists would lose strength in the next election and they threatened the tired and discouraged Benes with civil war unless he agreed

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to a cabinet change which gave them more power than they already had. On the basis of this concession wrung from Benes, they were able to build a socialist state as harsh as any in Eastern Europe. But the Soviet leaders no more shared this view of the seizure of power in Czechoslovakia than they shared the Western view of the creation of the other socialist states in Eastern Europe. *Coup d'état* was for them hardly an accurate description of the events in Prague. Force had not been employed but only threatened. They could say that communist parties did not automatically resort to force when other means failed. At almost the same time as the events in Prague, the Finnish communists' plans to take power had miscarried and been abandoned. The transition of Czechoslovakia to socialism convinced the Soviet leaders, who were of course eager to believe it, that there were many roads to socialism.

As we have seen, Stalin felt that the Yugoslav and Chinese experiences did not represent a test of Lenin's two-stage theory since they were concomitants of a world war. With respect to the validity of the thesis in other circumstances, Stalin had the failure of the Chinese communists in 1927 as a reference point. Stalin's successors, however, decided at the July 1955 plenum of the CPSU to give the policy another trial. Their motives and reasoning can only be surmised. First, they felt that Europe offered few opportunities. The success of the economic reconstruction of Western Europe and the strength of the NATO forces had made it an unlikely arena for the expansion of political influence. Second, the North Vietnamese had demonstrated for the first (and so far the only) time that Lenin's two-stage theory of revolution could work. It had worked without any Soviet assistance, but Chinese help had played a role at the end. Could the new leadership who had replaced Stalin permit new countries to become socialist without their participation? At the Bandung conference some months earlier, the Chinese had laid claim to the leadership of the underdeveloped world. Could the Soviet Union abandon this terrain and its claim to leadership of revolution? The two-stage theory had an automatic limit. When all the colonies had achieved independence, the applicability of the theory would be at an end. Could the theory be extended to semi-colonies, that is states which had achieved political independence but were still subordinate to imperialist countries by economic means?

For a time the Cuban model seemed to offer much hope. In Cuba a non-communist leader seized power and had frustrated US efforts to oppose and then to depose him as he became more anti-American and, by automatic reflex, pro-Soviet. The Soviet leaders could easily believe that their military power had preserved Cuban independence. Khrushchev's symbolic warning in autumn 1960 that a missile attack would be launched on the United States in the event of an American invasion of Cuba was interpreted as being hedged to the point of insignificance. In fact Khrushchev and the Soviet press reiterated the warning, making it clear that the Soviet promise to come to the aid

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of Cuba with missiles would not be invoked if there were no US attack but would be otherwise. Thus, when the United States broke off its attack at the Bay of Pigs the Soviets quite probably believed what they said, namely that Soviet power had made possible the transition of a semi-colony to full independence. When Castro revealed his conversion to communism later in 1961, a new model had been created. A country had become a socialist state with the communist party playing only a minor role. The socialist revolution occurred after power had been taken and consolidated. In terms of personnel the Cuban communists in the Partido Socialista Popular missed the boat altogether for in the new communist party created by Castro only one of the top leaders, Rodriguez, was retained and he plays a secondary role. In a sense Cuba is an example of a communist revolution without communists. But this did not stay the euphoria of the Soviet leaders who told the American Ambassador in Moscow that the Cuban revolution made them feel young again. They seemed delighted to realize that socialism had better prospects for early expansion than they had thought. The leading organ of the CPSU, *Kommunist*, wrote that Latin America was the most revolutionary continent in the world and that Cuba was a model for the rest of the Caribbean and even for Latin America as a whole. The missile crisis of October 1962 demonstrated that the Soviet ability to deter the exercise of US power in April 1961 had not set a precedent [2]; and since that point, with a few minor ups and downs, the Soviet Union has expected no more than the formation of nationalist anti-American governments in Latin America.

BUT the hopes for national democracy, the new doctrine invented to describe the phenomenon of the Castro conversion, did not die. It was believed that, as in Cuba, in other underdeveloped countries a charismatic national leader could rule with the support of the communist party and other parties or power groupings. This period of national democracy would not necessarily be brief as it was in Cuba; it might extend over many years. Somehow in that time the communist party would become dominant. Just how was not clear. Either the leader himself, after the example of Castro, would be converted to communism and take all his non-communist followers with him, or the communist party would grow in size and finally predominate. Another possibility which may have been in the minds of the Soviet leaders was not mentioned for obvious reasons. The contradictions between the communists and the other

2 In point of fact the Soviet Union had no or very marginal capacity to deliver nuclear weapons to the United States in April 1961. In October 1962 if all the sites in Cuba had become operational, some change would have been introduced into the weapons balance. How significant the change would have been was quite differently viewed within the Kennedy administration. I am making the point that the Soviet leaders believed that the failure of the United States to prevent a Caribbean country from passing to socialism in 1961 and the subsequent survival of the regime was in part a function of the changing weapons balance.

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groupings might sharpen to the point of an open conflict from which the communists would emerge triumphant.

But the high expectations that national democracy would be the ante-room of socialism were dashed. Nkrumah, Ben Bella, Sukarno, all collapsed. In their states the level of industrialization and education was low. The groups on which the national leader could base his power were small, essentially concentrated in the armed forces or in the state bureaucracy, all of which viewed the communist party as a dangerous rival. Sometimes, as in the case of Sukarno, the national leader would play one of these groups off against the other to create a balance of forces which he could manipulate. But the position of the party was precarious. For example in late 1960 Castro was balancing the communists of Cuba against the amorphous 26th of July Movement, some of whose leaders were breaking with Castro. The communists, being the only political party, refrained from recruitment because they felt it would provoke fear and then reprisals from the others. If in such situations the communists with their superior organization and discipline try to expand, they risk frightening their opponents into acting against them. If they stand pat, they are liable to become subject to the political law that whatever does not grow, stagnates and rots.

The tendency in underdeveloped countries is for the national leader to govern through some kind of one-party movement or organization, and this makes the prospects for the continued existence of the communist party poor. For a while non-communists feared that the permission granted to the communist party to preserve its identity was a licence to infiltrate and ultimately to dominate, but it was in the event the communists who were exploited and then discarded.

Non-communists have tended to overestimate communist power, believing that a weak communist organization could, by virtue of its ideology and organizational structure, dominate more powerful political groups. The Soviet leaders have inclined to the more traditional wisdom that the strong dominate the weak, but how can this general tendency be reconciled with the high expectations placed by them on national democracy?

There are two possible reasons. First, there is the intense desire to believe that socialism someday—no matter how distant—would become a world system. The Bolsheviks have exacted so many sacrifices from their own people, and as yet have produced such indifferent results in terms of what they promised—material comforts and social equality—that to bear the present one had to believe that the future would be better. One of the explanations for this situation offered (and probably believed by those who offered it) was that the leap from the realm of necessity to the realm of abundance would only be possible when the danger from the imperialists had ceased to exist. Socialism could only fulfil its promise if new socialist countries continued to appear. To believe that the Soviet Union is the first and most important of a series of socialist states which

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will usher in a new age is both psychologically comforting and enhancing the legitimacy of Soviet rule.

THE vestiges of this desire for self-justification in traditional revolutionary terms is however only one reason for the importance attached to this new path to socialist revolution. Perhaps more significant was the belief that Soviet support of national democracies furthered the goals of Soviet foreign policy. The leaders of these new states who had been politically formed as revolutionaries had given little thought to the prosaic problems of running a state. It was more congenial to continue fighting the enemy who had already surrendered the field. They therefore emphasized the struggle against 'neo-colonialism', the struggle against the continued economic domination by the ex-colonial powers. This applied as much to the states that had recently gained political independence like India or Algeria as to states that had long enjoyed political independence, like Peru and Chile. The Soviet Union, therefore, supported these nationalist movements even if it entailed some sacrifices on the part of the native communist parties because they served to weaken the dominant world position of the capitalist states, the United States above all. But the collapse of hopes for nationalist democracy in the middle 1960s does not necessarily mean that the Castro variant of the conversion of the ruler has lost its validity. Following a Latin American tradition, Castro had adopted the professed ideology of a state hostile to that of the North Americans, hoping, in his case with justification, to secure the political and military support of that state. Before considering whether the Soviet Union would welcome a series of such ideological conversions, it is necessary to examine the degree of control which the Soviets can exercise over them according to the original provisions, of The Communist International, was to examine the credentials of newly formed parties seeking acceptance as communists. The Comintern exercised the right of admission and of expulsion. Since the liquidation of the Comintern in 1943 anyone can proclaim himself a communist and can claim support and protection from the states pretending to the leadership of the communist movement. Just as the United States has been saddled with the support of any leader who proclaims himself anti-communist, so the Soviet Union is constrained to accept anyone who proclaims himself or his state communist. The Soviet leaders will not automatically and cheerfully accept any new responsibility foisted on them. Could or would the Soviet Union transfer capital to a socialist Brazil in the amounts that the United States has permitted to flow to an authoritarian Brazil? The chief objection to self-anointed communist national leaders is that matters are taken out of Soviet control. The choice is support of self-proclaimed socialist states like Cuba, or God forbid, Haiti, or bearing the onus of letting a fledgling socialist state perish. Soviet leaders have insisted that they do not want to export communism. Their insistence carries conviction because if a communist

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party cannot make a revolution on its own it cannot survive on its own and instead of representing an accretion to the strength of the other socialist states it becomes yet another drain on their exiguous resources.

In an earlier period the Soviet Union could run risks and assume costs to convert the *cordon sanitaire* of its enemies into a defensive *glacis*. But with the advent of nuclear weapons a *glacis* has become converted from a military outpost into a political vulnerability. Loss (Yugoslavia), defection (Hungary and potentially Czechoslovakia), or defiance coupled with charges of betrayal of communism (China) are heavy costs. Understandably the Soviet leaders are reluctant to encourage the creation of new socialist states without reasonable confidence that they will be assets rather than liabilities.

WHAT then can Soviet leaders expect? By and large they no longer believe that the proletariat in advanced industrial countries will produce a revolution. The behaviour during the events of 1968 of the French communist party and the proletariat whose interests they claim to represent demonstrate once again that the proletariat will not make revolutions on the model of the Great October Revolution. National liberation movements are largely a feature of a political phase which has almost passed from the scene. Since great world wars are both unexpected and undesirable, the Soviet Army will not again be able to act as a surrogate for the proletariat. There may however be some new conversions on the Castro model, or the formation of new socialist states on completely novel lines.

All in all, it can therefore be expected that the Soviet Union will approach all such situations warily. The main effort will probably be concentrated on keeping existing socialist states socialist—a hard enough task—rather than on looking for new socialist revolutions which are increasingly viewed as burdens rather than opportunities.

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Comment

Paul Cocks

PROFESSOR Dinerstein has chosen for the main focus of his paper the changing world of Soviet perceptions and expectations, particularly with regard to the expansion of communist power and the creation of new socialist states. In trying to extract the lessons of the past and their implications for the future in the minds of Russia's rulers, he explores and emphasizes the confrontation, interaction, and conflict between the Marxist-Leninist ideology, on the one hand, and the dynamics of power and recalcitrant reality, on the other. To be sure, his stress upon the cognitive patterns and perceptual prism of the Kremlin leaders with its peculiar set of blinkers is rightly placed. Policy is always first and foremost the product of how political leaders approach and interpret the world, how and if they come to modify and accommodate their subjective thinking with objective reality, how and if they learn to overcome their original preconceptions and misconceptions. I would therefore like to keep within this perceptual framework. At the same time, however, I would like to illuminate an additional dimension of the 'communist myth' and of the Soviet 'learning experience', which is integrally related to but different from that which Professor Dinerstein has singled out for attention.

Generally speaking, the 1960s may be described as a period of Great Awakening and Discovery, a time of demoralization and disillusionment, for the Soviet leadership. It is in this context that Professor Dinerstein discusses Soviet experience and expectations with respect to the Third World and the shattering of their hopes for new socialist states there. This has led them to share a growing lack of confidence in historical determinism and to temper considerably their optimism, characteristic especially of Khrushchev, about the path and inevitability of communist success. But the decade and a half after Stalin's death proved to be a period of rude awakening and disillusionment in another sense as well. Even more important in the eyes of the Soviet political elite than their growing realization of the improbability of the formation of new socialist states, at least as conceived in the past, was their growing awareness of the possibility—indeed the frightening reality—of decay in noncapitalist states. This applied, above all, to socialist countries individually and to the world socialist community more generally. Not the expansion of communist power but rather the survival of existing communist parties and regimes has emerged as the paramount concern. The spectre of political disintegration and decay under socialism has given rise to new preoccupations, priorities, and perspectives about the world, its workings, and the future.

As Professor Dinerstein notes at the conclusion of his paper, 'One can expect that effort will be concentrated on keeping the existing socialist

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states socialist rather than in looking for new socialist revolutions'. System-maintenance, both internally and internationally, rather than system-expansion has become the top political priority for the communist world. Indeed, there are already some indications of rethinking in Moscow along this line, and this is likely to continue to shape Soviet policy, domestic and foreign, throughout the 1970s. Here there are three areas of interest that particularly stand out.

Domestic Factors and Developmental Forces: New Perspectives on Building Socialism

Not only the setbacks in Africa and Asia but also the turmoil in the socialist world during the past decade have impressed upon the Kremlin leadership the need to explain phenomena for which Marxist doctrine makes no allowance. Dogmatic thinking in terms of historical determinism distorted their views of the Third World but it also clouded their perceptions of the socialist community. Most important was the lack of any theory of decay under socialism which could account for, much less help to stem, the growing tide of 'defections' and 'deformations' between and within socialist countries. The *a priori* assumption that the seizure of power largely predetermines the course of history and makes progress under socialism automatic, unilinear and irreversible simply left no room for any 'regressive' stages or phenomena, such as, for example, Mao's Cultural Revolution in China or Dubcek's 'counter-revolution' in Czechoslovakia, let alone the Sino-Soviet conflict in general. On the other hand, the durability of capitalist systems was also equally at odds with the Marxist doctrine that projected for them only a path of perennial crises and inevitable decay. In short, reality sharply diverged from the theory that should have provided a guideline to it.

It is true that this dogmatic Marxism-Leninism had a view of the world which was static, deterministic and dominated by a fundamental dichotomy, and its inadequacy was recognized by the Soviet leaders after Stalin's death. One need only recall Mikoyan's remarks at the 20th Party Congress in 1956. Berating Soviet scholars and ideologues for their failure to study and explain the complex and contradictory phenomena of contemporary capitalism, he harshly condemned the backwardness of ideological work and political analysis under Stalin. In the same breath he criticized them for skimming the surface and failing to plumb the depths in their analyses of socialism. For the most part, they still studied Marxism-Leninism, he said, solely from the 'Short Course'. Obviously this Stalinist primer was a poor guide to the developing complexities and contradictions of contemporary and increasingly 'comparative' socialism.

It is also true that under Khrushchev some adjustments and innovations were made in order to facilitate a more flexible policy and a more differentiated world view. But the idiosyncratic political style and the ideological fervour of the former First Secretary served to impose limits on the extent of perceptual adjustment and analytical change. As a 'true

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believer', Khrushchev shared many of the fundamental biases of Marxism-Leninism, and they continued to obstruct his perspectives and policy responses.

IN their attempts to remedy some of Khrushchev's mistakes, his successors have sought to sharpen their perspectives and analytical tools in order to understand better and to act more effectively in a world they recognize as increasingly more complex. In this respect they have merely carried further the trend discernible under Khrushchev towards adaptation and an effort to break with the rigid and simplistic world view of Stalinism. But they have also tried to go beyond Khrushchev and to avoid his personal, and often dangerous, kind of 'hare-brained' scheming and 'subjectivist' bungling. Most significantly, they have tried for the first time to develop a more adequate theory of political change, one that would allow for both development and decay in not only capitalist but noncapitalist (including socialist) systems as well. As a result they have acquired a much more dynamic perspective on power, politics, and socialism. To a certain extent, then, Soviet perceptions and political analyses since Khrushchev have been marked by what Samuel Huntington has called 'the change to change' in Western social science and political thought in recent years. This form of 'convergence', moreover, has not been entirely coincidental, being in some degree the product of a deliberate attempt by the Russians to emulate and benefit from Western techniques and experience. The Soviet 'learning process' has not in fact been restricted solely to their own experience; they have been increasingly willing and anxious to 'learn' from the West and to adopt methods which seem to work for their adversaries.

Khrushchev's successors have emphasized the need for a more sophisticated, scientific approach to the economics and politics of system-building, socialist and nonsocialist. Like Lenin at the end of his life, they have come to recognize the complexities of development and administration as well as the need to avoid simple solutions. Experience at home and abroad has made them increasingly sensitive to sources of stability and instability. The political practice of such leaders as Khrushchev, Novotny, and Mao within the socialist community, or Nkrumah and Sukarno in the Third World, has made them all too aware of the dangers of inept leadership, administrative mismanagement, and institutional devitalization making for political collapse and decay. Consequently, in dealing with the developing countries Soviet analysts since the mid-1960s have placed much greater emphasis on such factors as political corruption and charismatic leadership, the role of bureaucracy, the social and educational background of officialdom and the general citizenry, the status of the military, the nature of the communist party, and the structure of other institutional centres of power. Their view of socialist development in Eastern Europe, China, and above all the Soviet Union has also been marked by this new stress on the need to study and strengthen the

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bureaucratic infrastructure and political superstructure. Long neglected and depreciated in Marxist theory, the problems of actually running socialist society and achieving economic growth have taken on a new importance for communist elites and, for that matter, the nationalistic leaders of the developing countries as well. Along with this growing appreciation of the importance of domestic and developmental factors, Khrushchev's successors have also become painfully aware of nationalism at home and abroad, which now looms in their minds as the main evil of revisionism of both 'left' and 'right', as the primary source of political deviation and decay under socialism.

SINCE Khrushchev, therefore, Soviet thought and writings about political development in both the Third World and the socialist world have revealed a general shift of focus from revolution to organization, from adventure (or, more accurately speaking, adventurism!) to administration, and from struggle to stability. In part this reflects a more sober recognition by the Soviet leadership of the difficulties in development for the countries of Africa and Asia as well as a growing awareness of the increasingly post-revolutionary orientation of their ruling elites. For most of these nationalistic regimes the revolutionary euphoria of the fifties and early sixties generated by their achievement of political independence and its aftermath is on the wane. Almost everywhere the charismatic leadership and adventurist one-man rule of the initial post-liberation period has given way—along with the leaders themselves—to bureaucratic oligarchy and military dictatorship. Growing realization by these elites of the stark realities of their backwardness and of the difficulties of overcoming it has sobered them considerably. Above all, it has caused them to take a more genuine interest than before in the problems of administration and development and in acquiring the managerial skills and technical wherewithal necessary to achieve economic growth and to maintain political stability.

But has this not also been the case with the Soviet leadership and, for that matter, with communist political elites generally over the past decade? To be sure, the dominant stress on system-maintenance reflects in part the different leadership style and personal preferences of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. But it also reflects, I would argue, the growing institutionalization of the Soviet system and the rise of a bureaucratic oligarchy that is essentially post-revolutionary in outlook and is anxious to preserve what it has built. This above all seems to account for the increased stress by Khrushchev's successors on the need to study more intensively and to abide by the imperatives of what is now called a 'developed' or 'mature' socialist society. All talk about the 'withering away' of the state and self-administration by the masses that occupied such a prominent place in Khrushchev's grand design has been dropped and replaced by concern with strengthening the bureaucratic infra-

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structure and the political superstructure of what is perceived to be a fully developed, i.e. institutionalized socialist society.

Scientific Management and Technocratic Socialism: The New Course for the Seventies

The gradual realization on the part of Soviet leaders of the possibility of decay under socialism, has been accompanied by an increasing awareness of their own backwardness, technological and political. They have also come to recognize that the roots of decay lie in part in this very backwardness as well as in the bureaucratization which nurtures and sustains it. With respect to improving economic administration and speeding technical progress, they became convinced of the inadequacy of Khrushchev's policies and brand of executive command, as well as of the need for greater managerial skills and organizational efficiency. Politically, too, Khrushchev's system of Party rule with its neglect of state agencies and governmental administration laid bare the growing backwardness, devitalization, and indeed 'withering' of Soviet political institutions. His particular style of mobilization politics and promotion of public participation outside and often against the existing institutional framework and entrenched bureaucratic elements increasingly threatened the latter's survival as well as the stability and survival of the system which they had come to embody and to command. At the same time, they exposed the growing inability of the bureaucratic infrastructure and political superstructure to control effectively the dynamic processes of development in Soviet society and the economy. Not surprisingly, then, the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime has played down the excessive voluntarism and amateurism of Khrushchevian populism, stressing instead bureaucratic reform along more elitist and technocratic lines. This better befits the mentality of a ruling oligarchy and also coincides with what it perceives as the main imperatives of the Soviet system at its present stage of development. They have again turned to scientific rationalization in order to make more efficient what in their eyes is a workable and developed system. For inspiration and direction they have accordingly turned not to the spirit of Lenin's *State and Revolution*, but to that of *Better Less But Better*, his last article and dream of a technocratic revolution against primitive bureaucracy.

It is significant that since the mid-1960s interest has been growing in 'scientific management' and there has been a relentless pursuit of greater bureaucratic rationality, cybernetics, and computer technology not only in the USSR but throughout the communist world. This turn to technocracy indicates, I would argue, an aggressive but essentially defensive response by communist bureaucratic elites. Conscious of growing ferment and dissident forces within their societies that seek alternative paths of political and economic development, they are most anxious to preserve intact the basic contours and continuity of their political systems. This requires, however, a substantial turn of the

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technocratic screw in the machinery of power and the wheels of production as well as more modern methods of social engineering and control.

Another factor underlies this change of perspective and more technocratic policy since Khrushchev. Through his constant reorganizations of Party and state, his continual policy shifts, and erratic leadership style, Khrushchev produced a growing sense of drift and lack of direction in the Soviet elite and communist officialdom more generally. There was discernible a creeping malaise and sense of helplessness, if not hopelessness, among the ruling establishments in the face of increasingly assertive societies and complex economies, not to mention arbitrary leaders, that defied their direction. Indeed the dream of the administered society rooted in Marxism, especially its Leninist variant with its extreme elitism and technocratic twist, seemed to be vanishing forever. Everywhere communist elites saw power slipping irretrievably from their hands and with it their hopes for further communist social engineering and reconstruction. The overthrow of Khrushchev should perhaps be seen as a deliberate and concerted effort on the part of the Soviet political elite to overcome this state of affairs within the Soviet Union. In like manner, the forceful occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and termination of the Dubcek attempt to give socialism 'a human face' signified their determination to check creeping pluralism and untamed spontaneity in the bloc more generally. Both actions reflect the underlying determination of Russia's rulers to control events, to maintain not only a communist monopoly of power but the idea of social engineering from above as well. Similarly, the craze for 'scientific management' and chase after computers in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe since Khrushchev are quite natural responses for Leninist elites for whom political manipulation and management of society are deeply engrained as a way of life and state of mind.

On the ideological front, the main force behind the growing stress, particularly since 1968, on the need to study the distinctive features of 'developed' socialism is also, it seems, the desire to preserve continuity and to prevent deviation in communist political development. It is an attempt to fill an important ideological void that increasingly creates difficulties and dangers for political practice. The problem lies not only in the failure of Marx to depict in any detail the future communist order but also in his emphasis on the essentially primitive, coercive, and transitional character of the 'socialist' phase of its development. In his eyes the dictatorship of the proletariat was not a model of a 'mature' socialist society, nor is it taken to be such by official Marxists today, even in Moscow. Under Khrushchev little effort was made to elaborate such a model, particularly along the present lines of, essentially, perpetuating the existing system and structure of power. On the contrary, power considerations and his own ideological orientation led the former First Secretary to concentrate on building the future communist order, on the

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withering away of the state superstructure and the growth of public participation in administrative affairs. Though he himself always admitted that this was to be a long-term process, he tended, nevertheless, to push its development much faster than the ruling elite desired. Not surprisingly, this 'great leap' mentality and the 'prematurity' of his populist schemes and weakening of the state machinery in building socialism have been condemned by his successors. Instead they are emphasizing the paramount need to avoid discontinuity and harmful disruptions in moving from the dictatorship of the proletariat to what used to be called under Khrushchev the 'state of the whole people'. Capturing the conservative thrust behind the current ideological line and the present rather than future orientation of the political leadership is the stress given to the idea that socialist development proceeds gradually, step by step, that socialism grows into communism. This is a similar line to that of Bukharin and the right opposition at the end of the 1920s.

In its effort to develop a model of developed socialism, the post-Khrushchev leadership is also trying to delineate more clearly the limits of permissible change not only in the Soviet Union but in the socialist bloc as a whole. By spelling out the conditions that constitute a threat of internal decay and accordingly invite suppression from without, this model represents a further elaboration of the 'Brezhnev Doctrine'. Significantly, in the absence of such a model some communist elite elements began by default and by design to take non-Marxist models of advanced capitalist society, popular in the West, as guides for their own development. This was most noticeably the case with the Dubcek reformist leadership in 1968, which sought to build a more pluralistic and democratic socialist political system in Czechoslovakia. For Moscow of course this remains the height of political heresy which must be eliminated, by force if necessary. The accent on building a developed socialist society, therefore, should be seen as an integral part of the larger campaign of ideological and political warfare that has been conducted from Moscow, especially since the occupation of Czechoslovakia, to arrest and root out the seeds of revisionism on all sides.

Generally speaking, the Czech experiment in giving socialism a human face sought to combine and reconcile two quite different sets of revisionist forces. Some more liberal-minded communists were genuinely concerned with erecting a system of viable restraints against political arbitrariness. Others, who were more bureaucratic and technocratic-minded reformists, sought mainly to modernize the administrative system and economy along more rational but not necessarily democratic lines. The latter has also become the dominant concern of the Soviet leaders though, of course, they take a much more constricted and political view of rationalization than revisionist technocrats like Ota Sik. To be sure, the socialism of the Prague Spring reformers is seen by Russia's rulers as fundamentally contrary to Leninism and their power interests. They are not so averse, however, to giving socialism a more technocratic face so long as the turn

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to technocracy enhances their power, improves economic performance, and preserves the dominant position of the Party in the political system. In many respects technocracy is fully compatible with the authoritarian, elitist, and manipulative elements in Leninism. Though it certainly carries its own kind of revisionist antipodes and political risks, a turn of the technocratic screw may be the only way for the existing regime to maintain itself in power and to manage an increasingly complex and mature society, and this seems to be more and more the view of the Kremlin Old Guard and of communist ruling elites almost everywhere. The recent changes in leadership command and political style in East Germany and Poland, not to mention the general communist chase after greater bureaucratic rationality, indicate indeed that scientific management may be the New Course and technocracy the New Face of socialism in the 1970s.

Technology, Trade, and Peaceful Coexistence: New Roads and Inroads

Significantly, Russia's rulers have also become steadily aware of their own technological backwardness vis-à-vis the West. It is ironic that this has occurred just at the time when they have achieved relative nuclear parity with the United States. In contrast to Khrushchev, however, they have come to realize that technical progress is not measured solely in terms of the number of missiles and nuclear warheads in a country's military arsenal. Ultimately decisive, they realize, is the rate of technological innovation and diffusion throughout society and the economy as a whole. Here, then, Khrushchev's successors have come to take a much more profound view not only of the meaning and imperatives of the so-called 'scientific and technological revolution' but of the nature of the technological race between socialism and capitalism as well. Moreover, they are aware that in the competition between the two social systems the domestic performance of each will be more critical than ever.

As so often in the past, the response of Russia's rulers has been to seek the cure for her technological backwardness in the West, to borrow advanced Western technology and methods in order to overcome her domestic troubles. In this case, such technology and techniques involve computers, cybernetics, systems analysis, operations research, scientific management, information theory, etc. While certainly the conflict with China and the increasing burden of the arms race and domestic troubles at home have been important political considerations, the desire for Western trade and technology has also been an integral factor in the Kremlin's calculus and current pursuit of *détente* and peaceful coexistence. A concerted effort is being made by the Brezhnev regime to acquire Western technical knowhow and financial credit to develop backward areas and economic sectors of the Soviet Union. Similarly, within Comecon the thrust behind the new schemes of integration that have been pushed by the Kremlin since 1970 seems to be not only to enhance Soviet political control but also to have the East Europeans carry more of the

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burden of investment in the future development of the USSR. It seems to me that the trade and technology gambit is basically a device by which Moscow can have its cake and eat it too. That is, by having the US, Japan, Western Europe, and the socialist bloc provide the bulk of the finance and technology needed to modernize the Soviet economy and to bridge the growing technological gap with the West, the Soviet leadership itself does not have to alter radically its own resource allocations. It can maintain substantially intact its disproportionate investment in military and heavy industry and at the same time avoid the political troubles and bureaucratic infighting which would inevitably arise with any major change in investment policy. In short, it is a means by which to achieve modernization on the cheap, both economically and politically.

While it opens up new opportunities for Moscow to exploit its capitalist adversaries, an expansion of trade relations and technological cooperation with the West also carries important political risks. Indeed it is perceived by the Kremlin as providing a channel for imperialist infiltration and subversion of socialist regimes generally. The process of borrowing Western techniques inevitably raises the problem of controlling and limiting the noxious influences of external stimuli. How can technological transfer be channelled and contained so that it does not result in the import of alien ideas and forces which threaten the legitimacy and stability of the existing regime? How can borrowing be limited to the adoption of foreign methods so that it does not lead to a wider imposition of Western models? Needless to say, Moscow is acutely aware of these possibilities. It is largely because of them that it has raised considerably the pitch of the ideological warfare against revisionism and has laid special stress on the fact that ideological competition between socialism and capitalism grows rather than declines in an era of expanded peaceful coexistence.

IN sum, therefore, though time has brought to the Kremlin leaders new perspectives and attitudes, it has not eliminated, or even alleviated, the problems which they face at home and abroad. Nor does a fresh understanding of the complexities of the world and of the dilemmas of Russia's backwardness guarantee that even with more sophisticated technical gadgetry and political analysis they will be able to solve the problems plaguing them any more successfully than Khrushchev. If anything, their new awareness of reality in all its baffling dimensions will probably only confound and confuse them all the more as they move into the 1970s and beyond.

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From SALT I to SALT II

W. K. H. Panofsky

SALT is an acronym for 'Strategic Arms Limitation Talks' and two simple questions arise with respect to this formula. First, what is the meaning of 'strategic'? Second, what is the appropriate forum for carrying out such 'talks'? Although the questions are simple, lack of agreement on the answers has produced some of the difficulty in this arms control negotiation. Each issue is an important part of the perennial problem of how to define 'separable topics' suitable for constructive arms control negotiation. Naturally all military armament problems, be they strategic, tactical or logistic, are interrelated at some level. Moreover military and political considerations can never be entirely separated: the success of arms control negotiations and the subsequent implementation of the resulting agreements depend greatly on the political context and vice versa. The level of armament of any one nation affects all other nations to some degree; thus the justified concerns in a world pressing for arms control are becoming increasingly multilateral. Yet the surest way to frustrate the progress of arms control negotiations is to invoke an excessive amount of 'linkage' and to involve an excessive number of conferees. In fact 'linkage' or an overly large forum have at times been demanded by participants in arms control negotiations in order deliberately to inhibit progress without overtly assuming the responsibility for doing so. It testifies to the serious purpose of the Soviet Union and the USA that agreement to shed linkage with outstanding political-military problems in Europe was reached early at SALT.

Since the protagonists in the strategic arms race are, overwhelmingly, the United States and the Soviet Union, it was recognized in the late 1960s that strategic arms limitation would lend itself to negotiations in a *bilateral* forum between these two powers. Even this format is a matter of some controversy: any negotiation between the two superpowers, even if successful, tends to produce resentment among other countries who either feel that their interests will be adversely affected, or who view such a move as a high-handed step by the superpower. Extensive consultation with the allies of each power can, of course, improve this situation and the US has assumed the obligation of doing so.

There is a great deal of ambiguity involved in the definition of strategic as opposed to tactical armaments. The Soviets take the position (with which the US does not explicitly disagree) that a strategic weapon is a piece of armament controlled by one of the negotiating nations and capable of carrying nuclear explosives, which threatens the homeland of the other. However, because of the geographical asymmetry between the United States and the Soviet Union such a definition, if interpreted rigidly, would place the US weapons stationed in Western Europe under the

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purview of bilateral strategic talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, while those Soviet and Warsaw Pact weapons threatening Western Europe would not be so included. Moreover some weapons systems are inherently dual purpose in nature, depending on the armament they carry and their basing. For instance, the US F-111 aircraft can be deployed either as a medium-range strategic bomber or in a tactical support role. Similarly there is some ambiguity in regard to such Soviet medium-range bombers as the Badger and Blinder which, if supported by an adequate fleet of tankers and based in a strategically threatening role to the US, could carry out two-way missions against parts of the United States. There is no evidence, however, that the Soviets are in fact deploying these airplanes for a strategic role, or that they possess the tanker support to do so.

In spite of these obvious areas of ambiguity which are inherent in any attempt to carve out a ' separable ' piece of arms control negotiation, the Soviets and the United States started in 1967 to pursue seriously the initial steps leading to what have become the SALT negotiations. President Johnson wrote in January 1967 to Premier Kosygin on this subject, which was discussed further at the Glassboro meeting in 1967 between the two leaders. Hopes rose that strategic arms limitation talks could commence in earnest during the Johnson Administration but they were thwarted by the cooling-off period after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Nixon Administration made a fresh study of the basic positions in connexion with SALT after it took office; the first SALT sessions commenced on 17 November 1969. Negotiations have alternated between Helsinki and Vienna and eventually culminated in the Moscow Treaty on ABM and the Interim Agreement limiting offensive weapons, signed by President Nixon and Chairman Brezhnev on 26 May 1972.

The reason for this combination of an ABM Treaty and an Interim Agreement dealing with offensive weapons is directly associated with the ambiguity concerning the definition of strategic weapons referred to above. There is no real problem of definition with regard to defensive strategic weapons such as ABM and defence against strategic bombers: if appropriately located in the territory of a negotiating party, they are presumably designed to defend the home country. However, there can be, and is, occasional disagreement as to which defensive system protects against strategic aircraft and which serves in an anti-missile role. Although this is a minor problem, it has given rise to some debate as to the method of control of defensive systems at SALT; there is however no real question as to which are strategic. On the other hand, the question of Forward-Based Systems (FBS), i.e. US aircraft based in Europe which are able to deliver nuclear weapons on Soviet territory, did prove to be a major hang-up. It was for this reason that the Soviets took the position for many months that the first phase of SALT should attempt to reach agreement on defensive missile systems only. This position was opposed by the United States and the impasse was not resolved until 20 May 1971

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when the leaders of the two governments made a joint announcement that an agreement on offensive strategic weapons should take the form of an Interim Agreement only. This announcement constituted a political commitment by both powers to actually reach such an Agreement as well as a Treaty on ABM and made it a virtual necessity to have the negotiations for this interim goal concluded in time for the Moscow Summit.

I am emphasizing this history to highlight the fact that the United States' negotiating position was somewhat weakened in regard to offensive weapons as a result of this asymmetric situation. When one party proclaims lack of interest in including offensive weapons in an agreement, while the other party, in this case the United States, considers this to be a necessity, then the bargaining leverage of the second party is reduced in consequence. This point should be kept in mind when listening to those critics who on the one hand insisted that offensive weapons be included in the first phase of SALT, but, on the other hand, criticized the resulting bargain struck by the US negotiators as not good enough.

The dominant emphasis on defensive strategic weapons, in particular on ABM, has profound implications for strategic policy. The overt aim of SALT is of course to reduce the burden of armament on the two sides, and to decrease the danger of nuclear war by increasing strategic stability between the two parties. An additional objective might be what I call 'arms race stability', i.e. removal of the incentive for both parties to increase the number and complexity of their strategic weapons.

Much has been said and written about the concept of strategic stability and different points of view abound. I can not go into detail here beyond identifying some salient facts. Strategic stability implies that even in a crisis neither party should see any advantage in deliberately starting a nuclear war. In principle such stability could be attained either in a 'defence-dominated' or in an 'offence-dominated' mode. If both sides could cover themselves with a defence which provided a 'weapons-tight' umbrella, then attack by the opponent would presumably be futile and escalation of offensive strategic weapons would serve no strategic purpose. Conversely, if neither side possessed any significant defence, and if offensive weapons on both sides were protected against a first strike by the other by being either hidden or strengthened against such an attack, then 'offence-dominated' stability would prevail. Which to strive for in arms control is not so much a question of principle or strategic theory as a matter of technical reality. In the nuclear age it is impossible to achieve a tight defence, or even one of any significance at all, against all-out attack; moreover, economic 'exchange ratio' calculations give abundant proof of the fact that any increase in defence can be negated by a much less costly escalation in offence that would still leave the defender equally exposed. Thus a stable 'defence-dominated' strategy is technically unattainable; in much of the debate about the question of the agreement limiting ABM this basic technical point is not explicitly

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covered. Thus if the strategic arms race between the US and the USSR is to be arrested, both countries must accept the situation—whether they like it or not—whereby their population is exposed to retaliatory attack from an opponent.

Given this technical situation, it is clear that strategic arms control, to be effective at all, has to move in the 'offence-dominated' mode, and therefore limitation or prohibition of ABMs becomes the key tool. Once the ABM system is limited to negligible protection of the population of both countries, then the value of each offensive missile in a second-strike deterrent role is greatly enhanced; this means that the incentive for pursuing the offensive arms race should be considerably reduced. It was therefore recognized early on that a limitation on *ABM alone* would be an important arms control measure in its own right. The implication of such an ABM limitation is of course that both nations acknowledge the fact that a 'mutual hostage' posture is the only one technically attainable under current circumstances, many of the objections to such a situation notwithstanding. The ABM treaty finally signed at Moscow recognizes this situation by declaring explicitly (Article I, paragraph 2), 'Each party undertakes not to deploy an ABM system for the defence of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense. . . .'

One should emphasize that Soviet agreement to limit ABM deployments represents a dramatic reversal of what used to be Soviet policy as recently as four or five years ago. Traditionally, the Soviets have spent a vastly larger fraction of their strategic budget on defensive rather than offensive hardware; for instance, Soviet air defences exceed those of the US by a very large factor. In earlier private discussions among scientific groups (such as those held in connexion with pugwash meetings) the Soviets tended to represent defensive measures as being basically non-escalatory and purely protective. It is likely that the communications by the American representatives at such off-the-record scientific meetings deserve a good deal of credit for introducing the conviction into the Soviet decision-making process that in the nuclear age *defence* measures fuel the arms race in the context of a deterrent strategy; a position in sharp contrast to earlier Soviet writings and statements.

LET us now turn to the actual content of the SALT agreements. The ABM treaty permits each side to deploy 100 ABM interceptors to protect its National Command Authority (NCA), meaning Washington and Moscow, and another 100 interceptors to defend its missile silos. There are geographical constraints on the NCA defence and limitations on the number, size and power of radars which may accompany the interceptors. Mobile, as well as sea, air and space-based ABMs are prohibited and the number of ABM interceptor launchers at test sites is limited to 15 for each country. These limits are designed to accommodate the current ABM system around Moscow, while at the same time

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inhibiting the development of an ABM system having territorial defence capability. The geographic constraints on the missile silo defences take account of the existing situation at Grand Forks in the US; the agreement is designed to permit the establishment of an ABM defence system for an equivalent number of Soviet missile silos, presumably east of the Ural Mountains, which are, however, much more widely dispersed geographically than the Grand Forks installation. Even if both countries decide to build up their ABM systems to the limit permitted by the treaty the resulting defence capacity would be minimal. It is generally agreed by US military planners that the present Soviet 64 interceptor defence around Moscow would exact only a minimum extra 'price of admission' from a US missile force attacking the city. It is also recognized that the Safeguard ABM system around Grand Forks when employing 100 interceptors would increase the attacking force required to damage the Minuteman system to a specified level by only a small amount. It should, by the way, be noted that, in spite of the considerable confusion on this subject during the recent Congressional ABM hearings, the number of interceptors to be provided for Minuteman defence under the Administration's Safeguard proposal was never substantially different from those permitted under the SALT agreements, and that therefore only a minimal extra defence would be bought by the treaty.

This situation illustrates the fact that the ABM Treaty constitutes in essence 'arms control by supplemental purchase'. By this I mean that the two sides agreed to permit each other to *add* to their respective ABM inventories the particular kind of force which the other side already possessed or had in advanced stages of construction. Although I consider this an unfortunate precedent, the particular instance is not very serious because of the technical ineffectiveness of the two systems thus provided. In general one has to recognize that the geographical and political differences between the Soviet Union and the United States are such that the weapons deployment patterns of the two nations are likely to be quite different. Therefore 'arms control by supplemental purchase' would clearly be an escalatory process if it were pursued on a large scale. Since the two countries have agreed that the sequence of SALT agreements should not result in military advantage for either party, and since the negotiations are being pursued under the mutual understanding that 'strategic parity' is their objective, an *overall* equivalence must be sought rather than, as in the case of the ABM treaty, exact correspondence *in detail*.

Considering the minimal effectiveness of both the Moscow ABM defence and the Grand Forks Safeguard defence it is clear that a great deal of money could have been saved without any substantial military consequences if a *zero* ABM agreement could have been negotiated. For various reasons, primarily historical, this proved impossible. The resulting situation illustrates the risks of the so-called 'bargaining chip' argument by which the Administration ultimately justified the Safeguard

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deployment in the face of valid technical criticism levelled at the system; it is the same argument which the Administration continues to employ in order to justify procurement of new military systems which might be more difficult to support under the ordinary budgetary and Congressional approval process. Since Safeguard was so highly touted as a bargaining chip it proved politically difficult to negotiate it away, even though little purpose would ultimately be served by continuing Safeguard deployment. The Congress has resisted the Defense Department's request to finance the Washington NCA defence which is permitted under the treaty.* We do not of course know whether the Soviets will in fact proceed with an ABM defence for their missile silos east of the Urals; this is a project in which they had shown no interest prior to these negotiations, and which would have little value to them should they decide to pursue it.

The treaty on ABM contains a paragraph which commits both sides not to interfere with the ' national technical means of verification of the other party ', and in another paragraph ' each party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means '. These provisions are a *de facto* acknowledgement that technical means of surveillance such as intelligence satellites are now an essential element in assuring the stability of the strategic balance. The earlier conflicts on questions of inspection were avoided at SALT by recognizing that intelligence satellites and similar ' spy devices ' have made this a more open world where large-scale activities at least are difficult to conceal. This part of the agreement is a very important precedent for future arms control negotiations, yet has been given relatively little attention by the public.

The ABM agreement not only provides for *quantitative* constraints on the number of interceptors, or the number of radars, but it also provides some constraints on activities leading to *qualitative* changes. For instance, the agreement prohibits development and tests of ABM launchers for launching more than one interceptor missile, and it also prohibits testing of air defence devices in an ABM mode. The prohibitions of the ABM treaty thus go well beyond purely quantitative limits on deployment by going further back into the development and test chain of the military procurement process; this point will be discussed in more detail later.

The ABM treaty represents an enormous achievement in stabilizing the relations between the two countries. Not only does it constitute a declaration of policy that effectively makes the two countries hostage to one another in the interests of peace, but it *should* also limit the pressures for expansion of offensive armaments. Because of the difficulties in achieving a definitive offensive agreement enumerated earlier, the ABM treaty has not, unfortunately, had any noticeable effect as yet in reducing these pressures. There is no evidence that the Soviets have either reduced or expanded their offensive programmes as a result of SALT-I; on the

* The Defence Department's request to finance ABM defence of the NCA is not repeated in the budget proposal submitted in the current fiscal year.

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American side the ' bargaining chip ' argument has been used as support for expanding offensive deployments in order to place the US in a better position for negotiating the conversion of the interim offensive agreement to a definitive treaty.

LET me now consider some details of the Interim Agreement on offensive strategic weapons, and then the prospects for SALT-II.

The Interim Agreement sets separate quantitative limits on the deployment of sea-based and land-based ballistic missiles. On the Soviet side, ' heavy ' ballistic missiles (meaning the 300 or so SS-9 missiles for which the US has no counterpart) are being limited separately. The main body of the agreement avoids giving numerical limits; rather the words ' those deployed ', or ' under construction ', or ' operational ' are used to define the numbers to be limited. An annexed protocol does, however, document the numerical content of the agreement as it relates to sea-launched ballistic missiles. There is also a clause permitting conversion of the small number of obsolete (pre-1964) missile systems to more modern classes. Significantly, all constraints on bombers are omitted. This, of course, is a consequence of the impasse over inclusion of the US forward-based aircraft in Europe in the agreement.

Much has been said about the ' numerology ' which goes with the Interim Agreement. The fact is that if the Soviets proceed to the full extent permitted by the Interim Agreement they will have a limited numerical advantage over the US missile forces both in numbers of launchers and in terms of megatonnage carried. This numerical asymmetry has been justified by two types of arguments: (1) it does not matter anyway, and (2) the US has a leading advantage in those systems and characteristics *not* constrained by the Agreement so that strategic parity is achieved as an overall concept.

These justifications are soundly based; both countries are vastly overarmed with missiles and aircraft for a purely deterrent role, and this level of armament is made even more exorbitant as the result of the prohibition on ABM. Before SALT-I one could argue that an excess of offensive arms was needed to compensate for attrition caused by a possible future ABM system; this argument is no longer valid in view of the ABM Treaty.

Armament beyond what is needed for purely deterrent purposes is often justified by the claim that such devices are also needed to strike ' time-urgent ' military targets in addition to serving a purely retaliatory role. The ABM agreement explicitly specifies that the mutual hostage relationship of the two countries provides the basis for stability, and weapons beyond those required for that relationship tend to decrease that stability.

Since both countries are vastly over-armed for the simple role of retaliating in response to a first strike by the other, the statement is often made that the numerical inequality in favour of the USSR in missiles

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permitted by the agreement makes no strategic difference. On technical grounds this argument has some merits. Politically, however, it gives rise to considerable difficulty since even while one may allow that it ' does not really matter ', one has difficulty in answering the question ' Why did we agree to it? ' The real justification for the Interim Agreement, therefore, has to rest on those armaments not constrained by SALT-I, but which will presumably be brought under control once the Interim Agreement is converted into a permanent treaty at SALT-II; the Interim Agreement specifies a limit of five years to reach such a permanent agreement.

The US is leading in essentially all respects in those strategic systems not limited by SALT-I; the US has a long-range bomber force which is four times greater than that of the Soviet Union, and is leading in the *combined* megatonnage carried by missiles and bombers which is suitable for strategic delivery. (This assessment assumes that the medium-range Soviet bombers called Blinder and Badger are not strategic; I consider this to be a justified assumption.) Even more important, the US has an active programme for converting both the sea-launched and land-based ballistic missiles to carry MIRVs, that is, multiple warheads which can be aimed independently and which therefore multiply the number of enemy targets which are threatened. In addition the accuracy of US missiles is considerably higher than that of the Soviets, but, as mentioned above, the total weight of weaponry which can be carried by the Soviet missiles is larger. The American MIRV programme is proceeding rapidly; roughly one quarter of the US land-based missiles have been equipped with MIRVs as part of a programme aiming at the conversion of roughly half the force. The situation is similar with regard to the conversion of the Polaris fleet to ' Poseidon ', the MIRV-carrying missile carried on US submarines. Although the Soviets have not carried out any actual MIRV tests, the larger weight-carrying capacity of their missiles gives them the technical potential to incorporate future MIRV systems of larger destructive power than those of the US.

The Interim Agreement therefore halts Soviet deployment of those systems in which they appeared to have an active building programme, but it halts those systems at levels above those of the USA, in respect both of numbers and of weight-carrying capacity. At the same time the Agreement does not halt evolution of those systems in which the US has at the moment numerical and technical superiority, as well as an active ongoing programme: this is the nature of the trade-off. Most important, of course, is the fact that even assuming the fastest possible Soviet growth no one could reasonably claim that US deterrence against a Soviet ' first-strike ' attack will be endangered during the next five years; this is the period over which a follow-on agreement must be negotiated, lest the Interim Agreement lapse.

Let me briefly elaborate on this last conclusion. Both countries rely primarily on three separate strategic forces for deterring attack: the bomber fleet, sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and land-based

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ICBMs placed in hardened silos. There has been much debate about the ability to survive of the land-based forces under enemy attack. It can be argued that if an enemy missile had the proper combination of explosive power and accuracy it could knock out a hardened silo housing an ICBM. Therefore, if an enemy had an adequate number of warheads combined with sufficient accuracy and explosive power, a 'first-strike' attack against the opponent's silos appears at least conceivable. The technical problem of achieving such a combination of numbers of missiles, accuracy and explosive power, and the difficulty of launching such a first-strike attack with adequate precision of timing is enormous in itself; even more important, however, is the additional retaliatory role of the other two components of the force which the attacker would have to reckon with.

There are at present no known methods which would make the strategic missile submarine force vulnerable to an attack which could not be negated by appropriate countermeasures. In addition the bomber fleet cannot be attacked on the ground by ICBMs since the warning time between their launch and arrival is sufficient for the bombers to take off. In principle sea-launched ballistic missiles can have a short enough flight time to endanger the bomber force on the ground, but in the case of a synchronized attack from the sea against the bombers and of ICBMs against the hardened silos, the warning generated by the ICBM launch would once again permit the bomber force to take off. The combination of the three separate strategic forces thus makes the vulnerability of any one of them much less significant.

The Soviet Union is much more dependent on its land-based missile force than is the US. Their bombers and submarines are much fewer in number (although the submarine force is growing rapidly) and their submarines do not carry multiple warheads and are based much farther away from operating areas. Therefore, while the potential vulnerability of the US land-based ICBM has been much in the limelight during the Congressional debates on ABM and SALT (in view of the large weight-carrying capacity of Soviet missiles) there is at least as much reason for Russian concern in this respect, particularly since American MIRV technique is much more advanced. Vulnerability of land-based forces is much more closely related to the *qualitative* character of enemy missile forces than to the actual *numbers* of missile launchers the opponent possesses. Apart from the vast numerical increase produced by conversion to MIRV, the lethality of incoming warheads to hardened silos is determined primarily by the degree of accuracy as opposed to actual explosive power.

IT is therefore clear that SALT-II is generally expected to have the following three primary goals listed in what is in my view a decreasing order of priority: (1) the conversion of the Interim Agreement into a permanent Treaty giving *quantitative* limits on all strategic arms including

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those not at present covered by the Interim Agreement, such as bombers; (2) the provision of *qualitative constraints* to reduce the vulnerability of the land-based forces of each side; (3) the *reduction* of strategic force levels from the current 'overkill' stockpile to what at a conservative estimate is adequate for deterrence.

Some kind of accommodation on the question of forward-based aircraft in Europe is clearly essential for the attainment of the first objective. Fortunately the number and bomb-carrying power of forward-based aircraft involved here is relatively small and it is therefore possible, given a will to agree, to think of several formulas whereby such aircraft could be included in an agreement which provides numerical ceilings on some aggregates of strategic systems. Conversely, it is conceivable that the Soviets might be willing to modify their position in SALT-I, which required the inclusion of such forward systems in exchange for US concessions in other areas.

Various alternative packages to obtain *numerical* limitations to strategic offensive systems are possible. At one extreme would be agreements which permit a maximum 'freedom to mix' among different systems. Under such arrangements a formula would be devised which assigned a strategic value to each bomber and missile launcher and permitted a specified total aggregate value to each side. At the other extreme there is the possibility of limitations on a system-by-system basis for each side; many intermediate formulas are, of course, possible. The Jackson amendment, adopted after much controversy as part of Congressional approval of SALT-I, seems to indicate that Congress is not in favour of an overall 'freedom to mix' formula to achieve nominal parity among the parties and feels that the land-based strategic systems at least must be controlled separately. The problem is of course that the greater the number of separate categories to be controlled the more vociferous would be the public demand that exact equality in each category be negotiated, since there will be widespread disagreement over the relative importance of each system. Such arguments are not only sterile but are apt to lead to what I called earlier 'arms control by supplemental purchase' in the ABM case: there would be pressure for each side to purchase those weapons systems which the other side possesses. The Jackson amendment might therefore become an obstacle in the way of an agreement on strategic parity which is based on a large overall aggregate of permitted systems.

With the possible exception of mobile systems, there is little question that compliance with agreements on numerical limitations of strategic weapons can be verified by technical means without any on-site inspection or other controversial intrusive measures. The situation becomes more complex, however, with regard to the second step, that is the problem of achieving qualitative strategic limitations. It is generally acknowledged that once high accuracy or multiple warhead missile systems have been fully tested it is very difficult to determine whether the warhead of a

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deployed missile has high or low accuracy or whether it is single or multiple.

Enforcement of qualitative constraints on missiles must therefore take place during the testing phase and cannot rely on controls on deployment alone. This means that once a new technical development has been fully tested it is beyond control by ' national means ' of verification and, given current procedures and the lack of openness in Soviet society, the ' cat is out of the bag '.

The MIRV situation is an important example of this problem. To the best of our knowledge the Soviets have not as yet tested a MIRV device, although they have experimented with multiple warheads which cannot be independently aimed at separate targets. An extended series of tests is necessary to perfect an operational system and if a ban or limitation on missile testing were enacted at SALT-II which somehow prevented such a series from being carried out, the Soviets would find it difficult to deploy MIRVs on existing or future missiles. The US on the other hand has successfully tested MIRVs and, as previously mentioned, is proceeding with the conversion of existing missile systems both on land and sea to carry such devices. Any attempt to limit MIRV at this time would therefore be unpalatable for the Soviets because it would freeze them into a position of inferior technology. On the other hand, they presumably share with the Americans a common interest in preventing the emergence of missile forces which would threaten their land-based silos. An important question, therefore, is whether, in spite of the fact that MIRV technology is ' out of the bag ' on the US side, it is still possible to prevent the next round of the arms race, that is, the equipment of the entire force on both sides with MIRVs and the resulting decrease in strategic stability.

This situation may present a difficult problem in the next round of SALT, since any limitation of technology, particularly if it entails perpetuating an inferior position in that respect, runs counter to basic Marxist philosophy, which in general makes the assumption that any evolution of technology is beneficial to the Soviet system. In addition there are conflicts on the American side, many Defense Department spokesmen having proclaimed recently that any constraints on technology would be unacceptable to them.

However forceful the arguments of the Marxists on the one hand, and of the Pentagon technologists on the other, that military technology should not be constrained at SALT, it should be recognized that past arms control agreements have already set a precedent in limiting the evolution of technology in directions which by mutual consent have been considered unacceptable. The Limited Nuclear Test Ban of 1963 imposes some limitations on the evolution of nuclear explosives and the Treaty on the Ban of Biological Weapons curbs the development of lethal biological agents at the research stage. Furthermore, the SALT ABM Treaty contains numerous provisions which would, as we have seen, come under the heading of qualitative constraints.

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The attached chart (see pages 172–173) tabulates the extent to which previous arms control agreements have limited the weapons research and development cycle and shows clearly that the Interim Agreement of SALT-I stands almost alone in omitting any constraints on technology and dealing with deployment only. The example of these earlier agreements and the need to constrain 'hard silo killers' in the interest of strategic stability will, it is to be hoped, produce rapid progress at SALT-II in the improvement of qualitative constraints.

Finally, there is the difficult question of the reduction of strategic arms once the first two objectives of SALT-II, that is, to make the Interim Agreement comprehensive and permanent and to impose qualitative constraints, have been reached. There seems little hope that substantial reductions will prove negotiable, at least in the immediate future, despite the obvious fact that strategic weapons are a significant economic burden for both sides and that both the Soviet Union and the US will continue to have a huge excess of arms for mutual deterrence of first strike attack, an excess which will be even more obvious once the SALT agreements have eliminated the excuse that the additional arms are required to counter future opposition moves.

There are two basic reasons for the difficulty in negotiating substantial reductions. First there is the ambiguity of the policy controlling strategic weapons requirements and secondly there is the fact that the question of a 'safe' level of strategic arms becomes multilateral rather than bilateral once levels are substantially reduced. Many statements, from the President of the United States among others, have recently been published, maintaining that the Commander-in-Chief should have more options in response to a nuclear attack than simply to order wholesale slaughter of the opponent's society. Although few would disagree with this view, there remains the legitimate question of whether the options to be retained should include attacks against hard silos or military air-fields which are very likely to be empty after a nuclear strike. It is therefore hard to reconcile the requirement for flexibility in response to a nuclear strike with the excess of arms currently stockpiled by the two nations, and in particular the requirement for 'counterforce' weapons. The question of the involvement of third parties in reduction of strategic forces is a key one in respect of the level of strategic arms *reductions* which may be negotiable in the bilateral SALT-II format. The main reason why the SALT talks so far have proceeded bilaterally with some modicum of success and yet have been applauded by almost the entire world is that the interests of third parties have been affected to only a minor degree; most nations feel that their security would be increased if the mad momentum of the arms race between the superpowers is stopped. But the situation would look quite different, at least to some of the nations who count on protection from the nuclear 'shield' of the US or the Soviet Union, once the superpowers had agreed to very substantial reductions.

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CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED BY EXISTING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

Arms Control Agreement	*Basic Research*	*Research applied to Identified Technologies*	*Development*	*Test*	*Production*	*Deployment*	*Transfer*
SALT 25 May 1972 Limitations on ABM (Treaty, subject to ratification)			No ABM multiple warheads. No ABM reload or refiring. No adaptation of non-ABM systems to ABM use No development of sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile ABM	Agreed test ranges. Limits on launchers at test ranges. No test of ABM multiple warheads, or reload-capable launchers. No testing of non-ABM systems in an ABM role. No test of sea, air or space-based ABM or mobile ABM systems.		ABM launchers limited in nos. and locations. Radar constraints. No ABM capabilities to be given to non-ABM systems. No ABM reload capable launchers. No ABM multiple warheads. ABM system based on new physical principles not to be deployed	No transfer of ABM systems or components to other states
SALT Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms, May 1972						No deployment of sea, air or space-based ABM or mobile ABM system. No new starts of specified categories of land-based missiles and numerical limits on sea-based missile launchers. No increases in certain physical dimensions	

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Limited Nuclear Test Ban 1963		Nuclear devices requiring prohibited Tests	Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, Space and Underwater prohibited			
Seabed Treaty 1972			No testing of weapons of mass destruction on seabed		No nuclear devices on sea-bed.	
Non-Proliferation Treaty 1968				Inspection* of certain nuclear reactor stations No production of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear nations		No transfer of nuclear weapons and their technology
Biological Weapons Convention 1972	Research restricted to defensive measures	Prohibited	Prohibited except for defensive measures	Prohibited	Prohibited	
United Nations Treaty on Outer Space 1967					Prohibits weapons of mass destruction in orbit	
Antarctic Treaty 1959			No military testing of any kind. No nuclear explosions		No military bases or fortifications (inter alia)	

* Inspection of peaceful nuclear facilities mandatory for non-nuclear powers; voluntary for nuclear powers.

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Moreover, at lower levels of strategic armaments the Soviets would consider China, not the US, their primary strategic opponent.

The preceding discussion has, inevitably, dealt with the expectations for SALT-II primarily from the American point of view. Although both sides have publicly acknowledged that SALT-II will raise tougher fundamental issues than did SALT-I, it is less clear what the Soviet view will be.

Various important factors are involved for the USSR. The economic burden of the armament industry—the ' Steel Eaters ', to use Khrushchev's phrase—is proportionately much heavier for the Russians than for the US, but the industry is an established political force. The shift from the defence-loaded strategic deployment pattern of the Soviets to the ' offence-dominated ' stability implied by the SALT-I Treaty severely limiting ABM defences has been a drastic one and it is difficult to forecast how consistently the Russians will pursue in the strategy of mutual deterrence which the Treaty implies. The Soviet system tends to be at least as susceptible to the inertia of established institutions as that of the US; moreover the strategic missile forces are under a command structure separate from that of the rest of the Soviet armed forces. Therefore technical missile developments in process, or even a cut-back on missile deployment, may be difficult to achieve on a short time scale. There is also the conflict, which may have deep ideological roots, between achieving parity with the US in MIRV technology and enhancing the security of their land-based forces.

These considerations will all have to be taken into account by the Russians in their approach to SALT-II. Only when the exploratory phase is further advanced will their position become clear, although the Soviets traditionally have left the opening proposals in a negotiation involving serious technical content to the US and SALT-II may be no exception.

THERE is little doubt that SALT-I has increased security of *both* the USSR and the United States—even in the strictly military sense. This is a welcome reversal of the post-war trend of increasing costs for strategic weapons accompanied by decreasing security for all sides. Yet the burdensome military costs have not as yet been reduced and the arms race has been deflected, not arrested. The follow-on SALT talks will be a critical test of whether the Soviets and the USA will be able to stop by negotiations what has been so aptly termed ' the race to oblivion '.

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Comment

Marshall D. Shulman *

ARMS control is a field in which all of us are students, and no one is an expert. This is a subject that requires contributions from science and technology, from military strategic theory, from studies of international politics, domestic politics, history, economics, psychology, communications theory. Indeed, it is the interdisciplinary character of the subject which makes it intellectually interesting as well as important from a policy point of view. I do not feel that those who are engaged in Soviet studies have yet made an adequate contribution to this subject, and I hope that my remarks will help to kindle your interest in this direction. In my remarks, I will first relate the technical aspects of SALT discussed by Professor Panofsky to relevant aspects of Soviet foreign and domestic policy, and will then suggest some questions for further investigation by students of the Soviet Union.

What I have to say is necessarily impressionist and tentative, for it is of course difficult to do systematic scholarly investigation on the Soviet political system; please bear in mind that what follows is intended in an interrogatory spirit.

SALT and Soviet foreign policy

Professor Panofsky referred to the delay in getting started with SALT. There was a period of about eighteen months from the time President Johnson first proposed these meetings until Foreign Minister Gromyko signalled in June 1968 that the Soviet Union was prepared to accept. The interim period was an interesting one, because it involved a perceptible debate on whether stabilization of the strategic competition was feasible, and also whether the process of negotiation alone might have some utility. As is often the case in the Soviet military and other journals, the issues were debated in a surrogate way, through questions of a more general character. In the background, perhaps the most important factor was that this was a period in which the Soviet Union was bending its energies to try to overcome the condition of strategic inferiority under which it had laboured since the end of the second world war. It was not until about 1969 that the programmes begun in the early 1960s produced something like an approximate parity. This made it possible for the Soviet Union to invoke the principle of ' equal security ' as a basis for negotiation, which meant that the Soviet Union could feel assured that arms limitation agreements would not have the effect of

* Some of the matters discussed in this commentary are further developed in a chapter entitled ' SALT and the Soviet Union ' in the forthcoming book, *SALT, Strategic Arms Limitations*, edited by Mason Willrich and John B. Rhinelander, under the sponsorship of the American Society of International Law.

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freezing it into a position of inferiority. The Soviet build-up created a 'window in space'—a moment in time when negotiations became possible.

Also during this period one can observe a growing appreciation on the Soviet side of the limited political utility of nuclear weapons systems, and of the futility of a continuing competition in this realm. Taking root in this period was at least a tentative acceptance of the possibility that the United States might be prepared to enter into serious negotiations, that the overtures by the President, reinforced at the Glassboro meeting and by a visit to Moscow by former Secretary of Defence MacNamara, indicated that an alternative to the strategic competition could be taken seriously. Finally, perhaps the most important factor was that during this period the Soviet leadership was facing more directly some basic economic problems, in productivity and in the lag in its own technological development. These considerations gave added point to the argument that not only would a continuation of the strategic competition be futile, but that it would deflect resources needed in the industrial sector, and that the key to future Soviet power rested on the repair of its economy, on building a strong economic base and particularly on a modern industrial technology. Thus the alternatives were starkly drawn: the possibility of damping down the pace of competition in strategic weapons through SALT, as against a still greater deflection of resources into an accelerated weapons competition.

Involved in these considerations is the question of the extent to which there can be some degree of separability between the plane of strategic competition between the Soviet Union and the United States and the level of tension in their political competition. We have seen that Vietnam and Czechoslovakia were temporary impediments to SALT; whereas the mining of Haiphong harbour was not. We cannot be sure whether the latter instance marked a trend towards the acceptance of strategic arms limitations as a semi-independent variable, or whether the particular circumstances of the Summit meeting in the Spring of 1972—the intensity of interest in trade and technology transfer, the desire to offset the President's earlier visit to Peking, etc.—represented a unique situation.

One point that seemed clear in the debate which seems to me at variance with Professor Panofsky's paper is that of all the questions involved in current Soviet foreign policy, this appears to be the least ideological. In this realm one finds a high degree of pragmatism in the Soviet position. The impediments to which Professor Panofsky refers—what he describes as the Marxist reluctance to accept a position of inferiority—do not seem Marxist to me. The problem would not be greatly different if the Soviet Union were not a communist state. There are of course indirect ways in which the ideology affects Soviet perceptions of the United States, but this is less true in this field by a substantial degree than it is in the realm of the political competition between the two countries.

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SALT fitted comfortably into the general line of foreign policy worked out at the 24th Party Congress in 1971. The general rationale was that the present period required operations at a low level of tension for several reasons: it was the condition most favourable to the enlargement of trade and technological transfer; it was also favourable to an increase of Soviet political influence, responding to the opportunities created by the decline in American prestige and influence. Further, the 'normalization' of relations with the United States would limit the exploitability of American relations with China, and would help to maintain a reasonable level of quiescence in the West during a period in which Sino-Soviet relations continued to be exacerbated.

It appeared that what may have emerged in 1968 and 1969 may have been a coalition of interests which supported the entry into SALT, some favouring the exploration of possibilities for arms limitations, others believing that the process of negotiation itself would be useful from a political point of view—that it would contribute to a climate of *détente* and would have a demobilizing and perhaps a divisive effect in the West. The issue raised by the Soviet Union of forward-based systems, discussed by Professor Panofsky, served this multiple purpose. In the later stages of SALT, however, the Soviet Union made relatively little effort to exploit the political and propagandistic possibilities of the negotiations.

SALT and Soviet domestic politics

The politics of arms limitations appear to be about as complex in the Soviet Union as they are in the United States, but the political alignments, the interplay of interests and the process of decision-making are quite different on the Soviet side, reflecting the differences in the political structure of the two systems.

The following brief sketch of the decision-making process suggests a high degree of compartmentalization of technical information, the limited lateral transfer of information in this field (as in other fields in the Soviet Union), and the leading role of the military. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, although it provided the chairman of the SALT delegation, and backstopped the negotiations with a section on disarmament in the Division of International Organizations, the American desk and the Policy Planning Staff, was largely limited to political and negotiating aspects, and was not privy to hardware information on Soviet weapons systems. In this matter it was limited to what it could derive from Western sources. The Academy of Sciences was also involved in the preparations for SALT, although the extent of its influence is difficult to determine. A study group under the Academy had been operating for several years before the opening of negotiations, and of course defence scientists were involved to the extent that they had worked on particular weapons systems. There is not in the Soviet system the rotation of scientists in and out of defence work which has created a community of scientists

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who can serve as independent critics of the government position as in the United States.

Under the Academy of Sciences, the Institutes of the USA, and of World Economy and International Relations increased the political sophistication of analyses of the American political context and of American strategic thinking. An interesting development is that both Institutes have established staffs, manned in part by retired military officers, to follow Western strategic literature, and they have shown an increasing competence in this field.

The main responsibility for the preparation of the Soviet position, however, has been in the Ministry of Defence, in a section which operates under the direct supervision of the General Staff. It became clear during the Summit meeting that several working channels exist between the General Staff and the Party leadership. One is the Supreme Military Council, of which Brezhnev is chairman; the other is a link to the Party and government official responsible for defence production. The principal figures involved here are Dmitry F. Ustinov, a candidate member of the Politburo and also a member of the Party Secretariat, and L. V. Smirnov, a deputy prime minister in charge of the Soviet armament industry. In the hectic final stages of the SALT negotiations during the Summit, Smirnov was assigned to work with Henry Kissinger on some of the remaining difficulties, and it was apparent that he did so with a considerable measure of knowledgeability and authority.

The role of the Central Committee staff is a matter deserving of further study. It would of course be important to know whether the men who perform the function of coordinating information for the Politburo are technically competent in the hardware details of weapons systems, or whether they simply perform secretariat functions. The latter appears to be more probable. It would also be important to know whether they are parochial or knowledgeable about the outside world, and here it appears to be the case that they may be men of wide experience, having served in positions abroad under the *nomenklatura* system. Since the Khrushchev period, the Central Committee staff appears to function with more clearly defined functions, and to include men of competence as well as party regularity, many of whom have advanced degrees.

On the question of the identification of particular interest and pressure groups, I have not much to add to what has been written by Thomas Wolfe and Vernon Aspaturian. The main point here is the identification of the major military interests and the major economic interests, and the significant divisions within each of these categories, and the extent to which the Party succeeds in controlling and harmonizing the interplay of interests between these groups. Although the limitations of our present knowledge do not enable us to describe in detail the interplay of bureaucratic and organizational interests in the Soviet system, it seems reasonable to bear in mind the probability that, despite the centralized control of the Party, Soviet decision-making is not a purely unitary and rational affair,

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and that it involves political compromises between functional interests. Even if we cannot fill in the details, we should at least be cautious of generalizations about '*the* Soviet attitude', and should be conscious of the effect of US actions upon the balance of pressures on the Soviet side, while we continue to study this political process.

Soviet concepts of arms control

There can be no doubt that the Soviet leadership shares with the United States the concern about the avoidance of general war, approaches these matters with a considerable measure of sobriety, and has accepted, since the Khrushchev period, at least a general notion of nuclear deterrence. However, there are important differences in the conceptual approach dominant in the two countries.

The differences in language used for some principal terms are interesting. When after the second world war the term 'containment' came into general use as a definition of US policy, the word by which this came to be rendered in the Soviet Union was *sderzhivaniye*. Later, as the term 'deterrence' came into wide use in Western arms control literature, the same Russian word was used to convey this meaning, occasionally with the added phrase: *putyom ustrasheniya*. The sense this conveys is: 'containment by means of intimidation or threat'. Although this has perhaps the same general sense as the Western notion of deterrence, it raises the question whether there may not be important differences in the implications of the two approaches. In explicating the term, one Russian writer has used the formula: 'to guarantee a destructive retaliatory blow to any aggressor'. The standard paragraph of explication in the Soviet military literature runs something like this: imperialism is, of course, prone to aggression, but the strength of the socialist world is such that it prevents the imperialists from attacking us. If they should do so, however, we would strike back with such overwhelming force against their military targets, their industrial centres and their whole civilization that imperialism would be forever crushed and would never rise again.

This formulation does of course include deterrence in the Western sense, but it includes other elements normally differentiated from deterrence in the Western usage. It implies counterforce capabilities, war-fighting capabilities, and none of the distinctions between 'finite', 'limited' or 'graduated' deterrrence which have become important connotations in the West. How important are these differences?

From the Soviet point of view, the Western elaboration of arms control concepts is overly abstract, somewhat sophist, and removed from life. From the American point of view, the Soviet approach is simplistic, lacking an adequate understanding of the implications for security of the qualitative changes brought about by the new military technology. These differences clearly need to be made more explicit, and better understood on both sides.

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An agenda for further study

I would like to develop further Professor Panofsky's discussion of some impediments to arms control, and to list a few problems, both technical and political, deserving further study.

(1) One of the most difficult and perhaps most intractable problems is the matter of lead time—the time it takes to go from weapons design to production. The difficulty arises because planners, when they are thinking about weapons systems that will come into being perhaps five or seven or ten years from now, have to make some assumptions about what the other side will have been doing in the meantime. Planners tend, perhaps necessarily, to be prudential in these projections, often developing what has come to be called ' the worst case analysis '—that is, to assume that the adversary will do everything he could conceivably be capable of doing. This has been a major source of dynamism for the arms competition, despite the fact that the ' worst case analysis ' has rarely, perhaps never, been borne out. Perhaps this is an inherent problem, but might we not learn something from experience of the range of reasonable projections, since we have observed that the extreme interpretation of prudence has in fact served to decrease rather than increase our security?

(2) The tug of new technology is a related problem, which also involves both political and technical judgments. An interesting point here is that innovations in military technology may sometimes serve to underpin stability or may have the effect of undermining it. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the movement from bombers to liquid fuelled missiles and then to solid-fuelled missiles, and then to hardening, dispersion and mobility, tended to assuage apprehensions about the possibility of a surprise attack. A period of relative stability emerged as both sides accepted the notion of building their security around a retaliatory second strike capability, and you will have observed that the novels and the movies dramatizing the danger of a first-strike attack tended to go out of fashion. But in the late sixties, new technological innovations began to have the reverse effect, great improvements in accuracy and the development of multiple warheads which could be targeted individually reawakened apprehensions about the vulnerability of strategic systems. Although the possibility of a successful first-strike seems so remote as to be inconceivable, this apprehension is sufficient to raise the military competition to higher levels, and to create the additional problems described by Professor Panofsky of bringing the more complex weapons systems under some kind of limitation agreements. Do the random effects of technological innovations need to be accepted as inevitable, or can we understand and control this process better than we have done in the past?

(3) A problem arising out of the legacy of mistrust between the two systems and the differences in their political aims requires further thought about the extent to which strategic arms limitations depend upon trust. Apart from the verification of compliance with agreements through technical and other means of observation, is not the main reliance of each

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side upon the assumption that the other side will be rational in acting upon an enlightened view of its own security interests? The deterrence concept implies rational behaviour. How far is this assumption of rationality warranted? The behaviour of nations in the twentieth century does not encourage an assumption of rationality, and our growing psychological and political insights make us increasingly aware of the importance of non-rational factors in human behaviour, but is there any alternative to a precarious system of security based upon a modicum of trust in the ability of each side to understand and act upon an enlightened perception of its real security interests?

(4) A related problem is our still inadequate understanding of the implications of strategic parity. Even if one makes the assumption—still questioned by some—that in a condition of mutual deterrence, disparities in the arsenals of the two superpowers may have little if any military significance, the question arises as to the political and psychological effect of such disparities. Would Soviet and American behaviour be significantly different in a crisis situation under conditions of parity, as against some degree of superiority favouring one side or the other, even though the level of mutual deterrence is maintained? A specific form of the question as it is often asked is whether the outcome of the Cuban missile crisis would have been different now than it was in 1962, when the United States had a substantial strategic superiority? My own belief is that the elements of political myth cling to the supposed advantages of superiority, but myths do affect political behaviour unless they can be dispelled by an enlargement of popular understanding.

(5) Another interesting and highly controversial question requiring study is the effect of the ' bargaining chip ' tactic. The bolstering of each side's negotiating position has resulted in a stimulation of the arms competition by SALT, and many weapons programmes have been funded on the ground that they are needed to provide an incentive for the other side to negotiate. While there is logic in this argument, I believe that examination of the effect of this tactic in practice might show that it has stimulated armament programmes more than it has negotiations, and that it has left us saddled with programmes which would not have been supported on their merits. Where the ' bargaining chip ' tactic holds out options to the adversary, and makes it clear that in the absence of specific agreements we will be obliged to undertake programmes not otherwise needed, it might have some justification if the programmes can reasonably be defended as necessary, and where the programmes would not be funded if negotiations are successful. Neither of these conditions appears to have obtained in the Administration's use of the ' bargaining chip ' argument in behalf of the ' Trident ' programme.

(6) A point on which there has been disagreement, and on which students of the Soviet Union may be able to make a useful contribution, is the extent to which the arms competition has been subject to a process of interaction. Some have argued that Soviet military policies have

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reflected an immutable pursuit of expansionist aims; others that Soviet policies have been characterized by a considerable degree of pragmatism and of responsiveness to US military programmes. A careful review of the military programmes of the two countries over the period since the second world war should yield some useful insights on this question.

(7) Finally, there is the interesting question of the degree to which the plane of strategic competition between the US and the Soviet Union can be compartmentalized from the rise and fall of tension in other aspects of their relationship. In logic, the self-interest of the two countries in damping down the strategic competition exists whether there is a high or low level of tension in the Middle East, in Vietnam or Europe or elsewhere, or whether the prospect of trade relations is promising or not. Of course the political realities are such that a total separation of the strategic competition from the political climate is unlikely, but may it not be that both countries are on a learning curve, in which the implications of their security interests are becoming increasingly apparent? And might it not be the case that as we both advance along this learning curve it will become more widely understood that the essentially political competition between the two countries is determined less by their arsenals of mass destruction than by the effectiveness of their respective responses to the changing political conditions in the world?

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Comment

Richard F. Staar

IN his introductory section, the author asserts that the Soviet Union and the United States showed the seriousness of their intention by their agreement, 'reached early at SALT', to dissociate the talks from other political and military problems in Europe. Unfortunately, there appears to be little indication of such an agreement. The USSR insisted for a long time that American missile-carrying aircraft based in Europe should be included in the discussion. Even if one were to argue that the Soviet Union had no intention of undermining NATO, one can readily see how the European members of that alliance would view bilateral Soviet-American negotiations that involved a major component of the NATO weapons systems intended as a deterrent. This was a deliberate attempt to involve politics on the part of the Soviet Union. Other political objectives could be imputed to the USSR, both in the SALT negotiations and in the final agreement. One major Soviet goal may be to decouple the United States from Western Europe and to prepare the ground for the next stage of negotiations on European security. Public acknowledgment by the administration in Washington of parity and of a readiness to accept inferiority in certain areas could be viewed by Moscow as an important step in strengthening its bargaining position vis-à-vis Western Europe. Nor should one forget Soviet concern with its borders with the Chinese and the need to maintain a stable Western front, should it concentrate its attention on Mainland China in the coming period. In brief, SALT is inextricably linked to wider political considerations.

Furthermore, according to the writer, 'the protagonists in the strategic arms race are, overwhelmingly, the United States and the Soviet Union, . . .' In fact, the US government, apart from some improvement in the quality of its existing weapons systems, had not been in the race since 1965. It would be more accurate to say that the strategic arms race had simply been pursued by the two countries. The author mentions the unknown role of certain defensive systems, i.e. whether they are intended for anti-missile or only anti-aircraft purposes. He points to the existence of various views on the subject and yet glosses over these differences. The sentence, 'Although this is a minor problem, it has given rise to some debate as to the method of control of defensive systems at SALT; *there is however no real question as to which are strategic*' (italics added), appears most confusing.

In addition to Soviet medium-range bombers (500 TU-16 *Badger* and 200 TU-22 *Blinder*), mentioned by the writer, the USSR also has long-range bombers (100 TU-95 *Bear* and 40 Mya-4 *Bison*). To claim 'there is no evidence that the Soviets are deploying them for a strategic role' or that they possess the tanker support to do so involves speculation regarding intentions. A more prudent approach would perhaps be to

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consider capabilities. In fact, both types of aircraft are part of the USSR Long Range Air Force which includes an additional 50 Mya-4 *Bison* tankers, with staging and dispersal points in the Far East and the Arctic (polar attack route?). An authoritative source [1] lists all the above aircraft as part of Soviet strategic offensive forces.

The writer further suggests that Russian concern about American aircraft based in Europe and the inability to reach agreement on the subject was the 'reason that the Soviets took the position for many months that the first phase of SALT should attempt to reach agreement on defensive missile systems only'. Other possible reasons why the USSR might be interested in discussing American aircraft based in Europe have already been pointed out. One can adduce more reasons why the Soviet Union wanted to reach agreement on defensive missiles first. One consideration might have been the effect of the discussion on the progress of Safeguard; it is also possible that the Soviet Union considers itself in a better defensive position than the United States, and this point is obviously relevant to speculation the anti-missile role of certain anti-aircraft installations. The writer presents a hypothesis which remains to be proven.

The author argues that mutual assured destruction should be accepted as the basis for mutual deterrence. While it may be true that a technically complete and total defence is not feasible, it is possible to have a level of defence that adds to the potential aggressor's uncertainty of success, while it will not so increase the defender's confidence that he is immune from retaliation and he takes the offensive himself instead. In short, there is a middle way between laying one's own population open to attack and impenetrable defence. One should not forget that, while one principle of deterrence is to threaten retribution, an equally time-honoured principle of deterrence is to ensure that success in any initial offensive strike is impossible.

Although it is true that escalation of offensive weapons systems remains less costly today than the construction of corresponding defence installations, new technology could change this situation. It is disappointing that the author did not address himself to such a possibility. USSR space programmes are relevant in this connexion. Estimates vary regarding outlays for research and development, but it is generally accepted even outside Washington that the Soviet Union allocates at least several billion dollars more per year in this field than does the United States.[2] Detailed allocation of these funds remains classified information.

[1] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1972–1973* (London, 1972), pp. 6–7.

[2] US Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, *Soviet Space Programs, 1971* (Washington, D.C.; April 1972), pp. 74; prepared by the Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.

A Swiss military journal gives comparative R & D expenditures of $16–17 billion for the USSR and $13–14 billion for the United States during 1970. J. S. T., 'Hohe Sowjetausgaben für nukleare Waffensysteme', *Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift*, CXXXVIII, No. 10 (October 1972), p. 563.

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In judging both the American and Russian ABM systems to be technically ineffective, the writer may indeed have more information on the *Galosh* anti-ballistic missile than is generally available. On the other hand, this condition of 'technical ineffectiveness' may prevail only in the case of an all-out ICBM exchange. The author might agree, however, on the usefulness of a National Command Authority defence against an accidental launch.

The writer suggests that the Soviet Union may have accepted the principle of assured destruction as a result of private discussions at Pugwash. Here he would appear to be arguing on very slight evidence indeed. What the USSR intends to do after the ABM treaty has yet to be revealed. It depends in part upon what the Soviet Union does over the next few years in its development of offensive weapons as well as in its China policy, to mention only two considerations. Besides, it is doubtful how great a role Soviet scientists have in decision-making on such matters.

The author talks about 'overall equivalence' in viewing 'strategic parity'. A true overall equivalence, of course, should consider not only nuclear weapons but also conventional forces. If there is a weakening in the nuclear balance on one side, the overall equation would be upset unless balance is maintained in the non-nuclear area. The writer also mentions the 'bargaining chip' argument of the US Administration, implying that such an approach may lead to additional military procurement which otherwise might be avoided, but he overlooks the need to suggest other 'bargaining chips'. What should they be?

The author seems to indicate that unilateral observation from space would be sufficient and that agreement to rely on national technical means of verification is 'a very important precedent'. One can agree with him on this point, especially as it is stated later in his paper that such observations from space cannot really provide information on what remains concealed. However, the statement: 'There is no evidence that the Soviets have either reduced or expanded their offensive programmes as a result of SALT-I. . . .' must be challenged. The important question is what the USSR has done about its offensive weapons programmes, especially in view of the fact that Soviet intentions in SALT may not be those assumed by the writer. He cites 300 as the number of SS-9s. More recently published figures are higher.[3]

The author advances the argument that all one needs for deterrence is a certain amount of retaliatory power and that, therefore, numerical inequality in favour of the Soviet Union 'makes no strategic difference'. He overlooks the very important strategic problem that would be presented by gross disparity in numbers. In such a situation, the party that has a numerically greatly superior force could use a small portion of it in an attempt to disarm the other side, while still retaining sufficient

[3] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Research Report*, No. 5 (December 1972), Part I, p. 16, gives the number as 313 at that time.

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weapons to respond against a retaliatory strike by the party that was first attacked. In this case, the party first attacked would have to decide whether to retaliate and, thereby, assure its own destruction or to absorb the disarming attack and face the consequences. It is quite true that the relative position of the United States depends upon what happens during the next few years, but it would be rash to assume that what will happen in the future will necessarily be favourable.

The writer draws attention to the warning time provided for bombers during an ICBM attack. He does not mention the possible role of the fractional orbit bombardment system.

The superiority, cited by the author, of United States bombers and submarines represents only a short-term advantage. In view of the new USSR bomber, the ageing American fleet, and the rapidly increasing strength of Soviet SLBMs, this advantage may be gone before the five years are past.

When discussing SALT-II primary goals, the author suggests the reduction of strategic forces to levels adequate for deterrence. This, of course, is his opinion. Since the USSR has larger numbers of ICBMs and also greater throw-weight, what should or could the United States give up? In connexion with American bombers [4] deployed as forward-based systems, they number about 700 and cannot be looked upon as a ' relatively small ' force. Also, this would be an alliance (NATO) problem. How should one deal with this matter?

When discussing MIRVs, the writer suggests a Soviet unwillingness to accept a freeze on its inferior technology. This may not necessarily remain the case. One of the scholars [5] attached to the Institute for World Economics and International Relations in Moscow argues that the geographical factor should be replaced by a global correlation of forces concept. Hence, the USSR might be willing to accept a freeze on MIRVs in return for an appropriate trade-off that would lead to an overall balance based on equality.

As in the case of alleged ABM technical ineffectiveness, the author comments on the excess of nuclear weapon stockpiles but again ignores the possibility of anything other than a massive ICBM exchange. Ever since 1966, when Warsaw Pact manoeuvres code-named ' Vltava ' included 300 simulated tactical nuclear warhead explosions, the USSR has conducted annual war games in Eastern Europe that suggest preparation for different levels of warfare: conventional, limited with tac nukes, and general. The most recent of such manoeuvres, code-named ' Shield-72 ', involved 100,000 troops from five allied countries.[6]

The argument that ICBM forces ' are under a command structure separate from the rest of the Soviet armed forces ' and that, therefore,

[4] *Military Balance 1972–1973*, p. 6.

[5] Yu. Kostko, ' A Balance of Fear or Safeguarding Real Security? ', *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya*, No. 6 (23 May 1972), pp. 87–89.

[6] Radio Prague (16 September 1972).

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restraint on technical developments or missile deployment cutback may be difficult, appears to be a conclusion based on a faulty premise. All five branches of the USSR military establishment are subordinated to chief of staff V. G. Kulikov, who in turn reports to defence minister Marshal A. A. Grechko. As a matter of fact, ICBM commanding officer V. F. Tolubko only holds the rank of Army General. Other branch heads like Fleet Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, Aviation Marshal V. S. Kutakhov, and Marshal Pavel Batitsky of *PVO-strany* all outrank Tolubko which does not of course necessarily mean that his branch is less important. On the contrary, he is listed fourth [7] after the first deputy defence minister Marshal I. I. Yakubovskiy, chief political commissar Army General A. A. Yepishev, and the other first deputy defence minister Army General S. L. Sokolov. Absent was the chief of staff.

In conclusion, mutual assured destruction is, of course, a means of deterrence. Unfortunately, it relies on the opponent's good sense. Moreover it does not allow for really viable options, if for some reason deterrence should fail. This is why it is necessary also to provide deterrence by denying success to the potential attacker, which can only be built by erecting some shield for the nation as well as reducing offensive weapons systems at the same time.

[7] Among those greeting Marshal Grechko on his return from France. *Krasnaya zvezda* (3 December 1972).

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Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1970s

William Zimmerman

ANY discussion of Soviet foreign policy 'targets'—although the very notion of targets, for reasons which will soon become clear, seems to me to be open to serious question—involves the discussion of capabilities. By the beginning of the 1970s, Moscow, to belabour the obvious, had become a world power with global interests and capabilities. Nevertheless there are some goals for Soviet foreign policy which—while they may still be seriously entertained by some decision-makers and some members of the Soviet equivalent to the attentive public—we may safely exclude from our calculus.

THE history of what used to be called the world communist movement has seen the formulation by the communists of a series of models for the radical restructuring of the international order and the transformation of the modern 'capitalist' international system into a communist one. From the establishment of the USSR 50 years ago and for roughly 30 years thereafter, Marxist-Leninists in power have believed that the USSR was, in Stalin's words, 'a prototype of the future world Soviet Socialist Republic'. Such a conception was, of course, not without ambiguity. It was never clear whether the ultimate goal was a global USSR or a state system made up of little Soviet Unions. In practice, the expansion of the Soviet Union's territory—as opposed to its domain—was limited essentially to reclaiming the tsarist patrimony. What followed after Stalin's death was a new 'grand design', an attempt by Nikita Khrushchev to devise a formula for transforming the international system which was not only attractive to communists but also within the realm of possibility. Khrushchev envisaged an alternative global state system composed of independent communist states in which socialism and not imperialism would be the major factor determining the rules of the international game. As George Modelski noted in 1961, there would be a single dominant socialist power and a host of smaller socialist states; the United States would find itself in a 'socialist' encirclement.

The Khrushchevian conception of communism as an international system constituted in 1960 a reasonable extrapolation from world events. His calculus assumed that decolonialization in Asia and Africa was intrinsically ('objectively') 'anti-imperialist'. It also extrapolated from US and Soviet economic growth rates in the 1950s which seemed favourable for the Soviet Union. Finally, it assumed that Soviet possession of ICBMs eliminated American invulnerability and with it the United States' status as dominant power. The United States would be deterred from interfering with the historical process as manifested in the destabilizing

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tendencies inherent in a revolutionary epoch. As a result the international system would be transformed by the accumulation of changes in the internal political structures of the member states.

The vigorous efforts of the United States notwithstanding, and despite all the social turmoil in the United States in the 1960s, the evidence in the early 1970s suggests that the 1960s did not and the 1970s will not bear out Khrushchev's optimism. Soviet economic extrapolations, such as academician Strumilin's explicit projections in 1960, have not been borne out. Revolutionary optimism has been sustained by the thought that the replacement of capitalism by socialism on a global scale would not entail the time required to displace feudalism with capitalism. What made sense in confronting a country committed to massive retaliation had little impact on a power with a range of options other than humiliation or holocaust.

Khrushchev's successors, who have been imitating Western strategic doctrine, have bought for themselves a capability more in keeping with Khrushchev's grand design than that which the Soviet Union actually possessed during Khrushchev's tenure. Because of this new capability Moscow is better able to deter the ' export of counterrevolutions ' and to influence internal changes in particular countries, especially in marginal cases. While Moscow, bent on playing the world power game with a vengeance, may with this new capacity achieve some favourable changes in the global power configuration, a communist international system as a serious policy goal in the 1970s will remain unrealistic. Even if one continues to encounter Soviet statements to the effect that ' the attainment of a maximal preponderance of forces over the imperialist camp ' remains the socialist camp's goal, the economic capabilities of North America, Western Europe and Japan, coupled with the technological gap between the United States and the Soviet Union, render unattainable the achievement of overwhelming Soviet strategic or political superiority during the 1970s. There is no reason to quarrel with Sakharov's assessment of United States and Soviet technologies. He found the situation

> especially alarming if we take the leading capitalist countries and in particular the USA. By introducing into the economy elements of state regulation and planning, these countries have done away with destructive crises which formerly plagued capitalist economies. The widespread introduction of computing techniques and automation into the economy has guaranteed a rapid growth of productivity which in turn has assisted them partially to alleviate certain social difficulties and contradictions (unemployment benefits, a shorter working day). When we compare our economy with that of the USA, we see that ours is lagging behind, not only quantitatively, but—and this is the saddest part—qualitatively. The more novel and revolutionary the aspect of the economy, the wider become the rifts between the United States and ourselves. We are ahead of the USA in the production of coal and behind in the production of oil, gas and electric power, ten times behind in chemistry, and

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> immeasurably behind in computer technology. The latter is especially essential, for the introduction of electronic computers into the national economy is of decisive importance, and could radically change the face of the system of production and culture in general. This phenomenon has rightly been called the 'second industrial revolution'. Meanwhile, the total capacity pool of computers is hundreds of times less than that in the USA, and as for the use of electronic computers in the national economy, here the rift is so enormous that it is impossible to measure. We are simply living in a different era.
>
> Things are no better in the area of scientific and technological discovery. Here no increase in our role can be marked up. It is, rather, the reverse. [The American landing on the moon] . . . is one of the outward signs of an essential and ever-growing gap between our country and the West, extending through the whole spectrum of scientific and technological activity.

No less significant is the fact that the time when relations between communist states and non-ruling communist parties were clearly set off from the general international system has long since passed. The burgeoning doctrinal diversity among groups labelling themselves scientific socialist, communist, and Marxist-Leninist has been coupled with bitter disagreement about what constitutes a 'socialist' state or a non-ruling communist party. Changes in trade and communications, the evolving pattern of membership in organizations and, most important, the failure to contain conflict within a communist 'in-group', have all served to call into question the utility of speaking of a general communist international system. Rather, the changes that have taken place in the 'world communist movement' over the last 15 years or so have produced a clear separation between members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and Comecon (except Rumania) and both the remaining communist and the non-communist states. Moreover, the decision-makers of several socialist states, most notably China and Yugoslavia, have made it very clear that they are willing to go to great lengths to ensure the continuance of that separation. While it is possible to speak with plausibility of Moscow's aspirations to achieve a unique system of international relations—'an international relations of a new type', these aspirations are limited in practice to a hegemonical regional system defined organizationally by membership in the Warsaw Treaty Organization and/or Comecon and confined to Eastern Europe.

When we turn from capabilities to predicting choices among options fully within the capacity of Soviet decision-makers it becomes evident that our approach to analysing Soviet policy processes affects both our projections about future Soviet foreign policy and our ideas about the extent to which Soviet foreign policy can be influenced by actions outside the USSR. One approach tends in the name of analytic parsimony to anthropomorphize the state and treat it as a unitary rational decision-maker whose behaviour can be explained largely as a response either to

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the anarchic quality of international politics or to changes in the structure of the international system, or as a reaction to calculated moves by rival states. On the other hand, micro-analytic approaches have tended to see foreign policy as the continuation of domestic political processes, focusing on factors such as national character, modal personality, political culture, the belief system or social structure. Similarly, other political analysts have emphasized the relationship between the structure of the state and foreign policy; such classic explanatory notions as the dichotomy between the open and closed polity as well as the more recent discussions concerned with the impact of information flows within bureaucratic structures on policy outputs fall into this category of explanation. Finally, for those in the micro-analytic tradition, important foreign policy decisions may originate in the personalities and even idiosyncrasies of key decision-makers, their anxieties, their aspirations, and their perceptions.

The dominant tradition in Western analysis of Soviet foreign policy has been micro-analytic—in part because the Cold War created an atmosphere conducive to stressing the differences between Soviet foreign policy behaviour and that of other states, and in part because Soviet studies for a considerable period remained divorced, conceptually and methodologically, from the mainstream of comparative politics and international relations. More important, though, most scholars, myself included, came to the conclusion that there was compelling evidence to suggest that Soviet foreign policy did diverge from that of other states and that the explanation for the uniqueness of Soviet policy, its goals and methods, was to be found in the radical transformation of the Russian polity and society resulting from the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917.

In the study of Soviet foreign policy, micro-analytic approaches have traditionally been highly determinist. The most determinist of these was what William Welch has aptly termed, in his recent *American Images of Soviet Foreign Policy* (Yale, 1970), the essentialist approach, concerned to depict 'Truth with a capital "T", Truth about essences.' What the Soviet Union *did* in this calculus was not relevant to an understanding of Soviet goals. Rather what mattered was what the Soviet Union *was*. The essence of Soviet foreign policy flowed logically from the nature of totalitarianism, much as its Soviet counterpart explains American foreign policy as flowing logically from the nature of imperialism.

Such a view is reflected in Arthur Schlesinger's summary statement on the origins of the Cold War:

> Stalin and his associates . . . were bound to regard the United States as the enemy . . . because of the primordial fact that America was the leading capitalist power and thus, by Leninist syllogism, unappeasably hostile, driven by the logic of its system to oppose, encircle, and destroy Soviet Russia. Nothing the United States could have done in 1944–45 would have abolished this mistrust, required and sanctified as it was by Marxist gospel—nothing short of the conversion of the United States into a Stalinist despotism . . . [totally subservient] to Moscow.

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When applied to Soviet foreign policy generally, the essentialist position was not only highly determinist—it saw Soviet foreign policy as virtually non-reactive. Given the particular attributes of the Soviet political system, its foreign policy in this calculus was, as Welch remarks, 'ultra-hard and change-resistant because it is the outer extension of a shell . . . of a kind of system that is in essence ultra-hard and change-resistant'.

THE essentialist position has been unfashionable for some time now for reasons which are as obvious as they are significant. Far more enduring among the micro-analytic approaches has been a mechanistic orientation, which finds its archetypical representation in the early post-war writings of George Kennan; the chords struck by Kennan are still being echoed in very recent Western analysis of Soviet behaviour. (An example is Uri Ra'anan's 1972 memorandum 'The Changing American-Soviet Balance: Some Political Implications' prepared for the Senate Sub-Committee on National Security and International Operations.) The machine imagery permeates Kennan's thinking. It is most clearly manifest in the famous 'X' article, where Kennan describes 'the whole Soviet governmental machine, including the mechanism of diplomacy', as moving 'inexorably along the prescribed path, like a persistent toy automobile wound up and headed in a given direction, stopping only only when it meets with some unanswerable force'. He refers to 'individuals who are the components of this machine'; and compares them to 'the white dog before the phonograph' who hears 'only the "master's voice"'. He speaks of Soviet expansionism in almost Newtonian fashion: the Kremlin's 'political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, towards a given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power. But if it finds unassailable barriers in its path, it accepts these philosophically and accommodates itself to them.'

As in other analyses of this type, the impermeability of the Soviet Union to outside influence was an equally important feature of Kennan's mechanistic image. Kennan emphasizes the self sufficiency of the USSR. He was pessimistic about Soviet intentions, and was not in favour of continuing lend-lease or engaging in major trade with the USSR. He was advocating what amounted to a blockade posture as early as 3 December 1945, fearing that 'in furthering the military industrialization of the Soviet Union during the post-hostilities period, we will . . . again, as in the cases of Germany and Japan, be creating military strength which might some day be used to our disadvantage'. Kennan felt that Soviet minds were equally closed to persuasion or to acts of generosity on the part of the US. Given Soviet doctrine, the image of the enemy must be unquestioned. 'It must invariably be assumed in Moscow that the aims of the capitalist world are antagonistic to the Soviet regime', Kennan wrote. Likewise, he lamented the fact that 'the individuals who are

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components of this [Soviet governmental] machine are unamenable to argument or to reason which comes to them from outside sources'.

It was Soviet doctrine which, in the imagery of the 'X' article, fuelled the Soviet machine, determined Soviet goals, moulded Soviet expectations, and shaped Soviet perceptions. Soviet foreign and domestic goals were inextricably linked with the passing of capitalist 'remnants'. 'It became necessary to justify the retention of the dictatorship by stressing the menace of capitalism abroad.' Doctrine imbued Moscow with patience. 'The theory of the inevitability of the eventual fall of capitalism' has the fortunate implication that there is no urgency about it; this led Kennan to stress the non-adventuristic quality of Soviet foreign policy. In Kennan's view, the doctrine produced an incredibly distorted perception of the outside world, most notably of the hostility of the West. Thus, in a famous passage in 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct' Kennan observed, 'It is an indeniable privilege of every man to prove himself right in the thesis that the world is his enemy; for if he reiterates it frequently enough and makes it the background of his conduct he is bound eventually to be right'; and in the 'long telegram', he wondered 'Who, if anyone, in this great land actually receives accurate and unbiased information about [the] outside world. . . . It is hard to believe that Stalin himself receives anything like an accurate picture of [the] outside world'.

Like the essentialist position, the mechanistic approach sees doctrine, embodied in Soviet political institutions, as the mainspring of Soviet behaviour. It is less concerned, however, with essences than with behaviour. While stressing the duplicity of tactical changes, it foresaw the possibility of fundamental changes in Soviet behaviour within a short historical span of time frame (for Kennan, 10 to 15 years). Whereas for the essentialist the Soviet Union is a self-maintaining system, virtually insulated from the forces of history, in the mechanistic approach the Soviet Union, like the toy automobile, can either blow up or run down. The policy of containment successfully applied would thus 'promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power. For no mystical, messianic movement—and particularly not that of the Kremlin—can face frustration indefinitely without eventually adjusting itself in one way or another to the logic of that state of affairs'.

AS Soviet-American relations shifted from the total hostility of the height of the Cold War to the mixed, adversary, relations of the 1960s and 1970s, a reaction set in against the microanalytic, mechanistic conception of Soviet foreign policy. That reaction stemmed in large part from a well-founded judgment that what had seemed to make Soviet foreign policy unique, namely the role of ideology in the explanation of it, in fact explained little of Soviet behaviour in the post-war period. Indeed, with the exception of East Europe, where the Soviet Union has had the ability to enforce the norms of an 'international relations of a

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new type', it has very seldom followed the course which the postulated role of ideology would seem to imply. It may be safely asserted that any attempt to predict Soviet foreign policy (again, with the exception of Eastern Europe) for the 1970s from doctrinally derived goals is likely to prove a fruitless endeavour.

Almost all of us believed at one time that a Manichean frame of mind characterized the thought processes of Soviet leaders: for them, the world could be arranged along a single amity-enmity continuum with one main enemy located at one extreme and the Soviet Union at the other. Shifts in policy and arguments over tactics focused on the intermediary groups, classes, or states located between the two poles. Unfortunately for those enamoured of a simple world, it is of limited utility in 1972 to assert, as Ra'anan does, that 'international affairs must inevitably reflect a fundamental adversary relationship between the USSR and the "main enemy"'. Doubtless there are those in Moscow who think there must be still a single main enemy, but there are others who do not. Even among those whose view of the world remains Manichean, it surely is not intuitively obvious which state, the United States or the People's Republic of China, constitutes the main enemy. In either case, one is no more able to make predictions about Soviet policy towards China or the United States on the basis of hypotheses derived from this Bolshevik-Manichean perspective than to infer United States behaviour towards the Soviet Union and China from assumptions about the dynamics of 'modern imperialism'.

The Chinese-American-Soviet triangle illustrates well how little mileage one can derive from assuming behaviour consonant with 'proletarian internationalism'. Knowing that a particular state is governed by leaders who call themselves Marxist-Leninist does not tell us whether Moscow will consider these 'Marxist-Leninists' as genuine. In practice Moscow has shown an impressive capacity to ascribe favourable labels such as 'socialist' to those pursuing policies congruent with the prevailing Soviet calculus and to call into question the socialist credentials of states governed by Leninist parties who clash with Soviet policy.

'Life itself' has cast doubt on the proposition that in a given situation the Soviet Union will choose good relations with a communist state in preference to engaging in similar behaviour with non-communist states or that for any given state, a communist regime would be considered preferable to a non-communist one. One can imagine a major Soviet *rapprochement* with the United States in the 1970s looking towards a possible coalition against China in the 1980s or a limited war between the USSR and China sometime in the 1970s more easily than Soviet-Chinese collaboration for the remainder of the 1970s at the expense of the United States. Adam Ulam's 'strong impression that [Soviet policy towards [India] is dictated by a fear lest the vulnerable fabric of Congress rule in India disintegrate under the impact of overwhelming domestic and foreign problems and lest a Communist-dominated left-wing regime

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emerge as heir to the anarchy . . .' has been and probably will be throughout the 1970s relevant with regard to Soviet policies towards a number of non-communist states.

An approach to Soviet foreign policy which takes account of the international system only in that it pays attention to Moscow's likely tactical policy changes in response to the global power configuration is analytically incomplete. One does not predict Soviet behaviour by postulating fixed goals and treating Soviet foreign policy, like Mao's description of imperialism, as constantly and exclusively designed to ' make trouble, fail, make trouble again, fail again '. Western moves are important in explaining Soviet moves. Changes in the international environment and in the USSR's role and stake in the international system have produced changes in Soviet goals and hence in Soviet behaviour. There is no reason, in principle at least, why phenomena affecting the international system should influence Soviet foreign policy less than that of any other state.

Having said this one must note immediately that international stimulus-response modes are in their own way just as mechanistic as the traditional micro-analytic approach was. Each minimizes the consequences for foreign policy of factional controversies, institutional interests and social pressures. Each treats the impact of changes in the international environment on Soviet behaviour as operating in a direct fashion largely to produce adaptation in mode. Just as national interest approaches to Soviet foreign policy fail to specify how national interest is determined stimulus-response models provide no criteria for anticipating which stimuli will engender what kind of reaction.

CONSEQUENTLY there has been a movement back to the ' domestic sources of foreign policy ', but it is somewhat different from the past approach. The new paradigm, which for want of a better label may be designated cybernetic or organismic, attaches, like the stimulus-response approach, great significance to the reactive quality of Soviet foreign policy, yet differs from its mechanistic premise in acknowledging that the Soviet Union not only reacts, but that it also *learns*.

Thus, the Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s followed and emulated Western policies. There was a striking similarity between Moscow's strategic policy of the early 1960s and Dwight Eisenhower's ' New Look ', just as after Nikita Khrushchev's ouster his successors imitated the Kennedy-McNamara doctrine, building an immense strategic arsenal and acquiring a limited war capability, with the result that by fall 1972 the United States and the Soviet Union had almost identical weapons systems.

The mechanistic presumption of unity is also absent. Rather, the image of the Soviet policy process has been recast by abandoning a monolithic conception of the Soviet policy process and presuming the persistence of conflict and the differentiation of roles in an increasingly complex industrial society. Equally significant is an underlying assump-

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tion about the stated views and hidden thoughts of Soviet decision-makers and the Soviet attentive public. There is much greater recognition of the persistence of attitudes and attitude differences—a view of the psychology of Soviet public figures which contrasts strikingly with the automaton-like imagery in the mechanistic model.

Moreover, in this perspective, the domestic institutional adaptation to changes in the international environment is stressed, changes in the international environment are seen to affect the outcome of intra-elite controversies, the internal institutional structure, and the relative power position of key groups. For the essentialist no shift in American foreign policy had policy implications for the analysis of Soviet goals. For the micro-analytic mechanist, a shift in American (or Chinese) policy rarely influenced the Soviet propensity for expansionist tactics in the short and intermediate run. For the macro-analytic mechanist, a change in American policy would produce a foreign policy response by Moscow but no domestic reverberations. In the cybernetic approach, Moscow qua unitary actor, reacts; Moscow, qua organism, learns; acts by the US or other relevant external actors influence the context of policy debates in a conflict-ridden oligarchic Kremlin and the efficacy of interest articulations by various ' tendencies ' in Moscow.

IT would be satisfying to produce rules about Soviet priorities for the 1970s, but if what I have labelled a cybernetic or organismic approach to Soviet foreign policy constitutes an appropriate approach—and I think it does—prediction of Soviet priorities must be highly contingent. We could all agree that as a minimal priority all those in Moscow who count or will count in the 1970s are determined to ensure that the Soviet Union maintains an international presence everywhere and a dominant position in East Europe. We would all agree that the Russians do not want war; that they want technology and more consumer goods; that there are some elements of Western life style and attitudes which no one who is likely in the next decade to make up Moscow policy would wish to see disseminated in the Soviet Union; that they would want to keep all the territory over which they now exercise sovereignty; that they will seek a weakening of US positions in many parts of the world; that they would like at one and the same time good relations with the US and China, with India and Pakistan, Iran and Iraq, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Having said this, I do not believe much has been said. What will be sufficiently important to risk war? How disposed will Soviet leaders be to accept Western (and Japanese) technology if its advent requires the large scale presence in the Soviet Union of Western and Japanese life styles? Will consumer goods be stressed at the expense of foreign aid? Is there a price (financial or otherwise) for which some of the Kuriles would be returned to Japan (and if so, how much)? Is there a chance that some territory claimed jointly by the Soviet Union and China might be ceded to the Chinese as part of a general settlement? Does Soviet political

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dominance in East Europe imply opposition to all efforts by East Europeans (and if not all, which ones) to lower the barriers separating Eastern Europe from Western Europe? These and a host of other questions involving Soviet priorities in the 1970s cannot be answered without knowledge of the context, international and domestic, in which decisions in Moscow are taken at a particular time.

Indeed, I would go further. Given the complexities of Soviet reality it is reasonable to ask whether there is *a* Soviet policy; whether one may properly speak of targets; whether what appears to the outsider a policy designed to achieve a goal is instead an *outcome* of efforts by a variety of policy-making bodies to accomplish tasks which may be at cross purposes. Is there, say, *a* Soviet oil policy? It is reasonable to ask whether observed behaviour reflect decisions taken by the leadership with a view to achieving a foreign policy goal or whether, in the absence of an external counterweight, the Soviet leaders are unwilling to pay what they perceive to be the costs necessary to resist pressures generated from within. One could conclude by begging the question with a resounding, ' It depends '.

I shall not do it. Let us assume that in the 1970s the United States provides the kind of context in which (a) the prospects for major revolutionary advance (here including a major strategic breakthrough) will seem slim (at least to those in Moscow already disposed to a cautious and pessimistic assessment of the concrete historical situation); (b) the prospects for gradual, ' historically progressive ', development within the non-communist world will seem moderately favourable (again at least to those disposed to conceive of history as a ' linear ' rather than ' dialectical ' process); and (c) there will appear to be domestic benefits to be derived from cultivating relations with the US. If these conditions hold, it is likely that priorities will be shaped by an attention to the complex nature of problems rather than the payoffs to be gained from struggle.

The Soviet Union will continue to envisage international arrangements in which the risks of pursuing Soviet possessive goals are reduced, notwithstanding the fact that such an arrangement may also make more secure the pursuit of American or Chinese interests, or that achieving such an arrangement may come at the expense of a major ally. As Gyorgy Arbatov remarked this summer, *a propos* of the Moscow summit:

> The question essentially is that of the form in which the development of the historically inevitable class struggle in the world arena will take place. . . .
>
> Forms are by no means of secondary importance here; they may spell the difference between war and peace, between the senseless wasting of enormous material values in the arms race and military conflicts on the one hand and constructive competition that is ultimately advantageous to all peoples on the other. . . . (*Izvestia*, 22 June 1972)

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Such arrangements will not appreciably increase the prospect of peace breaking out between the Soviet Union and the United States (or for that matter, the USSR and China) but they may include schemes which further reduce the likelihood that a collapsing ally of one of the major global adversaries will take one, two, or all the major powers with it.

Should these conditions obtain, moreover, one can expect that there will result a reduction in the relative 'disposable surplus' for foreign policy. The reasons that this is likely under the conditions specified are several. The argument, already rendered implausible by the stabilization of the status quo in Europe, for foregoing internal goals because of an ostensible Western threat will appear even more hollow. The pattern of emulating the US will continue, taking the form of further institutional imitation.

Some credence must be given to Moscow's declarations that an important aspect of its foreign policy is the creation of an international environment conducive to internal development. The 1970s in retrospect may yet be seen as the decade in which the United States and the Soviet Union reordered their priorities; the US, to attend to its internal ailments and its connexions with Europe; the Soviet Union, to attend to its internal ailments and to Asia. A thoroughgoing Soviet turn inward (to the extent it clashes with a turn eastward) will, however, probably have to await the disenchantment which follows the full realization that global power does not bring with it the capacity to influence events which those in Moscow have until now generally thought inherent in that status.

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Comment

Alexander Dallin

AS I am very much in sympathy with Professor Zimmerman's argument, I shall try to build on his paper rather than discuss its more provocative features. In my view, the central fact in recent Soviet policy debates has been the achievement of strategic parity with the United States. This development both dispels long-standing fears and whets chronic appetites. And, paradoxically, it comes at a time when Soviet leaders, in spite of all the ritual and rhetoric, show increasing self-doubt, a growing awareness of the complexities of the modern age, and gnawing uncertainty about the Truth whose heralds they profess to be. It is useful to contrast the way the world looks from Moscow with the popular Western stereotypes of Soviet conduct abroad. If the latter still tend to see Russian behaviour largely as an unrelenting forward thrust, the Soviet perspective is one of overwhelming ambiguity, multiple failure and maddening frustration. As Professor Dinerstein has reminded us, Moscow looks back on a record of some 55 years of vain efforts to achieve, by all manner of techniques and instrumentalities, what had been assumed to be self-evident and inevitable. Against this background, present and future responses among Soviet decision-makers may be expected to range all the way from a reduction of expectations and operational objectives (if Mohammed cannot climb the mountain, the mountain must be cut down to size) to a persistence in familiar efforts to beat one's head against the old retaining wall (both because such behaviour has become natural, and because one seems to perceive a hardening of the head and a softening of the wall). However, until the present transitional phase is completed, it is impossible to predict with any assurance where Soviet policy will come to rest.

If nonetheless we must choose the most likely constellation, I would suggest that Soviet perception of the international environment and of domestic needs and opportunities combine to reinforce, for the time being, several fundamental options and priorities:

(1) The priority of domestic over international objectives. If this appears paradoxical in view of the recent increase in Soviet power, I would maintain that this is so precisely *because* of the increase in Soviet power, which helps erode old insecurities, as well as because of the new awareness of the difficulties, costs, and risks attendant to any effort to translate the new power into tangible ' pay-offs '.

(2) The priority of state over communist commitments—as Soviet behaviour in May 1972, in connexion with the Nixon visit to Moscow, on the heels of the American escalation in Vietnam, illustrated yet again.

(3) The priority of strategic parity (' equal security ') with the United States over the pursuit of strategic superiority, as a middle-range goal. This decision must have been reached prior to the 24th CPSU Congress,

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with obvious implications for resource allocation and current economic targets—largely as a result of an interaction of perceived foreign and domestic constraints.

(4) At least for the time being, the priority of economic over ideological goals, a practical corollary of the two preceding options together with the urgency of domestic needs (e.g. in agriculture) as well as foreign opportunities (e.g. economic relations with the US, Japan, and West Germany).

(5) The priority of perceived threats in the East (from China) over putative challenges in the West (e.g. from Germany). And finally,

(6) bearing more directly on our present topic, the priority of proximate over distant objectives. If this too seems paradoxical in view of the recent achievement of Soviet global capabilities—e.g. in naval power and strategic weapons—it seems clear that these accomplishments were either intended to enable the Soviet Union to avoid backing down from unfought confrontations (à la Cuba) or else to prepare for possible future conflicts whose risks Moscow continues to find forbiddingly high and whose occurrence is rendered even less likely precisely because of the Soviet acquisition of gross strategic parity.

THE shift in the primary objectives of Soviet attention abroad is best demonstrated by contrasting the expectations of the Khrushchev era (until 1962, perhaps) with the more recent pattern of Soviet word and deed. The euphoria of the late 1950s was based in large measure on the belief that—with the central conflict between the two superpowers in effect stalemated—the 'correlation of forces' was bound to shift dramatically in favour of the 'socialist camp', as the decolonized Third World would inevitably make common cause with the communist powers against the imperialists, with only a mild and painless assist from Moscow. Hence the brief flurry of high hopes—indeed, mumblings about the beginning 'third round' of revolutionary transformations (the first two having been identified with the aftermath of the two world wars)—and Soviet interest ranging from the Congo to Indonesia and Latin America. Some disappointment and reaction from this Khrushchevian over-optimism was evident even before Nikita Sergeyevich was retired from office. Under his successors there has been a far more hardheaded, if less dramatic and less elegant, Soviet concentration of the primary field of vision upon areas closer to Russian frontiers—a marked effort to 'improve relations' (i.e. increase Soviet security and/or influence) with the countries around the perimeter of the USSR and its vestigial bloc. This has meant a reversal of Soviet policy with regard to Iran and Turkey; increased Soviet efforts in the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent; new and potentially important changes in Soviet relations with Japan and West Germany. By contrast, more distant regions—such as South-East Asia, Africa, and Latin America—no longer hold the same attractiveness and apparent promise in Soviet eyes as they did 10 or 15 years ago.

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This shift does not make the USSR a regional power. But it does reflect an awareness of the risks and costs of erratic and at times counter-productive meddling, of expectations based on naïve and doctrinaire dichotomies between friend and foe; and an instinctive preference for caution and 'first things first'.

Undoubtedly this contraction of focus has also been stimulated by Soviet concern over the security of its longest border—with China—even though Chinese claims to Soviet territory and charges of Soviet 'social imperialism' are not likely to have any direct political or military effects.

It is easiest to make predictions about the extreme cases. On the one hand, remaining Soviet client states in Eastern Europe must expect to be the continued objects of Soviet solicitude. Though the *détente*, if it continues, is likely to stimulate greater diversity here, too, all parties concerned have probably learned their lessons from past experience: while *de facto* changes in Eastern Europe are likely to ensue, these will probably stop short of any demonstrative rupture with the Soviet regional system. Indeed, a subordinate Soviet objective in the current search for a European 'security' formula is stabilization not only vis-à-vis the West but also within its orbit. Despite the ambiguities arising from the perennial lack of an organizing principle for the 'socialist commonwealth', Moscow will no doubt continue to be committed to have and to hold what it can.

At the other pole from this essentially conservative and probably low-risk commitment, Russian leaders will no doubt be attracted by targets of opportunity—unplanned and unexpected—where, largely thanks to the failure of others rather than positive Soviet endeavours, the result might be an extension of Soviet influence abroad or the acquisition of new volunteer disciples. But it is safe to say that enthusiasm for expending resources and taking risks for the sake of dubious conquests, in an era of scarcity and nuclear mutual-hostage postures, is extremely small. To many Soviet observers the Cuban experience, too, must appear to have been scarcely worth the gambles and costs. Why then, in the years ahead, risk holocaust for the sake of bringing the benefits of communism to Rwandi, Rangoon, or the Ryukyus?

The attractiveness of the Soviet model in the Third World, moreover, seems to have declined sharply. Given an intelligent Western policy (admittedly, an implausible condition), one need anticipate no successful new volunteers swinging their own countries into the Soviet fold. Of course Moscow is only too well aware of the potential (albeit purely theoretical) awkwardness of such new 'successes'. It is no longer true, after all, that it would welcome all new communist accessions to power. If, for instance, a country were to wind up as a Chinese client or as a maverick defiantly demonstrating the viability of alternative varieties of communism, Moscow would stand to gain little but further embarrassment. And, for another thing, the last 'victory' the Soviet leadership

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would at present wish to be saddled with is, say, an India going communist—with Moscow henceforth responsible for providing the food, the administrative apparatus, capital, work, the ethic of efficiency and productivity, and the strategic umbrella for the Indian subcontinent.

The USSR has not moved its armed forces outside its 'sphere' since Stalin died; Cuba and Egypt are the two limiting cases. Leonid Brezhnev has been able to boast, in transparent allusion to Richard Nixon's professions, that the Soviet Union has indeed had a 'generation of peace'. There is no reason to think that it will be prepared to expand by the use of force in the coming years so long as the risks of nuclear confrontation or miscalculation remain what they are, and even more if the illusion of greater security can be achieved by extending Soviet political presence and influence and by denying areas to adversary control, rather than by, hopefully, the acquisition of air-tight domination over additional real estate.

Soviet efforts are thus likely to include the extension of its political presence abroad. But where? Past experience invites humility and restraint on the part of foreign analysts of Soviet moves. Journalists, statesmen, and scholars alike have had no difficulty in 'explaining'—after they have become manifest—Soviet drives, real and imaginery, by reference to seemingly immutable categories or habits. The Soviet fear of China (why had we not heard of it in the Stalin days?); the Soviet fear of Germany (how rapidly it has vanished since the Bonn-Moscow accords!); traditional Russian interest in the Near East (as if Brezhnev were concerned with the Straits and the Holy Places!); Egypt as a Russian landbridge to the Dark Continent; Russian ambitions to conquer India (with references dating back to Peter the Great, Paul I, and Leon Trotsky) . . . what nonsense has not been propounded in the facile explanation of Soviet behaviour in terms of messianic or geopolitical thrusts, or else deeply-engrained collective anxieties or aggressions! Let us be done with these; every one of these compelling drives has had to be discarded, sooner or later, anyway: none is compelling, and none predictable.

On the contrary, the recent experience with Egypt is a perfect example of the ambivalence of the Soviet policy-maker. He cannot resist the temptation of alluring opportunity—a twist on the role-playing of having to live up to one's reputation—but then finds himself caught amidst unacceptable options: quite rightly, he has no confidence in his ability to secure Soviet influence in Egypt without an indigenous socio-political base—a base that turns out not to exist; he finds the alternative prospect of plain withdrawal of Soviet aid and influence repugnant and unseemly; and he worries about the ultimate instability of a situation in which the fragile but symbolically important Soviet involvement abroad leaves it essentially at the mercy of local policy initiatives he cannot control. The long and varied record of Soviet involvements in the Third World has

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only one consistent thread: the ultimate failure of every attempt to gain influence, let alone control.

If then Moscow analysts have increasingly scaled down their expectations for the Third World, they have also become increasingly interested in *sui generis* stabilization in Europe. Surely, so long as the Sino-Soviet confrontation lasts (and there is no prospect of its early abatement), Soviet concern with its potential front line in the East prompts an easing of tensions in the West. Given the broader relaxation of Soviet-American relations, the new German *Ostpolitik*, and the growing importance of Western economic, technical and scientific assistance to the Soviet Union, an all-European formula might over the next few years, allow a relative freezing of political spheres and relations, now that Moscow has secured a recognition of East Germany. Behind their formal façade, it is true, other processes might well be at work within each nation-state, their range wide open from ' chileanization ' at one end to ' pepsification ' at the other. But in all likelihood nothing on either side will be nearly so extreme.

IT is then possible that the 1970s will be a period of relative Soviet maturity and restraint in foreign policy. But some notes of caution must be injected here as well. The next decade is certain to witness new and unforeseen developments, as the whole international power alignment has just begun to shift perceptibly. None of the powers seems at present ' on top ' of the changing world trends. Unforeseen crises may bring unforeseen responses from the Soviet Union, too. Even apart from such unpredictable crises, however, a *caveat* is in order.

Time and again, the United States has tended to overreact by taking at face value grandiloquent, ideological, strident Soviet pronouncements made to justify and explain away Soviet inaction, Soviet setbacks, Soviet misperceptions, and Soviet weakness. In retrospect, the ' worst-things-first ' analysis (however natural to prudent military planners) has tended to exacerbate tensions, to step up the arms race beyond all reason, to validate the worst Soviet assumptions about American behaviour and intentions, and to reinforce naïve and primitive stereotypes about ' communism ' in Western minds. Yet the conclusion that the future trend in Soviet conduct is in the opposite direction does not take into account, for example, the possibility of a new missile crisis, or an unpredictable miscalculation by Soviet policy-makers, or an instinctive disposition to inch toward higher risk-taking now that Soviet strategic parity seems recognized and American credibility undermined. The new priorities—and some of them are not all that new—are by no means irreversible, even though they do seem to reflect a secular logic and to signal a more cautious but more fundamental change in Soviet orientation than many observers would have expected only a few years ago.

A political crisis in the Soviet leadership may, for instance, suffice to put in jeopardy the present order of priorities. The rising younger

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generation of leaders may well be far more overtly and intensely nationalistic than their predecessors. It also includes a bothersome contingent of men—whose most prominent spokesmen have, it is true, been shunted aside—who might well develop into a Soviet version of the young fascists. Party bureaucrats and ideologues, on their part, may become increasingly worried about the political costs of increased intercourse with the West: economic, scientific, and technical 'cooperation' is not likely to 'undermine the Soviet system', but it may well have subtle consequences for Soviet outlook and orthodoxy which no 'vigilance campaign' can contain. Military die-hards are apt to bemoan arms control agreements and technological-economic interdependence which reduces Soviet freedom of action just when parity seemed achieved. The Shelepins as well as the Shelests remain on the CPSU Politburo, and their lesser replicas dot the bureaucratic landscape of the USSR.

What their ultimate role and influence will be, no one can predict. While—more likely than not—they may not prevail, they might conceivably be able to force a reassessment of policies and priorities. One determinant of Soviet foreign policy, when such a crisis arises, will be the extent to which the USSR has in its judgment benefited from the new priorities: what it has gained from *détente*, stabilization, and positive cooperation, and at what cost. In this respect Professor Aspaturian was right in focusing our attention on the critical question Soviet policymakers are bound to ask of the new policy: 'What have you done for us lately?'

Only the future will tell. But it is well to remember that recent Soviet moves no more reflect a fundamental change of attitude towards the West than the American change of policy stems from a basic reconsideration of Soviet life or communist doctrine. Over the past 20 years there have been demonstrably conflicting Soviet views of the United States and, more broadly, of the non-communist world and the prospects for war and peace. American behaviour has in some measure contributed to Soviet tension and uncertainty, with profound mistrust concealed but by no means dissolved underneath the layers of newly signed papers, clouds of exchangemanship, and visions of profit for American business. Slowly but surely, foreign policy behaviour can help confirm or dispel Soviet suspicions, can either give comfort to or discourage those who would revert to a 'forward' Soviet policy or those who would opt for Soviet neo-isolationism. But the major determinants of future Soviet policy are beyond our reach. The key lies in the complex interplay of Soviet elite politics and perceived needs and opportunities: the options for the future remain wide open.

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Comment

Arnold L. Horelick

I AGREE wholeheartedly with Professor Zimmerman's view of the restrictions on our capacity to predict Soviet foreign policy behaviour. We lack some of the most elementary data, including, in addition to what Professor Zimmerman mentioned, basic data about the foreign policy decision-making machinery of the Soviet Union. In fact, I am even less sanguine than he is about the extent to which we can confidently narrow the range of possibilities. Professor Zimmerman says of some goals of Soviet foreign policy that 'while they may still be seriously entertained by some decision-makers . . . *we* may safely exclude [them] from *our* calculus' on capability grounds: the Soviet leaders will simply not acquire the requisite instruments or the opportunity for realizing the goals. But goals are one thing and the probability that they can be realized another. On the strength of past performance, some allowance has to be made for miscalculations of that probability by Soviet leaders in the future. For example, Professor Zimmerman points out that Khrushchev's 'grand design' floundered because it was anchored in an extrapolation of events that turned out to be radically wrong. Yet, under Khrushchev's stewardship, many critical aspects of Soviet foreign policy in the late 1950s and early 1960s were based on precisely that miscalculation of the probable future global environment and of the Soviet Union's capabilities to exploit it advantageously. One could cite other, and more dramatic, instances, not only from the experience of the Soviet Union, testifying to the great reservoirs of self-delusion upon which political leaders freely draw in making and conducting foreign policy.

Professor Zimmerman observes that Khrushchev's successors, 'bent on playing the world power game with a vengeance', have bought for themselves capabilities more in keeping with Khrushchev's 'grand design' than Khrushchev had at his disposal during his tenure. But he goes on to assert that the economic capabilities of the non-communist advanced industrial states, together with the technological gap between the United States and the USSR, 'render unattainable the achievement of overwhelming Soviet strategic or political superiority during the 1970s'. This is Professor Zimmerman's assessment. I happen to think it is correct, but simply saying so, and citing Academician Sakharov as an expert Soviet witness, hardly constitutes a persuasive argument that Soviet leaders in the 1970s will also preclude it. Indeed, the issue appears even now to be a contentious one in elite Soviet circles.

Professor Zimmerman's scepticism about the utility of speaking about a general communist international system is well founded and his argument is well formulated. There is ample evidence both in Soviet political behaviour and in their rhetoric, of disappointment and even

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disenchantment with the prospects of ' world communism '. But it would be a mistake to infer from this disappointment or disenchantment with ' world communism ' that the result will be a benign Soviet foreign policy. Essentially revisionist, or, if you will, imperialist Soviet foreign policies are compatible with a broad range of concepts of the future international system; a universal communist international system is only one of them, and, at present, not a particularly interesting one. From the perspective of 1973, even the most ambitious set of Soviet foreign policy goals almost certainly do not envisage the universalization of the Warsaw Treaty Organization/Comecon pattern, but that pattern is hardly the only conceivable one whereby Soviet leaders might aspire to exercise decisive influence over actors in the international system not at present subordinated to the USSR.

Professor Zimmerman presents us with a typology for explaining and predicting foreign policy behaviour that follows along lines now familiar: macro- versus micro-analytical approaches; unitary rational decision-making models versus organizational process and bureaucratic policy models. I have no strong objections to his critique of what he calls the ' essentialist ' and ' mechanistic ' approaches to the study of Soviet foreign policy, at least not in the pristine form of those approaches that he chooses to criticize; I am not sure, however, particularly in the case of George Kennan's work, that the critic's reductionism has escaped the pitfalls of caricature.

I like the sophisticated critique Professor Zimmerman makes of the limitations of international stimulus-response models for explaining or predicting foreign policy behaviour. He is right to point out that such models fail to provide us with criteria for predicting which particular stimuli will generate what particular responses from whom and under what conditions.

But what Professor Zimmerman calls the ' cybernetic ' or ' organismic ' input-oriented approaches, while they correctly *identify* some of the critically important variables in the domestic political system that affect foreign policy behaviour, do not really take us much further than the other approaches in predicting what it will actually be. We do not begin to know enough about the real world referents of these variables to construct a working model of Soviet foreign policy decision-making based upon them, although these approaches are useful in that they direct us toward some of the right questions, including some ignored by other approaches, particularly the output-oriented ones.

With respect to learning and adaptation, I cannot agree that the attribution to Soviet leaders of a capacity to learn from foreign policy experience is an original contribution of the cyberneticists, although they have stated the proposition more elegantly and systematically. Even the ' mechanistic ' approach of George Kennan assumed such a capacity for Soviet leaders, postulating that they would, eventually, learn from the experience of repeated frustration and respond by a special form of

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adaptation which he called 'mellowing'. It is true that the earlier approaches did place greater emphasis on the impermeability of the Soviet Union, but the Soviet Union *was* less penetrable under Stalin than it is today. Unfortunately, the specific instances of Soviet 'learning' in foreign policy cited by Professor Zimmerman do not add up to a very persuasive argument. Given the well-known ineffectuality of the policy planning staff in the US Department of State, the apparent experiment of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a similar staff constitutes a peculiar kind of learning. Similarly, if the very limited application of modern social science concepts to the study of international relations in the Soviet Union is supposed to be an adaptative response to American practice, it rests on a gross misconception of the role that modern social science plays in shaping American foreign policy. The alleged Soviet emulation of US strategic doctrine and force posture is a much more substantial matter, but to the extent that there has been convergence, the laws of physics and the sharing of a common military technology probably explain the similarities better than the learning mechanism. Besides, the doctrinal and force posture differences are still very great, and are at the root of Soviet-American difficulties in finding a common ground on such matters as SALT and MBFR.

With Professor Zimmerman's broad conclusion, I am, as I indicated at the outset, in full agreement: the prediction of Soviet foreign policy priorities for the 1970s must be highly contingent. But who could quarrel with that? It is hardly a conclusion unique to a cybernetic or organismic approach to foreign policy. Still, I was relieved, towards the end of Professor Zimmerman's paper, to find that he had resisted the temptation to conclude that it is futile even to speak of *a* Soviet policy or of Soviet foreign policy targets of any kind. This has become the fashionable conclusion in some recent studies of American foreign policy by proponents of what I call Model V, the school that explains or predicts foreign policy decision-making by taking the Models II and III formulated by Graham Allison and adding them together, discounting altogether the possibility of purposeful, 'national', and rational foreign policy decision-making (Model I).

Professor Zimmerman concludes his paper by offering some modest contingent predictions about future Soviet behaviour which he says are consonant with the kind of cybernetic or organismic view of the Soviet policy process that he describes in his paper. To me, his contingent predictions seem more like circular arguments, and one needs only to be modestly logical, and neither cybernetic or organismic, to orbit quite comfortably with him. Thus, he argues that if the United States provides the kind of international context in which—in the view of Soviet leaders,

> (a) prospects for major revolutionary advances will seem slim;
>
> (b) prospects for gradually 'progressive' developments in the non-communist world will seem moderately favourable; and

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(c) there will appear to be domestic benefits to be derived from cultivating relations with the United States,

then, the Soviet leaders are likely to pursue policies that

(a) eschew radical efforts to transform the international system;
(b) exhibit patience; and
(c) continue to learn from the United States.

But Professor Zimmerman goes further with a projection that seems to assume something about a basic tendency in Soviet foreign policy that is not an explicit part of his model: namely, that should the conditions he specifies obtain, then one could expect a reduction in the relative 'disposable surplus' for foreign policy in the USSR. Why should this be so? Because, in the first instance, according to Professor Zimmerman, the argument for giving up internal goals because of an ostensible Western threat will appear even more hollow than it does now. But whether internal arguments for committing large resources to foreign policy that are based on perceptions of Western threats will seem more or less persuasive (to whom?) is a subsidiary issue. Threats can readily be manipulated; moreover, other arguments for giving a high priority to foreign policy will also be available.

The key question for the 1970s is whether the calculation of interests, preferences, and goals of those Soviet leaders who have succeeded up until now in gaining and holding for foreign and military policy priority in the allocation of Soviet resources will be as critically affected by a perception of diminished Western threat as our speaker appears to assume. It could be argued quite plausibly, perhaps just as plausibly, that in an environment of diminished threat, arguments for maintaining the foreign policy priority will be fuelled and reinforced by perceptions of fresh opportunities for pursuing, at reduced risk, external objectives whose attainment would be facilitated by a strengthened military posture and assertive foreign policies. In any case, to venture a prediction with any confidence at all about likely Soviet choices requires that we specify more about the Soviet foreign and domestic policy contexts in the 1970s than is included in Professor Zimmerman's three-item list.

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The USSR and Leftist Regimes in Less-Developed Countries*

Morton Schwartz

IN their analysis of the contemporary world scene, Soviet spokesmen continually stress the 'invincible unity' of 'the world socialist forces' led by the Soviet Union and 'the national liberation movement' in the less-developed countries of the Third World. Along with 'the revolutionary struggle of the working classes in capitalist countries', relations between and among these 'main components' of 'the world revolutionary process' are seen to be both close and interdependent. Each is viewed as a major contributor in the continuing historical struggle to destroy international capitalism. According to a typical Soviet statement:

> World socialism helps the national emancipation of the oppressed people while the liberation struggle contributes to the struggle for socialism and strengthens its positions. The national liberation movement deals heavy blows at the common enemy—imperialism. The national liberation movement bolsters up the socialist and democratic forces in the world arena, opens up new opportunities for launching an active struggle against the imperialist policy of plunder and conquest.[1]

The relationship between the USSR and the national liberation movement, therefore, is seen as symbiotic, i.e. the success of each helps promote the cause of the other.

The developing areas, however, are not viewed merely in terms of the global struggle against imperialism. Soviet writers have given voice to more positive expectations. The Third World, in their view, is a likely stage for new socialist revolutionary transformations. Thus, it is suggested, 'of paramount significance is the fact that after gaining national independence the former colonies and semi-colonies are now moving in the direction of socialism, adding to and making more universal its experience'.[2]

Such public utterances, repeated incessantly during the last two decades, excited a great deal of attention, in the developing countries and, especially, in the West. In the capitals of Western Europe and the United States, fears grew that Moscow would successfully penetrate and manipulate the newly-emerging nations in Asia and Africa. The Kremlin, it was felt, could then not only undermine the long-established Western pre-

* A version of this article was originally written under the auspices of the Southern California Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar.

1 *The USSR and Developing Countries* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, n.d.), p. 17.

2 Ibid.

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eminence in these areas but, simultaneously, establish a Soviet presence and promote the establishment of 'progressive' (i.e. Soviet-oriented communist or pro-communist) regimes.

However, much to its disappointment, the countries of the developing areas proved more obdurate than Soviet theorists or Kremlin politicians had assumed. The 'national liberation movement', they discovered, was not monolithic. Many of its members, though politically independent, were slow to join the USSR in the 'world-wide struggle against imperialism'. Equally distressing was the sluggish pace of the 'socialist revolution' in the Third World. Although numerous 'radical', 'progressive', 'anti-imperialist', 'revolutionary democratic' leaders assumed power in the developing areas, very few embraced 'scientific socialism' (i.e. Soviet-style Marxist-Leninism).

Thus, much to the dismay of Moscow, the expected symbiotic relationship has never fully developed. Even where prospects seemed especially propitious, radical leftist regimes in the underdeveloped countries have proved both inadequate as socialists and undependable as allies. It is the purpose of this paper to analyse this 'failed symbiosis' and evaluate its implications for Soviet foreign policy.[3]

THOUGH given to exaggeration when setting forth the 'eternal principles' upon which foreign policy is said to be based, the Soviet leaders are quite right when they assert that Moscow's concern for the Third World goes back to the very first days of the Soviet Republic. The original Soviet interest derives from Lenin's sensitivity to the 'revolutionary and nationalistic East'. It was here, in his view, as set forth in *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, that the great historical struggle would be fought. The revolt, of the colonial East against the 'counter-revolutionary and imperialist West', according to Lenin, would not only undermine Western economic and military power but would promote socialist revolutions in the weakest links in the imperialist system. The October Revolution in semi-Asiatic peasant Russia was, according to Lenin, the revolutionary model.[4]

The early Soviet leaders clearly identified with the 'revolutionary East'. Stalin, for example, saw the October Revolution as 'the first revolution in the history of the world to break the age-long sleep of the oppressed peoples of the East and to draw them into the fight against

[3] This article will focus almost exclusively on leftist regimes in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Latin America has been excluded for the simple reason that, until very recently, there have been no non-communist leftist governments in power for Moscow to concern itself with. Officially designated by the Kremlin as a 'socialist' regime, Cuba is outside the purview of our discussion. Whether out of a tendency to regard Latin America as in the US sphere of influence or because of its generally conservative foreign policy orientation, the Soviet reaction to the self-styled Marxist government of Salvador Allende in Chile has thus far been rather cautious.

[4] See Robert C. Tucker, *The Soviet Political Mind* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963), pp. 185–86.

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world imperialism'.[5] Despite this self-image, however, Moscow had neither resources nor time during the first decades of the Soviet regime to attempt to tap the potential revolutionary energies of the Third World. Occasional efforts in this direction were made—such as the convocation of the Congress of the Peoples of the East in Baku (1920) during which Greogory Zinoviev, head of the Communist International, summoned 'the peoples of the East . . . to a Holy War first of all against British Imperialism'[6] and military and economic assistance was granted to potential anti-Western nationalist leaders such as Kemal Ataturk in Turkey and Chiang Kai-Shek in China. But generally Soviet leaders were far too involved in more immediate concerns of survival during these years to pay much attention to the less developed areas.

Stalin, despite earlier avowals, was particularly unconcerned. Even with the collapse of the great European colonial empires after the second world war and the emergence of the newly independent nations in Asia and Africa, the Soviet leadership refused to recognize the revolutionary implications of such developments. In fact Stalin insisted that the granting of independence to such nations as India, Burma and other former colonies was, as Robert Tucker has observed, 'merely a cunning fiction by which the colonists and their local agents—such as Nehru—were trying to conceal the continuing reality of colonial dependence upon the West'.[7]

IT was not until the death of Stalin in 1953 that a broader reorientation of Soviet policy in the developing areas became possible. Under Khrushchev in the mid-1950s, the revolutionary implications of developments in the Third World were at last recognized, and the USSR became more deeply involved in the Third World. As he told the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956: 'The new period in world history which Lenin predicted has arrived.'[8] Soviet optimism under Khrushchev regarding the Third World was in part the result of Moscow's Manichaean world view. As Herbert Dinerstein has suggested, the Kremlin leaders

[5] J. V. Stalin, 'The October Revolution and the National Question', quoted in Robin Buss, *Wary Partners: The Soviet Union and Arab Socialism*, Adelphi Papers No. 73 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, December 1970), pp. 11–12.

[6] In response to Zinoviev's summons, this gathering of 1,891 delegates belonging to 37 different nationalities was said to have cried '"Jehad! Jehad!" . . . . Every man in the hall jumped to his feet. Studded daggers were drawn, Damascan swords unsheathed, revolvers brought out of their holsters and lifted on high while their owners yelled "We swear! We swear!"' Louis Fischer, *The Soviet in World Affairs, 1917–1929* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), Vol. I, pp. 283–84.

[7] Tucker, op. cit. p. 191. Stalin, according to Tucker, was afflicted with a world view according to whose logic there was simply no such thing as a neutral or 'uncommitted' country, no space between the two antagonistic worlds. Any territory necessarily remained an Anglo-American preserve until such time as it changed worlds and became part of the Soviet empire. 'All non-Communist nationalist leaders, from Ghandi to Nasser, were therefore seen by Stalin as "tools of Wall Street".'

[8] Quoted in George A. Brinkley, 'The Soviet Union and the United Nations: The Changing Role of the Developing Countries', *The Review of Politics*, XXXII (January 1970), p. 97.

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tend to view world politics as a zero-sum game, i.e. whatever one side loses, the other gains. Accordingly, the creation of new independent states from old European empires was seen as a loss for capitalism and therefore a gain for socialism.[9]

The Kremlin's enthusiasm regarding the Third World was not merely a derivative of zero-sum calculations. Potentially, far more was involved. The post-Stalin leaders (and probably many during the Stalin era as well) were very much aware that powerful anti-Western, anti-imperialist sentiments were widespread in the developing areas. Furthermore, as they undoubtedly knew, many of the leaders of the newly emergent nations were well disposed towards the USSR, the avowed enemy of the universally despised Western imperialism. The Soviet Union, furthermore, with its socialist economic system, seemed an impressive example of a poor country that industrialized in a relatively brief period of years. Little wonder, therefore, that many of their leaders sought friendly relations with the USSR and were receptive to Marxian socialism.

With the convening of the First Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in April 1955, the tide of national liberation was rapidly rising. The strength of anti-Western and anti-imperialist sentiment became especially pronounced in Indonesia, Egypt, Ghana, Algeria and elsewhere in Asia and Africa. With Castro's overthrow of Batista in Cuba in 1959, Latin America was seen to have entered the fray. The question logically arose: could not these sentiments be turned to advantage? Could not these regimes become political allies? Could not they be drawn gradually into the Soviet sphere?

Khrushchev was most optimistic. The Third World of the developing and newly independent nations became the centre of his hopes for further revolutionary advance. It was clearly with such dreams in mind that he undertook his much publicized trip to India, Burma and Afghanistan in Autumn 1955 and, that same year, made the decision to grant military assistance to Egypt. Throughout the latter half of the 1950s, the Third World increasingly became the principal object of Soviet attention and efforts. Moscow courted what it considered potential allies—from Afghanistan on the Soviet border to distant Indonesia—with political flattery and economic and military aid.

To explain in theory what had been decided upon in practice, the Soviet leaders began elaborate efforts to find doctrinal justifications for their new policies. The first such attempt came at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in early 1956 during which Khrushchev emphasized the important contribution which the new nations were making. His stress was on the international and anti-imperialist implications of the national liberation movement. In his view, the new nonaligned Asian and African states had joined the USSR and other socialist states in creating a 'vast zone of peace' which could, if united, prevent the

[9] Herbert Dinerstein, 'Soviet Doctrine on Developing Countries: Some Divergent Views', P-2725 (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1963), p. 4.

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imperialists from launching a new world war. Khrushchev's views regarding the peaceful foreign policies of the newly developed states allowed him to introduce the non-Leninist notion that 'war was no longer a fatal inevitability'.[10]

Thus, initial Soviet interest in the Third World was justified largely in terms of foreign policy. The new states' struggle for independence, noted one leading Soviet official, 'shakes the big imperialist powers' domination . . . and strengthens the positions of the peace supporters throughout the world'. In his view, 'the fact that . . . the powerful liberation movement is growing and gaining strength everywhere in the East . . . means that new possibilities and prospects are opening up for the entire anti-imperialist front'.[11]

This positive assessment of the international outlook of the new states was soon extended to their internal regimes. Earlier critical evaluations of nationalist leaders in the underdeveloped nations were now regarded as 'sectarian'. Gandhi, Nehru, Sukarno, Nasser, and Ben Bella were increasingly hailed as 'progressive' leaders in the struggle for the political and economic independence of their countries. The adoption of this new approach, however, was not without its complications. For example, a number of Asian and especially African leaders began to insist that Moscow certify their socialist credentials. While the Kremlin had generally recognized the ideological aspirations of the various 'African socialisms' and 'Burmese socialism', Soviet leaders were reluctant to admit any connexion between these vague formulations and Marxism-Leninism. Moscow faced yet another challenge. In a number of 'progressive' developing states, especially the Middle East, local communist party members were very harshly treated and were, understandably, severely critical of their oppressors. How could the Kremlin leaders reconcile Soviet support for such leaders as Nasser of Egypt or Kassem of Iraq who had, in the eyes of local Arab party officials, unleashed a reign of anti-communist terror?

TO reconcile these conflicting perspectives and bring the whole pattern of nationalist and revolutionary impulses in the Third World under one roof, Soviet authorities devised the formula of the 'national-democratic state'. According to this doctrine, initially set forth at the Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers Parties (November 1960), the newly independent sovereign states of Asia and Africa were classified as somewhere in transition between imperialism and socialism. Under proper leadership, it was suggested, they had the option of avoiding capitalism altogether and achieving socialism (the ultimate fate of every society) by a 'non-capitalist path of development'. However, in order to start their advance along this short-cut to socialism, the developing

10 See R. A. Yellon, 'The Winds of Change', *Mizan*, IX (March–April 1967), p. 52.
11 V. Semenov, 'The Collapse of the Colonial System of Imperialism and Problems of International Relations', *Kommunist* (No. 18, 1956); quoted in Yellon, pp. 52–53.

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countries first had to establish an 'independent national-democratic state', that is, a state that

> consistently upholds its political and economic independence, struggles against imperialism and its military blocs . . . against new forms of colonialism . . .; a state that rejects dictatorial and despotic methods of government; a state in which the people are assured broad democratic rights and freedoms (freedom of speech, press, assembly, demonstrations, and establishment of political parties and public organizations) and the opportunity to work for agrarian reform and the satisfaction of other demands in the sphere of democratic and social transformations and for participation in the determination of state policy.[12]

Thus, only by maintaining 'political and economic independence', i.e. independence of the West, and by allowing local communist party officials complete freedom of political activity could the new states implement the 'democratic and social transformations leading to socialism'. 'The formation and consolidation of national-democratic states ensures these states the possibility of rapidly developing along the path of social progress. . . .'[13]

Though designed to meet the ideological challenge of the more assertive 'progressive' regimes and ensure greater tolerance of local communist parties, the formula was not especially effective. The leaders of Guinea, Ghana, Mali, the UAR, and Burma, viewing themselves as legitimate socialists, aspired to a higher stage of evolution and refused to accept the 'national-democratic state' concept. Furthermore, they often remained suspicious and intolerant of local communists. In virtually all these countries, political activity was restricted to a single national-front party under the direct control of the nationalist leadership and usually excluded communist party participation.

The ineffectiveness of the 'national-democratic state' formula was the inevitable result of an internal inconsistency in Soviet policy. Moscow was trying to achieve two conflicting objectives simultaneously. The Soviet leaders sought, on the one hand, to take over patronage of the national liberation movement whose activities were now ranked, according to Moscow, as 'second in importance only to the formation of the world socialist system'.[14] A force of such proportions and potential clearly deserved Soviet support. However at the same time, the Kremlin was obliged to endorse the cause of their ideological brethren in local communist organizations (or at the very least to avoid too close an

[12] 'Statement at Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers Parties', *Pravda*, 6 December 1961, pp. 1-4; translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (hereinafter cited as *CDSP*), XII (4 January 1961), p. 4.

[13] Ibid. See also 'World Communism and Nationalist Movements', *Mizan*, III (January 1961), pp. 2–4, and William T. Shinn, Jr., 'The "National Democratic State", A Communist Program for Less-Developed Areas', *World Politics*, XV (April 1963), pp. 377–89.

[14] 'Statement of Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers Parties', *Pravda*, 6 December 1961, p. 4.

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association with those decimating their ranks). The 'national-democratic state' concept could not resolve this dilemma. Nationalist leaders, especially in the Arab world, remained hostile to Arab communism and suppressed its activities. Khrushchev, especially during his last years in office, turned a blind eye to these events.

IN response to the agonizing but perennial tactical question of whom to support—anti-Western revolutionary nationalist regimes of the true parties of scientific socialism—Khrushchev, much as Lenin before him, chose the nationalists.[15] While he occasionally protested against 'actions which weaken national unity' and was scornful of 'African socialism' and 'Arab socialism', the Soviet chieftain gave increasingly fulsome praise to local nationalist leaders. In 1963 and 1964, the argument was increasingly heard that 'petty-bourgeois and even bourgeois leaders of the national liberation movement' were 'going over to the positions of the working class'. Elevating them to a newly created and even more 'leftist' status, Khrushchev in December 1963 lauded the activities of 'revolutionary democratic statesmen' who 'sincerely advocate non-capitalist methods for the solution of national problems and declare their determination to build socialism'. An article in the journal *New Times* went still further when it declared that, given 'a leadership that accepts socialism, . . . the national liberation movement can immediately break out of the framework of bourgeois democratic revolution and begin the transition to socialist revolution'.[16]

Khrushchev clearly had placed his stakes on the 'revolutionary democrats' who, despite domestic hostility to communist activity, were hailed as directly contributing to the socialist cause. According to one enthusiast,

> The national liberation revolutions of today are a constituent part of the world socialist revolution. Fulfilling the tasks of overthrowing alien oppression, they exhibit a general democratic character. In addition, on an international scale, they are resolving a specific class problem—the job of fighting against the oppression of the most reactionary, imperialistic bourgeoisie. The anti-imperialist orientation of the national liberation movement draws it together with the struggle of the proletariat in imperial states and thereby makes it a constituent part of the world socialist revolution.[17]

[15] On the historical origins of this dilemma, see Allen S. Whiting's discussion of the Lenin-Roy controversy at the Second Comintern Congress (1920) in his *Soviet Policies in China, 1917–1924* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), Chap. III. Philip E. Mosely's 'Communist Policy and the Third World', *The Review of Politics*, XXVIII (April 1966), pp. 212–28, provides a perceptive discussion of its recent manifestations.

[16] These quotations are from Uri Ra'anan, 'Moscow and the "Third World"', *Problems of Communism*, XIV (January–February 1965), pp. 24–26.

[17] V. L. Tyagunenko, *Problemy sovremennykh natsionalno-osvoboditelnykh revolyutsii* (*Problems of Contemporary National Liberation Revolutions*) (Moscow, 1966), p. 26; quoted in N. A. Simoniya, 'O kharaktere natsionalno-osvoboditelnykh revolyutsii' ('On the Character of National Liberation Movements'), *Narody Azii i Afriki* (No. 6, 1966), p. 14.

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This was held to be true even where local communist parties were small and weak. Even 'if conditions for proletarian revolution have not yet matured', the transition to socialism can begin for 'the socialist world system is performing the functions of proletarian vanguard in relation to imperialist-oppressed nations'. Thus, as Uri Ra'anan observed, 'never mind if these countries have no active Communist Party; Soviet aid will compensate for this lack!' [18]

The high point of Soviet euphoria came in the spring of 1964 when Ben Bella appeared in Moscow for the May Day celebrations. Not only did Khrushchev place the Algerian leader next to him on the podium in Red Square but had him decorated with the title 'Hero of the Soviet Union'. Furthermore, the official citation for this decoration referred to Ben Bella as 'Comrade'. Two weeks later, during his visit to the United Arab Republic, Khrushchev showered similar praise on Nasser. Though at one point he publicly lectured the Egyptian President on the correct meaning of 'socialism', he came to the conclusion that the UAR had indeed 'embarked on the road of socialist development'. Nasser, too, was awarded the decoration 'Hero of the Soviet Union'. On his visit to the Aswan Dam, largely financed and built by the USSR, Khrushchev recalled the UAR President's past record and declared glowingly 'all these things are giving me the right to call you Comrade'.[19]

Khrushchev's enthusiasm for such 'revolutionary democrats' as Ben Bella and Nasser, and his strong praise for the regimes in Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Burma for having embarked upon the 'non-capitalist path' were matched by substantial military and economic support. Between September 1955, when the arms agreement with Egypt was announced, and 1967, the value of arms aid between the USSR and Eastern Europe and the non-communist countries of the Third World has been estimated at approximately US$5·9 billion. The major recipients of such assistance were the leading 'progressive' Third World countries, namely, Egypt, $1·7 billion; Indonesia, $1·2 billion; Iraq, $500 million. Military shipments to sub-Saharan Africa were relatively quite small—an estimated $86·5 million, as compared to $2·7 billion for the Middle East and $2·2 billion for South and South-East Asia. Its impact, however, was potentially far greater than this figure would imply. Given the low level of African military development, the Soviets could hope to make important political inroads at relatively low cost. Thus for the small sum of $10–15 million in arms aid, Moscow managed to place about 1,000

[18] Ra'anan, op. cit. p. 28.

[19] Ibid. pp. 26–27. Ra'anan points out that the actual award document cited Nasser as 'President of the UAR', not 'Comrade', as Khrushchev had referred to him, and as Ben Bella had been called. This odd handling of Nasser is seen to reflect domestic resistance to Khrushchev's policies. 'Orthodox ideologists in Moscow preferred to draw a sharper distinction than Khrushchev between Algeria, where the Communists published their own organ and had given full backing to the FLN and Egypt where the Communists had only just emerged from jail' (p. 27). Ra'anan makes a persuasive case that Khrushchev's unabashed support of 'revolutionary democrats' provoked considerable opposition within top Party circles in Moscow.

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advisers in Ghana, some of whom were reportedly assigned important positions in Nkrumah's presidential guard. Considerable Soviet military assistance and equipment were also evident in Guinea and Mali.[20]

Soviet non-military aid to 'progressive' regimes was equally impressive. Between 1955 and 1966, Egypt received an estimated $2·6 billion in economic assistance from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, including a $100 million credit for the first stage of the Aswan Dam—the most dramatic single undertaking in the Soviet foreign aid programme. (The final cost to the USSR for this dam, completed in 1970, has been estimated at $325 million.) Indonesia had received $640 million by 1962. (Although Sukarno had been one of the first nationalist leaders to win Soviet attention, especially when he emerged at the 1955 Bandung Conference as a militant anti-imperialist, Soviet aid was cut off in the early 1960s. Not only was the Indonesian economy turning into a shambles but by then Sukarno was increasingly turning his attention towards Peking.) Ben Bella's Algeria received $232 million during these same years.[21]

Khrushchev's ardour for 'revolutionary democrats' in Asia, the Middle East and Africa, and substantial Soviet economic and military support for their regimes are to be seen, of course, in terms of Moscow's political competition with the United States. Given its anti-imperialist orientation, the Kremlin was hopeful that, with economic and military largesse and political flattery, the new nationalist states would gravitate increasingly towards the Soviet Union. Soviet policies were shaped by other factors as well, however. Khrushchev's exaggerated embrace of Nasser and Ben Bella is probably best understood in terms of the political pressure he was then under. By 1964, the Soviet leader was both fighting to retain his domestic position from powerful political rivals and struggling to fend off Peking's increasingly sharp attacks on the Soviet position in the communist world and the developing countries. In such circumstances, Khrushchev anxiously sought new victories. Had the 'revolutionary democrats' become political allies and actively supported the Soviet cause, such successes would have demonstrated his skill in handling difficult foreign policy issues and thwarted Peking's drive for ideological and political pre-eminence. Khrushchev's inflated evaluations of future prospects in these countries, therefore, were less a belief in the 'socialist' credentials of Ben Bella, Nasser, Kassem, Keita, Nkrumah or Sukarno than his hope that they would support his position against his own domestic rivals and the Chinese.

20 The figures cited were from Wynfred Joshua and Stephen Gilbert, *Arms for the Third World; Soviet Military Aid Diplomacy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), esp. pp. 23, 45 and 73. Other major recipients include Afghanistan, $260 million, and India, $600–700 million.

21 The figures on Soviet economic assistance are from Charles B. McLean, 'Foreign Aid in Soviet Third World Policies', paper presented to the 1968 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 2–7 September 1968; and 'Communst Aid: for Whose Benefit?', *The Economist*, 6 November 1971, pp. 66–67.

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Khrushchev's efforts were for naught. In October 1964 he was ousted from office by a coalition of rivals, including those who had been distressed by his unduly optimistic Third World policies. These policies received a still sharper blow when, during the next few years, virtually all the leading 'revolutionary democrats' were removed from office. Ben Bella was overthrown in June 1965. Nkrumah was ousted by a military *coup* in February 1966. (Sukarno was deposed in September 1965 but, as already noted, the Kremlin had by this time lost confidence in his Peking-oriented leadership.) And somewhat later (November 1968), Modibo Keita, the Marxist-oriented leader of Mali, was overthrown. (The once promising regime of General Kassem in Iraq had been ousted by the Ba'ath Party in 1963. Moscow, however, had become disenchanted somewhat earlier with his anti-communist and anti-Nasser policies.)

With the fall of Khrushchev and the obvious blow to 'progressive' trends which this series of *coups* represented, the Kremlin's optimism regarding the Third World rapidly dimmed. There were, to be sure, earlier indications that not all was going well and especially that Khrushchev's exuberant courtship of 'revolutionary democratic' forces was excessive. In some instances, much to Moscow's chagrin, Soviet economic assistance had been wasted. In Indonesia, to take the worst case, none of the Soviet-aided industrial projects had been completed. The Kremlin was so distressed that Mikoyan apparently felt it necessary to lecture the Sukarno government on the need for careful planning.[22] There were other problems. When in 1961 self-proclaimed Marxist, Sekou Touré, expelled the Soviet Ambassador for interference in internal Guinean politics, Moscow also began to discover that a regime's 'progressive' orientation was no guarantee of a consistently pro-Soviet policy.[23]

THOUGH criticisms of developments in the Third World began to appear, especially in academic journals, in the early 1960s, faith in the 'fraternal alliance' between Soviet Union and the 'anti-imperialist national liberation revolutions' generally persisted throughout the Khrushchev era. By 1965, however, a more cautious policy line had emerged. The most startling indication of a new, far more sober policy outlook is to be found in the *Pravda* editorial comment of 27 October 1965, entitled 'The Supreme Internationalist Duty of a Socialist Country'. The article begins by emphasizing the semi-isolationist theme that the USSR best carries out its international obligations by ensuring its own domestic economic development. Repeating traditional slogans claiming Soviet responsibility for 'the world-wide liberation struggle' ('Can one name even one major revolutionary movement to which the socialist countries, above all the Soviet Union, have not rendered every possible support? There are no such movements.'), the Soviet leaders asserted that

[22] *Pravda*, 3 July 1964; cited in Mosely, op. cit. p. 233, fn. 40.
[23] See *The New York Times*, 21 and 27 December 1961.

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'the best way to fulfil our *internationalist duty* to the working people of the entire world is the successful construction of socialism and communism in the socialist countries' (italics added).[24] The USSR is thus apparently seen as fulfilling its vanguard role in the revolutionary movement by concentrating on its *internal* economic development!

In addition, despite traditional principles of 'proletarian internationalism', the Kremlin notes with surprising candour that:

> it is first of all the peoples of the young national states who can put an end to all forms of colonialism and neocolonialism and raise the economy and culture of these countries. In this struggle they receive the support of other detachments of the revolutionary movement. It is the supreme internationalist obligation of each revolutionary detachment to find the best solution on its own sector to those tasks that confront it. . . .

Each country and people, apparently, has the prime responsibility for their own problems.

Furthermore, internationalist rhetoric aside, there were clearly limits to what the USSR could and should do. First of all, 'as for the socialist states, it is obvious that they cannot pursue a domestic or foreign policy without regard for whether it helps or, on the contrary, harms the fighters against imperialism outside the limits of the socialist world. . . .'

> . . . the socialist countries, in deciding revolutionary tasks, cannot substitute for other detachments of the liberation struggle. They cannot take the place of the peoples of the young national states in solving the tasks of national liberation. . . . This would be the forcible imposition of their will on other peoples, which is alien to the very nature of Marxism-Leninism.

Thus excessively close ties between the USSR and the Third World could in Soviet eyes weaken the liberation movement itself. The Third World was also now admitted to be an economic burden to the USSR. 'Aid to the developing countries', noted *Pravda*, 'is given not out of surpluses but through the allocation of funds and materials that would be highly useful to the socialist countries themselves. . . .'

Soviet priorities have clearly been shifted. Though they continued to insist that they 'do not evade the great responsibility that history places on the socialist countries, [and] do not shift to others our share of resolute participation in the worldwide liberation struggle . . .', the Kremlin leaders had redefined their revolutionary obligations. As they declared,

> The peoples of the socialist countries are concentrating their main efforts on the building of socialism and communism in their own countries, seeing in this a decisive precondition for intensifying their help to the other detachments of the liberation struggle and their *chief contribution* to the development of the world revolutionary movement (italics added).

[24] 'The Supreme Internationalist Duty of a Socialist Country' (editorial), *Pravda*, 27 October 1965; reprinted in *CDSP*, XVII (17 November 1965), pp. 6–9.

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This *Pravda* article marked a dramatic downshift in Soviet attitudes, one which generally prevails to this day. In contrast to its earlier exuberance, Moscow increasingly adopted a much more detached stance. With its emphasis on 'building socialism' at home and its criticisms of attempting to 'substitute for other detachments in the liberating struggle' abroad, the post-Khrushchev leadership seemed to indicate a less active role for the USSR in the Third World. Furthermore, in stressing 'the supreme international obligation of each revolutionary detachment to find the best solution' for itself, the Kremlin was apparently recognizing that its own successes and failures in the Third World were basically dependent on the political situation in each country and that, in fact, Moscow's influence on such developments was rather less than had originally been hoped. While aid and support to the 'revolutionary democrats' would be continued, a sterner, more suspicious eye would be cast on its relative cost-effectiveness: what and how much aid to whom at what costs and risks and with the prospects of what benefits?

THIS obvious downgrading of the national liberation movement was followed by a generally more critical analysis of their internal political systems. The Kremlin cast a particularly cool eye at its one-time favourites in the Third World, 'the national revolutionary democrats'. Some Soviet spokesman, it should be noted, remained convinced that these nationalist leaders could be converted to pro-Soviet and, eventually, Marxist-Leninist positions. According to academician Zhukhov,

> The logic of the anti-imperialist struggle, the grim lessons derived from the everyday contact with neo-colonialist practice and the growth and sharpening of class contradictions, more and more make people understand the truth and correctness of Marxism, and prompt many supporters of subjective theories to go over to the positions of scientific socialism. Such is the leading tendency of our time.[25]

Such optimistic judgments, though still voiced, were no longer universally shared. Most writers urged greater circumspection. While long-run assessments remained positive and hopeful, the 'revolutionary democrats' were now described in far less charitable terms.

As if to justify their more moderate posture, Soviet analyses now focused on the fact that most of the so-called progressive leaders were not of the working class. 'The leaders in countries with a non-capitalist orientation', notes one theorist, 'come mostly from the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie.'[26] Another writes that 'the political and governmental cadres and also the cadres of the party and military apparatus' in the national democratic states 'come, as a rule, from the intelligentsia which is basically bourgeois and petty-bourgeois by origins, habits and outlook'. These petty-bourgeois intellectuals, however, are considered a progressive

[25] Quoted in Buss, op. cit. p. 13.
[26] 'The Theory and Practice of the Non-Capitalist Way of Development', *International Affairs* (No. 11, 1970), p. 18.

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force; ' their revolutionary anti-feudal, anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist and democratic nature ', notes Ulyanovsky, ' is not to be denied '. Further, they are ' capable of taking determined measures against the feudal lords, semi-feudal landowners and foreign and local private capital ', thereby ' resolving many of the tasks confronting the developing countries '. Nevertheless, on balance the essentially petty-bourgeois nature of the government is a major impediment. ' By virtue of its class character ', Ulyanovsky continues, ' the modern democratic state . . . has limited possibilities.' [27]

The ' progressive ' elements in Third World countries suffer from a number of weaknesses, according to Moscow, not the least of which is their ideological confusion. For all their commitment to anti-imperialism, the petty-bourgeois revolutionary democrats have, in the Soviet view, only the foggiest notion of the meaning of socialism. One recent article refers disdainfully to ' the emergence of the most diverse petty-bourgeois and bourgeois theories of " socialism " in Asia and Africa '. ' Petty-bourgeois socialism ' is seen to have a ' revolutionary democratic trend (UAR, Algeria, Syria, Guinea and other countries), a communal-peasant trend (Tanzania), . . . a revolutionary nationalist trend (Indonesia, 1957–60), and a reactionary bureaucratic trend '. Similarly, ' bourgeois socialist theories ' have various tendencies. ' There are " democratic socialisms ", Indian version, " Senegalese socialism ", and the Kenyan model.' Finally there is reactionary socialism. ' When socialist slogans are used by the more conservative sections of the bourgeoisie, their " socialism " assumes a negative character. Reactionary bureaucratic petty-bourgeois " socialism " generally results in establishing a bureaucratic one-man dictatorship—civilian or military.' [28]

These diverse forms of ' socialism ', products of various influences, share one quality—they are wrong. That is to say, they are non-Marxist and as such they are unscientific. Thus even the ' revolutionary-democratic conception of socialism ' which contains ' certain elements of Marxism-Leninism ' and recognizes the necessity for social revolution and socialist transformation of society ' still has only a faulty knowledge of what Soviet theorists refer to as the general laws of social development. Though ' progressive revolutionary democrats ' may have learned ' a few isolated tactical slogans and economic principles of Marxism ', it is ' still a far cry from a scientific understanding of Marxism ', or ' the assimilation of Marxism-Leninism as a complex and indivisible world outlook. . . '.[29]

[27] Professor R. Ulyanovsky, ' The " Third World "—Problems of Socialist Orientation ', *International Affairs* (No. 9, 1971), p. 30. Professor Rostislav A. Ulyanovsky (Doctor of Economic Science) is apparently the same person as R. A. Ulyanovsky, Deputy Chief of the International Department of the Soviet Communist Party, i.e. one of the chief formulators of Soviet policy towards the ' progressive ' states of Asia and Africa. His writings, therefore, would seem to command special attention.

[28] A. Dansoko, N. Simoniya, C. Unni Raja, ' Afro-Asian Concepts of Socialism ', *World Marxist Review*, XIV (June 1971), pp. 166–67.

[29] G. Kim and A. Kaufman, ' On Sources of Socialist Conceptions in Developing Countries ', *World Marxist Review*, XIV (December 1971), p. 126.

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Such ideological weakneses and deficiencies, such inconsistencies and contradictions are 'the fertile ground on which illusions sprout'. According to a Radio Moscow commentary, 'any political parties and leaders who fail to respect the fundamental propositions of scientific socialism inevitably become willy-nilly defenders of capitalism'.[30] This lack of proper ideological grounding explains the setbacks and slow progress of recent years. The 'revolutionary movement', writes a recent analyst, 'is often led by social groups and political organizations representing the peasants, urban petty-bourgeoisie, and the civilian and military intelligentsia. These so-called middle strata possess a contradictory mentality. . . . They, and often their political representatives, are emotionally unstable and prone to sudden political convolutions.'[31] 'Vacillation, change of heart and fence-sitting', according to Party official R. A. Ulyanovsky, 'are the mark of the petty-bourgeois intellectual'.[32]

Thus the dominant position of these ideologically confused 'petty-bourgeois intellectuals' (who hold 'the key posts in the state, the Party, the army and the economic apparatus') 'creates a flimsy and reversible situation'. Their pre-eminence in the ruling national-democratic parties is considered especially dangerous. 'These parties', writes Ulyanovsky

> are based on the petty-bourgeois masses and because the local proletariat is either weak or non-existent, the class essence of these parties will evidently *long be determined* by the sway of petty-bourgeois intellectuals, with all the consequences that this entails, including their possible overthrow (italics added).[33]

Controlled as they are by vacillating, fence-sitting, unstable, irresolute, ideologically deficient petty-bourgeois intellectuals, the future of the socialist-oriented revolutionary democratic states of the Third World is now viewed with considerable apprehension. Even those who have chosen the non-capitalist path to socialism—and these are admittedly far from being a majority—are now regarded as being in a 'reversible' situation. Such was the lesson of the coups.

Another factor which makes these regimes less attractive in the eyes of the Soviet leadership has been their pronounced tendency towards one-man rule. In attempting to explain how 'such outstanding leaders of the national liberation movement as Kassem in Iraq, Sukarno in Indonesia, Ben Bella in Algeria, Nkrumah in Ghana, Keita in Mali', were removed from power with such relative ease and during so short a period of time, one Soviet analyst saw these developments as reflecting a 'crisis of personal power'. These leaders, neglecting pressing social problems in favour of 'resounding foreign policy activities', lost their popular base

[30] *USSR and Third World*, I (25 October–5 December 1971), p. 622.
[31] S. Shariddin, 'From National to Social Revolution', *World Marxist Review*, XV (March 1972), p. 151.
[32] Rostislav Ulyanovsky, 'Some Aspects of the Non-Capitalist Way for Asian and African Countries', *World Marxist Review*, XII (September 1969), p. 91.
[33] Ibid. p. 92.

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of support. Others view it in terms of the strong tendency in the developing states towards centralized political rule, i.e. the creation of a strong power structure which often results in ' a system of leaderism, Messianism, the identification of the destinies and tasks of the revolution with the personality of the leader '. ' In practice ', the revolutionary democrats ' often exhibit tendencies to authoritarianism, to the solution of pressing problems exclusively from above by administrative methods. . . '. Such behaviour, it is argued, inevitably leads to popular discontent.[34] Moscow has also expressed concern regarding ' the reactionary degeneration of the leadership groups, their gradual transformation into bureaucratic elites '. Soviet writers have even hinted, as David Morison has pointed out, at the emergence of fascist trends (' the autonomous executive authority and corporative spirit ').[35]

Complaints regarding personal rule in the Third World countries reflect Moscow's awareness of the fragility of the communist position. In states where they ' exaggerate the role of personality ' and ' identify the state and party with the person of a national leader ',[36] the role of local communist organizations and the potential influence of the USSR itself is obviously extremely uncertain. As we shall see shortly, Moscow's apprehensions regarding ' negative consequences ' have been fully justified.

The developing states are afflicted with other internal difficulties, not the least of which is corruption. For example, in explaining the overthrow of Modibo Keita's avowedly Marxist regime in Mali, one Soviet analyst placed the blame on ' newcomers who often are anxious to inherit the privileges formerly enjoyed by the colonial administrators '. This element, ' sometimes called the bureaucratic bourgeoisie ', is seen here (as it was in Ghana) as ' a serious threat to the revolutionary democratic government '.

> The bureaucratic top crust, while paying lip service to socialism, often lives in luxury in glaring contrast to the appalling poverty of the masses. This gives rise to widespread distrust and even hostility to those who, professing to be building socialism, urge the people to tighten their belts while they themselves build mansions and buy expensive automobiles.[37]

Earlier flights of fancy aside, recent Soviet analysis is increasingly attentive to the economic and political backwardness of the Third World. While in principle optimistic, frequent references to persistent negative traits (labelled as feudal and bourgeois)—such as nepotism, venality, ' the parasitic use of various state economic institutions ', ' political backwardness ', ' the bureaucraticism of the old and also the new officialdom and

[34] Quoted in David Morison, ' USSR and Third World, I, Ideal and Reality ', *Mizan*, XII (October 1970), pp. 10, 11.

[35] David Morison, ' Africa and Asia: Some Trends in Soviet Thinking ', *Mizan*, X (September–October 1968), p. 181; see also p. 172.

[36] Ibid. p. 174.

[37] ' After Mali ', *Mizan*, XI (July–August 1969), p. 207.

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officer corps', 'the smog of tribalism', the strong influence of nationalism—tend to create doubt whether assertions regarding 'progress along the route to socialism' are intended to be taken seriously. 'Social anomalies' are so profound and political and especially economic blunders so frequent that several writers have expressed concern that 'the very idea of socialism tends to be discredited'.[38] Thus, speaking of the 'complicated process' of non-capitalist development, Ulyanovsky was moved to admit that some of the 'contradictory tendencies' which one finds along this route 'are not only not consistently socialist, but sometimes even contradict the principles of socialism'.[39]

Another factor which Soviet analysts view as weakening the progressive evolution of the newly developing states is the prominent role played by the military in many of these countries. Earlier, the assessment of the role of the military was quite positive. According to a 1965 account, 'in Egypt, Burma, Algeria and some other countries army officers formed the backbone of the revolutionary democratic forces; the army was not only the centre of patriotic resistance, but also began to play, as in the UAR, an outstanding part in laying the basis of a new life'. After the onset of the *coups*, the military was downgraded. One writer, noting that army *coups* can be 'either to Right or to Left', urged that 'the gradual "demilitarization" of the revolution, that is to say, the growth of political forms and methods, replacing military ones' would be a 'healthy trend'.[40] Similarly, A. S. Kaufman warned against 'an exaggeration of the importance of the army'. 'The army', he wrote in 1968, 'has its own specific forms and methods of leadership, which do not always accord with the development of democratic forms of government. For example, one sees phenomena of this kind in Burma and in the UAR.'[41]

While a number of Soviet analysts regard the role of the military with high suspicion, others see the army as an effective organizing force, a unifying factor—perhaps the only one—capable of carrying out 'progressive' changes. Certain military leaders such as Nasser, Ne Win of Burma, the Syrian military leadership and Boumedienne of Algeria are looked on with favour as 'revolutionary democrats with epaulettes'. In these instances, the 'progressive' character of the regime—in terms of domestic and foreign policies—is seen as sufficient to qualify them for approval.[42]

THE single most often cited criticism of the 'revolutionary national-democratic leaderships' is their persistent hostility to communism in general and to their native communist parties in particular. The overt

[38] 'The Theory and Practice of the Non-Capitalist Way', op. cit. p. 22.
[39] *USSR and Third World*, I (7 December 1970–10 January 1971), p. 1.
[40] 'The Ebb Tide?', *Mizan*, VIII (September–October 1966), pp. 194–95.
[41] 'Third World Socialisms: A Harder Look', *Mizan*, X (May–June 1968), p. 152.
[42] Morison, 'USSR and the Third World . . .', op. cit. pp. 12–16.

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antipathy towards communism expressed by many of the Kremlin's favourite 'revolutionary democrats', their policies of repression and imprisonment of local communists, the banning of the communist party in their respective countries—policies adopted by many 'progressive leaders', especially in the Middle East—is a source of continuous embarrassment.

The dilemma for Moscow is in principle a profound one. As faithful Marxist-Leninists, the Soviet leaders remain committed to the position that the working class and its political vanguard, the communist party, are the only truly consistent and reliable forces in the struggle for socialism. Yet in many of the countries of Asia, the Middle East, and, especially, Africa, the proletariat is numerically small and, as one writer, notes, 'has not yet consolidated itself into a class, nor has it become aware of its historical mission, and sometimes does not have a political vanguard', i.e. a communist party. Under such circumstances, needless to say, the working class has 'not yet emerged as an independent social and political force'.[43] Given the fact that the working class is '*the vanguard of the socialist forces and no other class can replace it in that historic function*' (italics in the original),[44] it is difficult to see how the Soviet leaders can talk seriously about the prospects of socialist development in the developing countries.

In view of these circumstances, the dominant mood, appropriately, is one of restraint. One source stresses that 'a realistic revolutionary approach to the matter reveals that socialism must very often be built not out of the ideal material that an advanced working class alone can be, but of poor material that objective reality puts at the revolutionaries' disposal'. He notes, furthermore, that 'the working-class movement in most Afro-Asian countries is too weak, too poorly organized and too closely connected with its petty-bourgeois environment'. Under such dismal circumstances, his sole hope rests on the belief that 'national-democratic parties, above all their Left-wing groups, can after starting from non-Marxist national socialism, advance towards scientific socialism and overcoming contradictions, finally adopt it'. 'It is this possibility of moving from Left-wing national socialist trends to scientific socialism that should never be underestimated.'[45]

Here, once again, is the optimistic faith in 'going over' to Marxian socialism expressed earlier by academician Zhukhov. In point of fact, however, such assertions of the 'possibility' of converting the 'revolu-

[43] A. Kiva, 'Experience of Non-Capitalist Development in Africa', *International Affairs*, 5 November 1972, p. 28. 'In Mali, for example, the proletariat numbers 35,000 or 2·4 per cent of the working population. In Guinea there are 40,000. . . . According to incomplete figures, the People's Republic of Congo has a proletariat of 35,000–40,000, and Tanzania around 50,000. In Somalia, the industrial proletariat is just forming.' The author further notes that 'the intelligentsia, including army officers, is sometimes more numerous even than the proletariat' (p. 29).

[44] Ulyanovsky, 'The "Third World"—Problems of Socialist Orientation', op. cit. p. 31.

[45] Rostislav Ulyanovsky, 'Marxist and Non-Marxist Socialism', *World Marxist Review*, XIV (September 1971), p. 122.

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tionary democratic ' leadership to Marxism-Leninism is not taken very seriously. The main problem, as Ulyanovsky himself is the first to admit, is the ' misunderstanding and mistrust between Communists and national democrats ' in the developing countries, the ' distrust and suspicion of the working class and its revolutionary vanguard fanned by the forces of reaction and provoking anti-Communist attacks and excesses on the part of the national democrats '. As the Kremlin is more than aware, militant ' national democrats ', especially in the Middle East, are often hostile to communism as a political philosophy and suspicious of local communist leaders as potential rivals for power; in virtually all countries of the Levant, organized communist political activity is banned.[46] It is in this context that Moscow's plaint about authoritarian regimes solving problems ' from above by administrative methods ' is to be understood. Though individual communists may at times take part in the governing arrangements, as they do today in Syria and Iraq, the ruling Ba'athists in both countries have frequently imprisoned local Party leaders. As Ulyanovsky wrote in 1971, ' relations between the national democrats who came to power in Syria, Iraq and the Sudan and the Communists have been marked by prejudices, distrust and errors and by difficulties that persist to this day '.[47]

[46] In a remarkably forthright statement on this issue, President Nasser of Egypt declared that ' there will be no new imperialism to replace the Western imperialism from which we have liberated ourselves '.

" If, therefore, a small faction of heretics rises within the vastness of this Arab nation, making themselves agents of the foreigner, advocating Communism and calling for dependence, we call them a schismatic faction, who betrayed their fatherhood, their independence and the freedom of their country.

We, brethren, cannot in any matter allow this faction to work among us for the account of a foreign country or for the account of a foreign Communist Party.

We will never accept either that a prime minister of a foreign country—the Soviet Union—should defend this faction. . . .

If Khrushchev rises today to defend a small minority of the sons of our country who dissented from the unanimity of one Fatherland, saying that he is but defending Communism as a principle, we tell him that we do not consider this as defence of the Communist principle but as intervention in our affairs.

We do not interfere in the affairs of the Soviet Union, nor do we support a faction of the sons of the Soviet Union against another faction. So, if the head of the Soviet government intervenes today in order to support a small faction of the sons of our country against the unanimity of our people, we cannot accept that by any means.

We are free in our Fatherland to accept the principles which we consider in our interests and to reject the principles which represent dependence and atheism." (20 March 1959.) Press Release 50/59, UAR Information Department, Cairo. Quoted in Walter Laqueur, *The Struggle for the Middle East* (New York: Macmillan 1969), pp. 234–35. Another equally pointed indication of Middle Eastern hostility to Soviet communism is to be found in the recent remark by Colonel Qaddafi on Libyan radio: ' If the freedom of the Libyan people cannot be guaranteed and if this country's independence cannot be achieved except under the protection of the Russians, then let this people go to hell.' *USSR and Third World*, I (2 June–4 July 1971), pp. 327–28.

[47] Ulyanovsky, ' The " Third World "—Problems of Socialist Orientation ', op. cit. p. 33. He also declared, somewhat defensively: ' Soviet Communists will never refuse, while maintaining good relations with the national democrats, to proceed from the fact that the fraternal Communist parties were, are and will continue to be patriots devoted to the people, fighters of revolution against imperialism and for independence, democracy and social progress . . .', p. 32.

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IN response to the question of whom to support, the current leadership has opted, *in principle*, for a classical orthodox position. The stress in Soviet writings since the mid-1960s has invariably been on the working class and its political organizations. 'In countries that have taken the road of non-capitalist development, an iron-clad guarantee against the restoration of bourgeois-landowner and neocolonialist practices will be secured only when the working strata . . . become the driving power in the political life and in the governmental political apparatus.'[48] Thus to ensure against 'reversibility' and capitalist restoration, communist participation and, in time, leadership is said to be essential. As one theorist recently observed, 'Communists are the political force without which non-capitalist development can have no genuinely socialist perspective'. The formula, 'socialism without Communists' is 'theoretically insolvent'.[49]

To ensure proper revolutionary direction, Soviet writers insistently urge the creation of a united front, i.e. a 'militant alliance of Communist and national democratic parties'. In a tone of pleading rather than conviction, Moscow declared that the 'national democrats' are coming to the conclusion that 'the Marxist-Leninists are their only reliable ally. To weaken this alliance means weakening the whole front of progressive anti-imperialist forces.'[50] The objective is the creation of 'all-embracing parties of the united national front' joining together 'all genuinely socialist elements and groups of the working people. . . .'[51] The united front strategy, however, raises very serious questions, especially for local party officials. It is one thing to suggest 'cooperation and mutual understanding between revolutionary democratic and Marxist-Leninist parties'; it is something else to urge their 'unity'. Local communists have had difficulty enough, both in doctrinal and practical terms, in adjusting themselves to Moscow's flirtation with the nationalists. When the Soviet leaders suggested, possibly at the request of some 'revolutionary democrats', that the communists accept their own absorption into the governing single party, some communist leaders rebelled. Khaled Bagdesh, the long-time leader of the underground Syrian party, long ago condemned such views as 'tantamount to denying the need for the continued existence of the Party'.[52]

With the apparent sanction of Moscow, the Egyptian communists committed the heresy of 'liquidationism' when in 1965 they dissolved their independent organizational existence and as individuals joined the ruling Arab Socialist Union (ASU).[53] However, the Soviets have not been insistent that this pattern be followed everywhere. And, in fact, while

48 Ibid. p. 32.
49 Shariddin, op. cit. p. 152.
50 Ulyanovsky, 'Marxist and Non-Marxist Socialism', op. cit. p. 125.
51 *Nekapitalisticheskii put razvitiya stran Afrik* (*The Non-Capitalist Path of Development of the Countries of Africa*) (Moscow: Nauka, 1967), p. 371.
52 Quoted in Mosely, op. cit. p. 224.
53 Buss, op. cit. p. 15.

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continuing to urge that fraternal communist parties seek 'unity and militant alliance', recent statements urge that the 'leaders of the national democratic movement . . . recognize the legitimacy of their existence and development as an ideologically and *organizationally independent* political force . . .' (italics added).[54] The inability of Egypt's communists to gain significant influence in the Nasser- and Sadat-dominated ASU and the opposition of veteran Arab communists such as Bagdesh seems to have persuaded Moscow to abandon the urging of party dissolution.

THE problem, however, remains: how to create an effective role for local communists without upsetting the 'revolutionary democrats'? Soviet writers admit that they have not as yet found a satisfactory recipe. 'There can be no single answer as to the forms of unity and the bringing together of Marxist-Leninist and revolutionary democratic parties. But life itself demands a sound and discreet approach. . . .'[55] While 'soundness' currently demands that communists retain 'their ideological and political independence lest they dissolve in broad movements of abstract national unity',[56] 'life' always insists that reality be recognized. And as Ulyanovsky unequivocally states:

> a factor that must be reckoned with is that in many if not in most of the developing Asian and African countries, *no forces except the national democrats have the influence, authority, organization and support of the masses* to allow them to head a nation-wide struggle for the attainment of the aims of the present stage of the revolution (italics added).[57]

Soviet sources recognize, it would seem, that despite their deficiencies and weaknesses, only the 'national democrats' have political power. The influence of local communists—and the USSR itself—depends totally on them. In such circumstances, the only possible strategy is that of the united front, i.e. alliance with the nationalists. '*Without a strong rear and without the possibility of a well-organized working class*', writes Ulyanovsky, the 'national democrats . . . *cannot afford to spurn fellow-travellers, or even temporary allies.*' (italics in the original).[58] The same, obviously, is true for local communists. As Ulyanovsky notes, 'the crux of the matter' is that the position of the working class and its organizations 'depends on the policy of the ruling democrats, on their trust in the people and the working class and on their willingness to share power with them in a front of progressive, national democratic forces. . . .'[59] Given their obvious predominance, Moscow urges close cooperation with the 'national democrats' as the only viable strategy; overt hostility to nationalist rule by local communists is rejected as 'sectarian'.

[54] Ulyanovsky, 'Marxist and Non-Marxist Socialism', op. cit. p. 125.
[55] *Nekapitalisticheskii put . . .*, op. cit. p. 371.
[56] *USSR and Third World*, op. cit. p. 337.
[57] Ulyanovsky, 'The "Third World"—Problems of Socialist Orientation' op. cit. p. 30.
[58] Ibid. p. 34.
[59] Ibid. p. 32.

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Typical of the current Soviet position is their response to the situation in Iraq. 'The recognition of realities', writes *Izvestia*, 'is almost always evidence of political maturity and confidence in one's own strength and possibilities. The fact that the Ba'ath Party is in power is a reality.' What is necessary, therefore, is to establish cooperation between the Iraqi Communist Party and the Ba'ath Party and create a 'national front of progressive forces'.[60] Unity and cooperation, however, are 'not such a simple matter'. The two progressive forces, the communists and the Ba'athists, have not overcome 'the persistent mistrust and wariness toward one another that became engrained during the long years of mutual enmity. . . .'[61] This situation, it is admitted, can also be found elsewhere. '. . . in some countries', writes Ulyanovsky, 'national democrats who are in power even display a desire to take action against the leftist forces'.[62]

Despite such experiences, the Soviet leadership continues to urge 'patience' and 'restraint'. Revolutionary virtue is now characterized by 'the ability to brush aside secondary questions on which disagreements exist'.[63] Although 'anti-Communist measures' admittedly 'make it difficult to achieve mutual understanding', Ulyanovsky bravely counsels against 'philistine conceptions of morality' which would only 'obscure the political substance of the situation'. 'Proletarian parties', he reminds his readers, 'do not yield to emotion but proceed from objective class analysis'. And 'objective class analysis' always comes back to the essential fact that 'in a number of countries, national democratic parties are ruling parties playing the leading role in the national liberation movement. . . .'[64] Should they 'resort to repression', he admonishes local party officials to assess such actions 'without bias', 'in terms of the future', 'on a principled and yet flexible line', '*for the good of the cause*' (italics in the original!).[65]

THE dilemmas and frustrations inherent in Soviet policy towards the radical left in the Third World are nowhere more agonizingly revealed than in the recent events in the Middle East. The original focal point of Moscow's current anxieties was the Sudan. In mid-1969, a group of revolutionary nationalist military officers led by Gaafar Numayri seized power in Khartoum and established 'progressive' military rule similar to that prevailing elsewhere in the Arab world. Moscow looked upon the Numayri regime with favour, commending both its 'independent' domestic and foreign policies and urged creation of a broad 'national front'. It endorsed Numayri's efforts to crush the rebellion of southern

60 V. Kudryavtsev, 'Iraq Moves Forward', *Izvestia*, 8 June 1972, p. 4; translated in *CDSP*, XXIV (12 July 1972), pp. 13–14.
61 Ibid. p. 14.
62 R. A. Ulyanovsky, 'When the Chains Have Been Cast Off', *Izvestia*, 28 April 1971; translated in *CDSP*, XXIII (25 May 1971), p. 23.
63 Kudryavtsev, op. cit. p. 14.
64 Ulyanovsky, 'Marxist and Non-Marxist Socialism', op. cit. p. 126.
65 Ibid. pp. 126, 127.

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(and black) elements from south Sudan. Although a number of communists did participate in the post-*coup* government, the 'progressive' army officers looked upon them with considerable suspicion and, periodically, purged both communists and their sympathizers from their positions. The Communist Party as an organization was outlawed in 1969. In the face of such uncertainty, there was resistance to disbanding the Party. The Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) General Secretary, Abdel Khalik Mahgoub, in particular, rejected this alternative, despite the fact that, as in the case of the Egyptian Communist Party, Moscow had apparently endorsed this strategy.

In late 1970 and early 1971, the Numayri regime cracked down on the SCP, removing its members from government agencies and dissolving communist-led front organizations. Mahgoub himself was arrested. In response, the SCP central committee at a secret meeting in Khartoum decided to overthrow the Numayri regime. On 19 July 1971 a communist-led *coup* was carried out. Their efforts, however, proved in vain for, 72 hours later, forces loyal to Numayri crushed the rebellion. The *coup* was swiftly liquidated and the plotters executed.

The agonies for Moscow were several. Sensing a new 'progressive transformation' in the Sudan, the Kremlin responded favorably to the rebel government of Major Hashim al-Ata, a pro-communist military officer. Not only did *Tass* report with favour al-Ata's statement that his government would maintain 'friendly relations with the socialist countries, headed by the great Soviet Union', but the Soviet Ambassador was the only foreign diplomat to call on al-Ata during his short-lived tenure in office.[66]

Numayri's anger at Soviet behaviour at the time of the *coup* was increased by Moscow's sharp criticism of his treatment of the SCP. After much fanfare, including public interrogations and court martials, the leaders of the 19 July *coup* as well as a number of well-known Sudanese communists were executed—including Mahgoub himself, General Secretary since 1949, Shafi Ahmed al-Sheikh, a leading trade unionist and a recipient of the Lenin Peace Prize, and Joseph Garang, a leading Party official from south Sudan. The execution of such high-ranking communist officials, whose own role in the July events is still unclear, brought sharp protests from the Soviet government. Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny sent a message to General Numayri denouncing the 'bloody terror' and 'cruel measures' then being implemented against the 'democratic forces of the Sudan'. Numayri was furious; he became increasingly convinced that the Russians were behind the communist-led *coup*. Several weeks after the event he said as much. 'Moscow wants its agents to take power and govern the country', he declared in September, 'but Moscow has been as stupid as the conspirators.' A number

66 *Pravda*, 21 July 1971; translated in *CDSP*, XXIII (17 August 1971), p. 1; and *USSR and Third World*, I (5 July–15 August 1971), p. 419.

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of Soviet and other communist diplomats and officials were expelled. Though strained, diplomatic relations were not, however, broken.[67]

As a result of the Sudanese developments, Soviet-Egyptian relations were brought to a near breaking-point. Cairo was very angry about the attempted *coup*—the influential editor of *Al-Ahram*, Muhammad Haykal, referred to it as a ' prodigious historical error '—and along with President Qadaffi of Libya, Egyptian President Sadat gave Numayri full support and assistance in his crushing of the uprising. In response to an apparent request from Moscow that the UAR recognize the al-Ata government, Sadat is reported to have told the Soviet Ambassador: ' You must know we Arabs will never be Marxists; and that is why we will not allow a Marxist regime to exist in our region.' Though reportedly placed on alert, UAR military forces were spared the necessity of intervention by the successful countercoup.[68]

Moscow clearly regarded Sadat's support of Numayri as gross ingratitude. Soviet-Egyptian relations, it should be noted, were already under some pressure. In April 1971, two months before the Sudanese developments reached a crisis point, Vice-President Ali Sabry was arrested on charges of having conspired to seize power. Though not a communist, Sabry was strongly pro-Soviet. His arrest could not but have been a source of concern for the Russians. Moscow's resentment of Sadat's internal policies was further exacerbated when, as a result of the Sudanese developments, a number of prominent UAR pro-communists were arrested, including Khalid Muhyi ad-Din, head of the UAR World Peace Council and Lenin Prize Winner. Moscow angrily demanded an explanation.[69] By early 1972 mistrust had grown so pronounced that a conference was called in Cairo in April to settle differences between the USSR and the Arabs. Though both sides reportedly aired their grievances openly, nothing was accomplished.[70] Three months later, Soviet military advisers were summarily expelled from Egypt.

Thus for all its efforts, Moscow has on its hands a group of restive and suspicious ' national-democratic ' Arab leaders. Though *Pravda* quotes Sadat as having said that the withdrawal of Soviet military personnel can ' in no way affect the basic principles of Egyptian-Soviet friendship ',[71] the Kremlin clearly has lost considerable influence—and military bases—in the Middle East. Moscow is now seeking to court the Ba'athist regimes in Iraq and Syria. However, such successes as the Kremlin may have will be more a function of the anti-Cairo sentiments prevalent in both countries than of any sympathy for the Soviet or

[67] *USSR and Third World*, I (20 September–24 October 1971), p. 554; I (5 July–15 August 1971), pp. 414–20; and ' Events in the Sudan ', *Pravda*, 31 July 1971; translated in *CDSP*, XIII, 29 (17 August 1971), p. 6.

[68] *USSR and Third World*, I (5 July–15 August 1971), p. 395, and I (16 August–19 September 1971), p. 464.

[69] Ibid. I (20 September–24 October 1971), p. 522.

[70] Ibid. II (13 March–17 April 1972), p. 209.

[71] *Pravda*, 20 July 1972; translated in *CDSP*, XXIV (16 August 1972), p. 18.

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communist cause. Though the USSR and Iraq signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in April 1972, and two communists are now participating in the Baghdad government, it should be recalled that Iraq has been the scene of some very bitter anti-communist repressions. (The Iraqi Communist Party in June 1971 published a list of its members who had been imprisoned, tortured to death or summarily executed by the Ba'athists.) [72]

The USSR has suffered a diplomatic defeat of great importance. In addition, despite the Soviet-Egyptian communiqué (July 1971) in which 'both sides expressed their conviction that anti-Communism causes damage to the liberation aspirations and national interests of peoples, and that it should not be tolerated',[73] the communist parties in all Arab states (except Lebanon) are banned, and their leaders in exile, under detention or close surveillance. And, as a result of Chinese expression of sympathy for the Numayri government 'when the traitorous conspiracy took place', and a $30 million Chinese loan, Khartoum's relations with Peking have been improving.[74] Moscow's policies towards the Arab left have clearly come to grief.

WHAT general conclusions can be drawn regarding Soviet policies towards leftist regimes in the Third World? The first thing that seems clear is that the great expectations of a decade ago about the prospects for 'revolutionary advance' in the developing countries have been drastically revised downward. The earlier optimism, it should be noted, seems to have been largely genuine. There is a ring of truth to Tyagunenko's explanation that

> . . . in the late 1950s and early 1960s, as colonial regimes were toppling on every hand and some liberated countries rejected the capitalist way, some assumed that all, or almost all the developing countries would opt for the non-capitalist way without much delay. This view was confirmed by the rapid growth of the economic might and authority of world socialism, especially after the USSR's launching of the world's first sputnik and Yuri Gagarin's fantastic flight in outer space.

This enthusiasm was also encouraged, he suggests, by the fact that 'the leaders of the national liberation movement . . . all declared their socialist aims. . . .' All these factors taken together led to 'an exaggeration of the achievements of countries with a socialist orienation. . . .' [75]

Though some Soviet analysts began to have doubts and reservations much earlier—Soviet thinking regarding Africa, for example, revealed

[72] *USSR and Third World*, I (16 August–19 September 1971), p. 455.
[73] Ibid. I (5 July–15 August 1971), p. 394.
[74] Ibid. II (6 December 1971–17 January 1972), pp. 60–61.
[75] 'The Theory and Practice of the Non-Capitalist Way', op. cit. p. 14. Tyagunenko's remarks are, of course, self-serving, in that he was one of the enthusiasts for Khrushchev's earlier policies. His comments, nevertheless, seem quite plausible. After all, many Western analysts were then expressing concern (or delight) about the leftist cast they saw developing in the political systems of the newly-emerging states.

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misgivings and disillusionment as early as 1961 [76]—they were not openly expressed. As noted above, Khrushchev saw considerable political benefit in a close and enthusiastic embrace of fraternal revolutionary allies in the developing states. However, as Tyagunenko relates, 'there occurred a certain cooling off, especially after the events in Indonesia, Ghana and Mali, and there followed a period of "the revaluation of values".' Thus, as he admits, 'the experience already gained', i.e. the overthrow of a number of prominent 'revolutionary democrats', now 'makes a sober analysis possible'.[77]

Earlier hopes of creating new revolutionary states in the Third World were now revealed to be largely fanciful. With the ouster of such favourites as Ben Bella and Nkrumah, Moscow began to take a harder and closer look at the relatively backward conditions, politically and economically, prevailing in most Third World countries. In the mid-1960s, Soviet writers began to express a growing awareness of the relative durability of nationalistic, religious and even tribal influences on the political environment of these largely pre-industrial states. The emphasis, increasingly, was on 'the strong survivals of patriarchal mentality' and 'the influence of religious ideology', the persistence of 'primitive-communal' and 'patriarchal-tribal' institutions, acute tribal frictions, and the existence of 'massive illiteracy' among populations 80–90 per cent peasant.[78] The prevailing condition in the Third World, it came to be recognized, was socio-economic backwardness. As Ulyanovsky wrote in 1965, 'not one of the countries following the non-capitalist path promises to become an industrial or even an agrarian-industrial state in the near future. This will require . . . a *minimum* of 100 to 150 years' (italics added).[79]

In this type of socio-economic environment, talk of the transition to socialism becomes patent nonsense. One writer noted that he 'would sometimes hear in Cairo, even from educated people, remarks such as "Socialism must be built such as they launch a rocket: Three, two, one—off!" It is only a step from such ideas to disappointments and set-backs.'[80] While continuing to stress the progressive role of the national liberation movement, N. A. Simoniya warned that 'the anti-imperialist orientation of a revolution in itself tells us nothing about its social makeup'.[81] It would be wrong, he suggested, to exaggerate the progress made thus far; in point of fact, in most countries in Asia and Africa, 'there has been—fairly rapid in some countries and slow in others—an

76 'Ten Years of Soviet and Chinese Policies in Africa', *Mizan*, X (May/June 1968), pp. 110–11.

77 'The Theory and Practice of the Non-Capitalist Way', op. cit. p. 14.

78 See, for example, Kiva, op. cit. pp. 25–27 and V. L. Li, 'The Role of the National Liberation Movement in the Anti-Imperialist Struggle', *International Affairs* (No. 12 1971), p. 73.

79 R. Ulyanovsky, 'Socialism and the National Liberation Struggle', *Pravda*, 15 April 1966, p. 4; translated in *CDSP*, XVIII (4 May 1966), p. 24.

80 'The Ebb Tide?', *Mizan*, VIII (September–October 1966), p. 190.

81 Simoniya, op. cit. p. 13.

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evolution along the *capitalist* road' (italics added). In Asia, Simoniya noted, out of 28 liberated states, only two, Burma and Syria, were seen to be on the non-capitalist road; in Africa, of the 38 sovereign states then in existence, five—Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and the UAR—had taken the non-capitalist path of development.[82]

Even in those instances where a 'progressive' path has been taken, Simoniya warned, chances of evolution into socialism were rather small. 'In far from every case', he notes, 'do we observe the growth of democratic national liberation movements into socialist ones'. Although a tendency for such evolution does exist, 'it is not yet either the dominant nor the only one'. As in the case of Ghana—where 'bureaucrats assumed bourgeois traits'—the possibility of reversion to the capitalist path could not be excluded. 'For these reasons', concludes Simoniya, 'one cannot speak of "growing into socialism" as the dominant or general tendency in the development of national liberation movements.'[83]

Obviously, expectations regarding the imminence of 'revolutionary advance' has been downgraded. The transition of the new states to socialism, it is now generally felt, will be a very lengthy process. As one authoritative source described it, 'the non-capitalist development of the Afro-Asian countries will continue for several decades'.[84] Others see the assimilation to scientific socialism as 'a process that may span an entire historical epoch'.[85]

Given these sombre assessments, it is difficult to take Moscow's theoretical pronouncements regarding the 'non-capitalist path of development' seriously. References to Somalia, in this connexion, are a case in point. Although *Pravda* has characterized it as 'one of the most backward countries in Africa [with] three-quarters of the population leading nomadic lives',[86] some Soviet pundits insist on designating this woefully primitive nation as having taken the progressive, non-capitalist route. Clearly, Somalia's elevation to this exalted status has less to do with its internal arrangements than with the fact that the USSR has in recent years grown increasingly concerned about developments in East Africa. It has been Moscow's interest in cultivating the Mogadishu government, and especially in countering a growing Chinese influence in the region, that has prompted the USSR to train and equip the 12,000-man Somali army and air force and to extend $50 million in economic aid (since 1963). The Kremlin obviously is less concerned with Somalia's progress in its 'transition to a settled way of life' (according to *Pravda*, the country's

[82] Ibid. p. 16.

[83] Ibid. pp. 17, 16, 21. The author cites four instances of national liberation movements evolving into socialist revolutions—Mongolia, China, North Korea and North Vietnam (p. 16).

[84] Ulyanovsky, 'The "Third World"—Problems of Socialist Orientation', op. cit. p. 34.

[85] Kim and Kaufman, 'On Sources of Socialist Conceptions in Developing Countries', op. cit. p. 128.

[86] *USSR and Third World*, I (2 June–4 July 1971), p. 331; see *USSR and Third World*, I (25 October–5 December 1971), p. 623, and Ulyanovsky, 'Marxist and Non-Marxist Socialism', op. cit. p. 125 for references to Somalia and the transition to socialism.

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main problem), than with the recent agreement that allows it to build a major naval base and military headquarters on Somalia's southern coast, facilities which could be of use as a fuelling point for a Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean.[87]

The Kremlin clearly has been using its doctrinal pronouncements as a form of political cajolery, honouring those regimes it seeks to court with flattering ideological labels. A similar ploy has been attempted in Tanzania and the Congo (Brazzaville). Here the main Soviet concern has been to obtain some influence in areas which have been the primary focus of Chinese activity in Africa. Peking has promised over $400 million to finance the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia railway, a sum larger than the $325 million extended by the Soviet Union for the Aswan High Dam, completed in 1970.[88] The regimes in both Dar es Salaam and Brazzaville are committed to the construction of ' socialism '. In fact, in 1969, the Congo was declared a People's Republic. Playing on their common ' socialist ' ideological affinities, Moscow apparently still hopes for closer relations with these ' progressive ' regimes. But despite Soviet flattery, the head of neither seems to have been turned. In both instances, relations with Peking are considerably closer than those with Moscow (though, in the case of the Congo, France probably is still the dominant outside influence).[89]

The prime criterion necessary to earn a developing country special status in Moscow's eyes is its foreign policy orientation, not the character of its economic-political systems. Nations regularly identified as ' national-revolutionary democratic states '—such as the UAR, Guinea, Burma and, usually, Algeria—have either demonstrated a consistent willingness to support Soviet policies (by cooperating with the USSR at the United Nations and other international conferences, by providing facilities for Soviet naval and air forces, by sending its students to Friendship University in Moscow) or are strategically located in terms of the Sino-Soviet rivalry. Burma, much like Tanzania and the Congo (Brazzaville), falls in the second category. Here, too, Soviet efforts to counter considerable Chinese influence have been to small avail. States occasionally mentioned as ' national-revolutionary democratic states '—Syria, Iraq, Tanzania, Somalia and the Congo (Brazzaville)—are apparently considered only episodic allies. Their ranking depends both on the fluctuations of internal politics (especially in Syria and Iraq) and the requirements of Soviet policy vis-à-vis China at any given time. Finally there is the category of former ' national-revolutionary democratic states '—such as Indonesia, Ghana, Mali and the Sudan. In each of these cases, ' progressive ' leaders were either overthrown (Nkrumah and Keita)

87 *USSR and Third World*, I (25 October–5 December 1971), p. 640, and II (18 April–21 May 1972), p. 292.

88 ' Communist Aid: For Whose Benefit ', *The Economist* (6 November 1971), p. 66.

89 See George T. Yu, ' Peking's African Diplomacy ', *Problems of Communism*, No. 2 (March–April 1972), pp. 16–24; and Marvine Howe, ' French Influence Pervades Marxist Congo ', *The New York Times*, 17 July 1972.

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or turned from 'the path of social progress' to either pro-Peking 'adventurism' (Sukarno) or 'anti-Communist hysteria' (Numayri).

The basic point should by now be obvious. Soviet attitudes and policies regarding leftist regimes in the Third World are solely a function of *raison d'état*. To the degree that such regimes can help promote Moscow's interests, either in extending Soviet influence or in undercutting that of the United States or China, they are given special mention by Soviet theorists and receive economic and military support. Where they do not, such regimes are condemned (however strong their 'socialist' inclinations) as being on the 'capitalist path of development', dominated by reactionaries and under bourgeois and neo-colonial influences.

The granting of Moscow's favour and largesse depends, therefore, on whether the leftist regime in question adheres to a pro-Soviet policy orientation. Soviet sources openly admit as much. Noting that relations among 'the principal revolutionary trends of our day implies reciprocal support', one writer reminds us that 'proletarian internationalism is not a one-way street. . . .' In return for 'all-round Soviet support', the 'national liberation movement . . . must also stand up in defence of the socialist countries'.[90] Ulyanovsky puts the matter rather more baldly when he asserts that the extension of assistance 'makes definite demands' on the 'foreign policy guidelines and concepts' of the developing states; it 'demands convergence with the socialist countries. . . .'[91]

Moscow's long-standing favourable attitude towards Egypt is obviously a product of such considerations. The Kremlin's designation of the UAR as a 'national-revolutionary democratic state' and its commitment of military and economic aid (to the tune of about $3·7 billion, i.e. $1·2 billion in economic assistance, $2·5 billion in military aid, since 1954)[92] indicates Moscow's considerable pleasure that the UAR under Nasser's leadership became a *point d'appui* for the extension of Soviet influence in the Middle East, in that Nasser allowed the stationing of 20,000 Soviet advisers in Egypt and permitted the Soviet Mediterranean fleet the use of its naval and air facilities. It was obviously such foreign policy actions rather than his efforts to implement 'Arab Socialism' that won Nasser such great acclaim in Moscow before he died in 1970. To the extent that his successor Anwar Sadat has adhered to a similarly pro-Soviet line, he, too, received plaudits as a great 'progressive' leader.

THUS, after nearly two decades of experience, the Kremlin leaders have concluded that the only sure guide to policy in the Third World is the protection and enhancement of the state interests of the USSR. Given

[90] Li, op. cit. p. 72.
[91] Ulyanovsky, 'The "Third World"—Problems of Socialist Orientation', op. cit. p. 29.
[92] *Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1971*, Research Study, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 15 May 1972), pp. 4, 18. According to 'official Egyptian statistics' as reported in the Cairo newspaper, *Al Ahram*, Soviet military assistance alone had reached a total of $5 billion. *The New York Times*, 31 March 1972.

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this conservative perspective, they pay little serious attention, as we have already seen, to the fate of their ideological brethren in the local communist organizations. It is not only that the communist parties in the new states are small and without much political influence or potential, but that the Soviet leadership no longer regards the spread of socialism through a communist revolution as desirable. Recent difficulties with comrades in Peking, Bucharest, Prague and Havana has undoubtedly reduced whatever interest Moscow ever had in fostering the creation of new communist states in the Third World.

Furthermore, as a consequence of many disappointments and failures, Soviet decision-makers have also grown cool to their erstwhile protegés, the ' national-revolutionary democrats '. Evidence of such coolness can be found in the Soviet reaction, or lack of reaction, to the overthrow of Modibo Keita as head of the government of Mali in November 1968. In sharp contrast to the public expressions of anguish which accompanied the ouster of Nkrumah in 1966, the Kremlin paid virtually no attention to the events in Mali despite the fact that Keita had been one of the few reigning leaders in Africa seriously committed to Marxian scientific socialism.[93]

The Kremlin apparently has become chary of too close an identification with the ' national democrats '. This seems true for several reasons. First, Moscow is clearly very reluctant to undertake burdensome new economic obligations. Recognizing the enormity of the problems confronting the new states, not to speak of their own continued economic difficulties, the Soviet leaders have taken a strikingly cold-blooded stance on the question of economic assistance. As one writer frankly observed, ' world socialism does not set itself the task of carrying all the material costs of providing external financing of the liberated countries '.[94] In the view of some analysts, the relatively tepid Soviet reaction to the Marxist regime of Salvador Allende reflects Moscow's concern that Chile, like Cuba, might become a substantial economic headache. (' Socialist ' Cuba under Fidel Castro has accumulated a total debt to the USSR—excluding the cost of military aid—estimated at $3 billion.[95])

Soviet writers in recent years have expressed growing alarm about the burden of the foreign aid programme on the Soviet economy. Moscow seems particularly perturbed by the fact that some of the countries on the

[93] Robert Legvold, ' The Soviet Union's Changing View of Sub-Saharan Africa ', in *Soviet Policy in Developing Countries*, W. Raymond Duncan (ed.) (Waltham, Mass.: Guin-Blaisdell, 1970), pp. 72–74. Under Keita, according to Legvold, ' Mali had set out to create a socialist society by means of a highly-centralized and well-disciplined political party trained in the precepts of Marxism-Leninism and committed to a rigorous socialization of the economy, rural as well as industrial. . . . Much as Mali did . . . the Soviet leaders scarcely seemed to notice.' Regarding the *coup*, ' The Soviet press assumed a completely neutral stance; it neither condemned those who overthrew Keita nor expressed regret over his fall.'

[94] Li, op. cit. p. 72.

[95] Leon Gouré and Jaime Suchlicki, ' The Allende Regime, Actions and Reactions ', *Problems of Communism*, XX (May–June 1971), p. 55; and Leon Gouré and Julian Weinkle, ' Cuba's New Dependency ', ibid. (March–April 1972), p. 75.

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'non-capitalist path' are taking Soviet promises of 'providing every assistance' rather too literally. 'Some African leaders', according to one writer, 'affirm that their countries cannot develop along the non-capitalist road unless such development is fully financed by the socialist states. . . .' This, the Soviet writer confesses, 'the socialist countries are not in a position to do'.[96] The Kremlin leaders have become so alarmed about this problem that, reversing long-standing dogma on the inherently exploitative character of 'imperialist' aid, they now even suggest that Western capital can play a positive role in the economic development of the new states. And in fact Soviet writers now recommend that the flow of Western assistance be accelerated. To justify this ideological turn-about, Moscow has claimed that such aid from capitalist nations 'would be a partial restitution of the damage which was caused in the period of colonialism and is still being caused as a result of neo-colonialist policy'.[97] The fact that it also helps reduce the pressure on scarce Soviet resources is undoubtedly not lost on the Soviet leaders.

Though it maintains a substantial aid programme—despite earlier indications of a cutback, the USSR extended $862 million in economic assistance in 1971, more than twice its previous yearly average[98]—the Kremlin leaders still regard 'the building of socialism and Communism' in the USSR as their 'chief contribution' to the world socialist cause. To the extent that the foreign aid programme detracts from this overriding purpose, it is curtailed. Soviet wariness, however, extends considerably beyond this. While concerned about the economic burden of their 'fraternal alliance' with the developing countries, Moscow is even more apprehensive about becoming too closely involved with erratic and possibly even dangerous clients.

As we have seen, the Soviet leaders have been aware for some time that support of 'national-revolutionary democratic states' entailed many risks. Given their general weakness and instability, such client regimes were neither durable nor reliable. The costs of a close commitment to politically fragile though progressive governments became apparent during the 1960s when, as a result of the *coups*, the USSR lost considerable influence and prestige (in Ghana and Algeria) and a sizeable investment of economic and military resources (in Indonesia). Some Soviet sources have expressed concern that the incompetence of some of their 'progressive' clients is tarnishing the good name of socialism around the world. An even greater risk, however, is the tendency toward 'Leftist adventurism' and 'extremism' which persists within the national liberation movement, especially in the Middle East.

What Moscow is concerned with here, obviously, is the danger of a direct military conflict involving the USSR. Whether as a result of some

[96] Quoted in David Morison, 'USSR and Third World, III, Questions of Economic Development', *Mizan*, XII (December 1970), p. 135.

[97] Ibid. p. 135.

[98] *Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1971*, op. cit. p. ii.

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'reckless action' by one of its protegés, or the use of violence by some guerrilla organization, the risk of escalating conflict, especially in areas where the United States has interests and commitments, is seen by Moscow as real—and intolerable. Soviet sources therefore have consistently downgraded the importance of guerrilla activity in both the Middle East and Latin America; they have been especially critical of the violence-prone groups in the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) (such as the Popular Front of George Habbash) and the strategy of subversion and violence espoused by Fidel Castro at the Tri-Continent Congress in Havana in 1966.[99]

THIS cautious posture creates two major problems. First, it risks antagonizing Moscow's would-be clients in the world revolutionary movement. The Egyptians in 1967, the radical groups in the PLO, and Fidel Castro were all clearly angered by Moscow's less than enthusiastic support of their cause. The Kremlin leaders, however, are clearly willing to incur the wrath of their revolutionary protegés for the sake of maintaining stable relations with the United States. The second problem is considerably more serious. The USSR's moderate policy line risks giving their erstwhile Chinese allies additional political leverage. Peking consistently has been urging revolutionary forces around the world to 'wars of national liberation'. Violent revolution, the Maoists have argued, is the only successful strategy. Given this perspective, the Chinese have been willing to support, with arms and money, such groups as the Popular Front. As early as 1965, the Chinese received Ahmed Shuquairy, the militant leader of the PLO, with a tempestuous welcome and signed a pact to supply diplomatic, military and economic support to the Palestinians. After their defeat in 1967, Radio Peking urged the Arabs, 'Plunge into long-term, fierce struggles! Fight on unflinchingly to final victory!' During the bitter armed showdown in Jordan in September 1970, Radio Peking urged the Palestinian guerrillas to 'fight on against the Jordanian military clique and their American militarist masters until final victory'.[100]

Coming from a more 'leftist' position, the Chinese represent a potentially serious challenge to Soviet influence among the brethren in the 'world revolutionary movement'. The Kremlin leaders have been especially stung by Chinese charges of the USSR's lack of support to the revolutionary forces. Fearful of Chinese inroads among the radical militants, Moscow defensively warns against the 'harmful influences of Maoist policy' and 'the dangers of leftist adventurism' and 'leftist extremism'. All those who endorse 'extremist' strategies, they charge,

[99] See David P. Forsythe, 'The Soviets and the Arab-Israeli Conflict', *World Affairs*, Vol. 134 (Autumn 1971), pp. 132–42; Wayne S. Smith, 'Soviet Policy and Ideological Formulations for Latin America', *Orbis*, XV (Winter 1972), pp. 1139–43, and 'Soviet Said to Counsel Arabs to Caution', *The New York Times*, 30 June 1972.

[100] John K. Cooley, 'China and the Palestinians', *The Journal of Palestine Studies*, 1 (1972), pp. 24–25, 27, 29.

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risk the same fate as befell the Indonesian communists who, after their attempted seizure of power failed in September 1965, were brutally and bloodily suppressed. The Kremlin leaders remain highly sensitive to this challenge from the left; as Soviet writers themselves confess, Peking's 'adventurist' approach has proven popular. 'Infected with petty-bourgeois disdain for class organizations and proletarian ideology', many young people in the Third World are 'extremely receptive to Leftist slogans and "revolutionary" demagoguery'.[101] On this front, the USSR is on the defensive.

Nevertheless, the Kremlin leaders adhere to a cautious line. Fearful that 'adventurist' policies might increase the danger of nuclear war, they tend to avoid violent confrontations. Thus in September 1970, the Soviet ambassador in Damascus counselled the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Jordan (where they had intervened on behalf of the Palestinian rebels) lest they precipitate an American intervention.[102] Moscow is especially anxious to avoid direct Soviet military involvement in a dangerous conflict situation. 'The Soviet Union has never shirked . . . its responsibilities for the future of world peace and world progress,' notes one Soviet commentator.

> But that does not mean that the principle of military support should be *irrationally* made absolute. In the age of atomic weapons, calls to settle scores with imperialism by the military might of the Socialist countries are extremely reckless (italics added).[103]

Such reticence has cost the Kremlin dearly in recent months. It was Moscow's continued refusal to make new offensive weapons systems available to the UAR which led Cairo, in July 1972, to expel the 20,000 Soviet military advisers stationed in the UAR. The Kremlin leaders obviously believed that the delivery of such weaponry would have been 'irrational' and 'extremely reckless'. According to Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat, Moscow's refusal only revealed its 'excessive and exaggerated caution'.[104]

Despite fervid proclamations of loyalty to 'the Leninist principle of solidarity with the people fighting for national liberation and social emancipation', the Soviet leaders obviously give first priority to the state interests of the USSR. Whether they are 'refusing to make the principle of military support absolute', as in the case of Egypt and to a lesser extent Vietnam, or abandoning a local communist force to the not-too-tender mercies of favoured 'revolutionary democrats' (as in Iraq under Kassem), the Kremlin always proceeds from an 'objective class analysis' in terms of which the class interests of the world revolutionary movement and the state interests of the USSR are seen to be identical. Thus, in its drive to

[101] *USSR and Third World*, I (25 October–5 December 1971), p. 570.
[102] Cooley, op. cit. p. 29.
[103] I. Shatalov, 'Leninist Foreign Policy and the National Liberation Movement', *International Affairs*, No. 1 (January 1969), p. 72.
[104] *The New York Times*, 25 July 1972.

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improve relations with Turkey, Iran and Iraq, Moscow has shown a nearly total indifference towards the Cypriot communists (all Greek), the Iranian Communist Party, and the Kurdish nationalist movement. Similarly, the recent struggles of Biafra and the black Sudanese were ignored in deference to the governments of Nigeria and the Sudan. In dealing with the Afro-Asian left, Moscow is obviously motivated far more by self-interest than sentiment.

WHAT is left, then, of the left in the Third World? In the Soviet view, not much. The 'national democrats' from whom so much was once expected have turned out to be of little consequence. This is true largely for two reasons. First, Moscow's primary foreign policy concerns in recent years have been the West, especially the United States, and China. Relations with the new states of the Third World are viewed primarily in terms of these two basic interests. Once it became apparent that the developing states do not significantly affect relations among the major powers—though at times, as in the Middle East and South-East Asia, they obviously can play an important role—interest in Moscow (as in Washington) flagged. Revolutionary rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding, 'the national liberation movement' is for Soviet policymakers of only indirect concern. Whether it be a *coup* in Algeria or a counter-*coup* in Indonesia, a 'national democratic' regime in Guinea or a 'bourgeois' government in Ceylon, these are matters usually of only local political importance and therefore of little immediate consequence to the Kremlin rulers.

Soviet loss of interest in the Third World left is also the result of nearly two decades of bitter and frustrating experience. The radical militants in the developing states have obviously had very few successes. Sub-Saharan Africa in particular is a disaster area. Of seven potentially promising situations, none has really fulfilled its original expectations. One 'progressive' regime was scuttled at birth (the Congo under Lumumba and Gizenga), two were overthrown (Ghana and Mali), Somalia is building 'nomadic socialism' (although it may provide the USSR with port facilities), and, to the extent that a communist presence becomes significant in Tanzania or the Congo (Brazzaville), it is more likely to be Chinese than Soviet. In only one African country, Guinea, does the 'national democrat' leadership seem effective, but even here, Sekou Touré's socialism is far more nationalist than Marxist-Leninist. Africa thus far has been the graveyard of 'scientific socialism'.

Even where they are more viable, as in the Middle East, Moscow has found the 'national democrats' indifferent, unreliable, expensive, ungrateful, and even at times dangerous allies. As the Kremlin leaders have seen time and again, Arab 'revolutionary democrats' are given to authoritarian, i.e. anti-communist, 'excesses' which, as in the Sudan, may have anti-Soviet consequences; they often cannot use the expensive Soviet equipment they receive (as Egypt demonstrated in 1967) much to the

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anguish of hard-pressed Soviet taxpayers; and even where the regime is pursuing ' positive neutrality ' and allowing the USSR use of naval and air facilities, it can involve the Kremlin in potentially explosive conflict situations.

Given this unhappy experience, Soviet interest in radical leftist regimes as such has sharply diminished. And, in fact, to the extent the Kremlin leaders are concerned about the Third World, the political colour of a particular regime is now of little matter. Moscow's long-standing interest in India, the single largest recipient of Soviet economic aid in the non-communist world, and its support of the Nigerian Federal Government's campaign to crush Biafra, had little to do with the ' progressiveness ' of their governments. Though neither has been elevated to the status of a ' national democracy ', the inherent importance of both countries to future developments in South Asia and Africa has been sufficient to stimulate and sustain considerable Soviet interest.

One final point: though the apparently natural symbiosis between Moscow and the Third World left has failed, the Kremlin leaders do not appear disillusioned. They still insist that Soviet power continues to exert a vital influence on the developing countries. While some theorists warn Soviet leaders to learn the lessons of the recent past, namely, that they cannot control events in these distant and troubled lands and that there is a serious risk to be run in ' the well-known exaggeration of the significance of the international factor ',[105] most Soviet analysts continue to emphasize the positive role to be played by the Soviet Union. They criticize any ' underrating of the influence on world revolutionary development of the world socialist system ' [106] and stress again and again the crucial importance of Soviet economic aid and ' all-round moral and political support '. ' This, and this alone ', according to Ulyanovsky, ' is the guarantee of repulsing the aggressive schemes and subversive actions of imperialism and reaction '. Soviet assistance, in his view, is one of the ' indispensable conditions that make a socialist orientation possible ' among the new states.[107]

Moscow's constant repetition of this theme is obviously put forth in the effort to persuade Third World leaders of the wisdom of maintaining close relations with the USSR, their disinterested and ever-faithful protector. Furthermore, by arguing that ' in present conditions ' the USSR ' objectively performs the role of the proletarian vanguard to the national liberation movement ',[108] the interests of the progressive forces in the Third World and those of the Soviet Union are neatly fused. What is good for the ' international vanguard ', i.e. the USSR, is naturally good for the ' revolutionary-democratic movement ' as a whole. The Soviet leaders clearly are trying to create the illusion that a symbiotic relation-

[105] Simoniya, op. cit. p. 13. See also Kim and Kaufman, op. cit. pp. 125–26.
[106] ' The Theory and Practice of the Non-Capitalist Way of Development ', op. cit. p. 14.
[107] Ulyanovsky, ' When the Chains Have Been Cast Off ', op. cit. pp. 22, 23.
[108] Li, op. cit. p. 74.

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ship between the USSR and the progressive forces in Third World countries continues to exist.

Given their decidedly unhappy experiences in the developing countries, it is difficult to believe that such claims are taken seriously. Why, then, continue to repeat them? To persuade the naïve and reinforce the idealistic at home and abroad? Perhaps. To convince the doubting Thomases in Moscow that the USSR still can exert a decided influence on developments in the Third World? Quite possibly. As has often been observed, the Kremlin's ideological formulations are often unconsciously intended to reinforce the faith of the Soviet leaders themselves. By continually stressing the critical role of 'the dominant international factor',[109] the Kremlin authorities may rekindle their undoubtedly strained faith in the efficacy of Soviet power. They may come to believe with a renewed vigour that the USSR does play an important role. One writer has recently observed:

> Life repeatedly shows that socialist construction, national liberation movements and revolutionary transformations in any country, regardless of the wishes of political leaders and theorists, were, are and will increasingly become the results of the world efforts of the international working class and its creation—the socialist system.[110]

Such formulations may well have a self-hypnotizing effect for, despite their many misfortunes in recent years, Soviet economic and military aid programmes seem to have been growing.[111] The Kremlin leaders apparently still believe that through economic assistance, arms transfers, and fraternal political guidance they can encourage Third World countries to follow a 'progressive' course.

Designed in part to reinforce the sceptical, stress on Soviet power and influence may also be intended to reassure the frightened. Moscow is increasingly worried, as we have seen, about the growing role of China in the Third World. While the Russians might logically assume that Peking will fare no better among radical elements in the developing countries than they have—and indeed there is little evidence thus far that any

[109] Shariddin, op. cit. p. 151.

[110] A. Sobolev, 'The Struggle of the CPSU for Unity of the World Communist Movement and Against Opportunism and Revisionism', *International Affairs* (No. 4, 1972), p. 57.

[111] According to a recent account, the Soviet Union has extended a total of $7·6 billion in economic assistance to developing nations since 1954. Soviet aid pledged in 1971 reached a figure of $862 million. In terms of economic assistance actually drawn—which amounted to approximately 47 per cent ($3·6 billion of the $7·6 billion) of economic aid offered, by far the greater part of such assistance has been delivered *since* the sober assessment of the post-Khrushchev leadership. Deliveries of economic aid: 1954–64: $1·195 billion; 1964–71: $2·415 billion. A similar pattern obtains regarding military assistance. Since 1955, when the programme began, total Soviet military aid has amounted to nearly $8 billion (slightly more than $1 billion in 1971). Here, again, the majority of credits have been offered since 1964: 1955–64: $3·790 billion; 1964–71: $4·160 billion. Though subject to periodic fluctuations, Soviet economic and military assistance programmes seem to have grown in importance. Figures cited compiled from *Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1971*, op. cit.

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important leftist group has been converted to Maoism—Soviet apprehension regarding China hardly lends itself to rational discussion. Assertions regarding the predominance of Soviet influence, therefore, as well as the Kremlin's continued involvement in the Third World, may be seen as a response to the perceived challenge of China. Soviet policies, like those elsewhere, are motivated as much by fear as by ambition.

Thus, official governmental spokesmen continue to assert full confidence in the relationship between the USSR and the leftist regimes in the Third World. They do so, in part, to avoid the costs of overt abandonment. Benign neglect of the principle of 'proletarian internationalism,' the doctrinal basis of Moscow's obligation to support 'progressive forces,' would damage the revolutionary self-image of the Soviet leaders. Such a posture would, in addition, run the risk of losing ground in the less-developed countries to the more militantly 'revolutionary' Chinese. Furthermore, disruption or reduction of existing assistance programs (or even the expectation of aid) would result in political losses—as both the Soviet Union and the United States found out at different times in Egypt. Continued loyalty to this policy, on the other hand, does not significantly constrain Soviet policy. As we have already seen, despite proclamations of fraternity with the 'world revolutionary movement,' the Kremlin with increasing success has been establishing good working relations with such 'bourgeois democratic' regimes as India and Nigeria as well as Iran and Turkey.

While the Kremlin's current foreign policy perspective allows it to sustain the rhetoric of 'fraternal alliance,' the Soviet leaders clearly do so without much expectation of meaningful gain. They may, therefore, strive to establish good relations with radical nationalist regimes and extend some measure of economic and military assistance. Soviet hopes for a significant pay-off, however, are not very great. The Kremlin's response to recent Middle Eastern developments are a case in point. Even when an apparently successful symbiotic relationship went awry—as in Egypt—the Soviet leaders, though clearly disappointed, took these political defeats with surprising equanimity. The very moderate response was a measure of the low level of Soviet involvement.

Less-optimistic, less-euphoric, perhaps less-ambitious than their predecessors, the current Soviet leaders seem more secure than Khrushchev and seem not to need the radical nationalists as much as he did. Brezhnev and Kosygin clearly ascribe more importance to traditional diplomatic matters—such as good relations with neighbouring states—than to ideologically-rooted notions regarding 'the fraternal alliance of progressive and revolutionary forces.' The symbiosis may have failed —but the Kremlin seems largely unconcerned.

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A Letter from Prague

George Moldau

I GO to Chebsko for the weekends, to a cottage, and I am always surprised and astonished at how remote and little informed the local people are about the political problems which 'stir up' life in Prague, and at their enviable ignorance and uncomplicated vision of the world they live in. And there is a precisely analogous relation between my friends from abroad and ourselves, so-called 'politically well-informed' people from Prague.

Not so long ago, an old colleague of mine arrived from Scandinavia. He was talking about the comments in the world press on the political trials in our country in July 1972. He said that the present political situation, the whole position of Czechoslovakia and that of Husak himself, as a puppet of the Soviet Union, is so absurd that no one can take it seriously. And that this also diminishes to some extent the importance of the opposition, including those who have been on trial here. Towards the end he asked me seriously whether people in our country agree at all with what political *emigrés*, like Pelikan, Goldstücker or Sik, are doing abroad and with the way in which they speak on behalf of Czechoslovakia. This caused me some embarrassment. How, without giving a long and complex description, does one explain to someone who does not live here any more the atmosphere which appears at first sight to prevail? It would take too long to explain the causes of this apparently contented apathy, so in the meantime we are left with the original, more concrete question of the relationship of the people who remained in Czechoslovakia towards the activities of Czechoslovak exiles.

In a laboratory a mouse or a guinea-pig which after a couple of attempts discovers that the cage-door does not give way, refrains from any further attempts to escape, lies in its cage without protest and, seemingly content, eats only what it is given as if it had no interest in escaping whatsoever. But the 'enlightened' breeder knows that this is only a ploy, and that if there were the slightest chance, or even a hint of a chance, for the mouse or guinea-pig to escape, it would forget about its 'domestication' and would run away. And there is a similar reaction among our people, of which the present leadership of the Communist Party is aware. So, in spite of all the check-ups and its 99·8 per cent vote in the last elections, it still watches feverishly and makes any kind of activity among the people impossible. It is even afraid of civic activity which is completely non-political. The reaction to these unnatural conditions is apathy and a quite striking lack of interest in anything political. Nevertheless, the person who on the surface is interested only in his earnings and in frequent holiday weekends will show enormous interest if you offer him, for example, Pelikan's *Listy* or Tigrid's *Svedectvi*

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(provided he does not think you are an informer). On learning from these that books by our writers are being published abroad, and that on the fourth anniversary of August 1968 a proclamation about the Czechoslovak situation was published in many world newspapers, his reaction will probably be:

> It is marvellous that somewhere at least something is being done, that not everyone is as silent as they are here, and that what happened during 1968 is not entirely forgotten.

A certain satisfaction will radiate from the speaker, although he himself belongs in general to the silent majority. Even a token resistance is almost heroism in Czechoslovakia now.

IN Czechoslovakia today there is virtually no hostility towards *emigrés* (apart from officially proclaimed 'public opinion'), and they are not even condemned by the nationalists. In this respect there is a basic difference between us and, for example, the Russians, who still think of Russian *emigrés* (for instance the writers) as traitors to the nation, even when they are in agreement with them politically. On the contrary, people in our country approve of going into exile, and to some extent even envy the determination shown by the exile, which they themselves lacked. In the case of a prominent scientist who has gone into exile, they are almost pleased that the results of his work will not be of assistance to the Soviet Union.

Exile is in fact an essential feature of Czechoslovak life. Indeed, Czechoslovakia can hardly be imagined without it; throughout modern times there has always been a certain section of the populace which emigrated, and in the end these *emigrés* always made an important contribution to the shaping of our own history. We remember for instance that in the first and second world wars, history was almost literally 'made' in exile, in the East or in the West, and that everyone understood this and was grateful for it.

Exile in the fifties was however slightly different from the current one. There is a great difference between the attitude of the average citizen towards the post-February (1948) emigration and towards that of post-August (1968). In the first case, only their supporters approved of the activities of the emigrants, whereas now support comes from the overwhelming majority of the nation, united in resistance. Furthermore it should be remembered that after February 1948 it was still possible to create history at home—at least a part of the population could really work—but not now. The present exile is, unfortunately, in terms of the cultural, political formation and continuation of our nation, performing the function of a 'Czechoslovak diaspora'.

After February 1948 some of the believers in one political ideology went abroad, while a group of people united by a different ideology became the 'government'; two groups with a different political and philosophical orientations confronted each other. In the sixties the

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antagonism had somehow diminished; this was simply the consequence of subsequent political development together with the disenchantment of the February 1948 generation. But the present situation is different. There is no one with any policy other than that of fulfilling the requirements of the USSR. There is no one who believes in any of the programmes which are being put forward, not even those who yesterday wrote and signed them. Any political upheaval, whether revolutionary or a palace *coup*, introduces another power group into the leadership, clears the way for other power groups who took part in the political change and who contributed something to it, and thus activists and leaders of a different kind are installed. But this does not apply to contemporary Czechoslovakia. There are people in key positions today whose main merit is their lack of opinions, and whose chief attribute is that they were never politically active and almost never participated in politics, because only such an apolitical person, with no originality or creativity, could get through the Novotny era, through 1968 and 1969 without 'harm', and still survive the test of 'all the phases' of the present check-ups. Anyone who was in the least interested in politics and who had some ability to lead and some political ambition, was exposed in one way or another and thus became unacceptable, for the Soviet Union is not keen to have in political positions in Czechoslovakia people who are in any way strongly opinionated and who could become real political partners. (For this reason Bilak is not exactly ideal for the Soviets either.) Today, except for a really tiny group of so-called 'inviters' and 'people who never betray', such as Kolder, Indra, and Bilak, or Jodas and Pamir, who are now both dead, and a few old county functionaries of a similar point of view (Husak or Svoboda do not come into this category of 'saints'), practically everyone else took part—and for that reason also compromised himself—during 1968. From the directors of enterprises and the presidium of the Writers' Union, to the district councils (MV) and the chairman of the street organization of the Communist Party, the selection criterion for the present 'leaders' at all these levels was a total lack of opinions, a lack of principles, or spinelessness and a willingness to adapt and to obey. Thus top posts of all kinds and at all levels are held today by people with no ability, who often have no knowledge whatsoever of the elementary principles of political work. Many of them—at least at the beginning—even lack the drive to rule.

SO we have a leadership without leaders, or a leadership without policies, and thus it is that Czechoslovakia and its tragedy (as my friend rightly pointed out) seems so ridiculous and unreal. It is only a poor caricature of Soviet politics. After all, Gustav Husak himself has only got secondhand power, power granted him as a favour, for he too was unscrupulous and compromised himself. Husak was always a very ambitious politician, who for years longed for power. What he envied Dubcek most of all was his popularity, and Husak's tragedy is precisely

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that he obtained power at the very moment when he was inevitably unpopular. The power was merely vested in him by the Soviet Union, and in order to keep it he had continually to prove his obedience. A man as ambitious and proud as Husak must hate the representatives of the Soviet policy, who left him with this bogus power for which he has paid with such humiliation. The other leading figures on the various levels of the Party and state apparatus, including various directors of schools, publishing-houses, 'captains of industry', and chief editors are in the same position. Everywhere in key positions are people who basically and fundamentally lack any political conviction, people who do not believe in themselves, who know that they have no 'merits' left. The present leaders lack completely the at times almost laughable pride of the previous leaders, pride derived from, say, 'class background' or the 'workers' profession', or some illegal activity.

The only positive feature of the people who 'decide' today is that they will never become fanatics, they will never manage to capture anyone by the strength of their conviction. They are not capable of leadership nor do they themselves feel 'entitled' to perform the functions they have been assigned. But these advantages have corresponding disadvantages, the worst of all being that these present power groups are so uncertain of themselves that they will never dare to take up any form of opposition. Their members know that their 'value' resulted only from their obedience. They know that their power was granted to them for their submissiveness, and that they cannot, and do not even know how they could hold it otherwise. They are aware that the slightest of pretexts would be sufficient for them to be got rid of and they also know that no argument would prevail against such a pretext. They are well aware of how they achieved power, and the very knowledge of the 'techniques' they used brings them sleepless 'Macbethian' nights. These 'leaders' are characterized by caution, inconspicuousness, lack of ideas and impersonal expression. They are always afraid and compensate for it by ever-increasing submissiveness and by suppressing any kind of activity around them. This may at times look like a Schweikian situation, but the resemblance is superficial. Schweik represents a form of rebellion, and behind any rebellion there is a self-confidence and a deep disdain for those in power. But no one in today's power groups is rebellious, and never will be; and if any of them are contemptuous, then subconsciously—or very rarely consciously—it is of themselves. They are afraid of those above them and of those below, and insecure in relation to both, being well aware of the 'inappropriateness' of their present positions. These people do not have the characteristics of the true, pre-war communists, or of their adversaries. True, they will never become fanatics. But it is also impossible to expect them ever to change and develop into real political leaders, to criticize the leadership and perhaps even guide a struggle for democratization. An ideological progress on their part similar to that undergone by some of the communists during the fifties

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(the same generation who prepared February 1948 and, 20 years after, January 1968) is absolutely impossible. Today's power groups—on all levels—are and will remain the most conservative element in the nation, acting as a brake on activity and criticism in all spheres of life. They will never become the 'spokesmen' of the nation, as did the writers or the majority of the communist-oriented intelligentsia in 1968. They can never 'compete' with the Czechoslovak exiles.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA has reached deadlock—it is a state without leaders. The people in power today cannot guide the political and cultural development of Czechoslovakia, and on the other hand the rest of us have no legal platform which we could begin to prepare for even minor reform.

And that is why Czechoslovakia's exiles are of such importance. With covert support from the home country, they can become the only real spokesmen of our nation. The political and cultural development of Czechoslovakia must now take the form of a modern diaspora, with all that this word implies in terms of cultural awareness. And when we say this, we at home are, alas, fully aware what this means for us personally. To realize this and to accept it is not easy for those who stayed. But because we are already aware of it, we are the more obliged to say it—clearly and publicly. We must give a mandate to those 'who are abroad', so that they themselves will realize their responsibility and act accordingly.

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A Conversation with Ota Sik

George R. Urban

Urban: At the time of the Czechoslovak reform movement, in 1956–68, there was a tendency in the Czechoslovak press and radio to attribute most of the country's troubles to Novotny's government and to the survival of Stalinism—especially the misdirection of the country's economy. Reading some of the complaints one was struck by their similarity with the complaints one hears in the West about the evils of centralization, the over-weening presence of bureaucracy, the dehumanization of work, the depersonalization of the individual—alienation, in short, in one form or another. The Czechs, by a skilful psychological transference—but possibly out of inexperience of the world outside their country—managed to pin all the blame for the unhappy state in which they found themselves on a convenient whipping boy: Stalinism personified by Novotny. But one wonders whether the Czechs and Slovaks wouldn't have been in for a horrible disappointment if, after a successful reformation of the Czech economy and body politic, they had found that the deeper causes of alienation remained unchanged, i.e. that a good deal of their troubles was not really due to the dictatorship of a few men or even to the system, but to the exigencies of mass industrial society.

In 1968 it was difficult to escape the impression that, for all their miseries, the Czechs and Slovaks were an optimistic nation, for they were led to believe that the good life could be attained by the removal of a few leaders, the reform of the economy, the elimination of certain party rules, the return to a purer form of Marxism and Leninism, and so on. Now there is no question that Novotny's policies must bear the brunt of the blame for what went wrong in Czechoslovakia. The question is how much of the blame should be apportioned to Stalinism, over-centralization, faulty planning, etc., and how much to the nature of the modern industrial system.

Sik: I think you have profoundly misunderstood the Czechoslovak reform movement. I don't think that either our economists or our political scientists and philosophers imagined for a moment that the Western world, the so-called capitalist world, had a positive alternative to offer to Stalinist bureaucratic socialism. I must say a word here about the semantics of the problem for it is too easy to assume that Stalinism is somehow coextensive with the cult of J. V. Stalin. It isn't. Social phenomena have to be given a name, and when we talk of Stalinism as a bureacratic system, we are simply saying that this system is neither progressive nor socialist. But in criticizing it we never implied that Western capitalism was the answer; we never imagined that the West would be without its own grave contradictions: social conflicts, bureaucratization, alienation and the rest. Stalinists, to our

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mind, are communists who ignore the basic objectives of socialism and protect their vested interests in the form of a particularly damaging dogmatism. I will, therefore, go on using the word Stalinism even though I do not, as I say, want to restrict the term to the cult of Stalin or the policies of the actual followers of Stalin.

Now, in Stalinist eyes, the Stalinist system is something diametrically opposed to Western society; we, on the other hand, believe that the bureaucratic order of Stalinism is not only *not* opposed to Western bureaucracy but that it is bureaucracy carried to its exponential extreme. When we talk of the problems of Western Europe and the United States we refer to the bureaucratization of society, the socially mismotivated pursuit of growth, the alienation of man and so on. Stalinism, however, far from remedying any of these phenomena, has taken them to absurd lengths. It has, in fact, fashioned state-monopolism into its *raison d'état*. This means that the monopolistic system, which in the West is surrounded by a number of checks and controls, has become the sole legitimate order in communist society. It means that under Stalinism there is a cast-iron hierarchy of disciplinarian relationships, that the economy is completely subordinated to the demands of heavy industry and arms production, and that the resulting alienation of man is incomparably greater than it is in any Western country, for all these programmes can only be carried out to the detriment of the individual and to the detriment of the service industries. You will see, therefore, that our critique of the state-monopolistic system of Stalinism was not accompanied by any naive expectation that the monopolistic system of private capitalism would offer us a valid alternative, but rather that we have been opposed to both.

Urban: I noticed with great interest that a remarkable specimen of self-examination of the kind you have just made was in fact published in Czechoslovakia after the Russian occupation. I am referring to a volume edited by Pavel Machonin, *Ceskoslovenska Spolecnost*, in which egalitarianism, bureaucratism and technocracy are shown to be the dangers which beset industrial society. I would hate to belittle the sins of Stalinism or exaggerate the virtues of Western industrial society but, as the contributors to this book argue, technocracy resembles socialism in its respect for technical competence, but it also resembles bureaucratism in its lack of democracy, and thus stands half way between the two: the evils of egalitarianism and bureaucracy aid and complement each other. I am stressing these points merely to show that technocracy, bureaucracy and egalitarianism overlap, and it is quite possible to think of a highly inequitable social order in which bureaucracy is the child of technocracy and not of a single-party system, although I would agree with you that the evils of a technocracy-led bureaucratization, which we are beginning to experience in the West do not compare with the evils of a totalitarian and politically motivated bureaucracy.

Sik: It is certainly true that the rapid industrialization of the Western countries has created its own technostructure, and it is also true that the

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social ethos of this technostructure reflects the methods of production every bit as faithfully as the small capitalist enterprises used to reflect theirs at an earlier stage. The difference is that today's technostructure is extraordinarily powerful, so that it can heavily influence consumer choice. Mind you, I believe it has always been the case that consumption was a function of production, but today the size and concentration of industry have spawned a bureaucracy which can no longer understand and cope with the vast variety of activities it is supposed to oversee and administer. For the ordinary citizen, who is at the suffering end of this process, this means fragmentation, depersonalization, poor motivation, and the rest.

And yet the picture is not wholly black. I have been in the West for some time now and I speak from personal experience when I say that, despite the growing power of Western monopolies, despite the technostructure and the bureaucratization of the economy, the market forces are still of decisive importance. Here is where I tilt lances with Galbraith. Of course, there has never been a time when supply and demand have been perfectly balanced by market forces alone, but it is, in my opinion, vastly preferable to have an imperfect market economy than to have none at all. The growth of monopolies and cartels has certainly distorted competition in the market economies; nevertheless, neither bureaucratization nor the power of the vast national and international companies has been sufficient to annul consumer-choice. The large Western enterprises still have to gear their production to the needs and tastes of the consumer, they still have to produce economically, and they still have to improve quality if they want to stay in business. These are three important factors which have completely ceased to matter in the communist economies because the free play of market forces has been suppressed there. When that happens, bureaucratization becomes an article of faith, consumer interests are violated as a matter of economic philosophy, and the consumer is simply told: 'This is what we are going to produce because we have laid it down in the Plan, and that is what you are going to consume.' The consumer is helpless.

Urban: What exactly was the point at issue between yourself and Galbraith?

Sik: Well, we met at a conference in Zurich on the subject of the manipulation of man in modern society—a well-trodden path by now. I gave a paper on the manipulation of the consumer in the East European states, and in this paper I tried to show how the East European consumer has become prostrate in the face of the all-powerful and ever-hungry Moloch of bureaucracy. Galbraith got up and countered my analysis with his thesis that there is no difference between manipulation in the East and manipulation in the West, that bureaucracy in the West is just as powerful as it is in the East and that there is really nothing to choose between the two. Well, I could not agree with him: one cannot put an equation mark between the ordinary man's manipulation in the West and his manipulation in the East European societies

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where bureaucracy has become a monster. If you do that you are making covert excuses for the East European variety, because the implication of what you're saying is that if the Western citizen can live with *his* bureaucracy—which is, as we know, unpleasant but not unbearable—so can the East European. But this is simply not true. Galbraith is clearly not familiar with Eastern Europe; if he were he would not be making such facile comparisons. We all know that there *is* manipulation in the West, but there is also a corrective mechanism which limits the possibilities of manipulation: there is competition between the various companies even though this competition is quite often rigged so that the consumer's choice may be illusory. But rather than taking up the cudgels against manipulation, Galbraith seems to be content with throwing up his hands in horror and declaring—with great wit, mind you, and in very fine English—that this is a wicked world which we cannot hope to change. An elegant gesture, but is it helpful?

Urban: Galbraith is also one of the main spokesmen of the idea that industrial societies converge because they share a common rationale. Would you say that this common rationale exists, and that industrial societies are, as it were, ineluctably driven into sharing a common social and cultural structure?

Sik: I have my own theory on this point. There are two ways in which societies may converge, and it is my earnest hope that the first will not materialize, but of course the possibility cannot be totally excluded. The first possibility is the bureaucratization of the whole of society, and this is Galbraith's point: if convergence consists of the fact that on both sides of the divide the market is disappearing, that planning is universally adopted and that industry is assuming such proportions that it is, for all practical purposes, centrally directed, then we can talk of convergence of a kind. However, this convergence would, in my opinion, be an entirely negative affair for it would mean the absolute bureaucratization of society, and the ordinary people would pay the price for it. Let me hasten to add that this sort of development is viewed with a great deal of sympathy by power elites both in the East and in the West, because elites look upon ordinary people as putty in their hands.

The second possibility of convergence—and this is the one I would support—is of a more positive kind and consists of two elements. First, it would try to eliminate some important causes of man's alienation by giving him direct access to decision-making. This means self-management, for it is through the representation of the citizen in all important organs of economic planning, social planning, local government, etc. that the conflict of interests between power elites and the powerless masses may eventually be overcome. All this sounds very sketchy and idealistic if one tries to summarize it in a few sentences, but we had a detailed blueprint in Czechoslovakia with which I will not burden you now.

The second element of my solution has to do with finding a balance between planning and the free play of market forces. I would definitely

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not want to have the market replaced by planning because the cost of this would have to be borne by the consumer. I would keep the market as a countervailing force to balance the monopoly-interests of the state. Planning would, by and large, be restricted to those parts of the economy in which market forces are unable to serve the long-term interests of society; clearly market forces are short-term forces, which cannot be expected to serve social interests. Here again I cannot agree with Galbraith when he claims that planning is bound to remain the preserve of the producers. I should like to see producers and consumers represented, on a basis of parity, wherever planning is done, from the state down to the small enterprise.

Urban: Are you hinting at participation (codetermination) on the Austrian/German pattern, or would the more radical Yugoslav example be closer to your thinking? What is interesting to observe is that although the Yugoslavs make great play with the Marxist provenance of workers' self-management, Marx and Engels never refer to workers' councils in their writings in so many words. I suppose they would not have been against them, but it is interesting that they should not have given us at least a broad outline of how they would like to see workers' councils operate in modern conditions.

Sik: I don't agree. In his work *The Civil War in France,* where Marx tries to generalize from the lessons of the Paris Commune, there is a clear reference to associations of workmen taking possession of the factories. . . .

Urban: . . . of abandoned workshops and factories 'under reserve of compensation' to the owners. A war-time measure, and I should have thought a flimsy precedent to build on.

Sik: Nevertheless Marx was showing that workers can manage their factories, and he was implying that self-management can be coordinated with social planning. This is the sort of thing we had in mind in Czechoslovakia. Nor can one say that Lenin has not written about workers' self-management. When the Soviet Party was preparing for its 7th Congress in 1918, Lenin suggested that all factories should be run by workers' councils, using this very term. It is, therefore, well established that the Marxist classics were not silent on the idea. However, in 1919 Lenin began to veer away from the councils. He said: 'We recognize neither freedom, nor equality, nor labour democracy if they are opposed to the interests of the emancipation of labour from the oppression of capital', and after the Kronstadt uprising Lenin changed his attitude very drastically; he began to feel that workers' self-management was a danger to the supremacy of the Party. At the 10th Congress there was the memorable discussion on the role of the trade unions, and Lenin coined the phrase 'anarchosyndicalism' to brand the Workers' Opposition (led by the former Commissar of Labour, Shlyapnikov and by Alexandra Kollontai) and with it any independent trade union activity. All of a sudden Lenin seems to have forgotten that he had himself been the proponent of the workers' councils. All of a sudden he emphasizes

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the leading role and personal responsibility of the enterprise director, throwing, in fact, the baby out with the bathwater. Instead of saying that while the workers' councils could not *replace* management, but should nevertheless complement the work of management in a supervisory capacity, Lenin simply rejected the whole idea, and from this rejection it was only one step to installing an almighty Party bureaucracy which made the enterprise director a beneficiary of the favours of the Party *apparat*. There was no question of the director being elected by the workers. There was no question of his independence.

Now in Czechoslovakia we were hoping to do exactly what Lenin decided he would not do—install a system of self-management.

Urban: But is it, do you think, possible to have democracy at the grass roots without having it in the whole polity? In Yugoslavia self-management is a safety valve: the polity is not democratic, there are no political parties and there are no free elections. Nevertheless the workers enjoy a certain autonomy. Can such a system last? Can democracy be part-time any more than marriage? Can one restrict freedom of choice to the shop floor?

Sik: Our plans were rather different from the Yugoslav model precisely because we would have followed through from self-management in the economy to pluralism in the political sphere. A single-party state makes it impossible for conflicting interests and ideas to be adequately represented. In the Western countries the power of bureaucrats is restrained by the play of market forces and by the checks of political democracy. These checks may be imperfect, but they are there.

In Eastern Europe the communists took a very critical and high-minded view of what they thought was a mere *show* of democracy in the West, and they decided to pour new wine into this old bottle; but instead of doing just that they broke the bottle in the process. So now we have no open conflict of interests, opinions or pressure groups. The only interest that can and does assert itself is that of the bureaucrats both in the State and in the Party. These men make all the decisions, wield all the influence and rule the masses without the masses' consent.

Urban: Trotsky's attack on Stalin centred precisely on the charge you make against Stalinism, namely, that Stalin's rule was the rule of bureaucracy, and we know how this rule emerged gradually from the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate of which Stalin was the Commissar before he became Secretary-General of the Party itself. Lenin saw the dangers of the very great power which Stalin wielded through his functions as Commissar of the Inspectorate, and one important reason for his break with Stalin was Stalin's inability—or unwillingness—to check the bureaucracy. So in this sense your critique is entirely in line with Trotsky's accusations and Lenin's fears.

In another sense, however, I think the Party programme which you worked out in Czechoslovakia ran counter to a good deal of sound Marxism and Leninism. What do I mean by that? The Czech Party's

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discussion of its future, at the Vysocany Congress, and especially of the new Party statutes, came back time and again to the problem of egalitarianism in socialist society, and rather to my surprise the demands were not for *more* equality, as one would have expected at a socialist meeting, but for less. Some of the comment waxes quite indignant on this point: 'Egalitarianism has little in common with true socialist equality and justice, especially if it amounts—as it did in our country—to egalitarian distribution of inadequate resources.'

This is a curious assertion: I should have thought a shortage of resources was the best possible argument for their even-handed, egalitarian distribution, especially in a socialist polity. Now all this strikes me as not being entirely in line with Marx's or Lenin's thinking. I would not care to defend your proposition in a debate with Vladimir Ilich, for of Lenin's three fundamental points about socialism the most important was precisely the principle of equality which you decry in your statutes. Lenin insisted on the election of officials and, most importantly, on the principle that the salaries of officials should be 'reduced to the level of the wages of the average worker'. He was, in all this, echoing the lessons Marx drew from the experiences of the Paris Commune: universal suffrage in the election of municipal councillors, revocability of councillors at any time, and public service at 'workmen's wages'. Now it may well be that the Czechoslovak experience demanded a drastic change in the Marxist and Leninist view of what constitutes socialism, but if so, perhaps the Vysočany Congress ought to have said so, and given us a fuller exposition of where Marx and Lenin had gone wrong.

Sik: Again, I can't agree that the discussion at the Vysocany Congress, or our new statutes, were rejecting Marx or Lenin, but we did refuse to look upon their ideas as dogma. Both Marx and Lenin suffered from a certain fixation when it came to discussing the material rewards of labour. Marx makes the point repeatedly that officials should be paid no more than workers, and I believe he arrived at this conclusion after insufficient reflection. In practice, an egalitarian wages policy is entirely untenable. Lenin abandoned the principle of egalitarian rewards fairly early in the game because he discovered that, without due financial incentive, people will either not work at all or they will not give of their best. As I say, Lenin was at fist obstinate on this point but he soon learnt from reality. Today in the Soviet Union the need for material incentives is fully realized, and the pay differentials between for instance a workman and a senior civil servant are very large—much larger than in most capitalist countries.

Our rejection of egalitarianism attempted to answer a specific problem. Egalitarianism in Czechoslovakia was a very thorough-going affair; it carried the equality of men—appropriate perhaps to a primitive workers' democracy—to such extremes that the most highly qualified professional people and the least qualified labourer earned about the same money. We had a situation where no one had any incentive to

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work harder or to improve his qualifications, because neither hard work nor a diploma could help him better his personal condition. It was common for a highly qualified engineer, with many years of hard study behind him, to earn less than a skilled worker: foremen were more poorly rewarded than the men who worked under them, and so forth. This was an invitation to apathy, conformity, mediocrity, idleness and a general reluctance to tackle anything but the easiest and least responsible jobs. People accepted the fact that they earned little and their answer to this poor reward was to give very little, in return. This is why we had to emphasize the dangers of egalitarianism in our discussions; we had to answer a specifically Czechoslovak problem—a hangover, perhaps, from the egalitarianism of the Bohemian Taborites and other millennial sects in our history. (In the other socialist countries this problem did not arise in such acute form.) We realized that if we wanted to provide the economy with qualified engineers, competent managers and administrators, we would have to pay them accordingly. We discovered after two decades of bitter experience that at this particular phase of the development of society the majority of people will not work harder or better unless they can get more money for their work, and unless the goods they want to buy with their money are available. Ignore this rule and you can be sure that your economy will be heading for ruin.

But we also drew another conclusion. We could see that it was not enough to pay people according to their work, but that it was also important to reward them according to the social usefulness of what they were doing. One of our big headaches under the Stalinist system was lack of control over the actual fulfilment of the Plan. Once a Plan was *officially* fulfilled, no-one was in a position to say whether the items foreseen in the Plan had been really produced, and no-one cared very much whether the articles produced were geared to consumer demand. The Plan was calculated on the basis of very primitive indicators, wage scales were predetermined, hence the social economies and diseconomies of production could not be measured. Now in our reforms we were saying that a real market provides the only practical indicators of the social profitability of work, i.e. whether a shoe or a pan is of the size and quality that the consumer really needs. Therefore we demanded material incentives, and we suggested that the economy should be forced, through the free play of market forces, to serve the real interests of society. All this sounds plain common sense, but in the Stalinist system common sense too was in short supply.

Urban: I am struck by a word which you used at the Vysocany Congress —the word, ' self-fulfilment ', or ' self-realization '. Talking of the future structure of Czechoslovak society the new Party programme says ' A socialist society must reckon with the factual inequality between those on the one hand whose jobs give them only a very limited opportunity for free self-fulfilment as human beings, whose working hours and wages make it almost impossible for them to achieve this outside their work,

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and who therefore depend on the mass-consumption system, and those on the other hand who do work that possesses, in however limited a fashion, features of genuine human self-fulfilment. . . .'

Now, let me reflect on this for a moment: the people whose jobs give them 'only a very limited opportunity for free self-fulfilment as human beings' are the vast majority of the population both in the East and in the West. They may no longer be the hewers of wood and drawers of water, but they still have the moronic, the soulless, the repetitive fatigues to perform. Psychologists tell us—and I am sure common sense tells us as much—that creative leisure as a compensation for soul-killing work is a figment of the social reformer's imagination. I am myself sceptical whether one can be free and a slave, ill and well, passive and creative in the same person; for work is not part of life—it tends to be life itself. Marx's idea of the rounded man (one who would 'hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, raise cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner . . . without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic') is a captivating vision, but it is utopian. The division of labour is a function of modern society and not, as Marx imagined, of the ownership of the means of production. Specialization since Marx's day has developed beyond what the most prophetic minds could foresee even 50 or 30 years ago.

Nor is it proven that the automation of the more tedious tasks in modern industry is an answer to work alienation. We know perfectly well that even if automation were applied continuously from craft to machine-tending and to conveyor belt technology, it would not answer the problem of alienation. It has been estimated that in the optimal American case automation would not affect more than 8 per cent of the labour force, that the cost would be astronomical, and the effects would be felt only after several decades, because only 8 per cent of American jobs are conceivably ripe for automation. James Bright's study of American automated plants shows that automated machinery requires not more but less skill, thought and initiative, in the same way as an automatic car takes less skill to drive than a manually operated one. I would therefore say that there is nothing we know about capitalist or socialist industrial society as it really is that would support the Vysocany Congress's claim that our alienation will decrease and our chances of self-fulfilment increase. If in your economic planning you decided to recognize the weaknesses of man, offering him material incentives to make him work harder, why not recognize his ordinariness and fallibility throughout? I find it interesting that a congress which blazes a trail, in some respects, towards a hard-headed, realistic conception of socialism, should still feel the need to pay homage to some very old-fashioned—and untenable—assumptions about the goodness, selflessness and creativity of man.

Sik: You were reproaching us a minute ago for not having adhered closely enough to the socialist classics—now you are saying that we have

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adhered to them too closely! You are endorsing my conviction that we must have struck the right balance.

Well, you must distinguish between short-term and long-term objectives, the short-term plans being much more realistic and the long-term ones much more theoretical. No-one said in our discussions that alienation would end tomorrow or the day after. The long-range plans set us tasks for the future, and they tried to contribute to a better understanding of certain problems which have been on the agenda of the socialist movement ever since socialism was first thought of. Yet I would not say that our long-range goals are unattainable simply because we have not been able to attain them so far. All of us need creative outlets of one kind or another. This is a psychological fact about man, and the hobbies we pursue in our leisure time are just one expression of this creativity—

Urban: —some of it very destructive creativity—

Sik: —that comes into it also. All we wanted to say was that man is an active rather than a purely passive animal, and self-fulfilment requires creative activities on a great many levels. I can well imagine that in the somewhat more distant future—which will certainly be a very complex future—the working week will be reduced to four days and later perhaps to three days, and the working day will be shorter than it is today. This will bring with it an enormously increased amount of time for creative leisure, and I think this time will be used for our education. People will demand to know much more, and on the basis of their new knowledge their interests will branch out in many new directions. There is a sense in which all this is already beginning to happen.

Urban: You will remember that one authentic eye-witness of our time, John Maynard Keynes, was very sceptical whether this newly won free time would be creatively used. Writing in 1930 Keynes asked: 'When poverty and insecurity have been eliminated from our lives, will we not get up to worse forms of mischief, because we have too much time on our hands, than we did when the daily grind consumed most of our energies? . . . . for the first time since his creation', Keynes said, 'man will be faced with his real, his permanent problem—how to use his freedom from pressing economic cares, how to occupy his leisure. . .'.

Sik: I cannot recognize this as a legitimate point in our discussion—for or against. Keynes makes an assertion based on the facts of the situation of his day. Assertions are not arguments. Keynes could not think away from a market economy in which an open-ended spiral of consumption has to keep up with an open-ended spiral of production. He was filled with foreboding at the thought of falling consumption and a rise in savings, because he could not imagine an inverse correlation between human happiness and the health of the market economy.

Urban: I should have thought Keynes was referring to something more general—to our helplessness, and perhaps unwillingness, to amuse ourselves usefully and creatively. He does not seem to exclude the possibility, but he does say that, given the nature of human history, it would

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be unreasonable to expect that we will make reasonable use of our vastly increased leisure.

Sik: These are matters which do not admit of precise argument. We are now touching on questions of faith, on basic human attitudes, on estimates of the real nature of man. I must put my cards on the table: I am an optimist and a humanist. I am convinced that our destructiveness, that our periodic insanities as individuals and societies are ultimately anchored in social frustrations.

How do I put a large topic in a very small nutshell? I believe man has in him the capacity for good as well as for evil—but this is stating the obvious. I also believe that it is in the power of society to encourage our positive and to discourage our negative proclivities. A society in which the outlets of human ambition are blocked, in which we are estranged from ourselves and our surroundings, in which we feel materially and culturally deprived, in which bureaucracy and fragmentation press upon us from all sides—such a society is the breeding ground of enormous frustrations and these, in turn, beget human beastliness in all its forms: hatred, envy, jealousy, *Schadenfreude,* destructiveness, what you will. If, however, the organization of society prevents such frustrations from arising, or tempers them when they do arise, then our negative characteristics too will find it more difficult to get the better of the positive ones. This is a perennial problem and we can't begin to do justice to it in a few sentences.

But coming back to our long-range objectives in Czechoslovakia, I must stress again that these were very long-range and somewhat idealistic targets. What we were trying to say by setting our sights so high was that production and consumption are not goods in themselves, and that they must not be allowed to become the ends of human endeavour. Our purpose was to show that work must prove its social usefulness, and as part of that general proposition we were adding that modern technology has given us the means to serve socially desirable ends with less pain, less work, less 'dirigisme' and fewer broken heads than we could have done 20 or even 10 years ago.

Urban: I am still not certain that I understand what you mean by man's 'self-realization' in your programme. What sort of a man is the 'man' whose self-realization you advocate? This is an important point for I can think of types of human being whose self-realization I would consider highly undesirable. The phrase returns with great frequency in the Statutes and the Vysočany discussion. There must have been some ideal type in the minds of the delegates.

Sik: We have never imagined that technical progress could eliminate the need to produce and the chores connected with production. But we did think that with the rapid advance of science and technology, and especially with automation, man's productive work would become less taxing and much more creative than it has been hitherto.

Urban: You don't think that the views I quoted a minute ago are per-

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suasive on this point, viz. that automation does not equal more intelligent work?

Sik: No, there are studies that show the opposite of the opinion you cited. They show that the machine-tending activity of automated equipment is almost as demanding as the designing and manufacture of the equipment itself. The maintenance and repair of such machinery requires sophistication and high intellectual ability. Work of this kind is not only conducive to the development of man's creative faculties but it can almost force such creative activity to emerge.

Urban: You are, then, in some respects not so far from agreeing with Galbraith that technological work, and the habit of rational enquiry that goes with it, are agents of intellectual and spiritual liberalization?

Sik: When I say that I don't agree with Galbraith's version of the theory of convergence, I do not, of course, mean to say that I disagree with him on all points. Where I would fault Galbraith in the context of the point you have made is that he does not distinguish precisely between different types of technical or para-technical work. There is a world of difference between the creativeness of the work of a project-engineer, or a cybernetics technician on the one hand, and the non-creativeness of an accountant in the tax collector's office, on the other. I can hardly think of a more moronic and soul-destroying activity than the sort of work our own Czechoslovak economists had to put up with in our Planning Bureau.

There is no easy answer to the problems of monotonous and demeaning work. Nevertheless we have made a great step forward from the hard physical fatigues of earlier generations, and I believe we are about to make another great step forward by reducing the need for fragmented and alienating labour. It is quite possible to imagine that the more unpleasant kinds of work will eventually be assigned to robots. Another aspect of the same problem is that we can, as I've said, expect the working day and the working week to become very much shorter and our leisure time much longer. When that happens, one of Engels' forecasts may well become reality, viz. that people will voluntarily take turns at doing the remaining monotonous chores of society, exchanging a small part of the working week unpleasantly spent for much more time to satisfy their interests and fulfil themselves as human beings.

Urban: One has to be an optimist to be a socialist but does one have to be bemused? I was reading the other day that by the time the average American reaches the age of 50 he will have spent 15,000 hours in front of his television set and seen 70,000 acts of gross violence ranging from rape to genocide. Now television watching is the most popular leisure-time activity of our age: our desire to reach a more elevated level of human consciousness and dignity is not convincingly established by it. Then, I am also less optimistic than you are that men who spend the money-earning part of their lives in moronic jobs will, when their time for leisure comes, suddenly engage in feats of responsible and creative activity. For a crude example, one knows from army life that the great

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majority of private soldiers have absolutely no desire to rise even to the rank of sergeant, for they hate having to shoulder responsibility—they find it easier to be told what to do. Now I am not saying that these are necessary reactions, but if we want to be practical and go by the only tested evidence we have—the evidence of history—man's proclivity for irresponsibility and idleness is the one thing we can be sure about. Creativity is a bonus.

Sik: I think you are a prisoner of our image of ourselves as we are today. But why should we not be able to detach our vision of the future from this image? I hold no brief for the lunatic fringe of the student rebellion, but one good thing the students have helped us to understand is that the army regular's willing subordination to authority and his fear of responsibility are becoming highly untypical of our society. We have to learn to think away from current stereotypes; why should it not be possible to imagine that two hours' work a day will be enough to satisfy our material needs, and that the rest of our time will be harnessed to some worthier purpose?

I don't want to treat you to homilies but it is true that so long as people haven't got enough to eat, the satisfaction of hunger will be their one real interest. When that condition is overcome and the other needs and creature comforts have also been tolerably satisfied, people begin to need music, they demand more education, books, theatre. I am not saying for a moment that an increase in leisure will automatically hoist us onto a higher level of consciousness. This can only happen if the whole ambiance of our society—our education, the style and quality of our living—challenges us to set ourselves objectives that are different from—and one hopes higher than—the ones we have set ourselves so far.

It is, of course, perfectly true that if you take man as he is today, and if you tell him that his eight-hour day will be reduced to two, but that he will enjoy the same wages he has been earning for a full day's work, he will be at a loss what to do with his leisure time because he has not been brought up to do anything sensible with it. That is where the inanities of television watching come in. Television has become a surrogate for the lives people have ceased to live. But this can, and will, change. Now, back to your question: what does the self-realization of man mean in the Czechoslovak programme?

The self-realization of man means that man can do justice to the species Man—that is to say, that we should be able to feel ourselves to be, and expect others to look upon us as being, human beings. What makes us different from non-human nature is our ability both to adapt to our surroundings and to change our surroundings through the conscious exertion of our intellect, and to find pleasure and satisfaction in so doing. Of course, one can put a mechanistic interpretation on this definition, in which case my conception of man acquires a quality of facile idealism. But if you think of self-realization not merely as a matter of personal satisfaction, but as something that is socially conditioned and feeds back into the quality of society, then the self-realization of man

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is invested with a fresh meaning. When we can do the kind of thing that fills us with joy, when we feel that our faculties are well stretched and our creative energies usefully employed, then, I would say, man has attained a measure of self-fulfilment.

Urban: Ignazio Silone once remarked to me that communism fails to convince as a life-philosophy because it has nothing to say to us on the question of death. I brought up this remark of Silone's in a conversation with Gyorgy Lukacs in 1968. His answer was that Communism seeks to give no explanation to Silone's problem as it regards it as a non-problem. Religion, he said, was a substitute for a poorly lived life, and he quoted Tolstoy's short story 'The Death of Ivan Ilych' as an illustration of his thesis that the secret of the good life is a sensible, goal-oriented and rational existence. This, I should have thought, was *his* definition of 'self-fulfilment'. How would you, as a principal architect of the Czechoslovak reform movement and as a former Deputy Prime Minister, react to Silone's question? It is, after all, a question which Bernstein had the foresight to raise.

Sik: We are now touching upon ultimate issues and I believe there are no answers to these questions, certainly not in our present state of consciousness. Is there absolute cognition? There isn't, but we can safely say that our knowledge of the world is steadily growing, though it is probably equally true that we shall never be able to exhaust it with finality. Every time we reach the frontiers of knowledge and can probe no further, explanations are sought in the irrational, and religion asserts itself. But as more and more of reality is opened up to scientific understanding, the field for religious types of belief narrows. Also it is clear that people who have acquired the habit of scientific thinking simply need no religion. Now this, in my view, is the long-term trend—the unanswerable questions will still be there but the demand that the answers should be couched in numinous language will shrink and perhaps cease to exist.

Having said this I recognize that, at the present stage of our social development, society still needs spiritual tranquillizers—it simply cannot do without the comfort of the numinous. But, as I say, the demand for these tranquillizing agents is falling off.

However, this still leaves us with the problem of morality. Religion and ethics are usually considered to be two sides of the same coin. Whether this is true or not, we must concede that the retreat of religion has been accompanied by a moral vacuum which we have, so far at least, not been able to fill. Society does need an ethic, but morality in my view should not be identified with any particular religion or any particular ideology. Morality has arisen as the conjoint realization of certain habits and rules of social coexistence, and at a certain stage of social development it came to be identified with religion. That is all.

In other words, the survival of society depends on the assertion of social interests through a social ethic, and it is this unwritten social ethic that is later translated into written rules and regulations. But as society

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changes, morality, too—precisely because it is a sophisticated expression of the collective interests of society—changes with it. Now in our situation today Christian morality has ceased to be effective; the rules of the game of yesterday have no attraction for the young. Their values are in conflict with their fathers' values. Yet a new ethic is very slow in emerging. The old code has lost its charisma but there isn't a new one we could trust—so we aren't in a position to answer certain questions which we will, I am entirely confident, be able to answer in a few generations.

Urban: The assertion is frequently made in Eastern Europe that the fundamental questions of society can only be answered by socialist society, and that these questions are in fact in the process of being answered in the socialist societies of Eastern Europe.

Sik: This is absolutely untrue—there is no socialist society that I can see in any of the 'socialist' countries. What we have in those countries is a state-monopolistic system in which man's estrangement is more profound than under traditional capitalism. The so-called 'socialist' morality handed down from on high as a substitute for the Christian ethic is not a morality born in the womb of society, not an ethic of the majority, but one which is entirely fashioned by and imposed upon the people by the holders of power. Clearly this ethic evokes no response and has no followers. It will not survive the present form of 'socialism' which is itself unlikely to die of old age.

Urban: The reforms contained in the Vysocany programme adjudicate on the large questions we have been discussing in almost the same spirit of socialist idealism in which a Kropotkin, or Bukharin and Preobrazhensky used to preach at us in 'The ABC of Communism', and you seem to share a good deal of that idealism.

Sik: This is not the first time that I have been accused of unwarranted idealism. Let me get this straight: I hold no brief for an ideal society, and I do not imagine that there could be a society from which all contradictions and conflicts have been eliminated. Anyone who assumes that such a society could exist has learned nothing from Marx's dialectic. My own interests are confined to solving certain practical contradictions in society, notably those which put brakes on its progress. We are, in the social sciences, trying to lay bare the nature of these contradictions and to offer solutions without, however, suggesting that once these particular problems have been solved, society would be free from conflicts. My own analysis starts from looking at the contradictions which exist in the so-called Western capitalist countries, and then looking at those which slow down the development of 'socialist' society, that is to say a society ruled by state monopolies. Having looked at these, I then ask myself how these contradictions may be removed—whether they can be removed by piecemeal social engineering or whether they require a change of system. But whatever solution I may have in mind, and whatever the outcome of any remedies I may offer, I would never be so

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unreasonable as to imagine that the society thus created would be without its own contradictions and that these wouldn't, at a later stage, require their own solutions. I am, therefore, no believer in any ideal society. There is no such thing.

Urban: If the Czechoslovak reform movement had been allowed to run its course, would it have found answers to the ills of mass industrial society as well as to the particular problems which Stalinism and a command economy had left in their wake? One impression one had of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was that the Czech social scientists were so busy trying to make the economy work and trying to make it competitive with the West that they had no time left to think of fundamentals. Western socialists, on the other hand, believe that that is precisely what the reform movement was about—to give us a model of how Marxism works —not in a backward country such as Russia where it doesn't work—but in the sort of industrialized country Marx wrote about.

Sik: In Czechoslovakia we tried to set side by side with each other problems which have arisen in a state-monopolistic, command economy, and those which have arisen in Western capitalism, and we came to the conclusion that, although here and there the problems arise in different form and assume different magnitudes, they are variables within the same equation and can be dealt with by the same methods. This analysis then led us to believe that it would make perfectly good sense to think of the two systems in terms of a common model, a model which would help us to overcome the contradictions both in the capitalistic and state-monopolistic types of society. I cannot now go into the details of our work, but we did try to raise all the big questions of modern industrial society, and we did come up with tentative conclusions which the Soviet occupation of our country did not allow us to put into practice. But—and this must be emphasized—we never imagine that our model was a cure-all, or that it was possible to hit upon an ideal formula.

Urban: Students of contemporary history and Sovietologists of all descriptions have already spilt a great deal of ink trying to persuade us that the Czechoslovak reform movement was—or was not, as the case may be—a matter of economic reforms first and political reforms only as a byproduct of the need to reform the country's badly lagging economy. Highly respectable Czech sources could be quoted to support either view. Some believe that economic renewal and politico-cultural liberalization played comparable parts in the Prague Spring: others support the idea that political reform was the prime mover, but that it had to masquerade under the guise of economic reform which was less likely to offend the sensibilities of reform-shy Stalinists. Do you as a crown witness of the economic reform programme come down in favour of one side or the other in this debate? If the 1956 Hungarian experience is anything to go by I should have thought that economic issues were the fuse, but the dynamite had been accumulating

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over the years in the whole body of Czechoslovak society, and had only been waiting for an appropriate issue to light the fuse.

Sik: I was there at the birth of this movement in 1957; I may perhaps even claim that I was one of its initiators. It all started around a small group of social theorists, but the actual problem we had to tackle as our first priority was that of the national economy. However, it was clear from the beginning that the economic problem itself had a strong national colouring, for we realized that Czechoslovakia could have been much further advanced in her social and cultural life if her economy—a basically advanced economy—had not been so disastrously mismanaged, that is to say, if the system as a whole had not driven that economy into absurd self-contradictions. In other words, it was Czechoslovakia's unsatisfactory cultural and economic performance that set us off on our investigations, and our first practical task was to see what could be done to drag the economy out of its trough. But no sooner did we start on that than we found ourselves surrounded by political scientists, sociologists and writers, all anxious to put their bit of reform in motion parallel with ours or, to be more precise, all anxious to show that it was impossible to make changes in one part of the polity without making changes in the others too. And, of course, it *was* impossible. And once it was realized that reform would have to affect the whole structure of society, questions began to be asked about the good life, the ultimate aims of socialism and indeed of human society.

Let me emphasize at this point that when I say that economic reform was perhaps the formative influence in the Prague Spring, I do not mean to say that there was any direct economic pressure on the government of the kind we saw on the Baltic coast of Poland in 1970 when poor wages, high prices and other consumer grievances led to direct action of a very bloody kind. No, in our case the reforms were the work of intellectuals. Our ideas had been patiently prepared over a long period of time at a fairly high level of abstraction. There was nothing spontaneous about them. Nor was it an accident that many of the intellectual reformers hailed from the Party Academy. These men were sincere socialists, they had no vested interests to defend, and they were not after power. They were persuaded that the system had to be changed, for they could see that what had been foisted on Czechoslovakia in the name of socialism was not only not offering answers to capitalism, but was itself a form of capitalism driven to absurd extremes in all but name. That is how things got started.

Urban: In what way did the 1956 Hungarian uprising affect your movement? I remember an article, by O. Machatka, in '*Literarny Listy*', written in June 1968, which surprised me at the time because it commemorated the tenth anniversary of the announcement that Imre Nagy and his associates had been sentenced to death and executed.

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The fact that such an article could be written was significant enough, for it amounted to the rehabilitation of Nagy and the 1956 uprising; but it was even more significant because it ended in the words: 'Even in our country his [Nagy's] ideas, which *anticipated so many future events and which probably sound much less far-fetched today*, should not remain unknown' [speaker's italics].

Sik: The writing was on the wall. We could see that a spontaneous assertion of the popular will could only end in suppression by the Soviet Union. We could see that, to avoid provoking Moscow, we had to proceed with great caution, great patience, and with great tactical finesse. Looking back on these patient preparations with the wisdom of hindsight, I would still say that we had done our best, and I would add that in the circumstances we hadn't done too badly. Alas, in the last phase of the reform movement things got out of hand. To the movement we had patiently prepared and controlled a new element was now added: a kind of self-combustion which escaped our control. Military occupation followed.

Today the great debate among the former leaders of the reform movement is whether occupation by the Warsaw Pact countries could have been forestalled if we had managed to keep our reforms more under control. My own opinion is that it would not have helped us, for the real source of our trouble was not so much the spontaneous spread of liberalization, as the composition of the leadership that came to power after Novotny's fall. For—contrary to popular opinion—this leadership was not a reform leadership but a leadership of compromise and dithering. There were both outright Stalinists in it and convinced reformers, and the occupation of Czechoslovakia was directly due to the fact that some of the Stalinist members of the leadership did not want the reforms to succeed in the first place: they *wanted* Soviet intervention.

When people talk of the 1968 Czechoslovak leadership the names of Dubcek and Smrkovsky are the ones usually mentioned. Yet in the same leadership you had men like Kolder, Indra, Svestka, Bilak and others whose goals were diametrically opposed to those of Dubcek and Smrkovsky. Well, this ghastly split in the leadership made life extremely difficult for the reformers and for the people, for under Novotny everyone could see that the enemy was the Novotny regime, but with this new leadership at the head of the country in the spring of 1968, it became very difficult to know whom to fight and whom to support. It was impossible to go against the new team, but it was equally impossible to go along with it. Some of the new leaders were sincerely for reform but others simply sabotaged the reform movement. For instance, one day Pavel was appointed as Minister of the Interior to clear out the Russians, but a month later Salgovic, an old NKVD agent, was made Secretary of State to keep the Russians in and sabotage Pavel's work. Then, the Politburo too was split down the middle, with about half its members dead set against the reforms. When you have

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half of the membership against you, your chances of success are none too good.

In any case, various provocations by the Stalinist old guard further exacerbated the mood of the people. Pressure groups were building up on all sides to keep the reform movement going and, as I have just said, these then began to have a momentum of their own which no-one could control. From then on it was only a question of time—of how soon, but not whether, troops would move in.

Urban: Some of us in the West have never been able to understand how old communists, many of them with years of prison experience under Stalin behind them, could expect to get away with a free Czechoslovak press, free television, freedom of speech at a time when Moscow regarded such experiments as internal *Soviet* developments, which were thought to constitute a mortal threat to Russia's internal orthodoxy, and therefore also to its power position. I had occasion to talk to one of the leaders of the Czechoslovak reform movement some 18 months before the Soviet occupation, and I ventured to express my doubt whether Moscow would tolerate the Czech variety of socialism. My interlocutor, who had himself suffered many years in prison in the 1950s and was a staunch communist, did not share my apprehension. He argued that the Soviet comrades would not want to prevent an entirely reliable and proven ally from following its road to socialism, especially if that road promised to lead to a model of a credible variety of Western socialism which might prove attractive to other Western nations. I find such idealism appealing, but I doubt if it has any place in the serious and ugly business of politics.

Sik: This is another Western over-simplification. It is so easy to be wise after the event. We were not so naïve as not to realize that Soviet intervention was a possibility. But possibility is one thing, necessity another. I do not agree with you that the probability of Soviet intervention was a foregone conclusion; there was an either/or possibility which, of course, we have never calculated in percentages. But supposing there was a 50:50 chance—I still believe that we should not have abdicated our responsibility but carried on with our plans in the same way as in fact we did.

In any case, I believe we did have a very real chance of forestalling Soviet intervention but this chance was thrown away; and *because* it was thrown away the direction of developments slipped out of our hands. The chance I am referring to was a speedy convocation of the 14th Party Congress. Up to April 1968 this was a realistic possibility. The delegates who had been elected were good and experienced people, and their hearts were in the reform movement. I am mentioning April because in April the Russians were, by all accounts, still undecided whether or not they should march on us. They had made their military preparations, but they were sitting on the fence. If we had managed to have our Party Congress, say, in April, I'm personally convinced

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that we would have elected a new leadership, consolidated our policies, and regained control of the reform movement in a way that would have given our Soviet critics every incentive to hold their horses. We could have seen to it that the press, radio, and television did not provoke the Soviet leaders unnecessarily. Of course, I cannot say with certainty whether—if all this had been done—we would in fact have avoided occupation. But there might have been a fair chance. We could have offered the Russians precise guarantees about our reliability as allies, as Western outposts of the socialist camp, etc., while telling them quite candidly at the same time what our internal reforms were trying to achieve. Unfortunately we never reached that point. We could not persuade Dubcek to bring the Party Congress forward to April. The conflicts between the Stalinist and reformist wings in the Party leadership made Dubcek hesitate, and the Congress was repeatedly postponed. By the time Dubcek had realized that we could not carry on without a new leadership and decided to convene the Congress for September, it was too late: the Soviet leaders had made up their minds to occupy us before the Congress. It is therefore not true to say that we were not aware of the dangers. We were, and that is why we were pushing for an early Congress. Our fight for an early Congress had in fact become our battle for saving the reform movement itself.

Urban: You were saying that the Russians might have been appeased by certain guarantees. Would the Russians have been amenable to the kind of argument I quoted a minute ago—an appeal to the long-range interests of the world communist movement, best served by a model socialist state in Czechoslovakia of the kind Marx imagined but the Soviet Union failed to realize?

Sik: You cannot operate with ideological arguments when you argue with the Russians. Dubcek believed one could, and he had to learn the hard way. Stalin's quip about the Pope's divisions is still typical of the mentality of the Soviet leaders. No, we ought to have given them reliable guarantees. Of course it is an open question how far we could have gone in giving such guarantees without jeopardizing the reform movement. Nevertheless, I am sure suitable guarantees could have been devised. I don't want to put all the blame on Dubcek, for he was himself a victim of the schism in the leadership; but it is a fact that the Russians had no practical guarantees from us that the movement would be held within certain limits; all they could see was that the press and television were bringing to light things that seemed insulting to them and hurtful to their interests and that we were not in a position to stop it. This, in their eyes, was direct provocation and they acted accordingly. We could see perfectly well that the Russians themselves could do with a new model of socialism, but it was impossible to convince them by ideological means. That is why I attach such great importance to the issue of the Party Congress. For ten years we had inched our way forward step by step without

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significant reverses. We were patient and cautious because we had learned from Hungary. But when it came to convincing the leadership that the Congress ought to be called in April, we were—for the first time in ten years—defeated, and this proved a fatal reverse. The moment we realized that the Congress would not be called before September, we knew that we had lost. But what was there for us to do? Incite the nation to withdraw its confidence from Dubcek? That would have been an act of desperation and gross irresponsibility.

Urban: Would it have been right and realistic to ask the people to fight when the Russian troops arrived in Czechoslovakia?

Sik: No, fighting a war is something we can no longer afford. The Soviet tanks got us between two pincers from which there was no escape. Our military predicament was worse than it was when Hitler occupied our country in 1938. Nor was there the slightest hope that anyone would help us. Armed resistance to the Soviet invasion would have spelt the suicide of our nation.

There are Czechoslovak emigrants who now tell us that we ought to have fought. Well, I would not have liked to take responsibility for such a decision. Our geographic and military situation was entirely unlike that of Yugoslavia. We were not prepared for military resistance and we would not have stood the slightest chance of making a success of it. And I do not believe that we had the right to ask thousands of our young men to lay down their lives in a token demonstration of our national mettle.

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Statement of the Human Rights Committee

Question: Last year you, together with other people, signed an 'Appeal for Amnesty'. Does the Decree of Amnesty issued by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 28 December 1972 accord with the wishes expressed in the 'Appeal'?

Shafarevich: Unfortunately, no. The 'Appeal' called for an amnesty of persons convicted 'for reasons directly or indirectly connected with their opinions'. All the articles [of the Penal Code] invoked in such instances are excluded from the Decree. In particular the amnesty does not apply to:

Persons convicted of 'especially dangerous state crimes', particularly those falling under articles 70–72 of the RSFSR Penal Code—anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, and the organization of groups for this purpose (articles used in the struggle against *samizdat* and other manifestations of dissidence); article 64—betrayal of the fatherland (invoked in the cases of persons attempting to leave the country).

Persons convicted under article 190–1 (applied in the same instances as article 70) and article 190–3 (applied to persons who participate in demonstrations to which the authorities take objection).

Persons convicted under articles 142 and 227—violation of the laws concerning the separation of Church and State, infringement of the person and the rights of citizens under the appearance of performing religious ceremonies (invoked against believers).

Persons sentenced under the above-mentioned articles fall outside the terms of the Decree even if they satisfy the other, very narrow conditions in which the Decree as a whole is applicable.

The 'Appeal' also called for the release of persons who have served a term of imprisonment over and above what is now the maximum term of 15 years by reason of having been sentenced before the adoption of the present Fundamentals of Legislation. The Decree of Amnesty does not alter the position of prisoners in this category.

Sakharov: The Decree is a disappointment in a number of other respects also. The 'Appeal' contained a call for the abolition, as part of the amnesty, of [the practice of] compulsory psychiatric treatment in ordinary and special-type hospitals on the basis of a court ruling for reasons directly or indirectly connected with [the defendant's] opinions or with an attempt to leave the country. But the Decree makes no mention at all of the abolition of compulsory treatment.

The category of persons to whom the amnesty applies is very restricted. In the case of those sentenced to a term of more than five

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years it applies only to persons of pensionable age who have never previously served a sentence, and to first and second category invalids. In the case of persons sentenced to a term of less than five years it applies also to war veterans, recipients of decorations and medals, pregnant women, women with children under 17 years of age, and persons who committed crimes before the age of 17.

Another disappointment is the exclusion of article 209–1 (the so-called 'Parasite' law) from the amnesty.

Persons who 'persistently violate the regime while serving their sentence' fall outside the amnesty. Thus the application of the amnesty as a whole depends entirely upon the administration in the place of confinement.

Question: What do you think of Valery Chalidze's loss of Soviet citizenship?

Sakharov: I do not know all the circumstances relating to the granting of permission to Chalidze to leave the country. But it was obvious right from the start that the granting of permission to a private person to deliver [a series of] unofficial lectures—and to his wife too—was totally unprecedented. Even for quite loyal and high-ranking Soviet citizens a private family trip abroad is exceptional.

My own and Shafarevich's attempts to discuss the possible consequences of his trip with Chalidze, the most likely one of which seemed to be his loss of citizenship, met with strong resistance. It would appear that Chalidze's loss of citizenship was in a sense as much his own doing as the authorities'. That is why I am surprised at the way the event has been treated in the West. A number of commentaries have regarded it as one of the most glaring violations of [human] rights in our country. This view is a distorted one and distracts attention from the more serious problems. But all I have said (and it is my own personal opinion and not a statement on the part of the Committee) does not mean that I consider the authorities acted lawfully in depriving Chalidze of his citizenship. Their action stands in conflict with generally accepted legal principles as reflected in, for instance, the Declaration of Human Rights.

Question: What can you say about the activities of the Human Rights Committee?

Shafarevich: Our country is now facing a number of extremely grave and difficult problems—economic, social and spiritual. They can only be solved as a result of effort, self-sacrifice and initiative on the part of every citizen. And this is where the Human Rights Committee can play a role too, because it is the only association of its kind in the country, existing as it does on an entirely legal basis and at the same time in no way controlled by the state. I believe the Committee's chief task is to

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study the most important social and legal questions of principle in our lives. We all of us have only a vague idea of many of them, and we simply cannot afford this.

Sakharov: Of course, we have done far less than we would have liked. The Committee's work has not always managed to steer clear of a pseudo-scientific approach, and this has diverted it from some vital problems. Some documents have been devoted to questions which affect only a very narrow circle of people. But the important thing is, I feel, that the work has begun, and that it is being continued.

Podyapolsky: I visualize the Committee's work as involving the preparation of surveys containing factual material and legal analysis. I think that some of the Committee's papers on the rights of persons declared mentally ill are good examples of its activity.

It was very distressing when Andrei Tverdokhlebov resigned from the Committee a few days ago for personal reasons. Together with Chalidze and Sakharov he had been one of the three founding members of the Committee. But I hope that we will be joined by new and able colleagues who want to participate in work that is both interesting and vital to the country.

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Letter to the Editor

Dear Sir,

Will you allow me, as a member of your International Advisory Board and of the academic staff of LSE to draw your readers' attention to something which should be of interest to all who are concerned with the study of the social sciences. The British Library of Political and Economic Science, of which LSE is now the sole trustee, will in February launch an appeal for £2½ million. This Library, which has trained and helped many thousands of scholars in the field of the social sciences, was founded in 1896 (a year after the School itself). It is now so seriously overcrowded that 90 per cent of the Library's great collection is inaccessible, and the need for a new building is most pressing. LSE has had the enormous good fortune to obtain an option to purchase from W. H. Smith & Sons Ltd. their Portugal Street repository. This building, known as Strand House, is adjacent to the School's site and was constructed to bear the weight of books. It is therefore an ideal building for the British Library of Political and Economic Science from every point of view. It provides a unique opportunity for the School to rehouse the Library in a manner which will at last enable it to function properly as one of the world's most outstanding collections in the whole field of social studies, ranging over many centuries and many languages.

The University of London, the University Grants Committee and the Government have endorsed the School's plans to the extent of providing nearly £2 million towards the total cost of £4½ million, which includes the site, the building and the adaptation of the building. The balance to be raised, £2½ million, is certainly large. The School has set up an Appeal organization to raise this balance. Lord Robbins is its chairman. We at the School believe that reasonably generous contributions from the many thousands in this country and in many other countries who have an interest in maintaining the British Library of Political Science will make it possible for us to raise the balance which is required. All donations should be made payable to The LSE Library Appeal Fund, and sent to Lord Robbins at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, Aldwych, London WC2A 2AE.

Yours very truly,

LEONARD SCHAPIRO

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Our Contributors

VERNON V. ASPATURIAN is Professor at the Slavic and Soviet Language and Area Center, University of Pennsylvania.

PAUL COCKS, formerly an Assistant Professor of Government at Harvard, is now a National Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Stanford, California. He is author of *Controlling Communist Bureaucracy: Ethics, Rationality and Terror*.

ALEXANDER DALLIN is Professor of History and Political Science at Stanford University and Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution.

HERBERT DINERSTEIN is a Professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C.

PIERRE HASSNER is a Senior Research Associate at the Centre d'Etudes des Relations Internationales, Paris and Professor of Politics at the Johns Hopkins University European Center.

ARNOLD HORELICK is a member of the Senior Research Staff of the Rand Corporation's Social Science Department. He is co-author of *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy* (1966).

KARL KAISER is Professor of Political Science at the University of Saarland, Saarbruecken, Federal Republic of Germany. He is author of *EWG and Freihandelszone: England und der Kontinent in der europäischen Integration* (1963), *German Foreign Policy in Transition* (1968), *Friedensforschung in der Bundesrepublik* (1970), co-editor of *Britain and Germany* (1971).

JACK F. MATLOCK is Director of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs at the Department of State, Washington, D.C.

GEORGE MOLDAU is the pen-name of a contributor from Czechoslovakia who wishes to remain anonymous.

WOLFGANG PANOFSKY is Director at the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, Stanford University, California.

RICHARD PIPES is Professor of History and Director of the Russian Research Center, Harvard University. His most recent book is *Struve, Liberal on the Left* 1870–1905.

ROBERT A. SCALAPINO is author of many books on Asian Politics among which the recent are *Asia and the Major Powers* (1972), *American-Japanese Relations in a Changing Era* (1972), *Elites in the People's Republic of China* (Editor and contributor) (1972) and *Communism in Korea*, 2 vol. (co-author) (1972). He is Professor in the Political Science Department, University of California, Berkeley.

MORTON SCHWARTZ is Associate Professor and Acting Chairman in the Department of Political Science, University of California, Riverside.

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PAUL SEABURY, author of *The Rise and Decline of the Cold War*, is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. He is at present a Visiting Scholar at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London.

MARSHALL SHULMAN is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Russian Institute at Columbia University, New York. He is author of *Beyond Cold War* and other books.

OTA SIK was Director of the Economic Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences and a member of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. In 1968 he was a Deputy Prime Minister. He is now Professor of Economics at the University of St. Gallen.

RICHARD F. STAAR is Associate Director of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, California.

JAN F. TRISKA is Professor and Associate Chairman of the Department of Political Science and a member of the Institute of Political Studies at Stanford University. He is co-author of *Soviet Foreign Policy* (1968) and editor of *Communist Party-States: International and Comparative Studies* (1969).

GEORGE R. URBAN is author of *Kinesis and Stasis* and *The Nineteen Days*, and has edited and contributed to *Talking to Eastern Europe*, *The Miracles of Chairman Mao* and *Can We Survive our Future*? He is a former Senior Research Associate of the University of Southern California.

WILLIAM ZIMMERMAN is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. He is author of *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations:* 1956–67.

BENJAMIN ZOOK is Chief of the Soviet Foreign Policy Division of the Office of Research and Analysis, Europe and the Soviet Union, at the Department of State, Washington, D.C.

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